(a) The Method of Investigation.
466.
The distinguishing feature of our nineteenth century is not the triumph
of _science,_ but the triumph of the scientific _method_ over science.
467.
_The history of scientific methods_ was regarded by Auguste Comte
almost as philosophy itself.
468.
The great _Methodologists:_ Aristotle, Bacon, Descartes, Auguste Comte.
469.
The most valuable knowledge is always discovered last: but the most
valuable knowledge consists of _methods._
All methods, all the hypotheses on which the science of our day
depends, were treated with the profoundest contempt for centuries:
on their account a man used to be banished from the society of
_respectable_ people--he was held to be an "_enemy of God,_" a reviler
of the highest ideal, a madman.
We had the whole _pathos_ of mankind against us,--our notion of what
"truth" ought to be, of what the service of truth ought to be, our
objectivity, our method, our calm, cautious and distrustful manner were
altogether _despicable...._ At bottom, that which has kept men back
most, is an æsthetic taste: they believed in the picturesque effect of
truth; what they demanded of the scientist was, that he should make a
strong appeal to their imagination.
From the above, it would almost seem as if the very _reverse_ had been
achieved, as if a sudden _jump_ had been made: as a matter of fact, the
schooling which the moral hyperboles afforded, gradually prepared the
way for that _milder form of pathos_ which at last became incarnate in
the scientific man....
_Conscientiousness in small things,_ the self-control of the religious
man, was a preparatory school for the scientific character, as was
also, in a very pre-eminent sense, the attitude of mind which makes a
man _take problems seriously,_ irrespective of what personal advantage
he may derive from them....
_(b)_ The Starting-point of Epistemology.
470.
Profound disinclination to halt once and for all at any collective view
of the world. The charm of the opposite point of view: the refusal to
relinquish the stimulus residing in the enigmatical.
471.
The hypothesis that, at bottom, things proceed in such a moral fashion
that _human reason must be right,_ is a mere piece of good-natured
and simple-minded trustfulness, the result of the belief in Divine
truthfulness--God regarded as the Creator of all things.--These
concepts are our inheritance from a former existence in a Beyond.
472.
The contradiction of the so-called "facts of consciousness."
Observation a thousand times more difficult, error is perhaps the
absolute _condition_ of observation.
473.
The intellect cannot criticise itself, simply because it can be
compared with no other kind of intellect, and also because its ability
to know would only reveal itself in the presence of "actual reality";
that is to say, because, in order to criticise the intellect, we should
have to be higher creatures with "absolute knowledge." This would
presuppose the existence of _something,_ a "thing-in-itself," apart
from all the perspective kinds of observation and senso-spiritual
perception. But the psychological origin of the belief in _things,_
forbids our speaking of "things in themselves."
474.
The idea that a sort of adequate relation exists between _subject_ and
_object,_ that the object is something which _when seen from inside_
would be a subject, is a well-meant invention which, I believe, has
seen its best days. The measure of that which we are conscious of, is
perforce entirely dependent upon the coarse utility of the function of
consciousness: how could this little garret-prospect of consciousness
warrant our asserting anything in regard to "subject" and "object,"
which would bear any relation to reality!
475.
Criticism of modern philosophy: erroneous starting-point, as if there
were such things as "facts of consciousness"--and no _phenomenalism_ in
_introspection._
476.
"Consciousness"--to what extent is the idea which is thought of, the
idea of will, or the idea of a feeling (_which is known by us alone_),
quite superficial? Our _inner_ world is also "appearance."
477.
I am convinced of the phenomenalism of the _inner_ world also:
everything that reaches our consciousness is utterly and completely
adjusted, simplified, schematised, interpreted, the _actual_ process
of inner "perception," the _relation of causes_ between thoughts,
feelings, desires, between subject and object, is absolutely concealed
from us, and may be purely imaginary. This "_inner_ world of
appearance" is treated with precisely the same forms and procedures as
the "outer" world. We never come across a single "fact": pleasure and
pain are more recently evolved intellectual phenomena....
Causality evades us; to assume the existence of an immediate causal
relation between thoughts, as Logic does, is the result of the coarsest
and most clumsy observation. There are _all sorts of passions_ that may
intervene between two thoughts: but the interaction is too rapid--that
is why we _fail to recognise_ them, that is why we actually _deny_
their existence....
"Thinking," as the epistemologists understand _\r_ it, never takes
place at all: it is an absolutely gratuitous fabrication, arrived at
by selecting one element from the process and by eliminating all the
rest--an artificial adjustment for the purpose of the understanding....
The "mind," _something that thinks_: at times, even, "the mind absolute
and pure"--this concept is an evolved and second result of false
introspection, which believes in "thinking": in the first place an act
is imagined here which does not really occur at all, _i.e._ "thinking";
and, _secondly,_ a subject-substratum is imagined in which every
process of this thinking has its origin, and nothing else--that is to
say, _both the action and the agent are fanciful._
478.
Phenomenalism must not be sought in the wrong quarter: nothing is more
phenomenal, or, to be more precise, nothing is so much _deception,_ as
this inner world, which we observe with the "inner sense."
Our belief that the will is a cause was so great, that, according to
our personal experiences in general, we projected a cause into all
phenomena (_i.e._ a certain motive is posited as the cause of all
phenomena).
We believe that the thoughts which follow one upon the other in our
minds are linked by some sort of causal relation: the logician, more
especially, who actually speaks of a host of facts which have never
once been seen in reality, has grown accustomed to the prejudice that
thoughts _are the cause_ of thoughts.
We believe--and even our philosophers believe it still--that pleasure
and pain are the causes of reactions, that the very purpose of pleasure
and pain is to occasion reactions. For hundreds of years, pleasure and
pain have been represented as the _motives_ for every action. Upon
reflection, however, we are bound to concede that everything would have
proceeded in exactly the same way, according to precisely the same
sequence of cause and effect, if the states "pleasure" and "pain" had
been entirely absent; and that we are simply deceived when we believe
that they actually cause anything:--they are the _attendant phenomena,_
and they have quite a different purpose from that of provoking
reactions; they are in themselves effects involved in the process of
reaction which takes place.
_In short:_ Everything that becomes conscious is a final phenomenon, a
conclusion--and is the cause of nothing; all succession of phenomena
in consciousness is absolutely atomistic.--And we tried to understand
the universe from the _opposite_ point of view--as if nothing were
effective or real, save thinking, feeling, willing! ...
479.
_The phenomenalism of the "inner world!" A chronological inversion
takes place,_ so that the cause reaches consciousness as the
effect.--We know that pain is projected into a certain part of the
body although it is not really situated there; we have learnt that all
sensations which were ingenuously supposed to be conditioned by the
outer world are, as a matter of fact, conditioned by the inner world:
that the real action of the outer world never takes place in a way of
which we can become conscious.... That fragment of the outer world of
which we become conscious, is born after the effect produced by the
outer world has been recorded, and is subsequently interpreted as the
"cause" of that effect....
In the phenomenalism of the "inner world," the chronological order
of cause and effect is inverted. The fundamental fact of "inner
experience" is, that the cause is imagined after the effect has been
recorded.... The same holds good of the sequence of thoughts: we seek
for the reason of a thought, before it has reached our consciousness;
and then the reason reaches consciousness first, whereupon follows
its effect. All our dreams are the interpretation of our collective
feelings with the view of discovering the possible causes of the
latter; and the process is such that a condition only becomes
conscious, when the supposed causal link has reached consciousness.[1]
The whole of "inner experience" is founded on this: that a cause is
sought and imagined which accounts for a certain irritation in our
nerve-centres, and that it is only the cause which is found in this way
which reaches consciousness; this cause may have absolutely nothing to
do with the real cause--it is a sort of groping assisted by former
"inner experiences," that is to say, by memory. The memory, however,
retains the habit of old interpretations,--that is to say, of erroneous
causality,--so that "inner experience" comprises in itself all the
results of former erroneous fabrications of causes. Our "outside
world," as we conceive it every instant, is indissolubly bound up with
the old error of cause: we interpret by means of the schematism of
"the thing," etc.
"Inner experience" only enters consciousness when it has found a
language which the individual can _understand_--that is to say, a
translation of a certain condition into conditions with which he is
_familiar;_ "understand" means simply this: to be able to express
something new in the terms of something old or familiar. For instance,
"I feel unwell"--a judgment of this sort presupposes a _very great and
recent neutrality on the part of the observer:_ the simple man always
says, "This and that make me feel unwell,"--he begins to be clear
concerning his indisposition only after he has discovered a reason for
it.... This is what I call _a lack of philological_ knowledge; to be
able to read a text, _as such,_ without reading an interpretation into
it, is the latest form of "inner experience,"--it is perhaps a barely
possible form....
[Footnote 1: When in our dream we hear a bell ringing, or a tapping at
our door, we scarcely ever wake before having already accounted for the
sound, in the terms of the dream-world we were in.--TR.]
480.
There are no such things as "mind," reason, thought, consciousness,
soul, will, or truth: they all belong to fiction, and can serve no
purpose. It is not a question of "subject and object," but of a
particular species of animal which can prosper only by means of a
certain _exactness,_ or, better still, _regularity_ in recording its
perceptions (in order that experience may be capitalised)....
Knowledge works as an _instrument_ of power. It is therefore obvious
that it increases with each advance of power....
The purpose of knowledge: in this case, as in the case of "good" or
"beautiful," the concept must be regarded strictly and narrowly from an
anthropocentric and biological standpoint. In order that a particular
species may maintain and increase its power, its conception of reality
must contain enough which is calculable and constant to allow of its
formulating a scheme of conduct. _The utility of preservation_--and
_not_ some abstract or theoretical need to eschew deception--stands as
the motive force behind the development of the organs of knowledge; ...
they evolve in such a way that their observations may suffice for our
preservation. In other words, the _measure_ of the desire for knowledge
depends upon the extent to which _the Will to Power_ grows in a certain
species: a species gets a grasp of a given amount of reality, _in order
to master it, in order to enlist that amount in its service._
(c) The Belief in the "Ego." Subject.
481.
In opposition to Positivism, which halts at phenomena and says,
"These are only _facts_ and nothing more," I would say: No,
facts are precisely what is lacking, all that exists consists of
_interpretations._ We cannot establish any fact "in itself": it
may even be nonsense to desire to do such a thing. "Everything is
_subjective,_" ye say: but that in itself is _interpretation._ The
subject is nothing given, but something superimposed by fancy,
something introduced behind.--Is it necessary to set an interpreter
behind the interpretation already to hand? Even that would be fantasy,
hypothesis.
To the extent to which knowledge has any sense at all, the world is
knowable: but it may be interpreted _differently,_ it has not one sense
behind it, but hundreds of senses.--"Perspectivity."
It is our needs that _interpret the world_; our instincts and their
impulses for and against. Every instinct is a sort of thirst for power;
each has its point of view, which it would fain impose upon all the
other instincts as their norm.
482.
Where our ignorance really begins, at that point from which we can see
no further, we set a word; for instance, the word "I," the word "do,"
the word "suffer"--these concepts may be the horizon lines of our
knowledge, but they are not "truths."
483.
Owing to the phenomenon "thought," the ego is taken for granted; but
up to the present everybody believed, like the people, that there
was something unconditionally certain in the notion "I think," and
that by analogy with our understanding of all other causal reactions
this "I" was the given _cause_ of the thinking. However customary
and indispensable this fiction may have become now, this fact proves
nothing against the imaginary nature of its origin; it might be a
life-preserving belief and _still_ be _false._
484.
"Something is thought, therefore there is something that thinks": this
is what Descartes' argument amounts to. But this is tantamount to
considering our belief in the notion "_substance_" as an "_a priori_"
truth:--that there must be something "that thinks" when we think, is
merely a formulation of a grammatical custom which sets an agent to
every action. In short, a metaphysico-logical postulate is already put
forward here--and it is not merely _an ascertainment of fact...._ On
Descartes' lines nothing absolutely certain is attained, but only the
fact of a very powerful faith.
If the proposition be reduced to "Something is thought, therefore there
are thoughts," the result is mere tautology; and precisely the one
factor which is in question, the "_reality_ of thought," is not touched
upon,--so that, in this form, the apparitional character of thought
cannot be denied. What Descartes _wanted_ to prove was, that thought
not only had _apparent reality,_ but absolute reality.
485.
The concept _substance_ is an outcome of the concept _subject,_ and not
conversely! If we surrender the concept soul, the subject, the very
conditions for the concept "substance" are lacking. _Degrees of Being_
are obtained, but Being is lost.
Criticism of "_reality_": what does a _"plus or minus of reality"_ lead
to, the gradation of Being in which we believe?
The degree of our feeling of _life_ and _power_ (the logic and
relationship of past life) presents us with the measure of "Being,"
"reality," "non-appearance."
_Subject i_ this is the term we apply to our belief in an _entity_
underlying all the different moments of the most intense sensations
of reality; we regard this belief as the effect of a cause,--and we
believe in our belief to such an extent that, on its account alone,
we imagine "truth," "reality," "substantiality."--a "Subject" is the
fiction which would fain make us believe that several similar states
were the effect of one substratum: but we it was who first _created_
the "similarity" of these states; the similising and adjusting of them
is the _fact--not_ their similarity (on the contrary, this ought rather
to be denied).
486.
One would have to know what _Being_ is, in order to be able to
_decide_ whether this or that is real (for instance, "the facts of
consciousness"); it would also be necessary to know what _certainty_
and _knowledge_ are, and so forth.--But, as we do _not_ know these
things, a criticism of the faculty of knowledge is nonsensical: how is
it possible for an instrument to criticise itself, when it is itself
that exercises the critical faculty. It cannot even define itself!
487.
Should not all philosophy ultimately disclose the first principles on
which the reasoning processes depend?--that is to say, our _belief_
in the "ego" as a substance, as the only reality according to which,
alone, we are able to ascribe reality to things? The oldest realism
at length comes to light, simultaneously with man's recognition of
the fact that his whole religious history is no more than a history
of soul-superstitions. _Here there is a barrier;_ our very thinking,
itself, involves that belief (with its distinctions--substance,
accident, action, agent, etc.); to abandon it would mean to cease from
being able to think.
But that a belief, however useful it may be for the preservation of a
species, has nothing to do with the truth, may be seen from the fact
that we _must_ believe in time, space, and motion, without feeling
ourselves compelled to regard them as absolute realities.
488.
_The psychological origin of our belief in reason.--_The ideas
"reality," "Being," are derived from our _subject-_feeling.
"Subject," interpreted through ourselves so that the ego may stand as
substance, as the cause of action, as the _agent._
The metaphysico-logical postulates, the belief in substance, accident,
attribute, etc. etc., draws its convincing character from our habit of
regarding all our actions as the result of our will: so that the ego,
as substance, does not vanish in the multiplicity of changes.--_But
there is no such thing as will._ We have no categories which allow
us to separate a "world as thing-in-itself," from "a world of
appearance." All our _categories of reason_ have a sensual origin: they
are deductions from the empirical world. "The soul," "the ego"--the
history of these concepts shows that here, also, the oldest distinction
("_spiritus_," "life") obtains....
If there is nothing material, then there can be nothing immaterial. The
concept no longer _means_ anything.
No subject-"atoms." The sphere of a subject _increasing_ or
_diminishing_ unremittingly, the centre of the system continually
_displacing_ itself, in the event of the system no longer being able
to organise the appropriated mass, it divides into two. On the other
hand, it is able, without destroying it, to transform a weaker subject
into one of its own functionaries, and, to a certain extent, to compose
a new entity with it. Not a "substance," but rather something which in
itself strives after greater strength; and which wishes to "preserve"
itself only indirectly (it wishes to _surpass_ itself).
489.
Everything that reaches consciousness as an entity is already
enormously complicated: we never have anything more than the _semblance
of an entity._
The phenomenon of the _body_ is the richer, more distinct, and more
tangible phenomenon: it should be methodically drawn to the front, and
no mention should be made of its ultimate significance.
490.
The assumption of a _single subject_ is perhaps not necessary, it
may be equally permissible to assume a plurality of subjects, whose
interaction and struggle lie at the bottom of our thought and our
consciousness in general. A sort of _aristocracy_ of "cells" in which
the ruling power is vested? Of course an aristocracy of equals, who are
accustomed to ruling co-operatively, and understand how to command?
_My hypotheses_. The subject as a plurality. Pain intellectual and
dependent upon the judgment harmful, projected. The effect always
"unconscious": the inferred and imagined cause is projected, it
_follows_ the event. Pleasure is a form of pain. The only kind of power
that exists is of the same nature as the power of will: a commanding
of other subjects which thereupon alter themselves. The unremitting
transientness and volatility of the subject. "Mortal soul." _Number_ as
perspective form.
491.
The belief in the body is more fundamental than the belief in the soul:
the latter arose from the unscientific observation of the agonies
of the body. (Something which leaves it. The belief in the _truth of
dreams_)
492.
The body and physiology the starting-point: why?--We obtain a correct
image of the nature of our subject-entity, that is to say, as a
number of regents at the head of a community (not as "souls" or as
"life-forces") as also of the dependence of these regents upon their
subjects, and upon the conditions of a hierarchy, and of the division
of labour, as the means ensuring the existence of the part and the
whole. We also obtain a correct image of the way in which the living
entities continually come into being and expire, and we see how
eternity cannot belong to the "subject"; we realise that the struggle
finds expression in obeying as well as in commanding, and that a
fluctuating definition of the limits of power is a factor of life. The
comparative _ignorance_ in which the ruler is kept, of the individual
performances and even disturbances taking place in the community,
also belong to the conditions under which government may be carried
on. In short, we obtain a valuation even of _want-of-knowledge,_
of seeing-things-generally-as-a-whole, of simplification, of
falsification, and of perspective. What is most important, however,
is, that we regard the ruler and his subjects as of the _same kind,_
all feeling, willing, thinking--and that wherever we see or suspect
movement in a body, we conclude that there is co-operative-subjective
and invisible life. Movement as a symbol for the eye; it denotes that
something has been felt, willed, thought.
The danger of directly questioning the subject _concerning_ the
subject, and all spiritual self-reflection, consists in this, that it
might be a necessary condition of its activity to interpret itself
_erroneously._ That is why we appeal to the body and lay the evidence
of sharpened senses aside: or we try and see whether the subjects
themselves cannot enter into communication with us.
_(d)_ Biology of the Instinct of Knowledge. Perspectivity.
493.
_Truth is that kind of error_ without which a certain species of living
being cannot exist. The value for _Life_ is ultimately decisive.
494.
It is unlikely that our "knowledge" extends farther than is exactly
necessary for our self-preservation. Morphology shows us how the
senses and the nerves as well as the brain evolve in proportion as the
difficulties of acquiring sustenance increase.
495.
If the morality of "Thou shalt not lie" be refuted, the sense for truth
will then have to justify itself before another tribunal--as a means
to the preservation of man, _as Will to Power._
Likewise our love of the beautiful: it is also the _creative will._
Both senses stand side by side; the sense of truth is the means
wherewith the power is appropriated to adjust things according to one's
taste. The love of adjusting and reforming--a primeval love! We can
only _take cognisance_ of a world which we ourselves have _made._
496.
Concerning the multifariousness of knowledge. The tracing of _its_
relation to many other things (or the relation of kind)--how should
"knowledge" be of another? The way to know and to investigate is in
itself among the conditions of life; that is why the conclusion that
there could be no other kind of intellect (for ourselves) than the kind
which serves the purpose of our preservation is an excessively hasty
one: this _actual_ condition may be only an accidental, not in the
least an essential; one.
Our apparatus for acquiring knowledge is not adjusted for knowledge.
497.
_The most strongly credited a priori "truths" are, to my mind, mere
assumptions pending further investigation_; for instance, the law
of causation is a belief so thoroughly acquired by practice and so
completely assimilated, that to disbelieve in it would mean the ruin of
our kind. But is it therefore true? What an extraordinary conclusion!
As if truth were proved by the mere fact that man survives!
498.
To what extent is our _intellect_ also a result of the conditions of
life?--We should not have it did we not _need_ to have it, and we
should not have it _as_ we have it, if we did not need it _as_ we need
it--that is to say, if we could live otherwise.
499.
Thinking in a primitive (inorganic) state is to _persevere in forms,_
as in the case of the crystal.--In _our_ thought, the _essential
factor_ is the harmonising of the new material with the old schemes (=
Procrustes' bed), the _assimilation_ of the unfamiliar.
500.
The perception of the senses projected outwards: "inwards" and
"outwards"--does the _body_ command here?
The same equalising and ordering power which rules in the idioplasma,
also rules in the incorporation of the outer world: our sensual
perceptions are already the _result_ of this process of _adaptation_
and _harmonisation_ in regard to _all_ the past in us; they do not
follow directly upon the "impression."
501.
All thought, judgment, perception, regarded as an act of _comparing_[2]
has as a first condition the act of _equalising,_ and earlier still the
act of _"making equal."_ The process of making equal is the same as the
assimilation by the amœba of the nutritive matter it appropriates.
"Memory" late, in so far as the equalising instinct appears to have
been _subdued_: the difference is preserved. Memory--a process of
classification and collocation; active--who?
[Footnote 2: The German word _vergleichen,_ meaning "to compare,"
contains the root "equal" _(gleich)_ which cannot be rendered in
English. TR.]
502.
In regard to the _memory,_ we must unlearn a great deal: here we meet
with the greatest temptation to assume the existence of a "soul,"
which, irrespective of time, reproduces and recognises again and again,
etc. What I have experienced, however, continues to live "in the
memory"; I have nothing to do with it when memory "comes," my will is
inactive in regard to it, as in the case of the coming and going of a
thought. Something happens, of which I become conscious: now something
similar comes--who has called it forth? Who has awakened it?
503.
The whole apparatus of knowledge is an abstracting and simplifying
apparatus--not directed at knowledge, but at the _appropriation_ of
things: "end" and "means" are as remote from the essence of this
apparatus as "concepts" are. By the "end" and the "means" a process is
appropriated (--a process is _invented_ which may be grasped), but by
"_concepts_" one appropriates the "things" which constitute the process.
504.
_Consciousness_ begins outwardly as co-ordination and knowledge of
impressions,--at first it is at the point which is remotest from the
biological centre of the individual; but it is a process which deepens
and which tends to become more and more an inner function, continually
approaching nearer to the centre.
505.
Our perceptions, as we understand them--that is to say, the sum of all
those perceptions the consciousness whereof was useful and essential
to us and to the whole organic processes which preceded us: therefore
they do not include all perceptions (for instance, not the electrical
ones);--that is to say, we have _senses_ only for a definite selection
of perceptions--such perceptions as concern us with a view to our
self-preservation. _Consciousness extends so far only as it is useful._
There can be no doubt that all our sense-perceptions are entirely
permeated by valuations (useful or harmful--consequently, pleasant or
painful). Every particular colour; besides being a colour, expresses a
value to us (although we seldom admit it, or do so only after it has
affected us exclusively for a long time, as in the case of convicts
in gaol or lunatics). Insects likewise react in different ways to
different colours: some like this shade, the others that. Ants are a
case in point.
506.
In the beginning _images_ how images originate in the mind must be
explained. Then _words,_ applied to images. Finally _concepts,_
possible only when there are words--the assembling of several pictures
into a whole which is not for the eye but for the ear (word). The
small amount of emotion which the "word" generates,--that is, then,
which the view of the similar pictures generates, for which one word
is used,--this simple emotion is the common factor, the basis of a
concept. That weak feelings should all be regarded as alike, _as the
same,_ is the fundamental fact. There is therefore a confusion of
two very intimately associated feelings in the _ascertainment_ of
these feelings;--but who is it that ascertains? _Faith_ is the very
first step in every sensual impression: a sort of yea-saying is the
_first_ intellectual activity! A "holding-a-thing-to-be-true" is
the beginning. It were our business, therefore, to explain how the
"holding-of-a-thing-to-be-true" arose! What sensation lies beneath the
comment "true"?
507.
The _valuation_, "I believe that this and that is so," is the essence
of "truth." In all valuations, the conditions of _preservation_ and
of _growth_ find expression. All our _organs and senses_ of knowledge
have been developed only in view of the conditions of preservation
and growth. The _trust_ in reason and its categories, the trust
in dialectics, and also the _valuation_ of logic, prove only that
_experience_ has taught the usefulness of these things to life: not
their "truth." The prerequisites of all living things and of their
lives is: that there should be a large amount of faith, that it should
be possible to pass definite judgments on things, and that _there
should be no doubt_ at all concerning all essential values. Thus it is
necessary that something should be assumed to be true, _not_ that it
_is_ true.
"The _real_ world and the world of _appearance_"-- I trace this
contrast to the _relation of values._ We have posited _our_ conditions
of existence as the _attributes of being_ in general. Owing to the
fact that, in order to prosper, we must be stable in our belief, we
developed the idea that the real world was neither a changing nor an
evolving one, but a world of _being._
_(e)_ The Origin of Reason and Logic.
508.
Originally there was chaos among our ideas. Those ideas which were able
to stand side by side remained over, the greater number perished--and
are still perishing.
509.
The kingdom of desires out of which logic grew: the gregarious instinct
in the background. The assumption of similar facts is the first
condition for "similar souls." _For the purpose of mutual understanding
and government._
510.
Concerning the _origin of logic._ The fundamental proneness to
_equalise_ things and to _see them equal_, gets to be modified,
and kept within bounds, by the consideration of what is useful or
harmful--in fact, by considerations of success: it then becomes adapted
in suchwise as to be gratified in a milder way, without at the same
time denying life or endangering it. This whole process corresponds
entirely with that external and mechanical process (which is its
symbol) by which the _protoplasm_ continually assimilates, makes equal
to itself, what it appropriates, and arranges it according to its own
forms and requirements.
511.
Likeness and Similarity.