SPACE, TIME, MATTER, MOTION, AND FORCE.
§ 61. That sceptical state of mind which the criticisms of Philosophy
usually produce, is, in great measure, caused by the misinterpretation
of words. A sense of universal illusion ordinarily follows the reading
of metaphysics; and is strong in proportion as the argument has appeared
conclusive. This sense of universal illusion would probably never have
arisen, had the terms used been always rightly construed. Unfortunately,
these terms have by association acquired meanings that are quite
different from those given to them in philosophical discussions; and the
ordinary meanings being unavoidably suggested, there results more or
less of that dreamlike idealism which is so incongruous with our
instinctive convictions. The word _phenomenon_ and its equivalent word
_appearance_, are in great part to blame for this. In ordinary speech,
these are uniformly employed in reference to visual perceptions. Habit,
almost, if not quite, disables us from thinking of _appearance_ except
as something seen; and though _phenomenon_ has a more generalized
meaning, yet we cannot rid it of associations with _appearance_, which
is its verbal equivalent. When, therefore, Philosophy proves that our
knowledge of the external world can be but phenomenal—when it concludes
that the things of which we are conscious are appearances; it inevitably
arouses in us the notion of an illusiveness like that to which our
visual perceptions are so liable in comparison with our tactual
perceptions. Good pictures show us that the aspects of things may be
very nearly simulated by colours on canvass. The looking-glass still
more distinctly proves how deceptive is sight when unverified by touch.
And the frequent cases in which we misinterpret the impressions made on
our eyes, and think we see something which we do not see, further shake
our faith in vision. So that the implication of uncertainty has infected
the very word _appearance_. Hence, Philosophy, by giving it an extended
meaning, leads us to think of all our senses as deceiving us in the same
way that the eyes do; and so makes us feel ourselves floating in a world
of phantasms. Had _phenomenon_ and _appearance_ no such misleading
associations, little, if any, of this mental confusion would result. Or
did we in place of them use the term _effect_, which is equally
applicable to all impressions produced on consciousness through any of
the senses, and which carries with it in thought the necessary
correlative _cause_, with which it is equally real, we should be in
little danger of falling into the insanities of idealism.
Such danger as there might still remain, would disappear on making a
further verbal correction. At present, the confusion resulting from the
above misinterpretation, is made greater by an antithetical
misinterpretation. We increase the seeming unreality of that phenomenal
existence which we can alone know, by contrasting it with a noumenal
existence which we imagine would, if we could know it, be more truly
real to us. But we delude ourselves with a verbal fiction. What is
the meaning of the word _real_? This is the question which underlies
every metaphysical inquiry; and the neglect of it is the remaining cause
of the chronic antagonisms of metaphysicians. In the interpretation put
on the word _real_, the discussions of philosophy retain one element of
the vulgar conception of things, while they reject all its other
elements; and create confusion by the inconsistency. The peasant, on
contemplating an object, does not regard that which he contemplates as
something in himself, but believes the thing of which he is conscious to
be the external object—imagines that his consciousness extends to the
very place where the object lies: to him the appearance and the reality
are one and the same thing. The metaphysician, however, is convinced
that consciousness cannot embrace the reality, but only the appearance
of it; and so he transfers the appearance into consciousness and leaves
the reality outside. This reality left outside of consciousness, he
continues to think of much in the same way as the ignorant man thinks of
the appearance. Though the reality is asserted to be out of
consciousness, yet the _realness_ ascribed to it is constantly spoken of
as though it were a knowledge possessed apart from consciousness. It
seems to be forgotten that the conception of reality can be nothing more
than some mode of consciousness; and that the question to be considered
is—What is the relation between this mode and other modes?
By reality we mean _persistence_ in consciousness: a persistence that is
either unconditional, as our consciousness of space, or that is
conditional, as our consciousness of a body while grasping it. The real,
as we conceive it, is distinguished solely by the test of persistence;
for by this test we separate it from what we call the unreal. Between a
person standing before us, and the idea of such a person, we
discriminate by our ability to expel the idea from consciousness, and
our inability, while looking at him, to expel the person from
consciousness. And when in doubt as to the validity or illusiveness of
some impression made upon us in the dusk, we settle the matter by
observing whether the impression persists on closer observation; and we
predicate reality if the persistence is complete. How truly
persistence is what we mean by reality, is shown in the fact that when,
after criticism has proved that the real as we are conscious of it is
not the objectively real, the indefinite notion which we form of the
objectively real, is of something which persists absolutely, under all
changes of mode, form, or appearance. And the fact that we cannot form
even an indefinite notion of the absolutely real, except as the
absolutely persistent, clearly implies that persistence is our ultimate
test of the real as present to consciousness.
Reality then, as we think it, being nothing more than persistence in
consciousness, the result must be the same to us whether that which we
perceive be the Unconditioned itself, or an effect invariably wrought on
us by the Unconditioned. If some mode of the Unconditioned uniformly
produces some mode of consciousness—if the mode of consciousness so
produced, is as persistent as would be such mode of the Unconditioned
were it immediately known; it follows that the reality will be to our
consciousness as complete in the one case as in the other. Were the
Unconditioned itself present in thought, it could but be persistent; and
if instead of it, there is present its persistent effect, the resulting
consciousness of reality must be exactly the same.
Hence there may be drawn these conclusions:—First, that we have an
indefinite consciousness of an absolute reality transcending relations,
which is produced by the absolute persistence in us of something which
survives all changes of relation. Second, that we have a definite
consciousness of relative reality, which unceasingly persists in us
under one or other of its forms, and under each form so long as the
conditions of presentation are fulfilled; and that the relative reality,
being thus continuously persistent in us, is as real to us as would be
the absolute reality could it be immediately known. Third, that thought
being possible only under relation, the relative reality can be
conceived as such only in connexion with an absolute reality; and the
connexion between the two being absolutely persistent in our
consciousness, is real in the same sense as the terms it unites are
real.
Thus then we may resume, with entire confidence, those realistic
conceptions which philosophy at first sight seems to dissipate. Though
reality under the forms of our consciousness, is but a conditioned
effect of the absolute reality, yet this conditioned effect standing in
indissoluble relation with its unconditioned cause, and being equally
persistent with it so long as the conditions persist, is, to the
consciousness supplying those conditions, equally real. The persistent
impressions being the persistent results of a persistent cause, are for
practical purposes the same to us as the cause itself; and may be
habitually dealt with as its equivalents. Somewhat in the same way that
our visual perceptions, though merely symbols found to be the
equivalents of tactual perceptions, are yet so identified with those
tactual perceptions that we actually appear to see the solidity and
hardness which we do but infer, and thus conceive as objects what are
only the signs of objects; so, on a higher stage, do we deal with these
relative realities as though they were absolutes instead of effects of
the absolute. And we may legitimately continue so to deal with them as
long as the conclusions to which they help us are understood as relative
realities and not absolute ones.
This general conclusion it now remains to interpret specifically, in its
application to each of our ultimate scientific ideas.
* * * * *
§ 62.[11] We think in relations. This is truly the form of all thought;
and if there are any other forms, they must be derived from this. We
have seen (Chap. iii. Part I.) that the several ultimate modes of being
cannot be known or conceived as they exist in themselves; that is, out
of _relation_ to our consciousness. We have seen, by analyzing the
product of thought, (§ 23,) that it always consists of _relations_; and
cannot include anything beyond the most general of these. On analyzing
the process of thought, we found that cognition of the Absolute was
impossible, because it presented neither _relation_, nor its
elements—difference and likeness. Further, we found that not only
Intelligence but Life itself, consists in the establishment of internal
_relations_ in correspondence with external relations. And lastly, it
was shown that though by the relativity of our thought we are eternally
debarred from knowing or conceiving Absolute Being; yet that this very
_relativity_ of our thought, necessitates that vague consciousness of
Absolute Being which no mental effort can suppress. That _relation_ is
the universal form of thought, is thus a truth which all kinds of
demonstration unite in proving.
By the transcendentalists, certain other phenomena of consciousness are
regarded as forms of thought. Presuming that relation would be admitted
by them to be a universal mental form, they would class with it two
others as also universal. Were their hypothesis otherwise tenable
however, it must still be rejected if such alleged further forms are
interpretable as generated by the primary form. If we think in
relations, and if relations have certain universal forms, it is manifest
that such universal forms of relations will become universal forms of
our consciousness. And if these further universal forms are thus
explicable, it is superfluous, and therefore unphilosophical, to assign
them an independent origin. Now relations are of two
orders—relations of sequence, and relations of co-existence; of which
the one is original and the other derivative. The relation of sequence
is given in every change of consciousness. The relation of co-existence,
which cannot be originally given in a consciousness of which the states
are serial, becomes distinguished only when it is found that certain
relations of sequence have their terms presented in consciousness in
either order with equal facility; while the others are presented only in
one order. Relations of which the terms are not reversible, become
recognized as sequences proper; while relations of which the terms occur
indifferently in both directions, become recognized as co-existences.
Endless experiences, which from moment to moment present both orders of
these relations, render the distinction between them perfectly definite;
and at the same time generate an abstract conception of each. The
abstract of all sequences is Time. The abstract of all co-existences is
Space. From the fact that in thought, Time is inseparable from sequence,
and Space from co-existence, we do not here infer that Time and Space
are original conditions of consciousness under which sequences and
co-existences are known; but we infer that our conceptions of Time and
Space are generated, as other abstracts are generated from other
concretes: the only difference being, that the organization of
experiences has, in these cases, been going on throughout the entire
evolution of intelligence.
This synthesis is confirmed by analysis. Our consciousness of Space is a
consciousness of co-existent positions. Any limited portion of space can
be conceived only by representing its limits as co-existing in certain
relative positions; and each of its imagined boundaries, be it line or
plane, can be thought of in no other way than as made up of co-existent
positions in close proximity. And since a position is not an
entity—since the congeries of positions which constitute any conceived
portion of space, and mark its bounds, are not sensible existences; it
follows that the co-existent positions which make up our consciousness
of Space, are not co-existences in the full sense of the word (which
implies realities as their terms), but are the blank forms of
co-existences, left behind when the realities are absent; that is, are
the abstracts of co-existences. The experiences out of which,
during the evolution of intelligence, this abstract of all co-existences
has been generated, are experiences of individual positions as
ascertained by touch; and each of such experiences involves the
resistance of an object touched, and the muscular tension which measures
this resistance. By countless unlike muscular adjustments, involving
unlike muscular tensions, different resisting positions are disclosed;
and these, as they can be experienced in one order as readily as
another, we regard as co-existing. But since, under other circumstances,
the same muscular adjustments do not produce contact with resisting
positions, there result the same states of consciousness, minus the
resistances—blank forms of co-existence from which the co-existent
objects before experienced are absent. And from a building up of these,
too elaborate to be here detailed, results that abstract of all
relations of co-existence which we call Space. It remains only to
point out, as a thing which we must not forget, that the experiences
from which the consciousness of Space arises, are experiences of
_force_. A certain correlation of the muscular forces we ourselves
exercise, is the index of each position as originally disclosed to us;
and the resistance which makes us aware of something existing in that
position, is an equivalent of the pressure we consciously exert. Thus,
experiences of forces variously correlated, are those from which our
consciousness of Space is abstracted.
That which we know as Space being thus shown, alike by its genesis and
definition, to be purely relative, what are we to say of that which
causes it? Is there an absolute Space which relative Space in some sort
represents? Is Space in itself a form or condition of absolute
existence, producing in our minds a corresponding form or condition of
relative existence? These are unanswerable questions. Our conception of
Space is produced by some mode of the Unknowable; and the complete
unchangeableness of our conception of it simply implies a complete
uniformity in the effects wrought by this mode of the Unknowable upon
us. But therefore to call it a necessary mode of the Unknowable, is
illegitimate. All we can assert is, that Space is a relative reality;
that our consciousness of this unchanging relative reality implies an
absolute reality equally unchanging in so far as we are concerned; and
that the relative reality may be unhesitatingly accepted in thought as a
valid basis for our reasonings; which, when rightly carried on, will
bring us to truths that have a like relative reality—the only truths
which concern us or can possibly be known to us.
Concerning Time, relative and absolute, a parallel argument leads to
parallel conclusions. These are too obvious to need specifying in
detail.
* * * * *
§ 63. Our conception of Matter, reduced to its simplest shape, is that
of co-existent positions that offer resistance; as contrasted with our
conception of Space, in which the co-existent positions offer no
resistance. We think of Body as bounded by surfaces that resist; and as
made up throughout of parts that resist. Mentally abstract the
co-existent resistances, and the consciousness of Body disappears;
leaving behind it the consciousness of Space. And since the group of
co-existing resistent positions constituting a portion of matter, is
uniformly capable of giving us impressions of resistance in combination
with various muscular adjustments, according as we touch its near, its
remote, its right, or its left side; it results that as different
muscular adjustments habitually indicate different co-existences, we are
obliged to conceive every portion of matter as containing more than one
resistent position—that is, as occupying Space. Hence the necessity we
are under of representing to ourselves the ultimate elements of Matter
as being at once extended and resistent: this being the universal form
of our sensible experiences of Matter, becomes the form which our
conception of it cannot transcend, however minute the fragments which
imaginary subdivisions produce. Of these two inseparable elements,
the resistance is primary, and the extension secondary. Occupied
extension, or Body, being distinguished in consciousness from unoccupied
extension, or Space, by its resistance, this attribute must clearly have
precedence in the genesis of the idea. Such a conclusion is, indeed, an
obvious corollary from that at which we arrived in the foregoing
section. If, as was there contended, our consciousness of Space is a
product of accumulated experiences, partly our own but chiefly
ancestral—if, as was pointed out, the experiences from which our
consciousness of Space is abstracted, can be received only through
impressions of resistance made upon the organism; the necessary
inference is, that experiences of resistance being those from which the
conception of Space is generated, the resistance-attribute of Matter
must be regarded as primordial and the space-attribute as derivative.
Whence it becomes manifest that our experience of _force_, is that
out of which the idea of Matter is built. Matter as opposing our
muscular energies, being immediately present to consciousness in terms
of force; and its occupancy of Space being known by an abstract of
experiences originally given in terms of force; it follows that forces,
standing in certain correlations, form the whole content of our idea of
Matter.
Such being our cognition of the relative reality, what are we to say of
the absolute reality? We can only say that it is some mode of the
Unknowable, related to the Matter we know, as cause to effect. The
relativity of our cognition of Matter is shown alike by the above
analysis, and by the contradictions which are evolved when we deal with
the cognition as an absolute one (§ 16). But, as we have lately seen,
though known to us only under relation, Matter is as real in the true
sense of that word, as it would be could we know it out of relation; and
further, the relative reality which we know as Matter, is necessarily
represented to the mind as standing in a persistent or real relation to
the absolute reality. We may therefore deliver ourselves over
without hesitation, to those terms of thought which experience has
organized in us. We need not in our physical, chemical, or other
researches, refrain from dealing with Matter as made up of extended and
resistent atoms; for this conception, necessarily resulting from our
experiences of Matter, is not less legitimate, than the conception of
aggregate masses as extended and resistent. The atomic hypothesis, as
well as the kindred hypothesis of an all-pervading ether consisting of
molecules, is simply a necessary development of those universal forms
which the actions of the Unknowable have wrought in us. The conclusions
logically worked out by the aid of these hypotheses, are sure to be in
harmony with all others which these same forms involve, and will have a
relative truth that is equally complete.
* * * * *
§ 64. The conception of Motion as presented or represented in the
developed consciousness, involves the conceptions of Space, of Time, and
of Matter. A something that moves; a series of positions occupied in
succession; and a group of co-existent positions united in thought with
the successive ones—these are the constituents of the idea. And since,
as we have seen, these are severally elaborated from experiences of
_force_ as given in certain correlations, it follows that from a further
synthesis of such experiences, the idea of Motion is also elaborated. A
certain other element in the idea, which is in truth its fundamental
element, (namely, the necessity which the moving body is under to go on
changing its position), results immediately from the earliest
experiences of force. Movements of different parts of the organism in
relation to each other, are the first presented in consciousness. These,
produced by the action of the muscles, necessitate reactions upon
consciousness in the shape of sensations of muscular tension.
Consequently, each stretching-out or drawing-in of a limb, is originally
known as a series of muscular tensions, varying in intensity as the
position of the limb changes. And this rudimentary consciousness of
Motion, consisting of serial impressions of force, becomes inseparably
united with the consciousness of Space and Time as fast as these are
abstracted from further impressions of force. Or rather, out of this
primitive conception of Motion, the adult conception of it is developed
simultaneously with the development of the conceptions of Space and
Time: all three being evolved from the more multiplied and varied
impressions of muscular tension and objective resistance. Motion, as we
know it, is thus traceable, in common with the other ultimate scientific
ideas, to experiences of force.
That this relative reality answers to some absolute reality, it is
needful only for form’s sake to assert. What has been said above,
respecting the Unknown Cause which produces in us the effects called
Matter, Space, and Time, will apply, on simply changing the terms, to
Motion.
* * * * *
§ 65. We come down then finally to Force, as the ultimate of ultimates.
Though Space, Time, Matter, and Motion, are apparently all necessary
data of intelligence, yet a psychological analysis (here indicated only
in rude outline) shows us that these are either built up of, or
abstracted from, experiences of Force. Matter and Motion, as we know
them, are differently conditioned manifestations of Force. Space and
Time, as we know them, are disclosed along with these different
manifestations of Force as the conditions under which they are
presented. Matter and Motion are concretes built up from the _contents_
of various mental relations; while Space and Time are abstracts of the
_forms_ of these various relations. Deeper down than these, however, are
the primordial experiences of Force, which, as occurring in
consciousness in different combinations, supply at once the materials
whence the forms of relations are generalized, and the related objects
built up. A single impression of force is manifestly receivable by a
sentient being devoid of mental forms: grant but sensibility, with no
established power of thought, and a force producing some nervous change,
will still be presentable at the supposed seat of sensation. Though no
single impression of force so received, could itself produce
consciousness (which implies relations between different states), yet a
multiplication of such impressions, differing in kind and degree, would
give the materials for the establishment of relations, that is, of
thought. And if such relations differed in their forms as well as in
their contents, the impressions of such forms would be organized
simultaneously with the impressions they contained. Thus all other modes
of consciousness are derivable from experiences of Force; but
experiences of Force are not derivable from anything else. Indeed, it
needs but to remember that consciousness consists of changes, to see
that the ultimate datum of consciousness must be that of which change is
the manifestation; and that thus the force by which we ourselves produce
changes, and which serves to symbolize the cause of changes in general,
is the final disclosure of analysis.
It is a truism to say that the nature of this undecomposable element of
our knowledge is inscrutable. If, to use an algebraic illustration, we
represent Matter, Motion, and Force, by the symbols _x_, _y_, and _z_;
then, we may ascertain the values of _x_ and _y_ in terms of _z_; but
the value of _z_ can never be found: _z_ is the unknown quantity which
must for ever remain unknown; for the obvious reason that there is
nothing in which its value can be expressed. It is within the possible
reach of our intelligence to go on simplifying the equations of all
phenomena, until the complex symbols which formulate them are reduced to
certain functions of this ultimate symbol; but when we have done this,
we have reached that limit which eternally divides science from
nescience.
That this undecomposable mode of consciousness into which all other
modes may be decomposed, cannot be itself the Power manifested to us
through phenomena, has been already proved (§ 18). We saw that to assume
an identity of nature between the cause of changes as it absolutely
exists, and that cause of change of which we are conscious in our own
muscular efforts, betrays us into alternative impossibilities of
thought. Force, as we know it, can be regarded only as a certain
conditioned effect of the Unconditioned Cause—as the relative reality
indicating to us an Absolute Reality by which it is immediately
produced. And here, indeed, we see even more clearly than before, how
inevitable is that transfigured realism to which sceptical criticism
finally brings us round. Getting rid of all complications, and
contemplating pure Force, we are irresistibly compelled by the
relativity of our thought, to vaguely conceive some unknown force as the
correlative of the known force. Conditioned effect and unconditioned
cause, are here presented in their primordial relation as two sides of
the same change; of which we are obliged to regard the conditioned and
the unconditioned sides as equally real: the only difference being that
the reality of the one is made relative by the imposition of the forms
and limits of our consciousness, while the reality of the other, in the
absence of those forms and limits, remains absolute.
Thus much respecting the nature of our ultimate scientific ideas. Before
proceeding to our general inquiry concerning the causes of Evolution, we
have still to consider certain ultimate scientific truths.
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Footnote 11:
For the psychological conclusions briefly set forth in this and the
three sections following it, the justification will be found in the
writer’s _Principles of Psychology_.