THEÆTETUS.
Subjects and personages in the Theætêtus 110
Question raised by Sokrates--What is knowledge or Cognition? First
answer of Theætêtus, enumerating many different cognitions.
Corrected by Sokrates 111
Preliminary conversation before the second answer is given.
Sokrates describes his own peculiar efficacy--mental obstetric--He
cannot teach, but he can evolve knowledge out of pregnant minds
112
Ethical basis of the cross-examination of Sokrates--He is
forbidden to pass by falsehood without challenge 113
Answer of Theætêtus--Cognition is sensible perception: Sokrates
says that this is the same doctrine as the _Homo Mensura_ laid
down by Protagoras, and that both are in close affinity with the
doctrines of Homer, Herakleitus, Empedoklês, &c., all except
Parmenides _ib._
Plato here blends together three distinct theories for the purpose
of confuting them; yet he also professes to urge what can be said
in favour of them. Difficulty of following his exposition 114
The doctrine of Protagoras is completely distinct from the other
doctrines. The identification of them as one and the same is only
constructive--the interpretation of Plato himself 115
Explanation of the doctrine of Protagoras--_Homo Mensura_ 116
Perpetual implication of Subject with Object--Relate and Correlate
118
Such relativity is no less true in regard to the ratiocinative
combinations of each individual, than in regard to his percipient
capacities _ib._
Evidence from Plato proving implication of Subject and Object, in
regard to the intelligible world 121
The Protagorean measure is even more easily shown in reference to
the intelligible world than in reference to sense 122
Object always relative to Subject--Either without the other,
impossible. Plato admits this in Sophistes 126
Plato's representation of the Protagorean doctrine in intimate
conjunction with the Herakleitean 126
Relativity of sensible facts, as described by him _ib._
Relations are nothing in the object purely and simply without a
comparing subject 127
Relativity twofold--to the comparing Subject--to another object,
besides the one directly described _ib._
Statement of the doctrine of Herakleitus--yet so as to implicate
it with that of Protagoras 128
Agent and Patient--No absolute Ens 129
Arguments derived from dreams, fevers, &c., may be answered 130
Exposition of the Protagorean doctrine, as given here by Sokrates
is to a great degree just. You cannot explain the facts of
consciousness by independent Subject and Object 131
Plato's attempt to get behind the phenomena. Reference to a double
potentiality--Subjective and Objective 133
Arguments advanced by the Platonic Sokrates against the
Protagorean doctrine. He says that it puts the wise and foolish on
a par--that it contradicts the common consciousness. Not every
one, but the wise man only, is a measure 135
In matters of present sentiment every man can judge for himself.
Where future consequences are involved special knowledge is
required 136
Plato, when he impugns the doctrine of Protagoras, states that
doctrine without the qualification properly belonging to it. All
belief relative to the condition of the believing mind 137
All exposition and discussion is an assemblage of individual
judgments and affirmations. This fact is disguised by elliptical
forms of language 139
Argument--That the Protagorean doctrine equalises all men and
animals. How far true. Not true in the sense requisite to sustain
Plato's objection 141
Belief on authority is true to the believer himself--The efficacy
of authority resides in the believer's own mind 142
Protagorean formula--is false, to those who dissent from it 143
Plato's argument that the wise man alone is a measure--Reply to it
_ib._
Plato's argument as to the distinction between present sensation
and anticipation of the future 145
The formula of Relativity does not imply that every man believes
himself to be infallible _ib._
Plato's argument is untenable--That if the Protagorean formula be
admitted, dialectic discussion would be annulled--The reverse is
true--Dialectic recognises the autonomy of the Individual mind
146
Contrast with the Treatise De Legibus--Plato assumes infallible
authority--sets aside dialectic 148
Plato in denying the Protagorean formula, constitutes himself the
measure for all. Counter proposition to the formula _ib._
Import of the Protagorean formula is best seen when we state
explicitly the counter-proposition 150
Unpopularity of the Protagorean formula--Most believers insist
upon making themselves a measure for others, as well as for
themselves. Appeal to Abstractions 150
Aristotle failed in his attempts to refute the Protagorean
formula--Every reader of Aristotle will claim the right of
examining for himself Aristotle's canons of truth 152
Plato's examination of the other doctrine--That knowledge is
Sensible Perception. He adverts to sensible facts which are
different with different Percipients 153
Such is not the case with all the facts of sense. The conditions
of unanimity are best found among select facts of sense--weighing,
measuring, &c. 154
Arguments of Sokrates in examining this question. Divergence
between one man and another arises, not merely from different
sensual impressibility, but from mental and associative difference
155
Argument--That sensible Perception does not include
memory--Probability that those who held the doctrine meant to include
memory 157
Argument from the analogy of seeing and not seeing at the same
time _ib._
Sokrates maintains that we do not see _with_ our eyes, but that
the mind sees _through_ the eyes: that the mind often conceives
and judges by itself without the aid of any bodily organ 159
Indication of several judgments which the mind makes by itself--It
perceives Existence, Difference, &c. 160
Sokrates maintains that knowledge is to be found, not in the
Sensible Perceptions themselves, but in the comparisons add
computations of the mind respecting them 161
Examination of this view--Distinction from the views of modern
philosophers 162
Different views given by Plato in other dialogues 163
Plato's discussion of this question here exhibits a remarkable
advance in analytical psychology. The mind rises from Sensation,
first to Opinion, then to Cognition 164
Plato did not recognise Verification from experience, or from
facts of sense, as either necessary or possible 168
Second definition given by Theætêtus--That Cognition consists in
right or true opinion _ib._
Objection by Sokrates--This definition assumes that there are
false opinions. But how can false opinions be possible? How can we
conceive Non-Ens: or confound together two distinct realities?
_ib._
Waxen memorial tablet in the mind, on which past impressions are
engraved. False opinion consists in wrongly identifying present
sensations with past impressions 169
Sokrates refutes this assumption. Dilemma. Either false opinion is
impossible, or else a man may know what he does not know 170
He draws distinction between possessing knowledge, and having it
actually in hand. Simile of the pigeon-cage with caught pigeons
turned into it and flying about _ib._
Sokrates refutes this. Suggestion of Theætêtus--That there may be
non-cognitions in the mind as well as cognitions, and that false
opinion may consist in confounding one with the other. Sokrates
rejects this 171
He brings another argument to prove that Cognition is not the same
as true opinion. Rhetors persuade or communicate true opinion; but
they do not teach or communicate knowledge 172
New answer of Theætêtus--Cognition is true opinion, coupled with
rational explanation 173
Criticism on the answer by Sokrates. Analogy of letters and words,
primordial elements and compounds. Elements cannot be explained:
compounds alone can be explained _ib._
Sokrates refutes this criticism. If the elements are unknowable,
the compound must be unknowable also 174
Rational explanation may have one of three different meanings. 1.
Description in appropriate language. 2. Enumeration of all the
component elements in the compound. In neither of these meanings
will the definition of Cognition hold _ib._
Third meaning. To assign some mark, whereby the thing to be
explained differs from everything else. The definition will not
hold. For rational explanation, in this sense, is already included
in true opinion 175
Conclusion of the dialogue--Summing up by Sokrates--Value of the
result, although purely negative 176
Remarks on the dialogue. View of Plato. False persuasion of
knowledge removed. Importance of such removal _ib._
Formation of the testing or verifying power in men's minds, value
of the Theætêtus, as it exhibits Sokrates demolishing his own
suggestions 177
Comparison of the Philosopher with the Rhetor. The Rhetor is
enslaved to the opinions of auditors 178
The Philosopher is master of his own debates 179
Purpose of dialogue to qualify for a life of philosophical Search
_ib._
Difficulties of the Theætêtus are not solved in any other Dialogue
180
Plato considered that the search for Truth was the noblest
occupation of life 182
Contrast between the philosopher and the practical
statesman--between Knowledge and Opinion 183