2. They make war, and ultimately agree concerning equal rights (justice
is made an end in itself).
3. Once this is reached, the actual differences in degrees of power
begin to make themselves felt, and to a greater extent than before (the
reason being that on the whole peace is established, and innumerable
small centres of power begin to create differences which formerly were
scarcely noticeable). Now the individuals begin to form groups, these
strive after privileges and preponderance, and war starts afresh in a
milder form.
People demand freedom only when they have no power. Once power is
obtained, a preponderance thereof is the next thing to be coveted; if
this is not achieved (owing to the fact that one is still too weak for
it), then _"justice" i.e. "equality_ of power" become the objects of
desire.
785.
_The rectification of the concept "egoism."_--When one has discovered
what an error the "individual" is, and that every single creature
represents the whole process of evolution (not alone "inherited," but
in "himself"), the individual then acquires _an inordinately great
importance._ The voice of instinct is quite right here. When this
instinct tends to decline, _i.e._ when the individual begins to seek
his worth in his services to others, one may be sure that exhaustion
and degeneration have set in. An altruistic attitude of mind, when
it is fundamental and free from all hypocrisy, is the instinct of
creating a second value for one's self in the service of other egoists.
As a rule, however, it is only apparent--a circuitous path to the
preservation of one's own feelings of vitality and worth.
786.
_The History of Moralisation and Demoralisation._
_Proposition one._--There are no such things as moral actions: they
are purely imaginary. Not only is it impossible to demonstrate their
existence (a fact which Kant and Christianity, for instance, both
acknowledged) but they are not even possible. Owing to psychological
misunderstanding, a man invented an _opposite_ to the instinctive
impulses of life, and believed that a new species of instinct was
thereby discovered: a _primum mobile_ was postulated which does not
exist at all. According to the valuation which gave rise to the
antithesis "moral" and "immoral," one should say: _There is nothing
else on earth but immoral intentions and actions._
_Proposition two._----The whole differentiation, "moral" and "immoral,"
arises from the assumption that both moral and immoral actions are the
result of a spontaneous will--in short, that such a will exists; or in
other words, that moral judgments can only hold good with regard to
intuitions and actions _that are free._ But this whole order of actions
and intentions is purely imaginary: the only world to which the moral
standard could be applied does not exist at all: _there is no such
thing as a moral or an immoral action._
The _psychological error_ out of which the antithesis "moral" and
"immoral" arose is: "selfless," "unselfish," "self-denying"--all unreal
and fantastic.
A false dogmatism also clustered around the concept "ego"; it was
regarded as atomic, and falsely opposed to a non-ego; it was also
liberated from Becoming, and declared to belong to the sphere of
Being. The false materialisation of the ego: this (owing to the belief
in individual immortality) was made an article of faith under the
pressure of _religio-moral discipline._ According to this artificial
liberation of the ego and its transference to the realm of the
absolute, people thought that they had arrived at an antithesis in
values which seemed quite irrefutable--the single ego and the vast
non-ego. It seemed obvious that the value of the individual ego could
only exist in conjunction with the vast non-ego, more particularly in
the sense of being subject to it and existing only for its sake. Here,
of course, the gregarious instinct determined the direction of thought:
nothing is more opposed to this instinct than the sovereignty of the
individual. Supposing, however, that the ego be absolute, then its
value must lie in _self-negation._
Thus: (1) the false emancipation of the "individual" as an atom;
(2) The gregarious self-conceit which abhors the desire to remain an
atom, and regards it as hostile.
(3) As a result: the overcoming of the individual by changing his aim.
(4) At this point there appeared to be actions that were self-effacing:
around these actions a whole sphere of antitheses was fancied.
(5) It was asked, in what sort of actions does man most strongly
assert himself? Around these (sexuality, covetousness, lust for power,
cruelty, etc. etc.) hate, contempt, and anathemas were heaped: it
was believed that there could be such things as selfless impulses.
Everything selfish was condemned, everything unselfish was in demand.
(6) And the result was: what had been done? A ban had been placed
on the strongest, the most natural, yea, the only genuine impulses,
henceforward, in order that an action might be praiseworthy, there must
be no trace in it of any of those genuine impulses--_monstrous fraud
in psychology._ Every kind of "self-satisfaction" had to be remodelled
and made possible by means of misunderstanding and adjusting one's self
_sub specie boni._ Conversely: that species which found its advantage
in depriving mankind of its self-satisfaction, the representatives of
the gregarious instincts, _e.g._ the priests and the philosophers, were
sufficiently crafty and psychologically astute to show how selfishness
ruled everywhere. The Christian conclusion from this was: "Everything
is sin, even our virtues. Man is utterly undesirable. Selfless actions
are impossible." Original sin. In short, once man had opposed his
instincts to a purely imaginary world of the good, he concluded by
despising himself as incapable of performing "good" actions.
_N.B._ In this way Christianity represents a step forward in the
sharpening of psychological insight: La Rochefoucauld and Pascal. It
perceived the essential equality of human actions, and the equality of
their values as a whole (all immoral).
***
Now the first serious object was to rear men in whom self-seeking
impulses were extinguished. _priests, saints._ And if people doubted
that perfection was possible, they did not doubt what perfection was.
The psychology of the saint and of the priest and of the "good" man,
must naturally have seemed purely phantasmagorical. The real motive of
all action had been declared bad: therefore, in order to make action
still possible, deeds had to be prescribed which, though not possible,
had to be declared possible and sanctified. They now honoured and
idealised things with as much falsity as they had previously slandered
them.
Inveighing against the instincts of life came to be regarded as holy
and estimable. The priestly ideal was: absolute chastity, absolute
obedience, absolute poverty! The lay ideal: alms, pity, self-sacrifice,
renunciation of the beautiful, of reason, and of sensuality, and a dark
frown for all the strong qualities that existed.
***
An advance is made: the slandered instincts attempt to re-establish
their rights (_e.g._ Luther's Reformation, the coarsest form of
moral falsehood under the cover of "Evangelical freedom"), they are
rechristened with holy names.
The calumniated instincts try to demonstrate that they are necessary in
order that the virtuous instincts may be possible. _Il faut vivre, afin
de vivre pour autrui:_ egoism as a means to an end.[7]
But people go still further: they try to grant both the egoistic and
altruistic impulses the right to exist--equal rights for both--from the
utilitarian standpoint.
People go further: they see greater utility in placing the egoistic
rights before the altruistic--greater utility in the sense of more
happiness for the majority, or of the elevation of mankind, etc. etc.
Thus the rights of egoism begin to preponderate, but under the cloak of
an extremely altruistic standpoint--the collective utility of humanity.
An attempt is made to reconcile the altruistic mode of action with the
natural order of things. Altruism is sought in the very roots of life.
Altruism and egoism are both based upon the essence of life and nature.
The disappearance of the opposition between them is dreamt of as a
future possibility. Continued adaptation, it is hoped, will merge the
two into one.
At last it is seen that altruistic actions are merely a species of the
egoistic--and that the degree to which one loves and spends one's self
is a proof of the extent of one's individual power and personality. In
short, that the more evil man can be made, the better he is, and that
one cannot be the one without the other. At this point the curtain
rises which concealed the monstrous fraud of the psychology that has
prevailed hitherto.
***
_Results._--There are only immoral intentions and actions; the
so-called moral actions must be shown to be immoral. All emotions are
traced to a single will, the will to power, and are called essentially
equal. The concept of life: in the apparent antithesis good and evil,
degrees of power in the instincts alone are expressed. A temporary
order of rank is established according to which certain instincts are
either controlled or enlisted in our service. Morality is justified:
economically, etc.
***
Against proposition two.--Determinism: the attempt to rescue the moral
world by transferring it to the unknown.
Determinism is only a manner of allowing ourselves to conjure our
valuations away, once they have lost their place in a world interpreted
mechanistically. Determinism must therefore be attacked and undermined
at all costs: just as our right to distinguish between an absolute and
phenomenal world should be disputed.
[Footnote 7: Spencer's conclusion in the _Data of Ethics._--Tr.]
787.
It is absolutely necessary to emancipate ourselves from motives:
otherwise we should not be allowed to attempt to sacrifice ourselves
or to neglect ourselves! Only the innocence of Becoming gives us the
highest courage and the highest freedom.
788.
A clean conscience must be restored to the evil man--has this been my
involuntary endeavour all the time? for I take as the evil man him
who is strong (Dostoievsky's belief concerning the convicts in prison
should be referred to here).
789.
Our new "freedom." What a feeling of relief there is in the thought
that we emancipated spirits do not feel ourselves harnessed to any
system of teleological aims. Likewise that the concepts reward and
punishment have no roots in the essence of existence! Likewise that
good and evil actions are not good or evil in themselves, but only
from the point of view of the self-preservative tendencies of certain
species of humanity! Likewise that our speculations concerning pleasure
and pain are not of cosmic, far less then of metaphysical, importance!
(That form of pessimism associated with the name of Hartmann, which
pledges itself to put even the pain and pleasure of existence into
the balance, with its arbitrary confinement in the prison and within
the bounds of pre-Copernican thought, would be something not only
retrogressive, but degenerate, unless it be merely a bad joke on the
part of a "Berliner."[8])
[Footnote 8: "Berliner"--The citizens of Berlin are renowned in Germany
for their poor jokes.--Tr.]
790.
If one is clear as to the "wherefore" of one's life, then the "how" of
it can take care of itself.
It is already even a sign of disbelief in the wherefore and in the
purpose and sense of life--in fact, it is a sign of a lack of
will--when the value of pleasure and pain step into the foreground,
and hedonistic and pessimistic teaching becomes prevalent; and
self-abnegation, resignation, virtue, "objectivity," _may,_ at the very
least, be signs that the most important factor is beginning to make its
absence felt.
791.
Hitherto there has been no German culture. It is no refutation of this
assertion to say that there have been great anchorites in Germany
(Goethe, for instance); for these had their own culture. But it was
precisely around them, as though around mighty, defiant, and isolated
rocks, that the remaining spirit of Germany, _as their antithesis,_
lay that is to say, as a soft, swampy, slippery soil, upon which every
step and every footprint of the rest of Europe made an impression and
created forms. German culture was a thing devoid of character and of
almost unlimited yielding power.
792.
Germany, though very rich in clever and well-informed scholars, has
for some time been so excessively poor in great souls and in mighty
minds, that it almost seems to have forgotten what a great soul or
a mighty mind is; and to-day mediocre and even ill-constituted men
place themselves in the market square without the suggestion of a
conscience-prick or a sign of embarrassment, and declare themselves
great men, reformers, etc. Take the case of Eugen Dühring, for
instance, a really clever and well-informed scholar, but a man who
betrays with almost every word he says that he has a miserably small
soul, and that he is horribly tormented by narrow envious feelings;
moreover, that it is no mighty overflowing, benevolent, and spendthrift
spirit that drives him on, but only the spirit of ambition! But to be
ambitious in such an age as this is much more unworthy of a philosopher
than ever it was: to-day, when it is the mob that rules, when it is the
mob that dispenses the honours.
793.
My "future": a severe polytechnic education. Conscription; so that as
a rule every man of the higher classes should be an officer, whatever
else he may be besides.