London and at the Hague, the 13th and 25th of May, 1700. It was agreed
that the dauphin should have all that had been assigned to him in the
partition treaty of 1698, plus the duchy of Lorraine; that the duke of
Lorraine should have the duchy of Milan, and that the remainder of the
Spanish monarchy, comprising Spain, the Indies, and the Netherlands,
should pass to the archduke Charles. Three months were given to the
emperor to accept this arrangement; if at the close of that time he had
not consented, another prince was to be substituted for the archduke.
[Sidenote: [1700-1701 A.D.]]
Rarely had Louis XIV shown himself as wise, as prudent, and as able, as
in forming these last combinations. He restored Lorraine to the crown,
with one stroke of the pen and without striking one blow--an important
province, and one which had been French for a long time. As for Naples
and Sicily, he offered them to Victor Amadeus in exchange for Nice and
Savoy, which would procure for France the natural barrier of the Alps and
repair the set-back of Ryswick.
In spite of the precautions which ought to have assured its secrecy, the
second treaty of partition was known in Madrid as quickly as the first
had been, and produced the same effect there. The king was much affected,
the queen became so enraged that, according to one story, she broke the
furniture of her apartment. The nation, wounded that the treaty should
have been concluded without consulting it, burst into recriminations
against the maritime powers; the thought only of dismemberment aroused
its pride.
The unhappy king then resolved to make a new will, the third. He
consulted jurists, theologians, the pope himself--to quiet his
conscience, alarmed by the thought of disinheriting the house of Austria.
Restrained by his scruples, he again feared that Louis XIV would not
accept a will made in favour of a French prince, and would prefer to
hold to the treaty of partition. Finally, feeling the approach of death,
he signed his third last will and testament, on the second of October.
He could not have put it off much longer, for he died on the first of
November.
The will was at once made public; Charles II declared the Spanish
monarchy to be indivisible. Recognising the rights of Maria Theresa and
her children, he designated as his successor the second of the grandsons
of Louis XIV, the duke of Anjou; and pending the arrival of the young
prince he confided the government to a junta, or council of regency,
presided over by the queen his widow. In case of non-acceptance of the
duke of Anjou, he substituted for him his brother the duke de Berri,
third son of the dauphin, and the duke of Savoy successively.[b]
The only doubt now remaining was whether Louis XIV would accept the will
of the late king of Spain in favour of his grandson, or whether he would
adhere to the treaty of partition. There was a long debate respecting
this in his council, which council consisted of but three ministers, the
chancellor Pontchartrain, the duke de Beauvilliers, and Torcy. They were
divided in opinion; but the dauphin, “drowned as he habitually was in
apathy and fat,” says Saint-Simon,[h] gathered warmth and energy on this
occasion, and spoke eloquently in behalf of his son’s rights. Madame de
Maintenon, who had also a voice in this council, adopted the same views;
and Louis decided.[f]
ACCESSION OF THE BOURBONS IN SPAIN
The duke of Anjou took the title of Philip V and left on the 4th of
December to live among his new subjects. Louis XIV wished that the
departure of his grandson should take place amid extraordinary solemnity.
It is at this time the celebrated phrase, “There are no more Pyrenees,”
is attributed to him.[141] The young prince travelled with the customary
pomp and slowness of royal cortèges. On the 21st of April, 1701, he
was received at Madrid, by the noisy acclamation of the Spaniards, who
flattered themselves with having saved the integrity of their monarchy.
In the whole of Europe the surprise was the same. Holland and
England believed that they had been duped, that Louis XIV had had an
understanding with Charles II, and that for the last two years he had
been playing a continuous comedy. However, they contained themselves and
made no manifestations. William contented himself with saying to Tailard,
“It is well. I recognise the loyalty of your master.” In Austria, where
until the last moment there was hope of a will in favour of the archduke,
there was both despondency and irritation. The emperor protested against
the will of Charles II, against its acceptance by France, and sent his
agents in hot haste to the different courts in order to resuscitate the
coalition; at the same time making preparations for a war of which he
resolutely counted the duration and extent.[b]
France had two great interests. The first was that Spain should be her
friend, to assure peace on the southern frontier; the second that the
northeastern frontier should be as far as possible from Paris and that
the Netherlands should at least be her ally. The first point seemed
gained by the advent to the throne of Charles V, of a Bourbon whom the
people received with enthusiasm, and whom the other states recognised.
The emperor protested and armed, but alone he could do nothing.
The second end was more difficult to attain, for neither England nor
Holland was willing to see the French at the mouth of the Schelde. To
get there much tact and prudence was necessary. The king unfortunately
unmasked his plans too quickly and braved Europe as if it was his
pleasure to do so. In spite of the formal clauses of Charles II’s will,
Louis did not exact from Philip V a renunciation of the French throne,
and by letters patent issued in December, 1700, preserved to him his
hereditary rank between the duke of Burgundy and the duke de Berri. This
would make possible a union of the two monarchies and show an alarmed
world France and Spain one day governed by the same king, which would not
have been a good thing for either country, and still less so for Europe.
A little later Louis drove the Dutch from the places they occupied in the
Netherlands by virtue of the Treaty of Ryswick, and replaced them with
French garrisons.[142] Finally on the death of James II he acknowledged
the prince of Wales, his son, as king of England, Ireland, and Scotland,
in spite of the advice of all his ministers. This insult to the English
people and to William III made war inevitable.
THE GRAND ALLIANCE OR THIRD COALITION AGAINST FRANCE (1701 A.D.)
[Sidenote: [1701-1702 A.D.]]
A third coalition was formed in September, 1701. This was the grand
league of the Hague into which England, Holland, Austria, and the
empire entered, and a little later Portugal, which became an enemy of
France[143] since a French prince was king of Spain, and especially since
French ports had been closed to her products. No allies in the whole of
Europe remained to Louis but the elector of Bavaria,[144] to whom the
Netherlands were secretly promised, and the dukes of Modena and of Savoy,
who were however soon to change sides. Spain was with him, but having no
soldiers or money or ships was, as Torcy said, “A body without a soul
whom France must nourish and sustain at her own expense.”
William III scarcely saw the opening of the war. He died in the month of
March, 1702, but his policy survived him because it was a national one.
Three men, famous for their hatred of France, Heinsius, Marlborough, and
Prince Eugene, replaced in close union the leader of the league. Heinsius
was grand pensionary of Holland, and he directed the republic with the
authority of a monarch when the stadholdership was abolished on the death
of William.
[Illustration: CLAUDE LOUIS HECTOR, DUC DE VILLARS
(1653-1734)]
Churchill, duke of Marlborough, received his first taste of war under
Turenne. He governed Queen Anne through his wife, parliament through his
friends, the ministry through his son-in-law Sunderland, secretary of
state for war, and through the great treasurer Godolphin, father-in-law
of one of his daughters. Prince Eugene, born in France about 1663, of the
count de Soissons and a niece of Mazarin, that Olympe Mancini whom Louis
had for one moment favoured, belonged to the house of Savoy. Destined to
an ecclesiastical career he preferred the profession of arms, and, at the
age of nineteen, demanded a regiment of Louis XIV, who refused to make a
colonel of the “Savoyard abbé.”[c] Disappointed in his hopes of obtaining
a command in the armies of France, he turned to the Empire and became its
greatest protector against the ambition of his former sovereign. During
one campaign of 1692 he had foiled Catinat in Italy and by a bold raid
from Piedmont into France had spread alarm far into the kingdom.[a] After
the Peace of Ryswick he resisted the Turks who had invaded Hungary and
won at Zenta, in 1697, a signal victory which placed him in the opinion
of his contemporaries by the side of Sobieski, the saviour of Vienna. Now
appointed president of the council of war and planning as a minister the
expeditions which he was to carry out as a general, he had a decisive
influence on the events which were to follow. By his good understanding
with Marlborough he was about to give the European coalition that thing
which it had always lacked--union.
To triumph over such adversaries France would have had to have the great
men of the preceding generation. But Louis had used them up. However,
some of the leaders that France still had, Villars, Catinat, Boufflers,
and Vendôme, deserved confidence and freedom. It is true that such as
Villeroi, Tailard, Marchin, and La Feuillade had every need of good
counsel and guidance, but it was not by holding these generals by the
leash that they were prevented from inflicting irreparable disaster upon
the French arms.
To Louis XIV’s idea the war should be defensive at all points except in
Germany, whither the elector of Bavaria summoned the French. Boufflers
was sent to the Netherlands to oppose Marlborough, who commanded the
Anglo-Batavian army; Catinat to Italy to shut the entrance to the
Milanese upon Prince Eugene and the imperials; Villars to Germany to join
the elector and march upon Vienna.[145]
WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION: THE FRENCH VICTORIES (1701-1704 A.D.)
For three years (1701-1704) the successes balanced each other. However,
Marlborough penetrated, in 1702 into the Netherlands in spite of
Boufflers, who with two armies on his hands did not know how to manœuvre
between them and abandoned without combat the places on the Maas as far
as Namur; at least he saved Antwerp the following year by the victory of
Eeckeren over the Dutch. In 1701 Prince Eugene descended into Lombardy
in spite of Catinat, who had a superior force, but who, badly obeyed and
perhaps betrayed by some Spanish officers, did not prevent him swooping
down from the Tyrol. Eugene threatened the whole line of the Adige, and
crossed that river without resistance at Castelbaldo on the plain, while
Catinat was waiting for him at Rivoli in the mountains. He forced the
passage of the Blanc canal in a fight at Carpi, July 9th, when Catinat
might again have stopped him; but the marshal, confused by manœuvres
as bold as they were able, retired behind the Mincio and further still
behind the Oglio which opened the Milanese to the enemy. The court
degraded him and gave his army to Villeroi.
This protégé of Madame de Maintenon was a good courtier but a bad
general. From the very first he wanted to take the offensive. He
recrossed the Oglio hoping to surprise Eugene at Chiari, but the duke of
Savoy kept the imperials informed of all his movements, and Villeroi,
surprised himself, was beaten in 1701.
However, the enemy could advance no farther, so long as it did not
have the stronghold of Mantua. Villeroi let the count de Tessé make a
brilliant defence there and took up winter quarters in Cremona. Once
while he was sleeping in supposed security he was awakened by sudden
firing. He dressed in haste, rushed from his lodging, and fell among
an Austrian squadron. It was Eugene, who was making a sudden attack on
Cremona. He would have succeeded had it not been for a regiment which
since four o’clock in the morning had been assembled for review by the
colonel. The enemy, arrived in the centre of the town, were driven back
through the gates; but they took the marshal with them (February, 1702).
[Ballads were sung in the streets of Paris to celebrate the double stroke
of fortune,--Cremona saved and Villeroi captured.] Vendôme replaced him
and for two years carried on a successful warfare against the imperials.
At first he forced them to retreat beyond the Mincio, which delivered
Mantua, then by a rapid march he went to seize their stores at Luzzara,
on the right bank of the Po (1702), so that he might approach the Tyrol.
At this moment the concealed treasons of the duke of Savoy changed to
open defection, the Bourbons having refused, very stupidly, to cede him
the Milanese in exchange for Savoy (1703). It was necessary for Vendôme
to turn against him to assure communication with France. He seized
the greater part of Piedmont and threatened Turin, but he no longer
threatened Austria.
[Sidenote: [1702-1703 A.D.]]
The same success in Germany. Catinat, called to the Rhine, did not
re-establish the reputation he compromised in Italy. He had allowed the
prince of Baden to cross the river and take Landau, Weissenburg, and
Haguenau. A diversion of the elector of Bavaria recalled the imperials to
Germany. Catinat, urged to follow them, dare not do so; but one of his
lieutenants, Villars, did. He attacked the prince of Baden in the Black
Forest near Friedlingen, and won his marshal’s baton on the field of
battle (October, 1702).[c] The victory was as absurd as that of Charles
the Bold at Montchery. The French infantry drove back the German and
then broke and fled in a panic. Villars was swept back with his men, and
was in utter despair when an officer rode up to say that the cavalry had
saved the day. It was not much to be proud of, for the German troops were
still in good order as they withdrew, but it gave the court its chance to
honour its favourite.[a]
The most decisive blow was struck at sea. Sir George Rooke and the duke
of Ormond made amends for an unsuccessful attack upon Cadiz, by forcing
the port of Vigo, and capturing and destroying the fleet of the enemy,
together with the galleons containing the treasures from South America.
The year 1703 passed in Flanders without any action of importance.
Marlborough took Bonn and Luxemburg, and manœuvred with a view to
capture Antwerp and Ostend, without success. More important movements
were taking place on the Rhine, where Villars commanded. The object of
the French king’s pushing the war into Germany, contrary to his usual
practice, was to succour his ally, the elector of Bavaria, who was so
sorely pressed by the imperialists that it was feared he would be obliged
to abandon the alliance of France. Villars employed the winter months
advantageously in making himself master of Kehl, opposite Strasburg. In
the spring he succeeded fully in breaking through the imperialist lines,
and joining the elector of Bavaria at Ratisbon; thus transferring the
seat of war from the Rhine to the Danube. If we are to credit Villars
himself, he conceived the idea of marching by Passau upon Vienna. The
elector, of a more sober school of tactics, could not share the French
general’s ardour. A difference of opinion, and subsequent coolness,
sprang up betwixt them. Even the more sage advice of Villars, to pass
the Danube and attack the imperialists before they could be joined by
an approaching army, was but reluctantly followed. The marshal was
obliged to shame his ally by threatening to make the attack alone. It
took place near Donauwörth, between Höchstädt and Blenheim (September,
1703), and the French were here victorious on a field which was destined
to be so fatal to them in the ensuing year. Unable to bring the elector
into his designs, Villars agreed to a plan to invade the Tyrol, and
open a communication through that country with the duke de Vendôme, who
commanded in Italy. The scheme was unsuccessful. Vendôme was kept in
check, not only by Prince Eugene, but by the duke of Savoy himself, and
the Tyrolese drove the elector from their valley. He made loud complaints
against Villars, and that able general in disgust threw up his command.[f]
[Sidenote: [1703-1704 A.D.]]
In November, 1703, the imperialists suffered a bloody defeat near Speier,
which gave Landau back to France. The victor was Tallard. He wrote to the
king, “Sire: Your army has taken more standards and flags than it has
lost common soldiers.”
THE CAMISARDS
This victory put an end to France’s success. Louis XIV sent Villars
against the revolting Protestants of the Cévennes, the _camisards_. These
unfortunate people had just seen Pope Clement XI renew the preaching of a
crusade against them (the bull of May 1st, 1703). Bewildered with terror
they accepted the help of England and the duke of Savoy, who were anxious
to foster civil war in the heart of France; and as they had been cruelly
treated, they revenged themselves in turn with similar cruelties.
Villars had it at heart to save the province and bring back these
exasperated men. “They are,” he said, “Frenchmen, very brave and very
strong--three qualities to be considered.” He used force against those
who persisted in fighting and was indulgent to those who put faith in his
word. He won over one of their leaders, Cavalier, and one campaign was
almost sufficient to re-establish peace in these provinces; but 100,000
men had perished in this horrible war.[c]
WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION--FRENCH REVERSES (1704-1713 A.D.)
The elector of Bavaria, however, remained master of the whole course of
the Danube as far as Passau. The small army of 20,000 men brought by
Villars, but now commanded by Marshal de Marchin [Marsin], swelled his
force, whilst Marshal Tallard, with 40,000 men on the Rhine, was ready
to march in the spring of 1704 and join Marchin and the elector. These
prospects made the court of Vienna tremble. That government was at the
same time pressed by the Hungarian insurgents, so that even the recall of
Prince Eugene from Italy with all the troops that could be spared from
keeping the duke of Vendôme in check, might not prove sufficient for
defending the Austrian capital--to such distress was the emperor reduced
in the spring of the year 1704.
It was then that Marlborough conceived the bold and generous design
of abandoning Flanders, that beaten field, so known and trodden by
commanders, so thickly sown with fortresses and cut with lines of defence
as to render decisive actions impracticable, and of marching on the
Danube, to the relief of the empire. Concealing his intentions, the duke
crossed the Rhine at Bonn, the Main near Frankfort, and marched towards
Bavaria.[f] At Mondelsheim near Heilbronn he had a conference with Eugene
and together they agreed upon the plan of campaign which was to bring the
victory of Blenheim and one of the greatest epochs in English military
history. The plan was Marlborough’s; he had laid it before William III
before his death and it had been rejected by the great Dutchman. Now
he staked all upon it and executed it in the face of the opposition of
England and Holland. From this time on, the greatest triumvirate of
Marlborough, Eugene and Heinsius direct the fortunes of the allies.[a]
The French had in the meantime mustered another army on the Rhine under
Villeroi. Him Prince Eugene undertook to observe, whilst Marlborough,
seconded by the prince of Baden, undertook to pass the Danube, penetrate
into Bavaria, and either force the elector to abandon the French
alliance, or punish him for his hostility to the empire. Marlborough lost
no time in manœuvring or counter-marches, but advanced straight against
the French and Bavarians, who were entrenched at Schellenberg, before
Donauwörth, a town that commands a bridge on the Danube. Marlborough’s
attack was decisive. The entrenchments were forced, the enemy were
defeated and fled, leaving many thousand men and several generals on
the field, as well as the passage of the Danube free. The English and
imperialists instantly poured over the river, crossed the Lech, and,
whilst the elector took refuge in Augsburg, until Marshal de Tallard
could reinforce him, Marlborough overran Bavaria to the gates of Munich,
ravaging and punishing the country for the hostilities of its chief. This
wretched and cruel system of warfare did not bring the elector to terms.
It irritated him, however, and drove his temper to seek vengeance in a
general engagement.
Unable to subsist south of the Danube in a country which he could not
occupy, and which he purposely ravaged, Marlborough withdrew to the
north of that river. Hoping to draw the enemy after him, he caused the
prince of Baden to lay siege to Ingolstadt. What he sought, took place.
The elector of Bavaria, anxious for revenge, and Tallard, who had joined
him, sharing his ardour, they passed the Danube, and posted themselves at
Höchstädt, on the very spot where Villars and the elector had in the last
year been victorious. Prince Eugene at the same time contrived to deceive
Villeroi, quitting his position, in front of that general, so as himself
to arrive with his army in time to join in the action, whilst Villeroi
remained perplexed or engaged in uncertain and tedious pursuit.
_The Battle of Blenheim_
On the morning of the 13th of August, 1704, the French and Bavarians drew
up before their camp. Their armies did not mingle, but remained separate,
that of Tallard on the right touching the Danube, that of Marchin and
the elector in continuance of the line on the left. Before the front of
Tallard was the village of Blenheim, on a rising ground, occupied by his
infantry. At some distance in advance of the French and Bavarians ran
a rivulet with marshy banks, on the other side of which were drawn up
the imperials, the Dutch and English; Marlborough commanding the latter
next the Danube, Prince Eugene the former. The elector committed a
capital fault in not posting his army near to the rivulet, so as either
to dispute its passage or to attack the enemy when they had partially
crossed it. But he did not suspect an intention to fight on the part
of Marlborough. Eugene began the action by attacking the elector and
Marchin, from whom he met with a stubborn resistance. Marlborough in
the meantime crossed the rivulet, and formed a strong body of infantry
opposite the centre of his antagonists. This centre was composed of
cavalry; for Tallard and the elector, remaining separate, had each drawn
up his army, according to rule, with its horse upon the wings.
But these wings, united, formed the centre of the combined army. And thus
a body of cavalry, destined by its nature to act offensively, was posted
in the principal, the central, the fixed position of the army. Tallard
no doubt reckoned that Marlborough would attack Blenheim, and, as Condé
would have done, spend a world of lives and heroic efforts to master the
position. Tallard knew this would cost hours; and he accordingly rode off
to the left to see how the elector was faring, whilst his antagonists
were drawing up, after having crossed the rivulet. Marlborough in the
meantime did despatch troops to attack Blenheim, with the view of
distracting Tallard from the principal movement. This was his advance
upon the centre, the weak, divided centre of cavalry. In fact it made
no resistance. Marlborough rushed in betwixt the elector and Tallard,
cutting the French and Bavarian line in two. This manœuvre decided the
victory. The elector with Marchin, taken in flank, gave up the advantage
they had gained over Eugene, wavered, retreated, fled; whilst Tallard,
hemmed betwixt the English and the Danube, ended by laying down their
arms and surrendering. As for the marshal himself, he was taken whilst
endeavouring to return from the elector’s division of the army to his
own. The entire glory of this victory was Marlborough’s; and he enhanced
it by that modesty and those attentions towards the vanquished which
had so redounded to the fame of the Black Prince after Poitiers. From
French writers we learn that Marlborough first set the example of
treating prisoners not only with clemency but with the politeness due
to misfortune; a trait that redeems those ravages in Bavaria which the
custom of war had unjustly sanctioned. The battle of Blenheim, in which
about 60,000 French and Bavarians against 52,000 of the allies were
engaged, cost to the vanquished 12,000 men killed, besides a greater
number made prisoners. The quantity of cannon, colours, and other
trophies, was immense. But its effects were greater than all. The French
armies were obliged to evacuate Germany altogether, abandon Bavaria, and
retire behind the Rhine. Marlborough proved to Vienna another Sobieski.
His victory re-established the imperial throne; nor was the house of
Austria ungrateful. [It created him a prince of the empire, while Queen
Anne made him a duke.]
[Sidenote: [1704-1706 A.D.]]
War was in the meantime raging in the Spanish peninsula. The archduke
Charles had been enabled by England to land with a respectable force in
that country, which he continued to dispute against Philip, the grandson
of Louis. Portugal had been won over to the side of England and the
archduke, and her aid proved of the greatest importance. It was singular
to observe in this campaign the armies of France and Spain commanded
by an Englishman, the duke of Berwick, while Ruvigny, created earl of
Galway, a native of France and a Huguenot _émigré_, commanded the English
forces. Sir George Rooke took Gibraltar in the same year in which the
victory of Blenheim was won.
Marlborough had delivered Germany from the French, and driven them
beyond the Rhine: he then turned his attention to the north, and aimed
at expelling them from those provinces of Spanish Flanders which they
had taken possession of in the beginning of the war. During the entire
campaign of 1705, the duke manœuvred in vain to attain this object by
bringing the French to action. A signal victory could alone enable him
to reduce a host of strong towns by a single blow; long watching for
this opportunity, it did not offer till the spring of the year 1706.
Marshal de Villeroi took the command in Flanders, and with orders to give
battle. Louis was weary of the tedious war, so many enemies besetting
him; the mere expense of resisting on every side being sufficient to
crush the monarchy. He was no longer in a condition to await the effect
of Louvois’ preparations, or Turenne’s manœuvres. Experience, sagacity,
skill no longer presided over either his councils or his armies: Louis
cried out for something decisive--for battle; like the gamester, whom
prudence has deserted, and who is anxious to stake all in a decisive
throw, which may relieve or ruin him. He bade Villeroi, therefore, give
battle. Had he even selected Villars for the important task! But Villars
was an indifferent courtier, being rude, independent, and proud. The
“short-geniused and superb Villeroi” was preferred, and despatched on the
difficult errand of giving battle to Marlborough.
_The Battle of Ramillies, 1706_
The French army, of about 80,000 men, reached the banks of the Mehaigne
near Ramillies, about half distance betwixt Namur and Tirlemont, on the
23rd of May, 1706. Despite the king’s order and his own ardour to fight,
it was Marlborough who marched to the attack. Villeroi was waiting to be
joined by Marchin; but, knowing himself to have a force stronger than the
English general, he resolved to await the attack, drawing up his army
in the position that chance had placed it, at an acute angle with the
Mehaigne. The French right wing was near this river, with the village
of Ramillies on a rising ground in front of it, precisely as Blenheim
had been with respect to the French army in the action called by that
name. Villeroi’s left was here covered by a little marshy river called
the Gheete, which rendered it unassailable indeed, but also rendered it
useless unless as supporting his right.
Marlborough did not arrive with his army till it was already past noon;
he reconnoitred, drew up in line corresponding to the French, and the
cannonade began. The duke in an instant had perceived that the Gheete
covering the enemy’s left rendered engagement on that side impossible; he
therefore drew all his force from that side, and drafting it in the most
concealed manner possible behind the troops about to attack Ramillies and
the French right, he concentrated his force on this point. This manœuvre
took a long time to execute, and yet Villeroi took no step to defeat it.
When Marlborough advanced, the French household cavalry charged him with
such impetuosity and valour as to break the attacking battalions, and
to endanger the duke himself; but the English, rallying in front, and
allowing these rash enemies to pass to the rear, where there was force
enough to deal with them, pushed on both upon Ramillies and upon the
French line behind it. The English, being in much superior numbers on
this point, owing to the inactivity of the French right, formed in one
unbroken line and charged, numbers breaking in between the intervals of
the French, who were drawn up in separate battalions, and taking them in
flank. Their rearguard failed to support those in front: the baggage,
it was said, impeded them: at all events the battle, though begun late,
proved ere sunset a decisive victory on one side and rout on the other.
The pursuit lasted the whole night, the fugitives suffering greatly in
their passage through the defile of Judoigne, which was blocked with
cannon and wagons. Here the day of Blenheim was renewed, the loss of
the French in killed and captive not being, however, so great. The
consequences were not less important; being the loss to France of all the
Spanish Netherlands, including Antwerp, Ghent, Bruges, Ostend, Brussels,
Mechlin, and Louvain. The fortresses of Menin and Dendermonde surrendered
also. Namur and Mons remained, the only towns unconquered.
The court was struck with consternation on learning of this second
defeat, of which the details were for a long time unknown. No courier
arrived, so that Louis was obliged to despatch Chamillart himself,
his minister, to Flanders. Villeroi was distracted, and had lost all
self-possession; everyone condemned a general whose imprudence had
placed the kingdom “within two fingers of its ruin.” Still Louis was
generous to his unfortunate general, and wrote him to give in his
resignation, in order to avoid the harshness of deprival. The duke
de Vendôme was recalled from Italy to take the command in Flanders;
and the duke of Orleans, the king’s nephew, succeeded Vendôme. This
last appointment surprised the court, which was aware of the extreme
repugnance felt by Louis to employ any of the princes of the blood; but
so unfortunate had proved his choice of late that the monarch resolved at
last to trust the defence of the kingdom to the zeal of his family.[f]
[Sidenote: [1706-1707 A.D.]]
Orleans found the army in Italy in great disorder, the generals divided
and insubordinate; Turin was besieged according to the plans of La
Feuillade [the most frivolous and incompetent of the favourites of
Louis], contrary to the advice of Vauban; the prince in irritation turned
over his powers to Marshal de Marchin. Prince Eugene, who had effected
his junction with Victor Amadeus, encountered the French army between the
Dora and Stura rivers. Orleans was seriously wounded at the battle of
Turin, September 7th, 1706; Marchin was killed and discouragement seized
the generals and the troops. The siege of Turin was raised and before the
end of the year almost all the places were lost and Dauphiné threatened.
Victor Amadeus refused to agree to a special peace and in March, 1707,
the prince of Vaudemont, governor of the Milanese for the king of Spain,
signed a capitulation at Mantua and sent back to France the troops
that still remained there. The imperials were masters of Naples. Spain
possessed nothing more in Italy.
Philip V had been threatened with the loss of Spain as of Italy. In the
past two years the archduke Charles of Austria under the name of Charles
III, with the support of England and Portugal, disputed the crown with
the young king. Philip V had lost Catalonia and had just failed in an
attempt to retake Barcelona, which had surrendered to Lord Peterborough.
The road to Madrid was cut off; the army was obliged to pass through
Roussillon and Béarn to resume the campaign. The king shut himself up in
the capital whither he was conducted by Marshal Berwick, a natural son
of James II; but Philip could not remain in Madrid, threatened by the
enemy. He betook himself to Burgos. The English entered the capital and
proclaimed Charles III.
But this was too much. The Spaniards could not allow an Austrian king
to be imposed upon them by heretics and the Portuguese. The cities
arose; a handful of cavalry was sufficient to enable Berwick to regain
possession of Madrid, and the king returned on the 4th of October amid
the acclamations of the people. Charles III now held only Aragon and
Catalonia in Spain. The French garrison, unoccupied since the evacuation
of Italy, came to the assistance of the Spaniards.
Louis XIV had made his grandson understand that a great sacrifice would
be necessary to obtain the peace he believed would soon be due to their
peoples. The Dutch refused their mediation. The campaign of 1707 was
signalled in Spain by the victory of Almansa, won on the 15th of April
by Marshal Berwick over the Anglo-Portuguese army and by the taking
of Lerida which surrendered on November 11th to the duke of Orleans.
In Germany Villars drove the enemy from the banks of the Rhine,[146]
advanced into Swabia, and ravaged the Palatinate, levying contributions
on the country of which he openly kept a part for himself.
[Sidenote: [1707-1708 A.D.]]
The inexhaustible elasticity and marvellous resources of France had
somewhat revived hopes in 1707. An invasion of Provence by Victor Amadeus
and Prince Eugene, a check before Toulon and their retreat, precipitated
by a rising of the peasants, had irritated the allies. Attempts at
negotiation at the Hague undertaken by the king remained without
result.[i]
But the emperor made a treaty of neutrality for Italy, and that brought
to the Rhine frontier the soldiers in Italy.[a] The allies hoped to
reduce the king lower; and certainly the prospects of France were never
more gloomy. The finances were in the greatest disorder. Chamillart had
the management of both war and finance departments: the exertion, united
with ill success, was too much; it was killing him. He wrote a piteous
letter to this effect, tendering his resignation to the king: Louis
read it, and writing on the margin of the letter, “Well, we will perish
together,” sent it back to the minister. One active genius, nevertheless,
was employed at this time to provide a remedy for the poverty of the
government, and a reform in the financial system: this was Vauban, the
celebrated engineer. The product of his labours was a plan for abolishing
the numerous and intricate branches of taxation, and substituting in its
place one uniform tax on property. He proposed to take a tenth of its
yearly value, which he called a _dîme royale_. This simple mode would
have proved the ruin of the financiers, the farmers of the revenue, and
the pensioners, that were paid out of divers intricate receipts ere they
reached the treasury. The scheme of Vauban was set aside; and paper
money now made its appearance in France for the first time.[f] The use
of credit was not understood, however, in France as it was being learned
in England. The establishment of the Bank of England, which enabled the
small kingdom to use all her resources without undue strain or present
exhaustion, had no parallel in France, where finances were managed
in secret councils of the king, and the nearest approach to national
banking was to anticipate future revenues to the utmost limit. To meet
or guarantee these anticipations, more imposts must be levied; more
distress and suffering resulted. In England the war furnished people with
a safe and new means of investment. In France the absence of a regular
institution of credit prevented that use of its resources which was to be
the astounding achievement of the Bank of France two centuries and a half
later.[a]
Despite his distresses, Louis was not inactive. He fitted out an
expedition for the pretender to Scotland, which failed. Funds were
wanting to supply the armies. Desmarets, who had succeeded Chamillart,
told the monarch that it was impossible to obtain money, except from
Samuel Bernard the banker. Louis saw Bernard, asked him to Marly, and
showed him the wonders of the place with a condescension that made the
courtiers stare. Bernard was so set beside himself by the honour, that
he declared he would rather see himself ruined than the empire of so
gracious a monarch in want; and the loan was instantly effected.
Villars commanded with his usual activity and success on the Rhine
in 1708, whilst the duke of Burgundy, grandson to Louis, aided by
Vendôme, commanded against Marlborough in Flanders. The allies had
not troops sufficient to garrison the numerous towns which they had
taken in Flanders, and which were far more inclined to French rule
than to the Dutch and English. Ghent and Bruges were, owing to these
causes, surprised. Emboldened by success, the French pushed across the
Schelde towards Brussels with rather uncertain intentions. Hearing
that Marlborough was approaching, they retired, and invested Oudenarde,
which intercepted the passage on the Schelde betwixt the French towns
and Ghent. They hoped to take it ere Marlborough could arrive. But that
general making forced marches, the French at his approach decamped from
before Oudenarde to retire to Ghent. The duke reached them on their
retreat, and a partial action took place, in which the French were
routed, and driven, with great loss, back to Ghent. The dukes of Vendôme
and Burgundy had a serious difference and quarrel on the field. Whilst
the commanders were squabbling, their army was beaten. The prince Eugene
then invested Lille, a bulwark not yet reduced. Lille surrendered in
October, 1708: with it fell Ghent and Bruges; and, with the exception of
one or two towns, the frontier of France lay completely open. [This was
the darkest hour for Louis XIV. Even the capital seemed no longer safe.]
[Sidenote: [1708-1709 A.D.]]
The year 1709 commenced by one of the most rigorous winters ever known.
The populace began to clamour under present sufferings, and with the
prospects of still greater. Seeing the disastrous and disturbed state
of the population, the parliament thought proper to assemble in the
great chamber, to consider the state of things. It was proposed to
appoint deputies to visit the provinces, buy corn, and watch over the
public peace. It was a bold attempt under Louis XIV. He reprimanded the
parliament, and told them that they had as little to do with corn as with
taxation. The magistrates obeyed, and were silent.
In such a state of threatened famine, aggravated by the oppression of
war, commerce remained at a stand: money was no longer forthcoming.
Bernard, the great banker, became a bankrupt. Even the insufficient
revenue could not be collected; and an adulteration of the coin was
had recourse to as the only expedient. Louis despatched the president
Rouillé to Holland to sue for peace; and soon after the marquis de Torcy,
minister, he might be called, of foreign affairs, was sent on the same
humiliating errand. The states of Holland, or their agents, here repaid
the French king all his past insults and pride. His envoys and his offers
were slighted, yet these last were sufficiently ample. Louis consented
to abandon his grandson the king of Spain, reserving for him merely
Naples. The states refused even Naples. Torcy offered them towns to form
a barrier in the Netherlands. In this nothing less than Lille and Tournay
would content them. They demanded Strasburg and Landau, tantamount to
Alsace, and the demolition of Dunkirk. Louis consented to demolish the
port of Dunkirk, as also the fortifications of Strasburg. In short, the
demands of the allies went not only to reduce France to what it was at
the accession of Louis, but prince Eugene claimed to keep possession
of his conquests in Dauphiné. Moreover, the allies insisted not only
upon the French king’s abandoning his grandson, but upon his aiding to
dethrone him. “If I am to continue warring,” replied Louis, “I had rather
fight my enemies than my children.”
The negotiations were thus broken off. The monarch gained much by them.
He showed his sincere desire for peace; and now making known, in a
printed appeal to his subjects, the terms that he had offered and that
had been rejected, the national feeling was roused to indignation.
The rich sent their plate to the mint, the king and royal family not
excepted; the poor hurried to the armies; and Louis was in a condition to
face his inveterate foes. The obduracy of Marlborough, of Prince Eugene,
and of the Dutch was certainly impolitic; for Spain might in one campaign
have been reduced, the French remaining neutral. France, herself, offered
to make every fair concession; and the commanders, in refusing, might
well incur the reproach of being actuated by selfish views, if the state
of distress in France had not warranted any hopes or pretensions on
their part. A great portion of the court of Versailles itself was for
abandoning Philip V, and withdrawing the troops from Spain; a measure
which did take place in part, owing, however, to a quarrel betwixt Madame
de Maintenon and the princess Orsini.
Meantime the allies had entered the field, well supplied from the copious
magazines of Holland. The French army, in a state of starvation and
nudity, opposed them. Its commander was the marshal de Villars. He was
indignant at the arrogance of the confederates, and the despondency of
the court: it was he who roused the drooping spirits of Louis and of his
ministers, and who alone preserved a confidence in the French soldiery
and in the fate of arms. Villars appears to be one of the truest and
finest specimens of the French soldier: he was ardent, bold, and valiant;
qualities which he enhanced by an air and habit of boasting. Full of
resources, he never lost confidence in himself, firmly believing that
neither Marlborough nor any other general could contend with him. At the
same time he was blunt and rude; could not brook to be commanded; too
independent to be a courtier, all ministers hated him and the butterflies
of the court joined them. “I am going to fight your enemies,” said he to
the monarch, as he was departing for a campaign; “I leave you amongst
mine.”
_The Battle of Malplaquet (1709 A.D.)_
The duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene had taken Tournay, and now
menaced Mons. Villars advanced by the road from Valenciennes to succour
it, and posted himself to the right of the road, in an interval betwixt
two woods, near Malplaquet. By advancing, he might have routed Prince
Eugene, who was at first inferior in numbers; but Marlborough coming up,
the two generals determined to attack Villars, who on his side, anxious
to measure himself with them and secure an advantage, had covered his
strong position by entrenchments and _abatis_, or trees felled and thrown
with their branches towards the enemy. The envoys of the Dutch states
dissuaded Marlborough from fighting; and they were right. Mons was in the
rear of the allied army, and Villars was in no condition to disturb its
siege, without at least quitting his entrenchments. Marlborough, however,
accustomed to conquer, somewhat undervalued his enemies, and resolved on
the attack.
The battle of Malplaquet was fought on the 11th of September. Each wing
of the French was in a wood, covered and entrenched, whilst the centre,
occupying the interval, had taken scarcely less care to cover itself.
Opposite the French centre, however, was a farm and a little wood, which
Prince Eugene occupied, and filled with troops that did not appear. The
action began on the wings, Marlborough charging Villars and driving him
back after a struggle. To support himself, Villars drew reinforcements
from the centre, and was making fresh head against the English, when
a ball struck his knee, and incapacitated him from commanding. Prince
Eugene, watching his opportunity, seized the moment that Villars had
weakened his centre, and, leading his infantry from the farm and wood,
rushed on the centre, and broke it, carrying their entrenchments. This
was victory. In the meantime, the Dutch attack on the other wing, where
Boufflers commanded, was defeated. Despite the valour of the young prince
of Orange, he could not establish himself in the wood or within the
entrenchment; and he was driven back.
[Sidenote: [1709-1711 A.D.]]
But the success of Boufflers was to no purpose. The French left and
centre were broken; and all that its victorious right could accomplish
was to cover the retreat, and prevent Malplaquet from being converted
into the same rout as Ramillies. The allies lost a prodigious number of
men in the attack of the woods and entrenchments. The number of French
slain was much less. Villars, in consequence, was as proud as if he had
gained the battle. “If God should grant us another such defeat, our
enemies would be destroyed,” wrote he to Louis. He afterwards boasted
that but for his wound he would have won the victory: Voltaire, who
was present, remarks that few believed the boast. Mons surrendered
immediately. This was the last victory of Marlborough.
In the next campaign, indeed, he showed his decided military superiority
to Villars, by breaking through lines that the marshal had declared
impregnable, and this without losing a man. But whilst France, with
the languor of an exhausted but still valiant combatant, was warding
off these blows, which the Dutch, in their anxiety for capturing towns
and forming a barrier, prevented from being straightforward and vital,
fortune was pleased to prostrate Marlborough, and rescue Louis from ruin
by the means of a canting clergyman and an obscure woman, who rose to
court favour. Sacheverell and Mrs. Masham effected what all the warriors
and statesmen of Versailles despaired to do. Marlborough was overthrown,
and with him England’s inveteracy and force.
Previous to affairs taking this unexpected turn, the situation of Louis
was desperate. Again he sent envoys to sue for peace, and they were
treated with the same contempt. Sympathy is here excited for the monarch,
struggling bravely not for his conquests but for his crown and country.
Louis on this occasion showed a spirit that more entitled him to the
name of Great, than all his early triumphs. What were his intentions, in
case of the war’s continuing, and of Marlborough’s invading France? He
has himself recorded them in a letter to Villars: “I reckoned,” said he,
“on going to Péronne or St. Quentin, gathering there every disposable
troop, wherewith to make a last effort with you, that we might perish
together; for never could I remain a witness of the enemy’s approaching
my capital.” This, indeed, breathes the pride of Louis XIV, but at the
same time his magnanimity and heroism. The battle of Villaviciosa, gained
by the French over the Austrian party in Spain, revived his hopes; the
disgrace of Marlborough, and the blunted hostilities of England, restored
him to security and confidence.
[Sidenote: [1711-1712 A.D.]]
Whilst the clouds in the political sky were thus clearing up for Louis, a
mass of private misfortune, almost unexampled, fell upon him. His pride
had been brought low. He was now stricken in his nearest affections: his
only son, the dauphin, died of the smallpox, April 14th, 1711. The son
of this prince became, in consequence, heir-apparent to the crown. The
greatest hopes were entertained of this youth. He had been the pupil
of Fénelon. Though naturally most violent and extreme in his passions
and temper, a sense of religion had worked a reformation in him, and he
became forbearing, pious, just. His reign promised to be a golden one for
France. Such was the young duke of Burgundy. His duchess [Marie Adelaide
of Savoy] was of a character as rare. With the most buoyant spirits
and the aptest wit, she was the delight of her royal grandfather, who
could not take a journey without her; and with him she took all kinds of
liberties. It was she who remarked, on hearing him speak of the triumphs
of Queen Anne’s reign, that “queens reigned more prosperously than kings;
because under a queen men governed, and women under a king.”
This prince and princess were both carried off suddenly by some unknown
disease [the former on February 18th, the latter on February 12th, 1712];
possibly by the smallpox, which was then universally prevalent and fatal:
but none of the external marks of that malady appeared on them. The title
of dauphin fell, within a very short time, upon a third head [the duke of
Brittany]; and it too was carried to the grave on March 8th. The second
child of the late duke of Burgundy, the duke of Anjou, was then at nurse,
and about two years old. The same malady seized it; and it was saved,
probably, by its superintendent, who would not permit either bleeding
or emetic to be employed--the favourite remedies of the time for every
ailment. This infant lived, and soon after became Louis XV.
Popular belief could not assign so many deaths of such important
personages to the cause of nature or disease. They were attributed to
poison; and the physicians, either through alarm and ignorance, or to
excuse their want of skill, corroborated, all save one blunt man, the
same opinion. Who could be guilty of such crimes? All eyes turned towards
the duke of Orleans, nephew of Louis. His life was profligate, his
character reckless, and his pride seemed to be to brave public opinion.
The king, with his wonted jealousy, had kept the prince from all high or
martial employ, except on one or two occasions. In Italy he had shown
courage. In Spain, contemning the dullness of Philip V, who at that time
had meditated retiring to the Indies, he had intrigued, it was averred,
to take his place. This put him in disgrace at court.
Even his studies gave handle to calumny. Chemistry was what he most
delighted in, and in this pursuit he was said to be actuated by an unholy
curiosity to read and influence his future destinies. Of a sarcastic
spirit, that despised and mocked humanity, the duke perhaps encouraged
these opinions of him in order to cater to his own amusement. The cry of
suspicion was now serious. The court entertained it. The people clamoured
about the Palais Royal, and were only prevented by the police from
breaking in and tearing the “poisoner” in pieces. To such accusers the
duke scorned to justify himself. He sought, however, an interview with
the king, who, worn with sorrow and tormented with suspicion, granted it.
Orleans demanded to be sent to the Bastille, confronted with witnesses,
and tried. Louis for answer could but shrug his shoulders. The monarch’s
mind was paralysed with his misfortune. The duke’s teacher of chemistry
was arrested, and there the matter ended. Posterity seems to have
acquitted Orleans of the crime; but his contemporaries, more credulous,
were far from resigning themselves to the same opinion. Some indeed
accused the house of Austria; and the absurdity of this supposition,
upheld by many creditable persons, has the effect of invalidating the
other. But none at that time dared to doubt the agency of poison.
_Battle of Denain (1712 A.D.)_
[Sidenote: [1712-1714 A.D.]]
Conferences for peace had opened at Utrecht in the commencement of
1712. It was no longer Marlborough but the duke of Ormonde, who now
commanded in Flanders. He concluded a suspension of hostilities with the
French; and Villars, delivered from the English, undertook to strike
a blow against the prince Eugene. That commander besieged Landrecies,
communicating with his magazines through the entrenched camp of Denain.
Villars, pretending to assault the besieging army round Landrecies, made
a side march suddenly, broke into the fortified lines, called arrogantly
by the imperials the road to Paris, and advanced upon Denain. His
officers cried for fascines to fill up the ditch. “Eugene will not allow
you time,” cried Villars, “the bodies of the first slain must be our
fascines.” They advanced, stormed the camp, which was commanded by Lord
Albemarle, a Dutch general, and carried it ere the prince could arrive.
This gallant action roused the spirits and fortunes of the French, and
gave weight to their efforts at Utrecht. By their own writers Denain is
almost swelled into comparison with Ramillies; its success is said to
have saved the kingdom. The defection of the English, under their tory
minister, from the grand alliance was, however, the true and only cause
of their safety. Without it Villars could not have won the day of Denain,
nor Louis made peace at Utrecht on any terms less than the abandonment of
the crown of Spain by the house of Bourbon.
TREATIES OF UTRECHT AND RASTATT (1713-1714 A.D.)
In April, 1713, the plenipotentiaries of France signed the Treaties
of Utrecht with England, Holland, and Savoy. The former country was
gratified by the demolition of the port of Dunkirk, the cession of
Gibraltar and Minorca, together with Newfoundland, Hudson Bay, and
the island of St. Christopher’s. Spain remained to Philip V on his
renouncing forever all right of succession to the crown of France.
The English ministry endeavoured to render this unwelcome part of the
treaty palatable to the parliament by a number of advantages stipulated
in favour of British commerce, which, however, as savouring of free
trade, and inimical to the connection with Portugal, failed of being
well received. The duke of Savoy, in addition to his paternal dominions
already recovered by him, had Sicily thrown into his lot.
The treaty with Holland was but provisional till the following year.[f]
The emperor and the empire alone remained outside the general peace.
War was resumed in Germany and on the Rhine. Villars seized Speier and
Kaiserslautern, and laid siege to Landau. Landau capitulated August 20th,
and on September 30th Villars entered Freiburg; the citadel surrendered
November 13th. The imperials now began to make pacific overtures;
Villars and Prince Eugene were charged with the negotiations. The peace
was finally signed at Rastatt March 6th, 1714.[i] The Rhine was here
acknowledged the frontier line on the side of Alsace. The elector of
Bavaria was restored to his dominions. The emperor, in lieu of Spain,
received Naples, Milan, and Sardinia, together with Spanish Flanders,
in which, however, the Dutch retained the right of garrisoning the
principal towns, forming, as it was called, the barrier against France.
Namur, Tournay, Menin, and Ypres were amongst these. Lille and French
Flanders remained to Louis. He retained this important conquest, as well
as Alsace; advantages which the triumphs of Villars materially tended to
gain. The title of the king of Prussia was acknowledged, and a certain
accession of territory procured to him. The Protestant succession to the
throne of England was also guaranteed by France.
One of the principal difficulties of the treaty was to procure from the
kings of France and Spain a valid renunciation of their mutual rights
to either crown, so as to obviate the possibility of their being united
upon one head. The verbal renunciation, or even the oath of the monarch,
was found insufficient, and not without reason, seeing how lightly the
declaration of Louis XIV on his marriage had been set aside. The English
required the guarantee of a national assembly corresponding to their
parliament, that, in short, of a states-general. Louis was, however,
more indignant and hurt at this suggestion than at the most arrogant
demands of the allies. He represented the nullity of the states, and his
own omnipotence. Still his sovereign word was not sufficient. Different
modes were suggested. Saint-Simon advised the calling of an assembly of
dukes to affix their signatures. Others proposed the entire peerage:
but Louis was as jealous of noble as plebeian, and could not tolerate
the aristocracy except in the garb and in the submissive office of a
courtier. All the guarantee he could give was the solemn registry of
the renunciation in his parliament or assembly of legists; and even to
this he took care to invite the peers with less than the ordinary form
and solemnity.[f] The treaties of Utrecht and Rastatt mark a distinct
epoch in European history. The age of the Habsburg supremacy, which had
ended in the great Peace of Westphalia, was succeeded by that of Bourbon
predominance; and Utrecht and Rastatt mark its fall as decisively as the
Peace of 1648 had ended the dreams of Habsburg ambition. For a while the
French monarchy still stands erect, and by the splendour of its show it
still imposes upon the eye. But its tottering structure is doomed when
the first great shock of revolution is felt. From now till 1789 the
main interest in the history of France is the trend toward the new era
which was to replace the old, worn, battered, and ruined edifice of the
absolute monarchy with a reconstructed society.[a]
[Illustration: EUROPE AFTER THE TREATIES OF UTRECHT AND RASTATT
(1713-1714)]
Louis now began to feel his health seriously decay. The hour of his
dissolution could not be distant. The future fate of his family and
kingdom occupied his thoughts. Of his legitimate descendants but one
feeble infant remained, with the exception of the king of Spain, who
by his renunciation was set aside from inheriting the crown of France.
The duke of Orleans thus filled the place of heir presumptive, and
from his station aspired to the regency. Louis dreaded to trust the
infant Louis XV to the keeping of this prince, who bore the worst of
characters. Though unconvicted, suspicion still rested upon him of having
poisoned his relatives. Louis did him more justice in calling him a
_fanfaron de crimes_, a braggard of crimes. But still the objection in
the royal breast was not removed. Actuated by these motives, as well
as by tenderness for the children born to him of Madame de Montespan,
Louis issued a decree, giving to the illegitimate princes the full
rights of the legitimate blood, calling them in succession to the
throne immediately after the young dauphin. Nothing marks the extreme
submissiveness of the parliament more than their registry of this
decree. But this obsequiousness was evidently owing to the inutility of
disturbing the last moments of the monarch. Louis completed this attempt
in favour of his illegitimate children by a testament which gave to the
duke du Maine, the eldest of these princes, the command of the household
troops and the chief power during the minority.[f]
DEATH OF LOUIS XIV
[Sidenote: [1714-1715 A.D.]]
Since the summer of 1714 Louis XIV, already cruelly shaken in health in
1712, had been gradually failing. His chief physician, Fagon, himself
enfeebled by age, did not perceive in time the slow fever which was
undermining the king’s health and did not take advantage of the resources
still offered by that powerful constitution. After the 11th of August,
1715, Louis XIV did not again leave the château of Versailles. The fever
increased, sleep vanished. On the 24th one of the king’s legs which
had been causing him acute pain showed marks of gangrene. The next day
Louis received the sacrament with calm and firmness. He manifested some
scruples respecting what he had been made to do in regard to the bull
_Unigenitus_.[147] He would have liked to see his archbishop, Noailles,
once more, and to be reconciled to him; means were found to prevent this.
On the 26th he bade farewell in moving terms to the principal personages
of his court. He also took leave of the prince and princesses, addressed
kindly words to the duke of Orleans as though to banish evil designs from
his heart if he should have conceived any, and then sent for the dauphin,
a beautiful child of five years of age, sole relic of all his legitimate
line in France.
“My child,” he said to him, “you will soon be the king of a great realm.
Never forget your obligations towards God; remember that you owe him all
that you are. Try to preserve peace with your neighbours. I have been too
fond of war. Do not imitate me in that, nor in the too great expenditure
which I have made. Lighten the burdens of your people as soon as you can
and do that which I have had the misfortune not to do myself.”
Touching, but vain words! The successor of Louis XIV was not reserved
for a work of reparation but for a work of dissolution and ruin. On the
morning of the 28th the king said to Madame de Maintenon that in leaving
her he was consoled by the hope that they would soon meet again. She
did not respond to this idea of meeting in eternity and appeared to see
in this sign of affection only a token of egoism. Thinking the end was
near, she set out that very evening for St. Cyr; the next day Louis,
being still fully conscious, asked for her; she returned, but only to
leave again finally on the evening of the 30th, thus abandoning on his
death-bed the man who had so constantly loved her. Her excuse was in
her extreme weariness of the existence which Louis had imposed on her.
He had overwhelmed her with his absorbing personality; for more than
thirty years she had not had a single day to herself; the necessity of
perpetually finding new resources to occupy and interest this active but
infertile mind, accustomed to live, so to speak, on the substance of
others, had exhausted and crushed her.
Louis was now only conscious at moments. The day of the 31st of August
passed in this manner: the gangrene was gaining on him. In the night
Louis revived to recite with the clergy the prayers for the dying. He
repeated several times in a firm voice: “_Nunc et in hora mortis--Mon
Dieu, aidez moi!_” then he entered on a long death-agony. On the 1st of
September, at a quarter past eight in the morning, the king drew his last
breath. He had lived seventy-seven years, reigned seventy-two, governed
fifty-four. It was the longest as well as the greatest reign in the
history of France. It was not one man, it was a world that was ended.
Before descending, in the train of feudalism, into that night of the
past in which one after another the perishable forms of eternal society
are plunged, the monarchy, that symbolic form of national unity, had
been manifested in a supreme personification which will remain forever
engraved in the memory of peoples. Louis XIV is, and will remain, the
king, the royal type, for foreign nations as well as for France. All that
monarchy, after having brought under one yoke the divergent elements of
the multiplex world of the Middle Ages, succeeded in producing in the
fullness of her power, she produced in Louis the Great. Flourishing in
her prime with the Great King, she grew old with him. The signs of decay
multiplied; the gangrene was manifested in her as in him and, if monarchy
did not die the same day as the monarch, the silent work of decomposition
was no longer to be arrested in her organs. We are about to watch the
dissolution of that vast frame until the day in which the real unity, the
sovereign nation, shall for the first time break through the worn-out
covering in its own true essence, without figure and without symbol.
France prospered under Louis XIV so long as he continued in the ideas
of Richelieu; she suffered, then declined, when she became unfaithful
to them. He himself condemned the excess of his wars and expenditure;
his expenditure on luxury and art, though doubtless very considerable,
has been much exaggerated by tradition; as to his wars, they were, some
justifiable, others excusable in their principle, but not in the inhuman
character which he allowed to be imprinted on them, nor, at times, in
the fashion in which they were conducted politically. France desired her
natural completion, and, in the respective condition of the nations,
the action of France to achieve her retransformation into the larger
territory of Gaul was enough to overthrow the equilibrium of Europe and
to provoke coalitions. Louis XIV committed the error of claiming to be
able to do still more, and, above all, of making the claim believed.
The two gravest charges which he merited are not those on which he
condemned himself; they were: in economics, that of having wrought harm
and rejected the remedy, ruined the finances and refused the radical
reform which might have restored them; in religion, that of having
destroyed the great work of Henry IV which Richelieu had continued. But
the responsibility of the revocation may well be divided: the revocation
of the Edict of Nantes was the logical consequence of monarchy according
to Bossuet, and this great crime against the state condemns the monarchy
still more than the monarch. The more we blame the monarchical theory
as contrary to the true ends of man and of the citizen, the more we are
disposed to indulgence towards the prince who was carried away by this
theory as by an almost irresistible fatality.
When the New Era, which opened amid the tempests [of the eighteenth
century], shall have found its shape and position; when society, free
and democratic, shall be definitely founded and recognised; when parties
cease to seek weapons in history, the name of Louis XIV will no longer
excite the anger of the French people, as the expression of a hostile
principle; and his statue, alternately adored and broken, will finally
repose amid the great images of the national Pantheon. If the French
people do not forget the culpable and fatal errors of Louis, they will
also remember that Louis has deserved to be identified with the most
brilliant century yet seen in modern civilisation. France pardons
willingly, too willingly perhaps, all those who have loved her, even with
a selfish and tyrannical love--all those who have made her glorious,
even at the expense of her happiness; she is only implacable towards the
memory of those leaders who have degraded her.[e]
[Illustration: LOUIS XIV AT THE DEATH-BED OF JAMES II]
FOOTNOTES
[139] [It must be remembered however that the great opponent of France
took his title from the principality of Orange, which is now in the
department of Vaucluse by the Rhone, in southern France.]
[140] [Tökely was a Hungarian magnate--a Calvinist, who, implicated in a
conspiracy, had aroused a portion of Hungary against the emperor. Louis
XIV supported him in his war.]
[141] [As to the saying, “There are no more Pyrenees,” its history is
this. The ambassador to Spain, as reported by Dangeau, spoke these words:
“The journey became easy and presently the Pyrenees melted away,” which
the _Mercure_ on the following day rendered as follows: “What joy! There
are no more Pyrenees, they are levelled, and we are one.” However, the
phrase well expresses the situation and the aim of Louis XIV. If it did
not fall from his lips, it was in the minds of all.[c]]
[142] [This was done by Marshal de Boufflers in February, 1701, and
effected with the help of the elector of Bavaria, governor of these
provinces. Holland took fresh alarm at this act.]
[143] [Louis XIV at first won Portugal to his side, and, in return for
certain advantages, a treaty was signed with France and Spain on June
18th, 1701. But the provisions were not kept. Dom Pedro entered the
coalition in May, 1703.]
[144] [The elector Maximilian believed himself ill used by Austria, and
deserted the allies he had supported in the League of Augsburg. The
second treaty with France was signed March 9th, 1701. The elector of
Cologne, in spite of the trouble of 1688, also treated with Louis, and
threw open her territory to French troops. So did the bishop of Münster
and three other powers of the empire.]
[145] [Duclos calls the War of the Spanish Succession “The only _just_
one that Louis ever undertook.”]
[146] Villars’ achievements had been noteworthy for some time. In 1706
he raised the blockade of Fort Louis on the Rhine. In 1707 he forced
the lines of Stollhofen which, extending from Philippsburg to the Black
Forest, were regarded as the rampart of Germany.
[147] [The enemies of the Jansenists obtained a decree from the king,
interdicting a work entitled _Réflections Morales sur le Nouveau
Testament_ by Father Quesnel, which Cardinal de Noailles had already
approved of. Clement XI launched the bull _Unigenitus_ condemning one
hundred and one propositions extracted from the _Réflections Morales_.
Eight prelates headed by Noailles protested against the bull. The king’s
confessor, Le Tellier, urged the king to have Noailles deposed. The
affair dragged a long time at Rome. The king was about to bring the
affair to his bed of justice when he fell ill.]
[Illustration]