But there is another class of pleasures, secondary and derivative

from these, and belonging to the mind alone without the body. The

expectation of future pleasures is itself pleasurable,[32] the

expectation of future pains is itself painful. In this secondary

class we find pleasure without pain, and pain without pleasure: so

that we shall be better able to study pleasure by itself, and to

decide whether the whole class, in all its varieties, be good,

welcome and desirable,--or whether pleasure and pain be not, like

heat and cold, desirable or undesirable according to

circumstances--_i.e._ not good in their own nature, but sometimes

good and sometimes not.[33]

[Footnote 32: Plato, Philêbus, p. 32 C. [Greek: ê(donê=s kai\

lu/pês e(/teron ei)=dos, to\ chôri\s tou= sô/matos au)tê=s tê=s

psuchê=s dia\ prosdoki/as gigno/menon.]]

[Footnote 33: Plato, Philêbus, p. 32 D.]

[Side-note: A life of Intelligence alone, without pain and without

pleasure, is conceivable. Some may prefer it: at any rate it is

second-best.]

In the definition above given of the conditions of pleasure, as a

re-action from antecedent pain, it is implied that if there be no

pain, there can be no pleasure: and that a state of life is

therefore conceivable which shall be without both--without pain

and without pleasure. The man who embraces wisdom may prefer this

third mode of life. It would be the most divine and the most akin

to the nature of the Gods, who cannot be supposed without

indecency to feel either joy or sorrow.[34] At any rate, if not

the best life of all, it will be the second-best.

[Footnote 34: Plato, Philêbus, p. 33 B. [Greek: Ou)kou=n ei)ko/s

ge ou)/te chai/rein theou\s ou)/te to\ e)nanti/on? Pa/nu me\n

ou)=n ou)k ei)ko/s; a)/schêmon gou=n au)tôn e(ka/teron

gigno/meno/n e)stin.]]

[Side-note: Desire belongs to the mind, presupposes both a bodily

want, and the memory of satisfaction previously had for it. The

mind and body are here opposed. No true or pure pleasure therein.]

Those pleasures, which reside in the mind alone without the body,

arise through memory and by means of reminiscence. When the body

receives a shock which does not go through to the mind, we call

the fact insensibility. In sensation, the body and mind are both

affected:[35] such sensation is treasured up in the memory, and

the mental part of it is recalled (without the bodily part) by

reminiscence.[36] Memory and reminiscence are the foundations of

desire or appetite. When the body suffers the pain of hunger or

thirst, the mind recollects previous moments of satisfaction,

desires a repetition of that satisfaction by means of food or

drink. Here the body and the mind are not moved in the same way,

but in two opposite ways: the desire belongs to the mind alone,

and is turned towards something directly opposed to the affection

of the body. That which the body feels is emptiness: that which

the mind feels is desire of replenishment, or of the condition

opposed to emptiness. But it is only after experience of

replenishment that the mind will feel such desire. On the first

occasion of emptiness, it will not desire replenishment, because

it will have nothing, neither sensation nor memory, through which

to touch replenishment: it can only do so after replenishment has

been previously enjoyed, and through the memory. Desire therefore

is a state of the mind apart from the body, resting upon

memory.[37] Here then the man is in a double state: the pain of

emptiness, which affects the mind through the body, and the memory

of past replenishment, or expectation of future replenishment,

which resides in the mind. Such expectation, if certain and

immediate, will be a state of pleasure: if doubtful and distant,

it will be a state of pain. The state of emptiness and consequent

appetite must be, at the very best, a state of mixed pain and

pleasure: and it may perhaps be a state of pain only, under two

distinct forms.[38] Life composed of a succession of these states

can afford no true or pure pleasure.

[Footnote 35: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 33 E--34 A. [Greek:

a)naisthêsi/an e)pono/mason . . . to\ de\ e)n e(ni\ pa/thei tê\n

psuchê\n kai\ to\ sô=ma koinê=| gigno/menon koinê=| kai\

kinei=sthai, tau/tên d' au)= tê\n ki/nêsin o)noma/zôn

_ai)/sthêsin_ ou)k a)po\ tro/pou phthe/ggoi' a)/n.]]

[Footnote 36: Plato, Philêbus, p. 34 A-B. [Greek: sôtêri/an

ai)sthê/seôs tê\n mnê/mên.]

[Greek: Mnê/mê] and [Greek: a)na/mnêsis] are pronounced to be

different.]

[Footnote 37: Plato, Philêbus, p. 35 C. [Greek: tê\n psuchê\n

a)/ra tê=s plêrô/seôs e)pha/ptesthai loipo/n, tê=| mnê/mê| dê=lon

o(/ti; tô=| ga\r a)\n e)/t' a)/llô| e)pha/psaito?]

35 D. [Greek: tê\n a)/r' e)pa/gousan e)pi\ ta\ e)pithumou/mena

a)podei/xas mnê/mên, o( lo/gos psuchê=s xu/mpasan tê/n te o(rmê\n

kai\ e)pithumi/an kai\ tê\n a)rchê\n tou= zô/ou panto\s

a)pe/phê|nen.]

[Footnote 38: Plato, Philêbus, p. 36 A-B.

This analysis of desire is in the main just: antecedent to all

gratification, it is simple uneasiness: gratification having been

supplied, the memory thereof remains, and goes along with the

uneasiness to form the complex mental state called _desire_.

But there is another case of desire. While tasting a pleasure, we

desire the continuance of it: and if the expectation of its

continuance be assured, this is an additional pleasure: two

sources of pleasure instead of one. In this last case, there is no

such conjunction of opposite states, pain and pleasure, as Plato

pointed out in the former case.]

[Side-note: Can pleasures be true or false? Sokrates maintains that

they are so.]

What do you mean (asks Protarchus) by true pleasures or pains? How

can pleasures or pains be either true or false? Opinions and

expectations may be true or false; but not pleasures, nor pains.

That is an important question (replies Sokrates), which we must

carefully examine. If opinions may be false or true, surely

pleasures may be so likewise. When a man holds an opinion, there

is always some Object of his opinion, whether he thinks truly or

falsely: so also when a man takes delight, there must always be

some Object in which he takes delight, truly or falsely. Pleasure

and pain, as well as opinion, are susceptible of various

attributes; vehement or moderate, right or wrong, bad or good.

Delight sometimes comes to us along with a false opinion,

sometimes along with a true one.

Yes (replies Protarchus), but we then call _the opinion_ true or

false--not _the pleasure_.[39]

[Footnote 39: Plato, Philêbus, p. 37.]

[Side-note: Reasons given by Sokrates. Pleasures attached to true

opinions, are true pleasures. The just man is favoured by the

Gods, and will have true visions sent to him.]

You will not deny (says Sokrates) that there is a difference

between the pleasure accompanying a true opinion, and that which

accompanies a false opinion. Wherein does the difference consist?

Our opinions, and our comparisons of opinion, arise from sensation

and memory:[40] which write words and impress images upon our mind

(as upon a book or canvas), sometimes truly, sometimes

falsely,[41] not only respecting the past and present, but also

respecting the future. To these opinions respecting the future are

attached the pleasures and pains of expectation, which we have

already recognised as belonging to the mind alone,--anticipations

of bodily pleasures or pains to come--hopes and fears. As our

opinions respecting the future are sometimes true, sometimes

false, so also are our hopes and fears: but throughout our lives

we are always full of hopes and fears.[42] Now the just and good

man, being a favourite of the Gods, will have these visions or

anticipations of the future presented to him truly and accurately:

the bad man on the contrary will have them presented to him

falsely. The pleasures of anticipation will be true to the former,

and false to the latter:[43] his false pleasures will be a

ludicrous parody on the true ones.[44] Good or bad opinions are

identical with true or false opinions: so also are good or bad

pleasures, identical with true or false pleasures: there is no

other ground for their being good or bad.

[Footnote 40: Plato, Philêbus, p. 38 C. [Greek: Ou)kou=n e)k

mnê/mês te kai\ ai)sthê/seôs do/xa ê(mi=n kai\ to\ diadoxa/zein

e)gcheirei=n gi/gneth' e(ka/stote?]]

[Footnote 41: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 38 E, 39. [Greek: dokei= moi

to/te ê(mô=n ê( psuchê\ bibli/ô| tini\ proseoike/nai . . . ê(

mnê/mê tai=s ai)sthê/sesi xumpi/ptousa ei)s tau)to/n, ka)kei=na

a)\ peri\ tau=ta/ e)sti ta\ pathê/mata, phai/nontai/ moi schedo\n

oi(=on gra/phein ê(mô=n e)n tai=s psuchai=s to/te lo/gous. . .

A)pode/chou dê\ kai\ e(/teron dêmiourgo\n ê(mô=n e)n tai=s

psuchai=s e)n tô=| to/te chro/nô| gigno/menon . . . Zôgra/phon,

o(\s meta\ to\n grammatistê\n tô=n legome/nôn ei)ko/nas e)n tê=|

psuchê=| tou/tôn gra/phei.]

It seems odd that Plato here puts the painter _after_ the scribe,

and not _before_ him. The images or phantasm of sense must be

painted on the mind before any words are written upon it if we are

to adopt both these metaphors).

The comparison of the mind to a sheet of paper or a book begins

with the poets (Æschyl. Prometh. 790), and passes into philosophy

with Plato.]

[Footnote 42: Plato, Philêbus, p. 39 E. [Greek: ê(mei=s d' au)=

dia\ panto\s tou= bi/ou a)ei\ ge/momen e)lpi/dôn.] 40 E. [Greek:

ou)kou=n o( au)to\s lo/gos a)\n ei)/ê peri\ pho/bôn** te kai\

thumô=n], &c. Also 40 D.]

[Footnote 43: Plato, Philêbus, p. 40 A-B.

Prophets and prophecies, inspired by the Gods, were phenomena

received as frequently occurring in the days of Plato.]

[Footnote 44: Plato, Philêbus, p. 40 C. [Greek: memimême/nai

me/ntoi ta\s a)lêthei=s e)pi\ ta\ geloio/tera.]]

[Side-note: Protarchus disputes this--He thinks that there are some

pleasures bad, but none false--Sokrates does not admit this, but

reserves the question.]

I admit this identity (remarks Protarchus) in regard to opinions,

but not in regard to pleasures. I think there are other grounds,

and stronger grounds, for pronouncing pleasures to be

bad--independently of their being false. We will reserve that question

(says Sokrates) for the present--whether there are or are not

pleasures bad on other grounds.[45] I am now endeavouring to show

that there are some pleasures which are _false_: and I proceed to

another way of viewing the subject.

[Footnote 45: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 40 E-41 A. _Sokr._ [Greek:

Ou)d' ê(dona/s g', oi)=mai, katanoou=men ô(s a)/llon tina\ tro/pon

ei)si\ ponêrai\ plê\n tô=| pseudei=s ei)=nai.] _Protarch._ [Greek:

Pa/nu me\n ou)=n tou)nanti/on ei)/rêkas], &c.]

[Side-note: No means of truly estimating pleasures and pains--False

estimate habitual--These are the false pleasures.]

We agreed before that the state, called Appetite or Desire, was a

mixed state comprehending body and mind: the state of body

affecting the mind with a pain of emptiness,--the state of mind

apart from body being either a pleasure of expected replenishment,

or a pain arising from our regarding replenishment as distant or

unattainable. Appetite or Desire, therefore, is sometimes mixed

pleasure and pain; both, of the genus Infinite, Indeterminate. We

desire to compare these pleasures and pains, and to value their

magnitude in relation to each other, but we have no means of

performing the process. We not only cannot perform it well, but we

are sure to perform it wrongly. For future pleasure or pain counts

for more or less in our comparison, according to its proximity or

distance. Here then is a constant source of false computation:

pleasures and pains counted as greater or less than they really

are: in other words, false pleasures and pains. We thus see that

pleasures may be true or false, no less than opinions.[46]

[Footnote 46: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 41-42.]

[Side-note: Much of what is called pleasure is false. Gentle and

gradual changes do not force themselves upon our notice either as

pleasure or pain. Absence of pain not the same as pleasure.]

We have also other ways of proving the point that much of what is

called pleasure is false and unreal[47]--either no pleasure at

all, or pleasure mingled and alloyed with pain and relief from

pain. According to our previous definition of pain and

pleasure--that pain arises from derangement of the harmony of our nature,

and pleasure from the correction of such derangement, or from the

re-establishment of harmony--there may be and are states which are

neither painful nor pleasurable. Doubtless the body never remains

the same: it is always undergoing change: but the gentle and

gradual changes (such as growth, &c.) escape our consciousness,

producing neither pain nor pleasure: none but the marked, sudden

changes force themselves upon our consciousness, thus producing

pain and pleasure.[48] A life of gentle changes would be a life

without pain as well as without pleasure. There are thus three

states of life[49]--painful--pleasurable--neither painful nor

pleasurable. But _no pain_ (absence of pain) is not identical with

pleasure: it is a third and distinct state.[50]

[Footnote 47: Plato, Philêbus, p. 42 C. [Greek: Tou/tôn toi/nun

e(xê=s o)pso/metha, e)a\n tê=|de a)pantô=men ê(dona\s kai\ lu/pas

pseudei=s e(/ti ma=llon ê)\ tau/tas phainome/nas te kai\ ou)/sas

e)n toi=s zô/ois.]

This argument is continued, though in a manner desultory and

difficult to follow, down to p. 51 A: [Greek: pro\s to\ tina\s

ê(dona\s ei)=nai dokou/sas, ou)sas d' ou)damô=s; kai\ mega/las

e(te/ras tina\s a)/ma kai\ polla\s phantasthei/sas, ei)=nai d'

au)ta\s sumpephurme/nas o(mou= lu/pais te kai\ a)napau/sesin

o)dunô=n tô=n megi/stôn peri/ te sô/matos kai\ psuchê=s

a)pori/as.]]

[Footnote 48: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 42-43.]

[Footnote 49: Plato, Philêbus, p. 43 D. [Greek: trittou\s bi/ous,

e(/na me\n ê(du/n, to\n d' au)= lupêro/n, to\n d' e(/na

mêde/tera.]]

[Footnote 50: Plato, Philêbus, p. 43 D. [Greek: ou)k a)\n ei)/ê

to\ mê\ lupei=sthai/ pote tau)to\n tô=| chai/rein.]]

[Side-note: Opinion of the pleasure-hating philosophers--That

pleasure is no reality, but a mere juggle--no reality except pain,

and the relief from pain.]

Now there are some philosophers who confound this distinction:[51]

Philosophers respectable, but stern, who hate the very name of

pleasure, deny its existence as a separate state _per se_, and

maintain it to be nothing more than relief from pain: implying

therefore, perpetually and inevitably, the conjunction or

antecedence of pain. They consider the seduction of pleasure in

prospect to be a mere juggle--a promise never realised. Often the

expected moment brings no pleasure at all: and even when it does,

there are constant accompaniments of pain, which always greatly

impair, often countervail, sometimes far more than countervail,

its effect. Pain is regarded by them as the evil--removal or

mitigation of pain as the good--of human life.

[Footnote 51: Plato, Philêbus, p. 44 B-C. [Greek: kai\ ma/la

deinou\s legome/nous ta\ peri\ phu/sin, oi( to\ para/pan ê(dona\s

ou)/ phasin ei)=nai . . . lupô=n tau/tas ei)=nai pa/sas

a)pothuga/s, a(\s nu=n oi( peri\ Phi/lêbon ê(dona\s

e)ponoma/zousin.]]

[Side-note: Sokrates agrees with them in part, but not wholly.]

These philosophers (continues Sokrates) are like prophets who

speak truth from the stimulus of internal temperament, without any

rational comprehension of it. Their theory is partially true, but

not universally.[52] It is true of a large portion of what are

called pleasures, but it is not true of all pleasures. Most

pleasures (indeed all the more vehement and coveted pleasures),

correspond to the description given in the theory. The moment when

the supposed intense pleasure arrives, is a disappointment of the

antecedent hopes, either by not bringing the pleasure promised, or

by bringing it along with a preponderant dose of pain. But there

are some pleasures of which this cannot be said--which are really

true and unmixed with pain. Which these are (continues Sokrates),

I will presently explain: but I shall first state the case of the

pleasure-hating philosophers, so far as I go along with it.

[Footnote 52: Plato, Philêbus, p. 44 C. [Greek: ô(/sper ma/ntesi

proschrê=sthai/ tisi, manteuome/nois ou) te/chnê|, a)lla/ tini

duscherei/a phu/seôs ou)k a)gennou=s], &c. Also p. 51 A.]

[Side-note: Theory of the pleasure-haters--We must learn what

pleasure is by looking at the intense pleasures--These are

connected with distempered body and mind.]

When we are studying any property (they say), we ought to examine

especially those cases in which it appears most fully and

prominently developed: thus, if we are enquiring into hardness, we

must take for our first objects of investigation the hardest

things, in preference to those which are less hard or scarcely

hard at all.[53] So in enquiring into pleasure generally, we must

investigate first the pleasures of extreme intensity and

vehemence. Now the most intense pleasures are enjoyed not in a

healthy state of body, but on the contrary under circumstances of

distemper and disorder: because they are then preceded by the most

violent wants and desires. The sick man under fever suffers

greater thirst and cold than when he is in health, but in the

satisfaction of those wants, his pleasure is proportionally more

intense. Again when he suffers from the itch or an inflamed state

of body, the pleasure of rubbing or scratching is more intense

than if he had no such disorder.[54] The most vehement bodily

pleasures can only be enjoyed under condition of being preceded or

attended by pains greater or less as the case may be. The

condition is not one of pure pleasure, but mixed between pain and

pleasure. Sometimes the pain preponderates, sometimes the

pleasure: if the latter, then most men, forgetting the

accompanying pain, look upon these transient moments as the summit

of happiness.[55] In like manner the violent and insane man, under

the stimulus of furious passions and desires, experiences more

intense gratifications than persons of sober disposition: his

condition is a mixed one, of great pains and great pleasures. The

like is true of all the vehement passions--love, hatred, revenge,

anger, jealousy, envy, fear, sorrow, &c.: all of them embody

pleasures mixed with pain, and the magnitude of the pleasure is

proportioned to that of the accompanying pain.[56]

[Footnote 53: Plato, Philêbus, p. 44 E. [Greek: ô(s ei)

boulê/theimen o(touou=n ei)=dous tê\n phu/sin i)dei=n, oi(=on tê\n

tou= sklêrou=, po/teron ei)s ta\ sklêro/tta a)poble/pontes ou(/tôs

a)\n ma=llon sunnoê/saimen ê)\ pro\s ta\ pollosta\ sklêro/têti?]

Answer: [Greek: pro\s ta\ prô=ta mege/thei.]]

[Footnote 54: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 45-46.]

[Footnote 55: Plato, Philêbus, p. 47 A.]

[Footnote 56: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 49-50 D. Plato here introduces,

at some length, an analysis of the mixed sentiment of pleasure and

pain with which we regard scenic representations, tragedy and

comedy--especially the latter. The explanation which he gives of

the sentiment of the ludicrous is curious, and is intended to

elucidate an obscure psychological phenomenon ([Greek: o(/sô|

skoteino/tero/n e)sti], p. 48 B). But his explanation is not

clear, and the sense which he gives to the word [Greek: phtho/nos]

is a forced one. He states truly that the natural object (at least

one among the objects) which a man laughs at, is the intellectual

and moral infirmities of persons with whom he is in friendly

intercourse, when such persons are not placed in a situation of

power, so as to make their defects or displeasure pregnant with

dangerous consequences. The laugher is amused with exaggerated

self-estimation or foolish vanity displayed by friends, [Greek:

doxosophi/a, doxokali/a] &c. (49 E). But how the laugher can be

said to experience a mixture of pain and pleasure here, or how he

can be said to feel [Greek: phtho/nos], I do not clearly see. At

least [Greek: phtho/nos] is here used in the very unusual sense

(to use Stallbaum's words, note p. 48 B, page 278) of "injusta

lætitia de malis eorum, quibus bene cupere debemus": a sense

altogether contrary to that which the word bears in Xen. Memor.

iii. 9, 8; which Stallbaum himself cites, as if the definition of

[Greek: phtho/nos] were the same in both.]

[Side-note: The intense pleasures belong to a state of sickness;

but there is more pleasure, on the whole, enjoyed in a state of

health.]

Recollect (observes Sokrates) that the question here is not

whether _more pleasure_ is enjoyed, _on the whole_, in a state of

health than in a state of sickness--by violent rather than by

sober men. The question is, about the intense modes of pleasure.

Respecting these, I have endeavoured to show that they belong to a

distempered, rather than to a healthy, state both of state of body

and mind:--and that they cannot be enjoyed pure, without a

countervailing or preponderant accompaniment of pain.[57] This is

equally true, whether they be pleasures of body alone, of mind

alone, or of body and mind together. They are false and delusive

pleasures: in fact, they are pleasures only in seeming, but not in

truth and reality. To-morrow I will give you fuller proofs on the

subject.[58]

[Footnote 57: Plato, Philêbus, p. 45 C-E. [Greek: mê/ me ê(gê=|

dianoou/menon e)rôta=|n se, ei) _plei/ô chai/rousin_ oi( spho/dra

nosou=ntes tô=n u(giaino/ntôn, a)ll' oi)/ou _me/getho/s_ me

zêtei=n ê(donê=s, kai\ _to\ spho/dra_ peri\ tou= toiou/tou pou=

pote\ gi/gnetai e(ka/stote], &c.]

[Footnote 58: Plato, Philêbus, p. 50 E. [Greek: tou/tôn ga\r

a(pa/ntôn au(/rion e)thelê/sô soi lo/gon dou=nai], &c.]

[Side-note: Sokrates acknowledges some pleasures to be true.

Pleasures of beautiful colours, odours, sounds, smells, &c.

Pleasures of acquiring knowledge.]

Thus far (continues Sokrates) I have set forth the case on behalf

of the pleasure-haters. Though I deny their full doctrine,--that

there is no pleasure except cessation from pain--I nevertheless

agree with them and cite them as witnesses on my behalf, to the

extent of affirming that a large proportion of our so-called

pleasures, and those precisely the most intense, are false and

unreal: being poisoned and drenched in accompaniments of pain.[59]

But there are some pleasures, true, genuine, and untainted. Such

are those produced by beautiful colours and figures--by many

odours--by various sounds: none of which are preceded by any

painful want requiring to be satisfied. The sensation when it

comes is therefore one of pure and unmixed pleasure. The figures

here meant are the perfect triangle, cube, circle, &c.: the

colours and sounds are such as are clear and simple. All these are

beautiful and pleasurable absolutely and in themselves--not simply

in relation to (or relatively to) some special antecedent

condition. Smells too, though less divine than the others, are in

common with them unalloyed by accompanying pain.[60] To these must

be added the pleasure of acquiring knowledge, which supposes

neither any painful want before it, nor any subsequent pain even

if the knowledge acquired be lost. This too is one of the unmixed

or pure pleasures; though it is not attainable by most men, but

only by a select few.[61]

[Footnote 59: Plato, Philêbus, p. 51 A.]

[Footnote 60: Plato, Philêbus, p. 51 E. [Greek: to\ de\ peri\ ta\s

o)sma\s ê(=tton me\n tou/tôn thei=on ge/nos ê(donô=n; to\ de\ mê\

summemi/chthai e)n au)tai=s a)nagkai/ous lu/pas], &c.]

[Footnote 61: Plato, Philêbus, p. 52 B. [Greek: tau/tas toi/nun

ta\s tô=n mathêma/tôn ê(dona\s a)mi/ktous te ei)=nai lu/pais

r(ête/on, kai\ ou)damô=s tô=n spho/dra o)li/gôn.]]

[Side-note: Pure and moderate pleasures admit of measure and

proportion.]

Having thus distinguished the pure and moderate class of

pleasures, from the mixed and vehement--we may remark that the

former class admit of measure and proportion, while the latter

belong to the immeasurable and the infinite. Moreover, look where

we will, we shall find truth on the side of the select, small,

unmixed specimens--rather than among the large and mixed masses. A

small patch of white colour, free from all trace of any other

colour, is truer, purer, and more beautiful, than a large mass of

clouded and troubled white. In like manner, gentle pleasure, free

from all pain, is more pleasurable, truer, and more beautiful,

than intense pleasure coupled with pain.[62]

[Footnote 62: Plato, Philêbus, p. 53 B-C.]

[Side-note: Pleasure is generation, not substance or essence: it

cannot therefore be an End, because all generation is only a means

towards substance--Pleasure therefore cannot be the Good.]

There are yet other arguments remaining (continues Sokrates) which

show that pleasure cannot be the Summum Bonum. If it be so, it

must be an End, not a Means: it must be something for the sake of

which other things exist or are done--not something which itself

exists or is done for the sake of something else. But pleasure is

not an End: it is essentially a means, as we may infer from the

reasonings of its own advocates. They themselves tell us that it

is generation, not substance:--essentially a process of transition

or change, never attaining essence or permanence.[63] But

generation or transition is always for the sake of the thing to be

generated, or for Substance--not substance for the sake of

generation: the transitory serves as a road to the permanent, not

_vice versà_. Pleasure is thus a means, not an End. It cannot

therefore partake of the essential nature and dignity of Good: it

belongs to a subordinate and imperfect category.[64]

[Footnote 63: Plato, Philêbus, p. 53 C. [Greek: a)=ra peri\

ê(donê=s ou)k a)kêko/amen ô(s a)ei\ ge/nesi/s e)stin, ou)si/a de\

ou)k e)/sti to\ para/pan ê(dona=s; kompsoi\ ga\r dê/ tines au)=

tou=ton to\n lo/gon e)picheirou=si mênu/ein ê(mi=n, oi(=s dei=

cha/rin e)/chein. . . .]

53 D: [Greek: e)sto\n dê/ tine du/o, to\ me\n au)to\ kath' au(to/,

to\ de\ a)ei\ e)phie/menon a)/llou . . . to\ me\n semno/taton

a)ei\ pephuko/s, to\ de\ e)llipe\s e)kei/nou.]]

[Footnote 64: Plato, Philêbus, p. 54 D. [Greek: ê(donê\ ei)/per

ge/nesi/s e)stin, ei)s a)/llên ê)\ tê\n tou= a)gathou= moi=ran

au)tê\n tithe/ntes o)rthô=s thê/somen.]]

[Side-note: Other reasons why pleasure is not the Good.]

Indeed we cannot reasonably admit that there is no Good in bodies

and in the universe generally, nor anywhere except in the

mind:--nor that, within the mind, pleasure alone is good, while courage,

temperance, &c., are not good:--nor that a man is good only while

he is enjoying pleasure, and bad while suffering pain, whatever

may be his character and merits.[65]

[Footnote 65: Plato, Philêbus, p. 55 B.]

[Side-note: Distinction and classification of the varieties of

Knowledge or Intelligence. Some are more true and exact than

others, according as they admit more or less of measuring and

computation.]

Having thus (continues Sokrates) gone through the analysis of

pleasures, distinguishing such as are true and pure, from such as

are false and troubled--we must apply the like distinctive

analysis to the various modes of knowledge and intelligence. Which

varieties of knowledge, science, or art, are the purest from

heterogeneous elements, and bear most closely upon truth? Some

sciences and arts (we know) are intended for special professional

practice: others are taught as subjects for improving the

intellect of youth. As specimens of the former variety, we may

notice music, medicine, husbandry, navigation, generalship,

joinery, ship-building, &c. Now in all these, the guiding and

directing elements are computation, mensuration, and statics--the

sciences or arts of computing, measuring, weighing. Take away

these three--and little would be left worth having, in any of the

sciences or arts before named. There would be no exact assignable

rules, no definite proportions: everything would be left to vague

conjecture, depending upon each artisan's knack and practice which

some erroneously call Art. In proportion as each of these

professional occupations has in it more or less of computation and

mensuration, in the same proportion is it exact and true. There is

little of computation or mensuration in music, medicine,

husbandry, &c.: there is more of them in joinery and

ship-building, which employ the line, plummet, and other instruments:

accordingly these latter are more true and exact, less dependent

upon knack and conjecture, than the three former.[66] They

approach nearer to the purity of science, and include less of the

non-scientific, variable, conjectural, elements.

[Footnote 66: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 55-56.]

[Side-note: Arithmetic and Geometry are twofold: As studied by the

philosopher and teacher: As applied by the artisan.]

But a farther distinction must here be taken (Sokrates goes on).

Even in such practical arts as ship-building, which include most

of computation and mensuration--these two latter do not appear

pure, but diversified and embodied in a multitude of variable

particulars. Arithmetic and geometry, as applied by the

ship-builder and other practical men, are very different from

arithmetic and geometry as studied and taught by the

philosopher.[67] Though called by the same name, they are very

different; and the latter alone are pure and true. The philosopher

assumes in his arithmetic the exact equality of all units, and in

his geometry the exact ratios of lines and spaces: the practical

man adds together units very unlike each other--two armies, two

bulls, things little or great as the case may be: his measurement

too, always falls short of accuracy.[68] There are in short two

arithmetics and two geometries[69]--very different from each

other, though bearing a common name.

[Footnote 67: Plato, Philêbus, p. 56 D-E. [Greek: A)rithmêtikê\n

prô=ton a)=r' ou)k a)/llên me/n tina tê\n tô=n pollô=n phate/on,

a)/llên d' au)= tê\n tô=n philosophou/ntôn? . . .

logistikê\ kai\ metrêtikê\ ê( kata\ tektonikê\n kai\ kat'

e)mporikê\n tê=s kata\ philosophi/an geômetri/as te kai\ logismô=n

katameletôme/nôn--po/teron ô(s mi/a e(kate/ra lekte/on, ê)\ du/o

tithô=men?]

Compare Aristotel. Ethic. Nikom. i. 7, p. 1098, a. 30.]

[Footnote 68: Plato, Philêbus, p. 56 D-E. [Greek: oi( me\n ga/r

pou mona/das a)ni/sous katarithmou=ntai tô=n peri\ a)rithmo/n,

oi(=on strato/peda du/o kai\ bou=s du/o kai\ du/o ta\ smikro/tata

ê)\ kai\ ta\ pa/ntôn me/gista; oi( d' ou)k a)/n pote au)toi=s

sunakolouthê/seian, ei) mê\ mona/da mona/dos e(ka/stês tô=n

muri/ôn mêdemi/an a)/llên a)/llês diaphe/rousa/n tis thê/sei.]]

[Footnote 69: Plato, Philêbus, p. 57 D.]

[Side-note: Dialectic is the truest and purest of all Cognitions.

Analogy between Cognition and Pleasure: in each, there are

gradations of truth and purity.]

We thus make out (continues Sokrates) that there is a difference

between one variety and another variety of science or knowledge,

analogous to that which we have traced between the varieties of

pleasure. One pleasure is true and pure; another is not so, or is

inseparably connected with pain and non-pleasurable

elements--there being in each case a difference in degree. So too one

variety of science, cognition, or art, is more true and pure than

another: that is, it is less intermingled with fluctuating

particulars and indefinite accompaniments. A science, bearing one

and the same name, is different according as it is handled by the

practical man or by the philosopher. Only as handled by the

philosopher, does science attain purity: dealing with eternal and

invariable essences. Among all sciences, Dialectic is the truest

and purest, because it takes comprehensive cognizance of the

eternal and invariable--_Ens semper Idem_--presiding over those

subordinate sciences which bear upon the like matter in partial

and separate departments.[70]

[Footnote 70: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 57-58.]

[Side-note: Difference with Gorgias, who claims superiority for

Rhetoric. Sokrates admits that Rhetoric is superior in usefulness

and celebrity: but he claims superiority for Dialectic, as

satisfying the lover of truth.]

Your opinion (remarks Protarchus) does not agree with that of

Gorgias. He affirms, that the power of persuasion (Rhetoric) is

the greatest and best of all arts: inasmuch as it enables us to

carry all our points, not by force, but with the free will and

consent of others. I should be glad to avoid contradicting either

him or you.

There is no real contradiction between us (replies Sokrates). You

may concede to Gorgias that his art or cognition is the greatest

and best of all--the most in repute, as well as the most useful to

mankind. I do not claim any superiority of _that_ kind, on behalf

of my cognition.[71] I claim for it superiority in truth and

purity. I remarked before, that a small patch of unmixed white

colour was superior in truth and purity to a large mass of white

tarnished with other colours--a gentle and unmixed pleasure, in

like manner, to one that is more intense but alloyed with pains.

It is this superiority that I assert for Dialectic and the other

sister cognitions. They are of little positive advantage to

mankind: yet they, and only they, will satisfy both the demands of

intelligence, and the impulse within us, in so far as we have an

impulse to love and strain after truth.[72]

[Footnote 71: Plato, Philêbus, p. 58 B. [Greek: Ou) tou=t' e)/gôge

e)zê/toun pô, ti/s te/chnê ê)\ ti/s e)pistê/mê pasô=n diaphe/rei

tô=| megi/stê kai\ a)ri/stê kai\ plei=sta ô)phelou=sa ê(ma=s.

a)lla\ ti/s pote to\ saphe\s kai\ ta)kribe\s kai\ to\

a)lêthe/staton e)piskopei=, ka)\n ê)=| smikra\ kai\ smikra\

o)ni/nasa. Tou=t' e)sti\n o(\ nu=n dê\ zêtou=men.]]

[Footnote 72: Plato, Philêbus, p. 58 D. [Greek: a)ll' ei)/ tis

pe/phuke tê=s psuchê=s ê(mô=n du/namis e)ra=|n te tou= a)lêthou=s

kai\ pa/nta e(/neka tou/tou pra/ttein, tau/tên ei)/pômen], &c.]

As far as straining after truth is concerned (says Protarchus),

Dialectic and the kindred sciences have an incontestable

superiority.

[Side-note: Most men look to opinions only, or study the phenomenal

manifestations of the Kosmos. They neglect the unchangeable

essences, respecting which alone pure truth can be obtained.]

You must see (rejoins Sokrates) that Rhetoric, and most other arts

or sciences, employ all their study, and seek all their standard,

in opinions alone: while of those who study Nature, the greater

number confine their investigations to this Kosmos, to its

generation and its phenomenal operations--its manifestations past,

present, and future.[73] Now all these manifestations are in

perpetual flux, admitting of no true or certain cognition. Pure

truth, corresponding to those highest mental endowments, Reason

and Intelligence--can be found only in essences, eternal and

unchangeable, or in matters most akin to them.[74]

[Footnote 73: Plato, Philêbus, p. 59. [Greek: ei) de\ kai\ peri\

phu/seôs ê(gei=tai/ tis zêtei=n, oi)=sth' o(/ti ta\ peri\ to\n

ko/smon to/nde, o(/pê| te ge/gone kai\ o(/pê| pa/schei ti kai\

o(/pê| poiei=, tau=ta zêtei= dia\ bi/ou?]]

[Footnote 74: Plato, Philêbus, p. 59.]

[Side-note: Application. Neither Intelligence nor Pleasure

separately, is the Good, but a mixture of the two--Intelligence

being the most important. How are they to be mixed?]

We have now (continues Sokrates) examined pleasure separately and

intelligence separately. We have agreed that neither of them,

apart and by itself, comes up to the conception of Good; the

attribute of which is, to be all sufficient, and to give plenary

satisfaction, so that any animal possessing it desires nothing

besides.[75] We must therefore seek Good in a certain mixture or

combination of the two--Pleasure and Intelligence: and we must

determine, what sort of combination of these two contains the Good

we seek. Now, to mix all pleasures, with all cognitions, at once

and indiscriminately, will hardly be safe. We will first mix the

truest and purest pleasures (those which include pleasure in its

purest form), with the truest or purest cognitions (those which

deal altogether with eternal and unchangeable essence, not with

fluctuating particulars). Will such a combination suffice to

constitute Good, or an all-sufficient and all-satisfactory

existence? Or do we want anything more besides?[76] Suppose a man

cognizant of the Form or Idea of Justice, and of all other

essential Ideas: and able to render account of his cognition, in

proper words: Will this be sufficient?[77] Suppose him to be

cognizant of the divine Ideas of Circle, Sphere, and other

figures; and to employ them in architecture, not knowing anything

of human circles and figures as they exist in practical life?[78]

[Footnote 75: Plato, Philêbus, p. 60 C. [Greek: tê\n ta)gathou=

diaphe/rein phu/sin tô=|de tô=n a)/llôn . . . ô(=| parei/ê tou=t'

a)ei\ tô=n zô/ôn dia\ te/lous pa/ntôs kai\ pa/ntê|, mêdeno\s

e(te/rou pote\ e)/ti prosdei=sthai, to\ de\ i(kano\n teleô/taton

e)/chein.]]

[Footnote 76: Plato, Philêbus, p. 61 E.]

[Footnote 77: Plato, Philêbus, p. 62 A. [Greek: E)/stô dê/ tis

ê(mi=n phronô=n a)/nthrôpos au)tê=s peri\ dikaiosu/nês, o(/, ti

e)/sti, kai\ lo/gon e)/chôn e(po/menon tô=| noei=n, kai\ dê\ kai\

peri\ tô=n a)/llôn a(pa/ntôn tô=n o)/ntôn ô(sau/tôs

dianoou/menos?]]

[Footnote 78: Plato, Philêbus, p. 62 A. [Greek: A)=r' ou)=n

ou(=tos i(kanô=s e)pistê/mês e(/xei ku/klou me\n kai\ sphai/ras

au)tê=s tê=s thei/as to\n lo/gon e)/chôn, tê\n de\ a)nthrôpi/nên

tau/tên sphai=ran kai\ tou\s ku/klous tou/tous a)gnoô=n], &c.]

[Side-note: We must include all Cognitions, not merely the truest,

but the others also. Life cannot be carried on without both.]

That would be a ludicrous position indeed (remarks Protarchus), to

have his mind full of the divine Ideas or cognitions only.

What! (replies Sokrates) must he have cognition not only of the

true line and circle, but also of the false, the variable, the

uncertain?

Certainly (says Protarchus), we all must have this farther

cognition, if we are to find our way from hence to our own

homes.[79]

[Footnote 79: Plato, Philêbus, p. 62 B. [Greek: A)nagkai=on ga/r,

ei) me/llei tis ê(mô=n kai\ tê\n o(do\n e(ka/stote e)xeurê/sein

oi)/kade.]]

Must we then admit (says Sokrates) those cognitions also in music,

which we declared to be full of conjecture and imitation, without

any pure truth or certainty?

We must admit them (says Protarchus), if life is to be worth

anything at all. No harm can come from admitting all the other

cognitions, provided a man possesses the first and most perfect.

[Side-note: But we must include no pleasures except the true, pure,

and necessary. The others are not compatible with Cognition or

Intelligence--especially the intense sexual pleasures.]

Well then (continues Sokrates), we will admit them all. We have

now to consider whether we can in like manner admit all pleasures

without distinction. The true and pure must first be let in: next,

such as are necessary and indispensable: and all the rest also, if

any one can show that there is advantage without mischief in our

enjoying every variety of pleasure.[80] We must put the question

first to pleasures, next to cognitions--whether they can consent

respectively to live in company with each other. Now pleasures

will readily consent to the companionship of cognitions: but

cognitions (or Reason, upon whom they depend) will not tolerate

the companionship of all pleasures indiscriminately. Reason will

welcome the true and pure pleasures: she will also accept such as

are indispensable, and such as consist with health, and with a

sober and virtuous disposition. But Reason will not tolerate those

most intense, violent, insane, pleasures, which extinguish correct

memory, disturb sound reflection, and consist only with folly and

bad conduct. Excluding these violent pleasures, but retaining the

others in company with Reason and Truth--we shall secure that

perfect and harmonious mixture which makes the nearest

approximation to Good.[81]

[Footnote 80: Plato, Philêbus, p. 63 A. [Greek: ei)/per pa/sas

ê(dona\s ê(/desthai dia\ bi/ou sumphe/ron te ê(mi=n e)sti\ kai\

a)blabe\s a(/pasi, pa/sas xugkrate/on.]]

[Footnote 81: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 63-64.]

[Side-note: What causes the excellence of this mixture? It is

Measure, Proportion, Symmetry. To these Reason is more akin than

Pleasure.]

This mixture as Good (continues Sokrates) will be acceptable to

all.[82] But what is the cause that it is so? and is that cause

more akin to Reason or to Pleasure? The answer is, that this

mixture and combination, like every other that is excellent,

derives its excellence from Measure and Proportion. Thus the Good

becomes merged in the Beautiful: for measure and proportion

(Moderation and Symmetry) constitute in every case beauty and

excellence.[83] In this case, Truth has been recognised as a third

element of the mixture: the three together coalesce into Good,

forming a Quasi-Unum, which serves instead of a Real Unum or Idea

of Good.[84] We must examine these three elements

separately--Truth--Moderation--Symmetry (Measure--Proportion) to find

whether each of them is most akin to Reason or to Pleasure. There can

be no doubt that to all the three, Reason is more akin than Pleasure:

and that the intense pleasures are in strong repugnance and

antipathy to all the three.[85]

[Footnote 82: Plato, Philêbus, p. 64 C. [Greek: Ti/ dê=ta e)n tê=|

xummi/xei timiô/taton a(/ma kai\ ma/list' ai)/tion ei)=nai

do/xeien a)\n ê(mi=n, _tou= pa=si gegone/nai prosphilê=_ tê\n

toiau/tên dia/thesin?]]

[Footnote 83: Plato, Philêbus, p. 64 E. [Greek: nu=n dê\

katape/pheugen ê(mi=n ê( ta)gathou= du/namis ei)s tê\n tou= kalou=

phu/sin; metrio/tês ga\r kai\ xummetri/a ka/llos dê/pou kai\

a)retê\ pantachou= xumbai/nei gi/gnesthai.]]

[Footnote 84: Plato, Philêbus, p. 64 E-65 A. [Greek: Ou)kou=n ei)

mê\ mia=| duna/metha i)de/a| to\ a)gatho\n thêreu=sai, su\n trisi\

labo/ntes, ka/llei kai\ xummetri/a| kai\ a)lêthei/a|, le/gômen ô(s

tou=to oi(=on e(\n o)rtho/tat' a)\n ai)tiasai/meth' a)\n tô=n e)n

tê=| xummi/xei, kai\ dia\ tou=to ô(s a)gatho\n o)\n toiau/tên

au)tê\n gegone/nai.]]

[Footnote 85: Plato, Philêbus, p. 65 C.]

[Side-note: Quintuple gradation in the Constituents of the Good. 1.

Measure. 2. Symmetry. 3. Intelligence. 4. Practical Arts and Right

Opinions. 5. True and Pure Pleasures.]

We thus see (says Sokrates in conclusion), in reference to the

debate with Philêbus, that Pleasure stands neither first nor

second in the scale of approximation to Good. First comes

Measure--the Moderate--the Seasonable--and all those eternal Forms

and Ideas which are analogous to these.[86] Secondly, come the

Symmetrical--the Beautiful--the Perfect--the Sufficient--and other

such like Forms and Ideas.[87] Thirdly, come Reason and

Intelligence. Fourthly, the various sciences, cognitions, arts,

and right opinions--acquirements embodied in the mind itself.

Fifthly, those pleasures which we have discriminated as pure

pleasures without admixture of pain; belonging to the mind itself

but consequent on the sensations of sight, hearing, smell.[88]

[Footnote 86: Plato, Philêbus, p. 66 A. [Greek: ô(s ê(donê\ ktê=ma

ou)k e)/sti prô=ton ou)d' au)= deu/teron, a)lla\ prô=ton me/n pê|

peri\ me/tron kai\ to\ me/trion kai\ kai/rion kai\ pa/nta o(po/sa

chrê\ toiau=ta nomi/zein tê\n a)i+/dion ê(|rê=sthai phu/sin.]]

[Footnote 87: Plato, Philêbus, p. 66 B. [Greek: deu/teron mê\n

peri\ to\ su/mmetron kai\ kalo\n kai\ to\ te/leon kai\ i(kano\n,

kai\ pa/nth' o(po/sa tê=s genea=s au)= tau/tês e)sti/n.]]

[Footnote 88: Plato, Philêbus, p. 66 C.]

It is not necessary to trace the descending scale farther. It has

been shown, against Philêbus--That though neither Intelligence

separately, nor Pleasure separately, is an adequate embodiment of

Good, which requires both of them conjointly--yet Intelligence is

more akin to Good, and stands nearer to it in nature, than

Pleasure.

* * * * *

Dionysius of Halikarnassus, while blaming the highflown metaphor

and poetry of the Phædrus and other Platonic dialogues, speaks

with great admiration of Plato in his appropriate walk of the

Sokratic dialogues; and selects specially the Philêbus, as his

example of these latter. I confess that this selection surprises

me: for the Philêbus, while it explicitly renounces the peculiar

Sokratic vein, and becomes didactic--cannot be said to possess

high merit as a didactic composition. It is neither clear, nor

orderly, nor comparable in animation to the expository books of

the Republic.[89] Every commentator of Plato, from Galen

downwards, has complained of the obscurity of the Philêbus.

[Footnote 89: Dionys. Hal. De Adm. Vi Dic. ap. Demosth. p. 1025.

Schleiermacher (Einleit. p. 136) admits the comparatively tiresome

character and negligent execution of the Philêbus.

Galen had composed a special treatise, [Greek: Peri\ tô=n e)n

Philê/bô| metaba/seôn], now lost (Galen, De Libris Propriis, 13,

vol. xix. 46, ed. Kühn).

We have the advantage of two recent editions of the Philêbus by

excellent English scholars, Dr. Badham and Mr. Poste; both are

valuable, and that of Dr. Badham is distinguished by sagacious

critical remarks and conjectures, but the obscurity of the

original remains incorrigible.]

[Side-note: Remarks. Sokrates does not claim for Good the unity of

an Idea, but a quasi-unity of analogy.]

Sokrates concludes his task, in the debate with Protarchus, by

describing Bonum or the Supreme Good as a complex aggregate of

five distinct elements, in a graduated scale of affinity to it and

contributing to its composition in a greater or less degree

according to the order in which they are placed. Plato does not

intimate that these five complete the catalogue; but that after

the fifth degree, the affinity becomes too feeble to deserve

notice.[90] According to this view, no Idea of Good, in the strict

Platonic sense, is affirmed. Good has not the complete unity of an

Idea, but only the quasi-unity of analogy between its diverse

elements; which are attached by different threads to the same

root, with an order of priority and posteriority.[91]

[Footnote 90: Plato, Philêbus, p. 66 C.]

[Footnote 91: Plato, Philêbus, p. 65 A. The passage is cited in

note 5, p. 363.

About the difference, recognised partly by Plato but still more

insisted on by Aristotle, between [Greek: ta\ lego/mena kath' e(\n

(kata\ mi/an i)de/an)] and [Greek: ta\ lego/mena pro\s e(\n (pro\s

mi/an tina\ phu/sin)], see my note towards the close of the Lysis,

vol. ii. ch. xx.

Aristotle says about Plato (Eth. Nikom. i. 6): [Greek: Oi( de\

komi/santes tê\n do/xan tau/tên, ou)k e)poi/oun i)de/as e)n oi(=s

to\ pro/teron kai\ to\ u(/steron e)/legon], &c.]

[Side-note: Discussions of the time about Bonum. Extreme absolute

view, maintained by Eukleides: extreme relative by the Xenophontic

Sokrates. Plato here blends the two in part; an Eclectic

doctrine.]

In the discussions about Bonum, there existed among the

contemporaries of Plato a great divergence of opinions. Eukleides

of Megara represents the extreme absolute, ontological, or

objective view: Sokrates (I mean the historical Sokrates, as

reported by Xenophon) enunciated very distinctly the relative or

subjective view. "Good (said Eukleides) is the One: the only real,

eternal, omnipresent Ens--always the same or like itself--called

sometimes Good, sometimes Intelligence, and by various other

names: the opposite of Good has no real existence, but only a

temporary, phenomenal, relative, existence." On the other hand,

the Xenophontic Sokrates affirmed--"The Good and The Beautiful

have no objective unity at all; they include a variety of items

altogether dissimilar to each other, yet each having reference to

some human want or desire: sometimes relieving or preventing pain,

sometimes conferring pleasure. That which neither contributes to

relieve any pain or want, nor to confer pleasure, is not Good at

all."[92] In the Philêbus, Plato borrows in part from both of

these points of view, though inclining much more to the first than

to the last. He produces a new eclectic doctrine, comprising

something from both, and intended to harmonise both; announced as

applying at once to Man, to Animals, to Plants, and to the

Universe.[93]

[Footnote 92: Diogen. Laert. ii. 106; Cicero, Academic. ii. 42;

Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 8, 3-5.]

[Footnote 93: Plato, Philêbus, p. 64 A. [Greek: e)n tau/tê|

mathei=n peira=sthai, ti/ _pote e(\n te a)nthrô/pô| kai\ tô=|

panti\ pe/phuken a)gatho/n_, kai\ ti/na i)de/an au)tê\n ei)=nai/

pote manteute/on.]

Schleiermacher observes about the Philêbus:--"Dieses also lag ihm

(Plato) am Herzen, das Gute zu bestimmen nicht nur für das Leben

des Menschen, sondern auch zumal für das ganze Gebiet des

gewordenen Seins," &c.

The partial affinity between the Kosmos and the human soul is set

forth in the Timæus, pp. 37-43-44.]

[Side-note: Inconvenience of his method, blending Ontology with

Ethics.]

Unfortunately, the result has not corresponded to his intentions.

If we turn to the close of the dialogue, we find that the

principal elements which he assigns as explanatory of Good, and

the relation in which they stand to each other, stand as much in

need of explanation as Good itself. If we follow the course of the

dialogue, we are frequently embarrassed by the language, because

he is seeking for phrases applicable at once to the Kosmos and to

Man: or because he passes from one to the other, under the

assumption of real analogy between them. The extreme generalities

of Logic or Ontology, upon which Sokrates here dwells--the

Determinant and Indeterminate, the Cause, &c.--do not conduct us

to the attainment of Good as he himself defines it--That which is

desired by, and will give full satisfaction to, all men, animals,

and plants. The fault appears to me to lie in the very scheme of

the dialogue. Attempts to discuss Ontology and Ethics in one and

the same piece of reasoning, instead of elucidating both, only

serve to darken both. Aristotle has already made a similar remark:

and it is after reading the Philêbus that we feel most distinctly

the value of his comments on Plato in the first book of the

Nikomachean Ethics. Aristotle has discussed Ontology in the

Metaphysica and in other treatises: but he proclaims explicitly

the necessity of discussing Ethics upon their own principles:

looking at what is good for man, and what is attainable by

man.[94] We find in the Philêbus many just reflections upon

pleasure and its varieties: but these might have been better and

more clearly established, without any appeal to the cosmical

dogmas. The parallelism between Man and the Kosmos is overstrained

and inconclusive, like the parallelism in the Republic between the

collective commonwealth and the individual citizen.

[Footnote 94: See especially Ethic. Nikom. i. 4, 1096-1097.

Aristotle reasons there directly against the Platonic [Greek:

i)de/a a)gathou=], but his arguments have full application to the

exposition in the Philêbus. He distinguishes pointedly the ethical

from the physical point of view. In his discussion of friendship,

after touching upon various comparisons of the physiological

poets, and of Plato himself repeating them, he says:--[Greek: ta\

me\n ou)=n phusika\ tô=n a)porêma/tôn paraphei/sthô; ou) ga\r

oi)kei=a tê=s parou/sês ske/pseôs; o(/sa d' e)sti\n a)nthrôpika/

kai\ a)nê/kei ei)s ta\ ê)/thê kai\ ta\ pa/thê, tau=t'

e)piskepsô/metha], Ethic. Nikom. viii. 1, 1155, b. 10.

The like contrast is brought out (though less clearly) in the

Eudemian Ethics, viii. 1. 1235, a. 30.

He animadverts upon Plato on the same ground in the Ethica Magna,

i. 1, 1182, a. 23-30. [Greek: u(pe\r ga\r tô=n o)/ntôn kai\

a)lêthei/as le/gonta, ou)k e)/dei u(pe\r a)retê=s phra/zein;

ou)de\n ga\r tou/tô| ka)kei/nô| koino/n.]]

[Side-note: Comparison of Man to the Kosmos, which has reason, but

no emotion, is unnecessary and confusing.]

Moreover, when Plato, to prove the conclusion that Intelligence

and Reason are the governing attributes of man's mind, enunciates

as his premiss that Intelligence and Reason are the governing

attributes in the Kosmos[95]--the premiss introduced is more

debateable than the conclusion; and would (as he himself

intimates) be contested by those against whose opposition he was

arguing. In fact, the same proposition (That Reason and

Intelligence are the dominant and controlling attributes of man,

Passion and Appetite the subordinate) is assumed without any proof

by Sokrates, both in the Protagoras and in the Republic. The

Kosmos (in Plato's view) has reason and intelligence, but

experiences no emotion either painful or pleasurable: the rational

nature of man is thus common to him with the Kosmos, his emotional

nature is not so. That the mind of each individual man was an

emanation from the all-pervading mind of the Kosmos or universe,

and his body a fragmentary portion of the four elements composing

the cosmical body--these are propositions which had been laid down

by Sokrates, as well as by Philolaus and other Pythagoreans

(perhaps by Pythagoras himself) before the time of Plato.[96] Not

only that doctrine, but also the analysis of the Kosmos into

certain abstract constituent _principia_--(the Finient or

Determinant--and the Infinite or Indeterminate)--this too seems to

have been borrowed by Plato from Philolaus.[97]

[Footnote 95: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 20-30.]

[Footnote 96: Cicero, De Nat. Deor. i. 11, 27: De Senectute, 21,

78; Xenophon, Memor. i. 4, 7-8; Cicero, Nat. Deor. ii. 6, 18;

Plato, Timæus, pp. 37-38, &c.

In the Xenophontic dialogue here referred to, Sokrates inverts the

premiss and the conclusion: he infers that Mind and Reason govern

the Kosmos, because the mind and reason of man govern the body of

man.]

[Footnote 97: See Stallbaum, Prolegg. in Philêb. pp. 41-42.]

[Side-note: Plato borrows from the Pythagoreans, but enlarges their

doctrine. Importance of his views in dwelling upon systematic

classification.]

But here in the Philêbus, that analysis appears expanded into a

larger scheme going beyond Philolaus or the Pythagoreans: _viz._

the recognition of a graduated scale of limits, or a definite

number of species and sub-species--intermediate between the One or

Highest Genus, and the Infinite Many or Individuals--and

descending by successive stages of limitation from the Highest to

the Lowest. What is thus described, is the general framework of

systematic logical classification, deliberately contrived, and

founded upon known attributes, common as well as differential. It

is prescribed as essential to all real cognition; if we conceive

only the highest Genus or generic name as comprehending an

infinity of diverse particulars, we have no real cognition, until

we can assign the intermediate stages of specification by which we

descend from one to the other.[98] The step here made by Plato,

under the stimulus of the Sokratic dialectic, from the Pythagorean

doctrine of Finient and Infinite to the idea of gradual,

systematic, logical division and subdivision, is one very

important in the history of science. He lays as much stress upon

the searching out of the intermediate species, as Bacon does upon

the Axiomata Media of scientific enquiry.[99]

[Footnote 98: Ueberweg (Æchtheit und Zeitf. Platon. Schriften, pp.

204-207) considers the Philêbus, as well as the Sophistês and

Timæus, to be compositions of Plato's very late age--partly on the

ground of their didactic and expository style, the dialogue

serving only as form to the exponent Sokrates--partly because he

thinks that the nearest approach is made in them to that manner of

conceiving the doctrine of Ideas which Aristotle ascribes to Plato

in his old age--that is, the two [Greek: stoichei=a] or factors of

the Ideas. 1. [Greek: To\ e(\n]. 2. [Greek: To\ me/ga kai\

mikro/n]. This last argument seems to me far-fetched. I see no

real and sensible approach in the Philêbus to this Platonic

doctrine of the [Greek: stoichei=a] of the Ideas: at least, the

approach is so vague, that one can hardly make it a basis of

reasoning. But the didactic tone is undoubtedly a characteristic

of the Philêbus, and seems to indicate that the dialogue was

composed after Plato had been so long established in his school,

as to have acquired a pedagogic ostentation.]

[Footnote 99: Bacon, Augment. Scient. v. 2. Nov. Organ. Aph. 105.

"At Plato non semel innuit particularia infinita esse maximé:

rursus generalia minus certa documenta exhibere. Medullam igitur

scientiarum, quâ artifex ab imperito distinguitur, in mediis

propositionibus consistere, quas per singulas scientias tradidit

et docuit experientia."]

[Side-note: Classification broadly enunciated, and strongly

recommended--yet feebly applied--in this dialogue.]

Though there are several other passages of the Platonic dialogues

in which the method of logical division is inculcated, there is

none (I think) in which it is prescribed so formally, or

enunciated with such comprehensive generality, as this before us

in the Philêbus. Yet the method, after being emphatically

announced, is but feebly and partially applied, in the distinction

of different species, both of pleasure and of cognition.[100] The

announcement would come more suitably, as a preface to the

Sophistês and Politikus: wherein the process is applied to given

subjects in great detail, and at a length which some critics

consider excessive: and wherein moreover the particular enquiry is

expressly proclaimed as intended to teach as well as to exemplify

the general method.[101]

[Footnote 100: The purpose of discriminating the different sorts

of pleasure is intimated, yet seemingly not considered as

indispensable, by Sokrates; and it is executed certainly in a very

unsystematic and perfunctory manner, compared with what we read in

the Sophistês and Politikus. (Philêbus, pp. 19 B, 20 C, 32 B-C.)

Mr. Poste, in his note on p. 55 A, expresses surprise at this

point; and notices it as one among other grounds for suspecting

that the Philêbus is a composition of two distinct fragments,

rather carelessly soldered together:--"Again after Division and

Generalization have been propounded as the only satisfactory

method, it is somewhat strange that both the original problems are

solved by ordinary Dialectic without any recourse to

classification. All this becomes intelligible if we assume the

Philêbus to have arisen from a boldly executed junction of two

originally separate dialogues."

Acknowledging the want of coherence in the dialogue, I have

difficulty in conceiving what the two fragments could have been,

out of which it was compounded. Schleiermacher (Einleit. pp.

136-137) also points out the negligent execution and heavy march of

the dialogue.]

[Footnote 101: See Politikus, pp. 285-286; Phædrus, p. 265;

Xenoph. Memor. iv. 5, 12.

I have already observed that Socher (Ueber Platon. pp. 260-270)

and Stallbaum (Proleg. ad Politik. pp. 52-54-65-67, &c.) agree in

condemning the extreme minuteness, the tiresome monotony, the

useless and petty comparisons, which Plato brings together in the

multiplied bifurcate divisions of the Sophistês and Politikus.

Socher adduces this as one among his reasons for rejecting the

dialogue as spurious.]

[Side-note: What is the Good? Discussed both in Philêbus and in

Republic. Comparison.]

The same question as that which is here discussed in the Philêbus,

is also started in the sixth book of the Republic. It is worth

while to compare the different handling, here and there. "Whatever

else we possess (says Sokrates in the Republic), and whatever else

we may know is of no value, unless we also possess and know Good.

In the opinion of most persons, Pleasure is The Good: in the

opinion of accomplished and philosophical men, intelligence

([Greek: phro/nêsis]) is the Good. But when we ask Intelligence,

_of what_? these philosophers cannot inform us: they end by

telling us, ridiculously enough, Intelligence of _The Good_. Thus,

while blaming us for not knowing what The Good is, they make an

answer which implies that we do already know it: in saying,

Intelligence of the Good, they of course presume that we know what

they mean by the word. Then again, those who pronounce Pleasure to

be the Good, are not less involved in error; since they are forced

to admit that some Pleasures are Evil; thus making Good and Evil

to be the same. It is plain therefore that there are many and

grave disputes what The Good is."[102]

[Footnote 102: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 505 B-C. [Greek: oi( tou=to

ê(gu/menoi ou)k e)/chousi dei=xai ê(/ _tis phro/nêsis, a)ll'_

a)nagka/zontai teleutô=ntes tê\n tou= a)gathou= pha/nai . . .

o)neidi/zonte/s ge o(/ti ou)k i)/smen to\ a)gatho/n, le/gousi

pa/lin ô(s ei)do/si; phro/nêsin ga\r au)to/ phasin ei)=nai

a)gathou=, ô(s au)= sunie/ntôn ê(mô=n o(/, ti le/gousin, e)peida\n

to\ tou= a)gathou= phthe/gxôntai o)/noma.]

In the Symposion, there is a like tenor of questions about Eros or

Love. Love must be Love of something: the term is relative. You

confound Love with the object loved. See Plato, Symposion, pp. 199

C, 204 C.

When we read the objection here advanced by Plato (in the above

passage of the Republic) as conclusive against the appeal to

[Greek: phro/nêsis] absolutely (without specifying [Greek:

phro/nêsis] _of what_), we are surprised to see that it is not

even mentioned in the Philêbus.]

[Side-note: Mistake of talking about Bonum confidently, as if it

were known, while it is subject of constant dispute. Plato himself

wavers about it; gives different explanations, and sometimes

professes ignorance, sometimes talks about it confidently.]

In this passage of the Republic Plato points out that Intelligence

cannot be understood, except as determined by or referring to some

Object or End: and that those who tendered Intelligence _per se_

for an explanation of The Good (as Sokrates does in the Philêbus),

assumed as known the very point in dispute which they professed to

explain. This is an important remark in regard to ethical

discussions: and it were to be wished that Plato had himself

avoided the mistake which he here blames in others. The Platonic

Sokrates frequently tells us that he does not know what Good is.

In the sixth Book of the Republic, having come to a point where

his argument required him to furnish a positive explanation of it,

he expressly declines the obligation and makes his escape amidst

the clouds of metaphor.[103] In the Protagoras, he pronounces Good

to be identical with pleasure and avoidance of pain, in the

largest sense and under the supervision of calculating

Intelligence.[104] In the second Book of the Republic, we find

what is substantially the same explanation as that of the

Protagoras, given (though in a more enlarged and analytical

manner) by Glaukon and assented to by Sokrates; to the effect that

Good is tripartite,[105] _viz._: 1. That which we desire for

itself, without any reference to consequences--_e. g._, enjoyment

and the innocuous pleasures. 2. That which we desire on a double

account, both for itself and by reason of its consequences--_e.

g._, good health, eyesight, intelligence, &c. 3. That which we do

not desire, perhaps even shun, for itself: but which we desire, or

at least accept, by reason of its consequences--such as

gymnastics, medical treatment, discipline, &c. Again, in the

Gorgias and elsewhere, Plato seems to confine the definition of

Good to the two last of these three heads, rejecting the first:

for he distinguishes pointedly the Good from the Pleasurable. Yet

while thus wavering in his conception of the term, Plato often

admits it into the discussions as if it were not merely familiar,

but clear and well-understood by every one.

[Footnote 103: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 506 E.

Compare also Republic, vii. p. 533 C. [Greek: ô)=| ga\r a)rchê\

me\n o(\ mê\ oi)=de, teleutê\ de\ kai\ ta\ metaxu\ e)x ou)= mê\

oi)=de sumpe/plektai, ti/s mêchanê\ tê\n toiau=tên o(mologi/an

pote\ e)pistê/mên gi/gnesthai?]]

[Footnote 104: Plato, Protagoras, pp. 356-7.]

[Footnote 105: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 357 B.]

[Side-note: Plato lays down tests by which Bonum may be determined:

but the answer in the Philêbus does not satisfy those tests.]

In the present dialogue, Plato lays down certain characteristic

marks whereby The Supreme Good may be known. These marks are

subjective--relative to the feelings and appreciation of sentient

beings--to all mankind, and even to animals and plants. Good is

explicitly defined by the property of conferring happiness. The

Good is declared to be "that habit and disposition of mind which

has power to confer on all men a happy life":[106] it is perfect

and all sufficient: every creature that knows Good, desires and

hunts after it, demanding nothing farther when it is attained, and

caring for nothing else except what is attained along with

it:[107] it is the object of choice for all plants and animals,

and if any one prefers any thing else, he only does so through

ignorance or from some untoward necessity:[108] it is most

delightful and agreeable to all.[109] This is what Plato tells us

as to the characteristic attributes of Good. And the test which

Sokrates applies, to determine whether Pleasure does or does not

correspond with these attributes, is an appeal to individual

choice or judgment. "Would you choose? Would _any one_ be

satisfied?" Though this appeal ought by the conditions of the

problem to be made to mankind generally, and is actually made to

Protarchus as one specimen of them--yet Sokrates says at the end

of the dialogue that all except philosophers choose wrong, being

too ignorant or misguided to choose aright. Now it is certain that

what these philosophers choose, will not satisfy the aspirations

of all other persons besides. It may be Good, in reference to the

philosophers themselves: but it will fail to answer those larger

conditions which Plato has just laid down.

[Footnote 106: Plato, Philêbus, p. 11 E.]

[Footnote 107: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 20 D-E, 61 C, 67 A. [Greek:

au)tarkei/a], &c.

Sydenham, Translation of Philêbus, note, p. 48, observes--"Whether

Happiness be to be found in Speculative Wisdom or in Pleasure, or

in some other possession or enjoyment, it can be seated nowhere

but in the soul. For Happiness has no existence anywhere but where

it is felt and known. Now, it is no less certain, that only the

soul is sensible of pain and pleasure, than it is, that only the

soul is capable of knowledge, and of thinking either foolishly or

wisely."]

[Footnote 108: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 22 B, 61 A.]

[Footnote 109: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 61 E, 64 C. [Greek: to\n

a)gapêto/taton bi/on pa=si prosphilê=].

Aristotle, Ethic. Nikomach. i. init. [Greek: ta)gatho/n, ou)=

pa/nta e)phi/etai].

Seneca, Epistol. 118. "Bonum est quod ad se impetum animi secundum

naturam movet."]

[Side-note: Inconsistency of Plato in his way of putting the

question--The alternative which he tenders has no fair

application.]

In submitting the question to individual choice, Plato does not

keep clear either of confusion or of contradiction. If this Summum

Bonum be understood as the End comprising the full satisfaction of

human wishes and imaginations, without limitation by certain given

actualities--and if the option be tendered to a man already

furnished with his share of the various desires generated in

actual life--such a man will naturally demand entire absence of

all pains, with pleasures such as to satisfy all his various

desires: not merely the most intense pleasures (which Plato

intends to prove, not to be pleasures at all), but other pleasures

also. He will wish (if you thus suppose him master of Fortunatus's

wishing-cap) to include in his enjoyments pleasures which do not

usually go together, and which may even, in the real conditions of

life, exclude one another: no boundary being prescribed to his

wishing power. He will wish for the pleasures of knowledge or

intelligence, of self-esteem, esteem from others, sympathy, &c.,

as well as for those of sense. He will put in his claim for

pleasures, without any of those antecedent means and conditions

which, in real life, are necessary to procure them. Such being the

state of the question, the alternative tendered by

Plato--Pleasure, versus Intelligence or Knowledge--has no fair

application. Plato himself expressly states that pleasure, though

generically One, is specifically multiform, and has many varieties

different from, even opposite to, each other: among which

varieties one is, the pleasure of knowledge or intelligence

itself.[110] The person to whom the question is submitted, has a

right to claim these pleasures of knowledge among the rest, as

portions of his Summum Bonum. And when Plato proceeds to ask--Will

you be satisfied to possess pleasure only, without the least spark

of intelligence, without memory, without eyesight?--he departs

from the import of his previous question, and withdraws from the

sum total of pleasure many of its most important items: since we

must of course understand that the pleasures of intelligence will

disappear along with intelligence itself,[111] and that the pains

of conscious want of intelligence will be felt instead of them.

[Footnote 110: Plato, Philêbus, p. 12 D.]

[Footnote 111: Plato, Philêbus, p. 21 C.]

[Side-note: Intelligence and Pleasure cannot be fairly

compared--Pleasure is an End, Intelligence a Means. Nothing can be

compared with Pleasure, except some other End.]

That the antithesis here enunciated by Plato is not legitimate or

logical, we may see on other grounds also. Pleasure and

Intelligence cannot be placed in competition with each other for

recognition as Summum Bonum: which, as described by Plato himself,

is of the nature of an End, while Intelligence is of the nature of

a means or agency--indispensable indeed, yet of no value unless it

be exercised, and rightly exercised towards its appropriate end,

which end must be separately declared.[112] Intelligence is a

durable acquisition stored up, like the good health, moral

character, or established habits, of each individual person: it is

a capital engaged in the production of interest, and its value is

measured by the interest produced. You cannot with propriety put

the means--the Capital--in one scale, and the End--the Interest--in

the other, so as to ascertain which of the two weighs most. A

prudent man will refrain from any present enjoyment which trenches

on his capital: but this is because the maintenance of the capital

is essential to all future acquisitions and even future

maintenance. So too, Intelligence is essential as a means or

condition to the attainment of pleasure in its largest sense--that

is, including avoidance or alleviation of pain or suffering: if

therefore you choose to understand pleasure in a narrower sense,

not including therein avoidance of pain (as Plato understands it

in this portion of the Philêbus), the comprehensive end to which

Intelligence corresponds may be compared with Pleasure and

declared more valuable--but Intelligence itself cannot with

propriety be so compared. Such a comparison can only be properly

instituted when you consider the exercise of Intelligence as

involving (which it undoubtedly does[113]) pleasures of its own;

which pleasures form part of the End, and may fairly be measured

against other pleasures and pains. But nothing can be properly

compared with Pleasure, except some other supposed End: and those

theorists who reject Pleasure must specify some other _Terminus ad

quem_--otherwise intelligence has no clear meaning.

[Footnote 112: Compare Plato, Republic, vi. p. 505 D (referred to

in a previous note); also Aristotel. Ethic. Nikom. i. 3, 1095, b.

30; i. 8, 1099, a. 1.

Respecting the value of Intelligence or Cognition, when the end

towards which it is to be exercised is undetermined, see the

dialogue between Sokrates and Kleinias--Plato, Euthydêm. pp.

289-292 B-E.

Aristotle, in the Nikomach. Ethic. (i. 4, 1096, b. 10), makes a

distinction between--1. [Greek: ta\ kath' au(ta\ diôko/mena kai\

a)gapô/mena]--2. [Greek: ta\ poiêtika\ tou/tôn ê)\ phulaktika\ ê)\

tô=n e)nanti/ôn kôlutika/]: and Plato himself makes the same

distinction at the beginning of the second book of the Republic.

But though it is convenient to draw attention to this distinction,

for the clear understanding of the subject, you cannot ask with

propriety which of the two lots is most valuable. The value of the

two is equal: the one cannot be had without the other.]

[Footnote 113: Plato, Philêb. p. 12 D.]

[Side-note: The Hedonists, while they laid down attainment of

pleasure and diminution of pain, postulated Intelligence as the

governing agency.]

Now the Hedonists in Plato's age, when they declared Pleasure to

be the supreme Good, understood Pleasure in its widest sense, as

including not merely all varieties of pleasure, mental and bodily

alike, but also avoidance of pain (in fact Epikurus dwelt

especially upon this last point). Moreover, they did not intend to

depreciate Intelligence, but on the contrary postulated it as a

governing agency, indispensable to right choice and comparative

estimation between different pleasures and pains. That

Eudoxus,[114] the geometer and astronomer, did this, we may be

sure: but besides, this is the way in which the Hedonistic

doctrine is expounded by Plato himself. In his Protagoras,

Sokrates advocates that doctrine, against the Sophist who is

unwilling to admit it. In the exposition there given by Sokrates,

Pleasure is announced as The Good to be sought, Pain as The Evil

to be avoided or reduced to a minimum. But precisely because the

End, to be pursued through constant diversity of complicated

situations, is thus defined--for that very reason he declares that

the dominant or sovereign element in man must be, the measuring

and calculating Intelligence; since such is the sole condition

under which the End can be attained or approached. In the theory

of the Hedonists, there was no antithesis, but indispensable

conjunction and implication, between Pleasure and

Intelligence.[115] And if it be said, that by declaring Pleasure

(and avoidance of Pain) to be the End, Intelligence the

means,--they lowered the dignity of the latter as compared with the

former:--we may reply that the dignity of Intelligence is exalted

to the maximum when it is enthroned as the ruling and controuling

agent over the human mind.

[Footnote 114: Eudoxus is cited by Aristotle (Ethic. Nikom. x. 2)

as the great champion of the Hedonistic theory. He is

characterised by Aristotle as [Greek: diaphero/ntôs sô/phrôn].]

[Footnote 115: The implication of the intelligent and emotional is

well stated by Aristotle (Eth. Nikom. x. 8, 1178, a. 16). [Greek:

sune/zeuktai de\ kai\ ê( phro/nêsis tê=| tou= ê)/thous a)retê=|,

kai\ au)/tê tê=| phronê/sei, ei)/per ai( me\n tê=s phronê/seôs

a)rchai\ kata\ ta\s ê)thika/s ei)sin a)reta/s, to\ d' o)rtho\n

tô=n ê=thikô=n kata\ tê\n phro/nêsin. sunêrtême/nai d' au)=tai

kai\ toi=s pa/thesi peri\ to\ su/ntheton a)\n ei)=en; ai( de\ tou=

sunthe/tou a)retai\ a)nthrôpikai/. kai\ o( bi/os dê\ o( kat'

au)ta\s kai\ ê( eu)daimoni/a. ê( de\ tou= nou= kechôrisme/nê], &c.

Compare also the first two or three sentences of the tenth Book of

Eth. Nik.]

[Side-note: Pleasures of Intelligence may be compared, and are

compared by Plato, with other pleasures, and declared to be of

more value. This is arguing upon the Hedonistic basis.]

In a scheme of mental philosophy, Emotion and Intellect are

properly treated as distinct phenomena requiring to be explained

separately, though perpetually co-existent and interfering with

each other. But in an ethical discourse about Summum Bonum, the

antithesis between Pleasure and Intelligence, on which the

Philêbus turns, is from the outset illogical. What gives to it an

apparent plausibility, is, That the exercise of Intelligence has

pleasures and pains of its own, and includes therefore in itself a

part of the End, besides being the constant and indispensable

directing force or Means. Now, though pleasure _in genere_ cannot

be weighed in the scale against Intelligence, yet the pleasures

and pains of Intelligence may be fairly and instructively compared

with other pleasures and pains. You may contend that the pleasures

of Intelligence are superior in quality, as well as less alloyed

by accompanying pains. This comparison is really instituted by

Plato in other dialogues;[116] and we find the two questions

apparently running together in his mind as if they were one and

the same. Yet the fact is, that those who affirm the pleasures

attending the exercise of Intelligence to be better and greater,

and the pains less, than those which attend other occupations, are

really arguing upon the Hedonistic basis.[117] Far from

establishing any antithesis between Pleasure and Intelligence,

they bring the two into closer conjunction than was done by

Epikurus himself.

[Footnote 116: See Republic, ix. pp. 581-582, where he compares

the pleasures of the three different lives. 1. [Greek: O(

philo/sophos] or [Greek: philomathê/s]. 2. [Greek: O(

philu/timos]. 3. [Greek: O( philokerdê/s].

Again in the Phædon, he tells us that we are not to weigh

pleasures against pleasures, or pains against pains, but all of

them against [Greek: phro/nêsis] or Intelligence (p. 69 A-B). This

appears distinctly to contradict what Sokrates affirms in the

Protagoras. But when we turn to another passage of the Phædon (p.

114 E), we find Sokrates recognising a class of pleasures attached

to the exercise of Intelligence, and declaring them to be more

valuable than the pleasures of sense, or any others. This is a

very different proposition: but in both passages Plato had

probably the same comparison in his mind.

Sydenham, in a note to his translation of the Philêbus (pp.

42-43), observes--"if Protarchus, when he took on himself to be an

advocate for pleasure, had included, in his meaning of the word,

all such pleasures as are purely mental, his opinion, fairly and

rightly understood, could not have been different in the main,

from what Sokrates here professes--That in every particular case,

to discern what is best in action, and to perceive what is true in

speculation, is the chief good of man; unless, indeed, it should

afterwards come into question which of the two kinds of pleasure,

the sensual or the mental, was to be preferred. For if it should

appear that in this point they were both of the same mind, the

controversy between them would be found a mere logomachy, or

contention about words (as between Epicureans and Stoics), of the

same kind as that would be between two persons, one of whom

asserted that to a musical ear the proper and true good was

Harmony, while the other contended that the good lay not in the

Harmony itself, but in the pleasure which the musical ear felt

from hearing it: or like a controversy among three persons, one of

whom having asserted that to all animals living under the northern

frigid zone, the Sun in Cancer was the greatest blessing; and

another having asserted that not the Sun was that chief blessing

to those northern animals, but the warmth which he afforded them;

the third should imagine that he corrected or amended the two

former by saying--That those animals were thus highly blest

neither by the Sun, nor by the warmth which his rays afforded

them, but by the joy or pleasure which they felt from the return

of the Sun and warmth."]

[Footnote 117: Plato, in Philêbus, p. 63 C-D, denounces and

discards the vehement pleasures because they disturb the right

exercise of Reason and Intelligence. Aristotle, after alluding to

this doctrine, presents the same fact under a different point of

view, as one case of a general law. Each variety of pleasure

belongs to, and is consequent on, a certain [Greek: e)ne/rgeia] of

the system. Each variety of pleasure promotes and consummates its

own [Greek: e)ne/rgeia], but impedes or arrests other different

[Greek: e)nergei/as]. Thus the pleasures of hunting, of gymnastic

contest, of hearing or playing music--cause each of these [Greek:

e)nergei=ai], upon which each pleasure respectively depends, to be

more completely developed; but are unfavourable to different

[Greek: e)nergei=ai], such as learning by heart, or solving a

geometrical problem. The pleasure belonging to these latter,

again, is unfavourable to the performance of the former [Greek:

e)nergei=ai]. Study often hurts health or good management of

property; but if a man has pleasure in study, he will perform that

work with better fruit and result.

This is a juster view of [Greek: ê(donê\] than what we read in the

Philêbus. The illogical antithesis of Pleasure _in genere_,

against Intelligence, finds no countenance from Aristotle.

See Ethic. Nikom. vii. 13, 1153, a. 20; x. 5, p. 1175; also Ethic.

Magna, ii. p. 1206, a. 3.]

[Side-note: Marked antithesis in the Philêbus between pleasure and

avoidance of pain.]

Another remark may be made on the way in which Plato argues the

question in the Philêbus against the Hedonists. He draws a marked

line of separation between Pleasure--and avoidance, relief, or

mitigation, of Pain. He does not merely distinguish the two, but

sets them in opposing antithesis. Wherever there is pain to be

relieved, he will not allow the title of _pleasurable_ to be

bestowed on the situation. That is not _true_ pleasure: in other

words, it is no pleasure at all. He does not go quite so far as

some contemporary theorists, the Fastidious Pleasure-Haters, who

repudiated all pleasures without exception.[118] He allows a few

rare exceptions; the sensual pleasures of sight, hearing, and

smell--and the pleasures of exercising Intelligence, which (these

latter most erroneously) he affirms to be not disentitled by any

accompanying pains. His catalogue of pleasures is thus reduced to

a chosen few, and these too enjoyable only by a chosen few among

mankind.

[Footnote 118: Plato, Philêbus, p. 44 B.]

[Side-note: The Hedonists did not recognise this distinction--They

included both in their acknowledged End.]

Now this very restricted sense of the word Pleasure is peculiar to

Plato, and peculiar even to some of the Platonic dialogues. Those

who affirmed Pleasure to be the Good, did not understand the word

in the same restricted sense. When Sokrates in the Protagoras

affirms, and when Sokrates in the Philêbus denies, that Pleasure

is identical with Good,--the affirmation and the denial do not

bear upon the same substantial meaning.[119]

[Footnote 119: Among the arguments employed by Sokrates in the

Philêbus to disprove the identity between [Greek: ê(donê\] and

[Greek: a)gatho/n], one is, that [Greek: ê(donê\] is a [Greek:

ge/nesis], and is therefore essentially a process of imperfection

or transition into some ulterior [Greek: ou)si/a], for the sake of

which alone it existed (Philêbus, pp. 53-55); whereas Good is

essentially an [Greek: ou)si/a]--perfect, complete,

all-sufficient--and must not be confounded with the process whereby it

is brought about. He illustrates this by telling us that the

species of [Greek: ge/nesis] called ship-building exists only for

the sake of the ship--the [Greek: ou)si/a] in which it terminates;

but that the fabricating process, and the result in which it ends,

are not to be confounded together.

The doctrine that pleasure is a [Greek: ge/nesis], Plato cites as

laid down by others: certain [Greek: kompsoi/], whom he does not

name, but whom the critics suppose to be Aristippus and the

Kyrenaici. Aristotle (in the seventh and tenth books of Ethic.

Nik.) also criticises and impugns the doctrine that pleasure is a

[Greek: ge/nesis]: but he too omits to name the persons by whom it

was propounded.

Possibly Aristippus may have been the author of it: but we can

hardly tell what he meant, or how he defended it. Plato derides

him for his inconsistency in calling pleasure a [Greek: ge/nesis],

while he at the same time maintained it to be the Good: but the

derision is founded upon an assumption which Aristippus would have

denied. Aristippus would not have admitted that all [Greek:

ge/nesis] existed only for the sake of [Greek: ou)si/a]: and he

would have replied to Plato's argument, illustrated by the example

of ship-building, by saying that the [Greek: ou)si/a] called a

_ship_ existed only for the sake of the services which it was

destined to render in transporting persons and goods: that if

[Greek: ge/nesis] existed for the sake of [Greek: ou)si/a], it was

no less true that [Greek: ou)si/a] existed for the sake of [Greek:

ge/nesis]. Plato therefore had no good foundation for the sarcasm

which he throws out against Aristippus.

The reasoning of Aristotle (E. N. x. 3-4; compare Eth. Magn. ii.

1204-1205) against the doctrine, that pleasure is [Greek:

ge/nesis] or [Greek: ki/nêsis], is drawn from a different point of

view, and is quite as unfavourable to the opinions of Plato as to

those of Aristippus. His language however in the Rhetoric is

somewhat different (i. p. 1370, b. 33).

Aristippus is said to have defined pleasure as [Greek: lei/a

ki/nêsis], and pain as [Greek: trachei=a ki/nêsis] (Diog. L. ii.

86-89). The word [Greek: ki/nêsis] is so vague, that one can

hardly say what it means, without some words of context: but I

doubt whether he meant anything more than "_a marked change of

consciousness_". The word [Greek: ge/nesis] is also very obscure:

and we are not sure that Aristippus employed it.]

[Side-note: Arguments of Plato against the intense pleasures--The

Hedonists enforced the same reasonable view.]

Again, in the arguments of Sokrates against pleasure _in genere_,

we find him also singling out as examples the intense pleasures,

which he takes much pains to discredit. The remarks which he makes

here upon the intense pleasures, considered as elements of

happiness, have much truth taken generally. Though he exaggerates

the matter when he says that many persons would rejoice to have

itch and irritation, in order that they might have the pleasure of

scratching[120]--and that persons in a fever have greater pleasure

as well as greater pain than persons in health--yet he is correct

to this extent, that the disposition to hanker after intense

pleasures, to forget their painful sequel in many cases, and to

pay for them a greater price than they are worth, is widely

disseminated among mankind. But this is no valid objection against

the Hedonistic theory, as it was enunciated and defended by its

principal advocates--by the Platonic Sokrates (in the Protagoras),

by Aristippus, Eudoxus,[121] Epikurus. All of them took account of

this frequent wrong tendency, and arranged their warnings

accordingly. All of them discouraged, not less than Plato, such

intense enjoyments as produced greater mischief in the way of

future pain and disappointment, or as obstructed the exercise of

calm reason.[122] All of them, when they talked of pleasure as the

Supreme Good, understood thereby a rational estimate and

comparison of pleasures and pains, present and future, so as to

ensure the maximum of the former and the minimum of the latter.

All of them postulated a calculating and governing Reason.

Epikurus undoubtedly, and I believe the other two also,

recommended a life of moderation, tranquillity, and meditative

reason: they deprecated the violent emotions, whether sensual,

ambitious, or money-getting.[123] The objections therefore here

stated by Sokrates, in so far as they are derived from the

mischievous consequences of indulgence in the intense pleasures,

do not avail against the Hedonistic theory, as explained either by

Plato himself (Protagoras) or by any theorists of the Platonic

century.

[Footnote 120: Plato, Philêbus, p. 47 B.]

[Footnote 121: I have already remarked that Eudoxus is

characterised by Aristotle as being [Greek: diaphero/ntôs

sô/phrôn] (Ethic. Nikom. x. 2). The strong interest which he felt

in scientific pursuits is marked by a story in Plutarch (Non Posse

Suaviter Vivi; see Epicur. p. 1094 A).]

[Footnote 122: The equivocal sense of the word Pleasure is the

same as that which Plato notes in the Symposion to attach to Eros

or Love (p. 205). When employed in philosophical discussion, it

sometimes _is_ used (and always _ought_ to be used) in its full

extent of generic comprehension: sometimes in a narrower sense, so

as to include only a few of the more intense pleasures, chiefly

the physical, and especially the sexual; sometimes in a sense

still more peculiar, partly as opposed to _duty_, partly as

opposed to _business_, _work_, _utility_, &c. Opponents of the

Hedonists took advantage of the unfavourable associations attached

to the word in these narrower and special senses, to make

objections tell against the theory which employed the word in its

widest generic sense.]

[Footnote 123: See the beautiful lines of Lucretius, Book ii.

init. When we read the three acrimonious treatises in which

Plutarch attacks the Epikureans (Non Posse Suaviter Vivi, adv.

Koloten, De Latenter Vivendo), we find him complaining, not that

Epikurus thought too much about pleasures, or that he thought too

much about the intense pleasures, but quite the reverse. Epikurus

(he says) made out too poor a catalogue of pleasures: he was too

easily satisfied with a small amount and variety of pleasures: he

dwelt too much upon the absence of pain, as being, when combined

with a very little pleasure, as much as man ought to look for: he

renounced all the most vehement and delicious pleasures, those of

political activity and contemplative study, which constitute the

great charms of life (1097 F-1098 E-1092 E-1093-1094). Plutarch

attacks Epikurus upon grounds really Hedonistic.]

[Side-note: Different points of view worked out by Plato in

different dialogues--Gorgias, Protagoras, Philêbus--True and False

Pleasures.]

We find Plato in his various dialogues working out different

points of view, partly harmonious, partly conflicting, upon

ethical theory. Thus in the Gorgias, Sokrates insists eloquently

upon the antithesis between the Immediate and Transient on the one

hand, which he calls Pleasure or Pain--and the Distant and

Permanent on the other, which he calls Good or Profit, Hurt or

Evil. In the Protagoras, Sokrates acknowledges the same

antithesis: but he points out that the Good or Profit, Hurt or

Evil, resolve themselves into elements generically the same as

those of the Immediate and Transient--Pleasure and Pain: so that

all which we require is, a calculating Intelligence to assess and

balance correctly the pleasures and pains in every given case. In

the Philêbus, Sokrates takes a third line, distinct from both the

other two dialogues: he insists upon a new antithesis, between

True Pleasures--and False Pleasures. If a Pleasure be associated

with any proportion, however small, of Pain or Uneasiness--or with

any false belief or impression--he denounces it as false and

impostrous, and strikes it out of the list of pleasures. The small

residue which is left after such deduction, consists of pleasures

recommended altogether by what Plato calls their truth, and

addressing themselves to the love of truth in a few chosen minds.

The attainment of Good--the object of the practical aspirations--is

presented as a secondary appendage of the attainment of Truth--the

object of the speculative or intellectual energies.

[Side-note: Opposition between the Gorgias and Philêbus, about

Gorgias and Rhetoric.]

How much the Philêbus differs in its point of view from the

Gorgias,[124] is indicated by Plato himself in a remarkable

passage. "I have often heard Gorgias affirm" (says Protarchus)

"that among all arts, the art of persuasion stands greatly

pre-eminent: since, it ensures subservience from all, not by force,

but with their own free consent." To which Sokrates replies--"I

was not then enquiring what art or science stands pre-eminent as

the greatest, or as the best, or as conferring most benefit upon

us--but what art or science investigates clear, exact, and full

truth, though it be in itself small, and may afford small benefit.

You need not quarrel with Gorgias, for you may admit to him the

superiority of his art in respect of usefulness to mankind, while

my art (dialectic philosophy) is superior in respect of accuracy.

I observed just now, that a small piece of white colour which is

pure, surpasses in truth a large area which is not pure. We must

not look to the comparative profitable consequences or good repute

of the various sciences or arts, but to any natural aspiration

which may exist in our minds to love truth, and to do every thing

for the sake of truth. It will then appear that no other science

or art strives after truth so earnestly as Dialectic."[125]

[Footnote 124: Sokrates in the Gorgias insists upon the constant

intermixture of pleasure with pain, as an argument to prove that

pleasure cannot be identical with good: pleasure and pain (he

says) go together but good and evil cannot go together: therefore

pleasure cannot be good, pain cannot be evil (Gorgias, pp.

496-497). But he distinguishes pleasures into the good and the bad;

not into the true and the false, as they are distinguished in the

Philêbus and the Republic (ix. pp. 583-585).]

[Footnote 125: Plato, Philêbus, p. 58 B-D-E. [Greek: Ou) tou=to

e(/gôge e)zê/toun pô, ti/s te/chnê ê)\ ti/s e)pistê/mê pasô=n

diaphe/rei tô=| megi/stê kai\ a)ri/stê kai\ plei=sta ô)phelou=sa

ê(ma=s, a)lla\ ti/s pote to\ saphe\s kai\ ta)kribe\s kai\ to\

a)lêthe/staton e)piskopei=, ka)\n ei) smikra\ kai\ smikra\

o)ni/nasa . . . A)ll' o(/ra; ou)de\ ga\r a)pechthê/sei Gorgi/a|,

tê=| me\n e)kei/nou u(pere/chein te/chnê| didou\s pro\s chrei/an

toi=s a)nthrô/pois, pro\s a)kribei/an de\ ê)=| ei)=pon e)gô\ nu=n

pragmatei/a| . . . mê/t' ei)/s tinas ô)phelei/as e)pistêmô=n

ble/psantes mê/te tina\s eu)dokimi/as, a)ll' ei)/ tis pe/phuke

tê=s psuchê=s ê(mô=n du/namis e)ra=|n te tou= a)lêthou=s kai\

pa/nta e(/neka tou/tou pra/ttein.]

Here, as elsewhere, I translate the substance of the passage,

adopting the amendments of Dr. Badham and Mr. Poste (see Mr.

Poste's note), which appear to me valuable improvements of a

confused text.

It seems probable enough that what is here said, conceding so

large a measure of credit to Gorgias and his art, may be intended

expressly as a mitigation of the bitter polemic assigned to

Sokrates in the Gorgias. This is, however, altogether conjecture.]

If we turn to the Gorgias, we find the very same claim advanced by

Gorgias on behalf of his own art, as that which Protarchus here

advances: but while Sokrates here admits it, in the Gorgias he

repudiates it with emphasis, and even with contumely: ranking

rhetoric among those employments which minister only to present

pleasure, but which are neither intended to yield, nor ever do

yield, any profitable result. Here in the Philêbus, the antithesis

between immediate pleasure and distant profit is scarcely noticed.

Sokrates resigns to Gorgias and to others of the like stamp, a

superiority not merely in the art of flattering and tricking the

immediate sensibilities of mankind, but in that of contributing to

their permanent profit and advantage. It is in a spirit contrary

to the Gorgias, and contrary also to the Republic (in which latter

we read the memorable declaration--That the miseries of society

will have no respite until government is in the hands of

philosophers[126]), that Sokrates here abnegates on behalf of

philosophy all efficacious pretension of conferring profit or

happiness on mankind generally, and claims for it only the pure

delight of satisfying the truth-seeking aspirations. Now these

aspirations have little force except in a few chosen minds; in the

bulk of mankind the love of truth is feeble, and the active search

for truth almost unknown. We thus see that in the Philêbus it is

the speculative few who are present to the imagination of Plato,

more than the ordinary working, suffering, enjoying Many.

[Footnote 126: Plato, Republ. v. 473 D.]

[Side-note: Peculiarity of the Philêbus--Plato applies the same

principle of classification--true and false--to Cognitions and

Pleasures.]

Aristotle, in the commencement of his Metaphysica, recommends

Metaphysics or First Philosophy to the reader, by affirming that,

though other studies are more useful or more necessary to man,

none is equal to it in respect of truth and exactness,[127]

because it teaches us to understand First Causes and Principles.

The like pretension is put forward by Plato in the Philêbus[128]

on behalf of dialectic; which he designates as the science of all

real, permanent, unchangeable, Entia. Taking Dialectic as the

maximum or Verissimum, Plato classifies other sciences or

cognitions according as they approach closer to it in truth or

exactness--according as they contain more of precise measurement

and less of conjecture. Sciences or cognitions are thus classified

according as they are more or less true and pure. But because this

principle of classification is fairly applicable to cognitions,

Plato conceives that it may be made applicable to Pleasures also.

One characteristic feature of the Philêbus is the attempt to apply

the predicates, _true_ or _false_, to pleasures and pains, as they

are applicable to cognitions or opinions: an attempt against which

Protarchus is made to protest, and which Sokrates altogether fails

in justifying,[129] though he employs a train of argument both

long and diversified.

[Footnote 127: Aristotel. Metaphys. A. p. 983, a. 25, b. 10.]

[Footnote 128: Plato, Philêb. pp. 57-58. Compare Republic, vii.

pp. 531-532.]

[Footnote 129: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 36 C. 38 A.

The various arguments, intended to prove this conclusion, are

continued from p. 36 to p. 51. The same doctrine is advocated by

Sokrates in the Republic, ix. pp. 583-584.

The doctrine is briefly stated by the Platonist Nemesius, De

Natur. Hominis, p. 223. [Greek: kai\ ga\r kata\ Pla/tôna tô=n

ê(donô=n ai( me/n ei)si pseudei=s, ai( de\ a)lêthei=s. Pseudei=s

me/n, o(/sai met' ai)sthê/seôs gi/gnontai kai\ do/xês ou)k

a)lêthou=s, kai\ lu/pas e)/chousi sumpeplegme/nas; a)lêthei=s de/,

o(/sai tê=s psuchê=s ei)si mo/nês au)tê=s kath' e(autê\n met'

e)pistê/mês kai\ nou= kai\ phronê/seôs, katharai\ kai\

a)nepi/miktoi lu/pês, ai)=s ou)demi/a meta/noia parakolouthei=

pote/.]

A brief but clear abstract of the argument will be found in Dr.

Badham's Preface to the Philêbus (pp. viii.-xi.). Compare also

Stallbaum's Prolegg. ch. v. p. 50, seq.]

[Side-note: Distinction of true and false--not applicable to

pleasures.]

In this train of argument we find a good deal of just and

instructive psychological remark: but nothing at all which proves

the conclusion that there are or can be _false pleasures_ or

_false pains_. We have (as Sokrates shows) false remembrances of

past pleasures and pains--false expectations, hopes, and fears of

future: we have pleasures alloyed by accompanying pains, and pains

qualified by accompanying pleasures: we have pleasures and pains

dependent upon false beliefs: but false pleasures we neither have

nor can have. The predicate is altogether inapplicable to the

subject. It is applicable to the intellectual side of our nature,

not to the emotional. A pleasure (or a pain) is what it seems,

neither more nor less; its essence consists in being felt.[130]

There are false beliefs, disbeliefs, judgments, opinions--but not

false pleasures or pains. The pleasure of the dreamer or madman is

not false, though it may be founded on illusory belief: the joy of

a man informed that he has just been appointed to a lucrative and

honourable post, the grief of a father on hearing that his son has

been killed in battle, are neither of them false, though the news

which both persons are made to believe may be totally false, and

though the feelings will thus be of short duration. Plato observes

that the state which he calls neutrality or indifference appears

pleasurable when it follows pain, and painful when it results from

an interruption of pleasure: here is a state which appears

alternately to be both, though it is in reality neither: the

pleasure or pain, therefore, whichever it be, he infers to be

_false_[131] But there is no falsehood in the case: the state

described is what it appears to be--pleasurable or painful: Plato

describes it erroneously when he calls it the same state, or one

of neutrality. Pleasure and Pain are both of them phenomena of

present consciousness. They are what they seem: none of them can

be properly called (as Plato calls them) "apparent pleasures which

have no reality".[132]

[Footnote 130: This is what Aristotle means when he says:--[Greek:

tê=s ê(donê=s d' e)n o(tô|ou=n chro/nô| te/leion to\ ei)=dos . . .

tô=n o(/lôn ti kai\ telei/ôn ê( ê(donê/] (Eth. Nik. x. 3, 1174, b.

4).]

[Footnote 131: Plato, Philêbus, pp. 43-44; Republic, ix. p. 583.

I copy the following passage from Professor Bain's work on "The

Emotions and the Will," the fullest and most philosophical account

of the emotions that I know (pp. 615-616; 3rd ed., pp. 550

seq.):--

"It is a general law of the mental constitution, more or less

recognised by inquirers into the human mind, that change of

impression is essential to consciousness in every form. . . There

are notable examples to show, that one unvarying action upon the

senses fails to give any perception whatever. Take the motion of

the earth about its axis and through space, whereby we are whirled

with immense velocity, but at a uniform pace, being utterly

insensible of the circumstance. . . It is the change from rest to

motion that wakens our sensibility, and, conversely, from motion

to rest. A uniform condition, as respects either state, is devoid

of any quickening influence on the mind. . . . We have repeatedly

seen pleasures depending for their existence on previous pains,

and pains on pleasures experienced or conceived. Such are the

contrasting states of Liberty and Restraint, Power and Impotence.

Many pleasures owe their effect as such to mere cessation. For

example, the pleasures of exercise do not need to be preceded by

pain: it is enough that there has been a certain intermission,

coupled with the nourishment of the exhausted parts. These are of

course our best pleasures. By means of this class, we might have a

life of enjoyment without pain: although, in fact, the other is

more or less mixed up in every one's experience. Exercise, Repose,

the pleasures of the different Senses and Emotions, might be made

to alternate, so as to give a constant succession of pleasure:

each being sufficiently dormant during the exercise of the others,

to reanimate the consciousness when its turn comes. It also

happens that some of those modes of delight are increased, by

being preceded by a certain amount of a painful opposite. Thus,

confinement adds to the pleasure of exercise, and protracted

exertion to that of repose. Fasting increases the enjoyment of

meals; and being much chilled prepares us for a higher zest in the

accession of warmth. It is not necessary, however, in those cases,

that the privation should amount to positive pain, in order to the

existence of the pleasure. The enjoyment of food may be

experienced, although the previous hunger may not be in any way

painful: at all events, with no more pain than the certainty of

the coming meal can effectually appease. There is still another

class of our delights depending entirely upon previous suffering,

as in the sudden cessation of acute pains, or the sudden relief

from great depression. Here the rebound from one nervous condition

to another is a stimulant of positive pleasure: constituting a

small, but altogether inadequate, compensation for the prior

misery. The pleasurable sensation of good health presupposes the

opposite experience in a still larger measure. Uninterrupted

health, though an instrumentality for working out many enjoyments,

of itself gives no sensation."

It appears to me that this passage of Mr. Bain's work

discriminates and sets out what there is of truth in Plato's

doctrine about the pure and painless pleasures. In his first

volume (The Senses and the Intellect) Mr. Bain has laid down and

explained the great fundamental fact of the system, that it

includes spontaneous sources of activity; which, after repose and

nourishment, require to be exerted, and afford a certain pleasure

in the course of being exerted. There is no antecedent pain to be

relieved: but privation (which is only a grade and variety of

pain, and sometimes considerable pain) is felt if the exertion be

hindered. This doctrine of spontaneous activity, employed by Mr.

Bain successfully to explain a large variety of mental phenomena,

is an important and valuable extension of that which Aristotle

lays down in the Ethics, that pleasure is an accessory or adjunct

of [Greek: e)ne/rgeia a)nempo/distos (e)ne/rgeia tê=s kata\

phu/sin e(/xeôs] Eth. N. vii. 13, 1153, a. 15), without any view

to obtain any separate extraneous pleasure or to relieve any

separate extraneous pain ([Greek: kath' au(ta\s d' ei)si\n

ai(retai/, a)ph' ô)=n mêde\n e)pizêtei=tai para\ tê\n

e)ne/rgeian], E. N. x. 6, 1176, b. 6).]

[Footnote 132: Plato, Philêbus, p. 51 A. [Greek: pro\s to\ tina\s

ê(dona\s ei)=nai dokou/sas, ou)/sas d' ou)damô=s], &c. [Greek: to\

phaino/menon a)ll' ou)k o)/n], p. 42 C, which last sentence is

better explained (I think) in the note of Dr. Badham than in that

of Mr. Poste.

Mr. Poste observes justly, in his note on p. 40 C:--"The falsely

anticipated pleasure in mistaken Hope may be called, as it is here

called, False Pleasure. This is, however, an inaccurate

expression. It is not the Pleasure, but the Imagination of it

(_i.e._ the Imagination or Opinion) that is false. Sokrates

therefore does not dwell upon this point, though Protarchus allows

the expression to pass." The last phrase of the passage which I

have thus transcribed ("Sokrates _therefore_ does not dwell upon

this point") is less accurate than that which precedes: for it

seems to imply that the Sokrates of Philêbus _admits_ the

inaccuracy of the expression, which seems to me not borne out by

the text of the dialogue. Both here and elsewhere in the dialogue,

the doctrine, that many pleasures are false, is maintained by

Sokrates distinctly--[Greek: to\ ê(/desthai] is put upon the same

footing as [Greek: to\ doxa/zein], which may be either [Greek:

a)lêthô=s] or [Greek: pseudô=s].

When Sokrates (p. 37 B) puts the question, "You admit that [Greek:

do/xa] may be either [Greek: a)lêthê\s] or [Greek: pseudê/s]: how

then can you argue that [Greek: ê(donê/] must be always [Greek:

a)lêthê/s]?" the answer is, that pleasure is not, if we speak

correctly, either true or false: neither one predicate nor the

other is properly applicable to it: we can only so apply them by a

metaphor, altogether misleading in philosophical reasoning. When

Sokrates further argues (37 D), "You admit that some qualifying

predicates may be applied to pleasures and pain, great or small,

durable or transient, &c. You admit that an opinion may be correct

or mistaken in its object, and when it is the latter you call it

_false_: why is not the pleasure which accompanies a false opinion

to be called false also?" Protarchus refuses distinctly to admit

this, saying, "I have already affirmed that on that supposition

the _opinion_ is false: but no man will call the _pleasure_ false"

(p. 38 A).]

[Side-note: Plato acknowledges no truth and reality except in the

Absolute--Pleasures which he admits to be true--and why.]

What seems present to the mind of Plato in this doctrine is the

antithesis between the absolute and the relative. He will allow

reality only to the absolute: the relative he considers (herein

agreeing with the Eleates) to be all seeming and illusion. Thus

when he comes to describe the character of those few pleasures

which he admits to be true, we find him dwelling upon their

absolute nature. 1. The pleasures derived from perfect geometrical

figures: the exact straight line, square, cube, circle, &c.: which

figures are always beautiful _per se_, not by comparison or in

relation with any thing else:[133] and "which have pleasures of

their own, noway analogous to those of scratching" (_i. e._, not

requiring to be preceded by the discomfort of an itching surface).

2. The pleasures derived from certain colours beautiful in

themselves: which are beautiful always, not merely when seen in

contrast with some other colours. 3. The pleasures of hearing

simple sounds, beautiful in and by themselves, with whatever other

sounds they may be connected. 4. The pleasures of sweet smells,

which are pleasurable though not preceded by uneasiness. 5. The

pleasures of mathematical studies: these studies do not derive

their pleasurable character from satisfying any previous uneasy

appetite, nor do they leave behind them any pain if they happen to

be forgotten.[134]

[Footnote 133: Plato, Philêbus, p. 51 C. [Greek: tau=ta ga\r ou)k

ei)=nai pro/s ti kala\ le/gô, katha/per a)/lla, a)ll' a)ei\ kala\

kath' au(ta\ pephuke/nai, kai/ tinas ê(dona\s oi)kei/as e)/chein,

ou)de\n tai=s tô=n knê/seôn prospherei=s.]

51 D: [Greek: ta\s tô=n phônô=n ta\s lei/as kai\ lampra/s, ta\s

e(/n ti katharo\n i(ei/sas me/los, ou) pro\s e(/teron kala\s a)ll'

au)ta\s kath' au(ta\s ei)=nai, kai\ tou/tôn xumphu/tous ê(dona\s

e(pome/nas.]]

[Footnote 134: Plato, Philêbus, p. 62 B.

We may illustrate the doctrine of the Philêbus about pleasures and

pains, by reference to a dictum of Sokrates quoted in the

Xenophontic Memorabilia (iii. 13).

Some person complained to Sokrates that he had lost his

appetite--that he no longer ate with any pleasure ([Greek: o(/ti

a)êdô=s e)/sthioi])--"The physician Akumenus (so replied Sokrates) teaches

us a good remedy in such a case. Leave off eating: after you have

left off, you will come back into a more pleasurable, easy, and

healthful condition."

Now let us suppose the like complaint to be addressed to the

Platonic Sokrates. What would have been _his_ answer?

The Sokrates of the Protagoras would have regarded the complainant

as suffering under a misfortune, and would have tried to suggest

some remedy: either the prescription of Akumenus, or any other

more promising that he could think of. The Sokrates of the Phædon,

on the contrary, would have congratulated him on the improvement

in his condition, inasmuch as the misguiding and degrading

ascendancy, exercised by his body over his mind, was suppressed in

one of its most influential channels: just as Kephalus, in the

Republic (i. 329), is made to announce it as one of the blessings

of old age, that the sexual appetite has left him. The Sokrates of

the Philêbus, also, would have treated the case as one for

congratulation, but he would have assigned a different reason. He

would have replied: "The pleasures of eating are altogether false.

You never really had any pleasure in eating. If you believed

yourself to have any, you were under an illusion. You have reason

to rejoice that this illusion has now passed away: and to rejoice

the more, because you have come a step nearer to the most divine

scheme of life."

Speusippus (the nephew and successor of Plato), if he had been

present, would have re-assured the complainant in a manner equally

decided. He would have said nothing, however, about the difference

between true and false pleasures: he would have acknowledged them

all as true, and denounced them all as mischievous. He would have

said (see Aul. Gell. ix. 5): "The condition which you describe is

one which I greatly envy. Pleasure and Pain are both, alike and

equally, forms of Evil. I eat, to relieve the pain of hunger: but

unfortunately, I cannot do so without experiencing some pleasure;

and I thus incur evil in the other and opposite form. I am ashamed

of this, because I am still kept far off from Good, or the point

of neutrality: but I cannot help myself. _You_ are more fortunate:

you avert one evil, _pain_, without the least alloy of the other

evil, _pleasure_: what you attain is thus pure Good. I hope your

condition may long continue, and I should be glad to come into it

myself."