SOPHISTES--POLITIKUS.
Persons and circumstances of the two dialogues 185
Relation of the two dialogues to the Theætêtus 187
Plato declares that his first purpose is to administer a lesson in
logical method: the special question chosen, being subordinate to
that purpose 188
Method of logical Definition and Division _ib._
Sokrates tries the application of this method, first, upon a
vulgar subject. To find the logical place and deduction of the
Angler. Superior classes above him. Bisecting division 189
Such a lesson in logical classification was at that time both
novel and instructive. No logical manuals then existed 190
Plato describes the Sophist as analogous to an angler. He traces
the Sophist by descending subdivision from the acquisitive genus
of art 191
The Sophist traced down from the same, by a second and different
descending subdivision 192
Also, by a third 193
The Sophist is traced down, from the genus of separating or
discriminating art 194
In a logical classification, low and vulgar items deserve as much
attention as grand ones. Conflict between emotional and scientific
classification 195
The purifier--a species under the genus discriminator--separates
good from evil. Evil is of two sorts; the worst sort is,
Ignorance, mistaking itself for knowledge 197
Exhortation is useless against this worst mode of evil.
Cross-examination, the shock of the Elenchus, must be brought to bear
upon it. This is the sovereign purifier _ib._
The application of this Elenchus is the work of the Sophist,
looked at on its best side. But looked at as he really is, he is a
juggler who teaches pupils to dispute about every thing--who palms
off falsehood for truth 198
Doubt started by the Eleate. How can it be possible either to
think or to speak falsely? 199
He pursues the investigation of this problem by a series of
questions _ib._
The Sophist will reject our definition and escape, by affirming
that to speak falsely is impossible. He will require us to make
out a rational theory, explaining Non-Ens 200
The Eleate turns from Non-Ens to Ens. Theories of various
philosophers about Ens _ib._
Difficulties about Ens are as great as those about Non-Ens 201
Whether Ens is Many or One? If Many, how Many? Difficulties about
One and the Whole. Theorists about Ens cannot solve them 201
Theories of those who do not recognise a definite number of Entia
or elements. Two classes thereof 202
1. The Materialist Philosophers. 2. The Friends of Forms or
Idealists, who recognise such Forms as the only real Entia _ib._
Argument against the Materialists--Justice must be something,
since it may be either present or absent, making sensible
difference--But Justice is not a body 203
At least many of them will concede this point, though not all Ens
is common to the corporeal and the incorporeal. Ens is equivalent
to potentiality 204
Argument against the Idealists--who distinguish Ens from the
generated, and say that we hold communion with the former through
our minds, with the latter through our bodies and senses _ib._
Holding communion--What? Implies Relativity. Ens is known by the
mind. It therefore suffers or undergoes change. Ens includes both
the unchangeable and the changeable 205
Motion and rest are both of them Entia or realities. Both agree in
Ens. Ens is a _tertium quid_--distinct from both. But how can
anything be distinct from both? 206
Here the Eleate breaks off without solution. He declares his
purpose to show, That Ens is as full of puzzle as Non-Ens _ib._
Argument against those who admit no predication to be legitimate,
except identical. How far Forms admit of intercommunion with each
other _ib._
No intercommunion between any distinct forms. Refuted. Common
speech is inconsistent with this hypothesis 207
Reciprocal intercommunion of all Forms--inadmissible _ib._
Some Forms admit of intercommunion, others not. This is the only
admissible doctrine. Analogy of letters and syllables _ib._
Art and skill are required to distinguish what Forms admit of
intercommunion, and what Forms do not. This is the special
intelligence of the Philosopher, who lives in the bright region of
Ens: the Sophist lives in the darkness of Non-Ens 208
He comes to enquire what Non-Ens is. He takes for examination five
principal Forms--Motion--Rest--Ens--Same--Different _ib._
Form of Diversum pervades all the others 209
Motion is different from Diversum, or is not Diversum. Motion is
different from Ens--in other words, it is Non-Ens. Each of these
Forms is both Ens and Non-Ens 210
By Non-Ens, we do not mean anything contrary to Ens--we mean only
something different from Ens. Non-Ens is a real Form, as well as
Ens _ib._
The Eleate claims to have refuted Parmenides, and to have shown
both that Non-Ens is a real Form, and also what it is 211
The theory now stated is the only one, yet given, which justifies
predication as a legitimate process, with a predicate different
from the subject 212
Enquiry, whether the Form of Non-Ens can come into intercommunion
with the Forms of Proposition, Opinion, Judgment 213
Analysis of a Proposition. Every Proposition must have a noun and
a verb--it must be proposition of _Something_. False propositions,
involve the Form of Non-Ens, in relation to the particular subject
_ib._
Opinion, Judgment, Fancy, &c., are akin to Proposition, and may be
also false, by coming into partnership with the Form Non-Ens 214
It thus appears that Falsehood, imitating Truth, is theoretically
possible, and that there may be a profession, like that of the
Sophist, engaged in producing it _ib._
Logical distribution of Imitators--those who imitate what they
know, or what they do not know--of these last, some sincerely
believe themselves to know, others are conscious that they do not
know, and designedly impose upon others 215
Last class divided--Those who impose on numerous auditors by long
discourse, the Rhetor--Those who impose on select auditors, by
short question and answer, making the respondent contradict
himself--the Sophist 215
Dialogue closed. Remarks upon it. Characteristics ascribed to a
Sophist 216
These characteristics may have belonged to other persons, but they
belonged in an especial manner to Sokrates himself _ib._
The conditions enumerated in the dialogue (except the taking of a
fee) fit Sokrates better than any other known person 217
The art which Plato calls "the thoroughbred and noble Sophistical
Art" belongs to Sokrates and to no one else. The Elenchus was
peculiar to him. Protagoras and Prodikus were not Sophists in this
sense 218
Universal knowledge--was professed at that time by all
Philosophers--Plato, Aristotle, &c. 219
Inconsistency of Plato's argument in the Sophistês. He says that
the Sophist is a disputatious man who challenges every one for
speaking falsehood. He says also that the Sophist is one who
maintains false propositions to be impossible 220
Reasoning of Plato about Non-Ens--No predications except identical
221
Misconception of the function of the copula in predication _ib._
No formal Grammar or Logic existed at that time. No analysis or
classification of propositions before the works of Aristotle 222
Plato's declared purpose in the Sophistês--To confute the various
schools of thinkers--Antisthenes, Parmenides, the Materialists,
&c. 223
Plato's refutation throws light upon the doctrine of Antisthenes
_ib._
Plato's argument against the Materialists 224
Reply open to the Materialists _ib._
Plato's argument against the Idealists or Friends of Forms. Their
point of view against him 225
Plato argues--That to know, and be known, is action and passion, a
mode of relativity 226
Plato's reasoning--compared with the points of view of both
_ib._
The argument of Plato goes to an entire denial of the Absolute,
and a full establishment of the Relative 227
Coincidence of his argument with the doctrine of Protagoras in the
Theætêtus _ib._
The Idealists maintained that Ideas or Forms were entirely
unchangeable and eternal. Plato here denies this, and maintains
that ideas were partly changeable, partly unchangeable 228
Plato's reasoning against the Materialists _ib._
Difference between Concrete and Abstract, not then made
conspicuous. Large meaning here given by Plato to
Ens--comprehending not only objects of Perception, but objects of
Conception besides 229
Narrower meaning given by Materialists to Ens--they included only
Objects of Perception. Their reasoning as opposed to Plato _ib._
Different definitions of Ens--by Plato--the Materialists, the
Idealists 231
Plato's views about Non-Ens examined _ib._
His review of the select Five Forms 233
Plato's doctrine--That Non-Ens is nothing more than different from
Ens _ib._
Communion of Non-Ens with proposition--possible and explicable
235
Imperfect analysis of a proposition--Plato does not recognise the
predicate _ib._
Plato's explanation of Non-Ens is not satisfactory--Objections to
it 236
Plato's view of the negative is erroneous. Logical maxim of
contradiction 239
Examination of the illustrative propositions chosen by Plato--How
do we know that one is true, the other false? _ib._
Necessity of accepting the evidence of sense 240
Errors of Antisthenes--depended partly on the imperfect formal
logic of that day 241
Doctrine of the Sophistês--contradicts that of other Platonic
dialogues 242
The persons whom Plato here attacks as Friends of Forms are those
who held the same doctrine as Plato himself espouses in Phædon,
Republic, &c. 246
The Sophistês recedes from the Platonic point of view, and
approaches the Aristotelian 247
Aristotle assumes without proof, that there are some propositions
true, others false 249
Plato in the Sophistês has undertaken an impossible task--He could
not have proved, against his supposed adversary, that there _are_
false propositions _ib._
What must be assumed in all dialectic discussion 251
Discussion and theorising presuppose belief and disbelief,
expressed in set forms of words. They imply predication, which
Antisthenes discarded 252
Precepts and examples of logical partition, illustrated in the
Sophistês 253
Recommendation of logical bipartition 254
Precepts illustrated by the Philêbus _ib._
Importance of founding logical Partition on resemblances perceived
by sense 255
Province of sensible perception--is not so much narrowed by Plato
here as it is in the Theætêtus 256
Comparison of the Sophistês with the Phædrus 257
Comparison of the Politikus with the Parmenidês 258
Variety of method in dialectic research--Diversity of Plato 259