THE CAUSES OF EVOLUTION.
§ 58. Is this law ultimate or derivative? Must we rest satisfied with
the conclusion that throughout all classes of concrete phenomena such is
the mode of evolution? Or is it possible for us to ascertain _why_ such
is the mode of evolution? May we seek for some all-pervading principle
which underlies this all-pervading process? Can we by a further step
reduce our empirical generalization to a rational generalization?
Manifestly this community of result implies community of causation. It
may be that of such causation no account can be given, further than that
the Unknowable is manifested to us after this manner. Or, it may be,
that the mode of manifestation is reducible to simpler ones, from which
these many complex consequences follow. Analogy suggests the latter
inference. At present, the conclusion that every kind of Evolution is
from a state of indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a state of definite
coherent heterogeneity, stands in the same position as did the once
ultimate conclusion that every kind of organized body undergoes, when
dead, a more or less rapid decay. And as, for the various kinds of
decomposition through which animal and vegetal products pass, we have
now discovered a rationale in the chemical affinities of their
constituent elements; so, possibly, this universal transformation of the
simple into the complex may be affiliated upon certain simple primordial
principles.
Such cause or causes of Evolution, may be sought for without in the
least assuming that the ultimate mystery can be fathomed. Fully
conscious that an absolute solution is for ever beyond us, we may still
look for a relative solution—may try to reduce the problem to its lowest
terms. Just as it was possible to interpret Kepler’s laws as necessary
consequences of the law of gravitation, and then to admit that
gravitation transcends analysis; so it may be possible to interpret the
law of Evolution as the necessary consequence of some deeper law, beyond
which we may nevertheless be unable to go.
* * * * *
§ 59. The probability of common causation, and the possibility of
formulating it, being granted, it will be well before going further, to
consider what must be the general characteristics of such causation, and
in what direction we ought to look for it. We can with certainty predict
that be it simple or compound, the cause has a high degree of
generality; seeing that it is common to such infinitely varied
phenomena: in proportion to the universality of its application must be
the abstractness of its character. Whatever be the agency and the
conditions under which it acts, we need not expect to see in them an
obvious explanation of this or that species of Evolution, because they
equally underlie species of Evolution of quite a different order.
Determining Evolution of every kind—astronomic, geologic, organic,
ethnologic, social, economic, artistic, &c.—they must be concerned with
something common to all these; and to see what these possess in common,
will therefore be the best method of guiding ourselves towards the
desired solution.
The only obvious respect in which all kinds of Evolution are alike, is,
that they are modes of _change_. Every phenomenon to which we apply the
term, presents us with a succession of states; and when such succession
ceases, we no longer predicate Evolution. Equally in those past forms of
it which are more or less hypothetical, and in those forms of it which
we see going on around, this is the common characteristic. Note
next, that the kind of change which constitutes Evolution, is broadly
distinguished from change of an equally general kind, in this, that it
is change of internal relations instead of change of external relations.
All things in motion through space are the subjects of change; but while
in this which we call mechanical motion, the relative position as
measured from surrounding objects is continually altered, there is not
implied any alteration in the positions of the parts of the moving body
in respect to each other. Conversely, a body exhibiting what we call
Evolution, while it either may or may not display new relations of
position to the things around it, _must_ display new relations of
position among the parts of which it is made up. Thus we narrow the
field of inquiry by recognizing the change in which Evolution consists,
as _a change in the arrangement of parts_: of course using the word
parts in its most extended sense, as signifying both ultimate units and
masses of such units. Further, we have to remember that this
change in the arrangement of parts which constitutes Evolution, is a
certain order of such change. As we saw in the last chapter, there is a
change in the arrangement of parts which is not Evolution but
Dissolution—a destructive change as opposed to a constructive change—a
change by which the definite is gradually rendered indefinite, the
coherent slowly becomes incoherent, and the heterogeneous eventually
lapses into comparative homogeneity. Thus then we reduce that
which we have to investigate to its most abstract shape. Our task is to
find the cause or causes of a certain order of change that takes place
in the arrangement of parts.
* * * * *
§ 60. Evidently the problem, as thus expressed, brings us face to face
with the ultimate elements of phenomena in general. It is impossible to
account for a certain change in the arrangement of the parts of any
mass, without involving—first, the _matter_ which makes up the parts
thus re-arranged; next, the _motion_ exhibited during the
re-arrangement; and then, the _force_ producing this motion. The problem
is a dynamical one; and there can be no truly scientific solution of it,
save one given in terms of Matter, Motion, and Force—terms in which all
other dynamical problems are expressed and solved.
The proposal thus to study the question from a purely physical point of
view, will most likely, notwithstanding what has been said in the first
part of this work, raise in some minds either alarm or prejudice.
Having, throughout life, constantly heard the charge of materialism made
against those who ascribed the more involved phenomena to agencies like
those seen in the simplest phenomena, most persons have acquired a
repugnance to such methods of interpretation; and when it is proposed to
apply them universally, even though it is premised that the solution
they give can be but relative, more or less of the habitual feeling will
probably arise. Such an attitude of mind, however, is significant, not
so much of a reverence for the Unknown Cause, as of an irreverence for
those omnipresent forms in which the Unknown Cause is manifested to us.
Men who have not risen above that vulgar conception which unites with
Matter the contemptuous epithets “gross” and “brute,” may naturally
enough feel dismay at the proposal to reduce the phenomena of Life, of
Mind, and of Society, to a level with those which they think so
degraded. But whoever remembers that the forms of existence which the
uncultivated speak of with so much scorn, are not only shown by the man
of science to be the more marvellous in their attributes the more they
are investigated, but are also proved to be in their ultimate nature
absolutely incomprehensible—as absolutely incomprehensible as sensation,
or the conscious something which perceives it—whoever fully realizes
this truth, I say, will see that the course proposed does not imply a
degradation of the so-called higher, but an elevation of the so-called
lower. Perceiving, as he will, that the Materialist and Spiritualist
controversy is a mere war of words, in which the disputants are equally
absurd—each thinking he understands that which it is impossible for any
man to understand—he will perceive how utterly groundless is the fear
referred to. Being fully convinced that whatever nomenclature is used,
the ultimate mystery must remain the same, he will be as ready to
formulate all phenomena in terms of Matter, Motion, and Force, as in any
other terms; and will rather indeed anticipate, that only in a doctrine
which recognizes the Unknown Cause as co-extensive with all orders of
phenomena, can there be a consistent Religion, or a consistent Science.
On the other hand, the conclusion that Evolution, considered under its
most abstract form, is a certain change in the arrangement of parts; and
that the causes of this change can be expressed only in terms of Matter,
Motion, and Force; may in critical minds raise the question—What are
Matter, Motion, and Force? Referring back in thought to the reasonings
contained in the chapter on “Ultimate Scientific Ideas;” and remembering
how it was there shown that absolute knowledge of Matter, Motion, and
Force, is impossible; some readers will perhaps conclude that any such
interpretation as the one above proposed, must be visionary. It may be
asked—How can a comprehensible account of Evolution be given in terms
that are themselves incomprehensible?
Before proceeding, this question must be met. There can be no sound
philosophy without clearly defined terms; and as, on the meanings of the
terms to be here used, doubts have probably been cast by the reasonings
contained in the chapter referred to, such doubts must be removed. If,
as was shown, our ideas of things do not correspond with things in
themselves, it becomes necessary to inquire in what way they are to be
accepted. If they are not absolutely true, then what is the exact
meaning of the assertion that they are relatively true? To this question
let us now address ourselves.