It is clear that in this book pessimism, or, better still, Nihilism,
stands for "truth." But truth is not postulated as the highest measure
of value, and still less as the highest power. The will to appearance,
to illusion, to deception, to becoming, and to change (to objective
deception), is here regarded as more profound, as more primeval, as
more metaphysical than the will to truth, to reality, to appearance:
the latter is merely a form of the will to illusion. Happiness is
likewise conceived as more primeval than pain: and pain is considered
as conditioned, as a consequence Of the will to happiness (of the will
to Becoming, to growth, to forming, i.e. to creating; in creating,
however, destruction is included). The highest state of Yea-saying to
existence is conceived as one from which the greatest pain may not be
excluded: the tragico-Dionysian state.