Louis had many royal qualities--a noble presence; manners
full of grace and dignity; an elocution at once majestic
and seductive; unwearied assiduity in business; a luminous
understanding; an instinctive taste for whatever is magnificent
in thought or action; and a genuine zeal for the welfare of his
people. But for the high office of moulding and conducting the
policy of the greatest of the nations of the civilised world,
he wanted three indispensable gifts--an education so liberal
as to have revealed to him the real interests and resources
of his kingdom; the faculty by which a true statesman, in the
silence of all established precedents, originates measures
adapted to the innovations, whether progressive or immediate,
of his times; and that dominion over passion and appetite which
is the one essential condition of all true mental independence.
Without such knowledge, such invention, and such self-control,
Louis could not really think, and therefore could not really
act for himself.--_Stephen._[j]
[Sidenote: [1679-1715 A.D.]]
After Nimeguen, Louis XIV was at the climax of his fortunes. He had no
equal among the other sovereigns of Europe. If he had not realised all
his ambitions, if he had made political mistakes and military mistakes
he had none the less shown a vigour, a spirit of continuity, a power of
calculation and often a rectitude of judgment which placed him far above
contemporary princes. He was served by great men, and he had always known
how to direct them and appropriate their work to himself, although he
had sometimes conceded too much to Louvois, and yielded too much to the
desire to display in war the brilliance of his court. He continually saw
everything and did everything himself in order to train himself by work,
and, as he said, by this means to complete his ideas.
[Sidenote: [1679-1680 A.D.]]
In 1679 France, instead of returning to her ancient peace footing,
preserved an effective force of 140,000 men, part of which was so
organised as to be able to take the field immediately. The maintenance
of this armament had for its object the support of certain pretensions
relative to the regulation of the frontiers. At Nimeguen the territories
ceded on either side had not been delimited in a definite manner. Louis
XIV and Louvois calculated on profiting by this circumstance to make new
acquisitions. Louvois was ambitious of deriving as much advantage from
peace as from war.
Louvois no longer directed military affairs alone. For a long time he
had been encroaching on the office of the secretary of state for foreign
affairs. Pomponne, who complained of this and who lacked the authority
and energy necessary to resist him, was disgraced. His successor was
Colbert’s own brother, Colbert de Croissy, formerly ambassador to London
and plenipotentiary to the congress of Aix-la-Chapelle and Nimeguen; but
Louvois’ influence in diplomacy remained none the less preponderant.
ACQUISITION OF FRONTIER PLACES (1679-1681 A.D.)
The regulation of the frontiers on the side of the Spanish Netherlands
was debated in a conference which was opened at Courtrai in the month of
December, 1679. During the long discussions which occupied it Louvois’
ambition was particularly directed towards the eastern frontier, where
he could proceed by other means than diplomatic arguments. As early as
1679 he occupied Homburg and Bitche, dependencies of Lorraine which had
been pledged by Duke Charles IV to the electors of Treves and Mainz.
He made the parliament of Besançon pronounce two decrees, the one of
September 8th, 1679, which declared the reunion to Franche-Comté of the
castellanies of Clermont, Châtelet, and Blamont--that is to say, more
than eighty villages, forming part of the principality of Montbéliard,
the property of the dukes of Würtemberg; the other, dated the 31st of
August, 1680, declared the reunion of the principality itself.
At the parliament of Metz Louis instituted a _chambre de réunion_,
intended to search out all the dependencies of the Three Bishoprics, that
is to say, the territories which might be claimed as their fiefs by any
title whatsoever. This question of dependencies had been the subject of
old disputes between France and the empire. Louvois resolved to settle
them finally by simple judiciary decrees and without beginning vexatious
lawsuits with the empire and the German princes. He drew up himself, or
caused to be drawn up under his own eyes, detailed instructions for the
king’s _procureur_ of the _chambre de réunion_ at Metz. The result of
this inquiry was to reunite to France about eighty fiefs. The county of
Zweibrücken was vacant and several competitors were disputing for it;
Louvois seized it in virtue of a very ancient feudal right found in the
title deeds of the bishopric of Metz. The king of Sweden, Charles XI, one
of the principal claimants, protested; he was offered a sum of money to
indemnify him. He refused to sell his rights and abandoned France, whose
ally he had been in the late wars, to throw himself on the side of her
enemies.
Another dispute--less old, since it dated only from the Treaty of
Westphalia, but not less important--had for object the empire’s
jurisdiction in Alsace and the territories of ten towns reunited to
France in 1648. Louis XIV had never recognised this jurisdiction; he had
imposed oaths on the towns of Alsace which reserved his own rights and
had taken little account of their privileges when these inconvenienced
his armies. He had contented himself with conceding them, after the war,
certain abatements of taxes under the name of compensation. In 1680
the sovereign council of Alsace, instituted by Mazarin at Ensisheim
and afterwards transferred to Breisach, decreed the suppression of all
imperial jurisdictions in the province and proceeded to reunions of
territories, similar to those of the Three Bishoprics.
The reunion of Strasburg which was the most considerable was accomplished
in another fashion. Strasburg, a free imperial city, had given good
grounds for complaint, inasmuch as she had observed her neutrality
but ill during the last war; she had on several occasions delivered
the bridge over the Rhine to the imperial troops. Louvois began by
withdrawing certain neighbouring territories from the jurisdiction of
Strasburg; then, eluding the vigilance of the imperial troops, he sent
into Alsace 35,000 men, whom he scattered, but in such a manner as to be
able to assemble them again at a given point. He watched for a favourable
opportunity. The arrival in the city of an officer of the emperor having
furnished him with the pretext he was seeking, he caused the approaches
and the passage of the Rhine to be suddenly occupied by his troops during
the night of the 27-28th of September, 1681. The inhabitants, taken
by surprise, demanded explanations. The French resident knew nothing;
the officer who led the troops referred them to Montclar, the military
commandant of Alsace. The latter informed them that he had orders to
obtain their recognition of the sovereignty of France; but that otherwise
their municipal, religious, and other privileges would be preserved.
[Illustration: FRANÇOIS MICHEL LE TELLIER, MARQUIS DE LOUVOIS
(1641-1691)]
[Sidenote: [1680-1681 A.D.]]
The magistrates wrote to the diet and to the emperor to notify them of
the extremity to which they found themselves reduced; their letters were
intercepted. As they were not in a position to offer the least resistance
they demanded to be allowed to consult the people. This consultation
could be only a matter of form; acquiescence was a matter of necessity.
On the 30th the city capitulated. Louvois’ first act was to restore the
cathedral to the Catholic clergy, whilst guaranteeing religious liberty
to the Protestants. Without loss of time the construction of a citadel,
barracks, and entrenched cantonments was taken in hand, less for security
against the inhabitants than to oppose a powerful bulwark to the empire.
On the 24th of October Louis XIV came to make a triumphal entry into his
new acquisition.
On the 30th of September, 1681, the day of the entry of a French
corps into Strasburg, another entered Casale. Louvois had long aimed
at dominating Piedmont and through Piedmont Italy. Casale, added to
Pinerolo, should furnish him the means. Casale was a possession of
the duke of Mantua. This duke was a debauched and prodigal prince, in
pressing need of money.
On the 8th of July, 1681, a treaty was secretly signed at Mantua, between
the duke and a French agent who had no official character, the abbé
Morel. Some troops had been collected in Dauphiné and at Pinerolo. A
passage for these troops was requested of the duchess of Savoy [widow of
Charles Emmanuel and regent for the infant duke], with the threat that it
would be insisted on. Finally, on the 30th of September, Catinat, who had
been at Pinerolo incognito for several months, took possession not only
of the citadel but of the castle and town of Casale in the name of Louis
XIV.
[Illustration: MARQUIS ABRAHAM DUQUESNE
(1610-1688)]
Henceforth Piedmont was shut in between two French fortresses and Louvois
assumed towards her the tone of a master. But the regent of Savoy
resisted with extreme vigour; it was almost necessary to employ violence
to obtain from her a free passage for the French troops passing from
Pinerolo to Montferrat. Finally, in order to save the independence of
Savoy, she accepted the condition of marrying her son to Mademoiselle
d’Orléans, Monsieur’s daughter (in 1684). Louis XIV thought that this
marriage would complete the deliverance into his hands of Piedmont and
secure him the entrance into Italy. He believed that the other Italian
states were now condemned to submit to his dictation. The contrary
was the case. Italy kept silence; but as soon as Victor Amadeus found
an opportunity of escaping from France, which he detested, he had no
difficulty in raising the peninsula against her.
The reunions declared in the Three Bishoprics and Alsace, and the
occupation of Strasburg and Casale, did not make Louvois forget the
conferences of Courtrai. The Spaniards showed in these conferences as
much ill-will as weakness and sought to prolong them. They had pledged
themselves to hand over Charlemont in exchange for Dinant, which was to
be restored to them. They did not do so until 1681 after an infinite
amount of chicanery. Louvois profited by these delays; he had the address
to negotiate with the bishop of Liège, to whom Dinant belonged, a direct
cession of that town to France and made use of this cession as an
authority for not surrendering it to Spain. Almost immediately afterwards
he occupied the little county of Chiny in Luxemburg, in virtue of an
ancient title of the bishopric of Metz. He sent troops thither to make
what was called a “pacific execution”; the country was reunited to the
crown, and the work of hunting up his dependencies was taken in hand.
At last, on the 4th of August, 1681, Louis XIV notified the conference
of Courtrai of his claims. They comprehended the castellany of Alost,
the towns of Grammont, Ninove, Lessines, and various territories. He
offered, it is true, to exchange those towns and territories which might
be necessary for the defence of Brussels, in return for “equivalents.”
The Spaniards protesting against these pretensions, Louvois increased
the French troops of the county of Chiny, established a sort of blockade
round Luxemburg, seized the first difficulty which arose in consequence
as a _casus belli_, pressed the blockade still closer during the winter,
and made every preparation to make himself master of the place in the
spring.
Nothing was more popular in France than this policy of aggrandisement.
Men took little trouble to find out whether it were just or safe. It was
enough that it should flatter national feeling and the military passions
then greatly over-excited.
PREPARATIONS FOR A SECOND COALITION (1681-1682 A.D.)
[Sidenote: [1681-1682 A.D.]]
But if France thus made herself the accomplice of the enterprises and
the ambition of the king, it was not possible for Europe to content
herself with being a passive spectator. Whilst Spain was discussing
and protesting at Courtrai, Germany was discussing and protesting at
Ratisbon and Frankfort. Sweden was irritated, Italy discontented, Holland
embarrassed. All the powers showed themselves attentive and anxious. None
was strong enough to struggle alone; the question was whether, after
a coalition dissolved at Nimeguen they would succeed in again drawing
together and coming to an understanding.
Louis XIV had reason to fear it. Therefore, in spite of the disdainful
majesty of his diplomacy, he endeavoured to make some of them advances
of a nature calculated to flatter. The year which followed the Treaty
of Nimeguen he married the eldest of his nieces, a very young girl, the
eldest daughter of Monsieur and of Henrietta of England, to the king of
Spain, Charles II. The young princess Marie Louise was the victim of
policy and obliged to accept a union repugnant to her. The same year the
dauphin, aged scarcely eighteen years, married a princess of Bavaria. The
king was eager to secure the elector of Bavaria, who had been faithful
to him since 1670; he hoped to strengthen himself in Germany by this
alliance. The marriage of Monsieur’s second daughter to the duke of
Savoy, Victor Amadeus, which was concluded soon after, in 1684, had for
object the extension of French influence in Italy.
Dutch patriotism had been on the watch against the ambition of Louis XIV.
William had no difficulty in seizing the weapons the king gave him. He
denounced French policy to Europe in a host of pamphlets which circulated
everywhere. The answers which Louis XIV in his turn circulated, the
language which he dictated to his envoys, did not bring reassurance.
The prince of Orange believed that in order to form another stronger and
more solid coalition it was needful to provide a centre and a head. The
centre should be Holland; the head himself. He began by joining with
the king of Sweden, Charles XI, who, despoiled of his pretensions to
the duchy of Zweibrücken, was the more irritated against France because
he had been her ally. Sweden and Holland signed a treaty at the Hague,
September 30th, 1681, to guarantee those of Westphalia and Nimeguen.
The two princes solicited adhesions everywhere; they obtained that of
the emperor on the 28th of February, 1682. Louis XIV did not choose to
wait till the coalition should have grown or till William had succoured
Luxemburg. In March he gave his troops the order to withdraw from the
positions they occupied before the town and abandoned his claims. That
the coalition was formidable is proved by the fact that Spain entered
into it on the second of May and that this example was followed in the
course of the year by an infinity of German princes, even by the elector
of Bavaria.
In 1682 Louis XIV had stopped his progress before Luxemburg and had
submitted his claims to the arbitration of the king of England who had
already been mediator at Nimeguen. He had recoiled before the threat of a
coalition and the indignation of the Germans, although in this direction
he had secured the alliance of the elector of Brandenburg and of the king
of Denmark, both recently his enemies but disposed to serve him since he
was on bad terms with Sweden. In spite of the generosity he affected he
seized an opportunity which presented itself to make the prince of Orange
feel his vengeance. William had a lawsuit with the duchess de Nemours;
the king gave the order to occupy his principality. The town of Orange
was dismantled and its sovereignty declared to have devolved on the crown
(August, 1682).[139] The prince sent Heinsius (the grand pensionary)
to make complaint at Paris; he could obtain nothing and preserved keen
resentment in consequence.
[Sidenote: [1682-1684 A.D.]]
The empire through the diet at Ratisbon and the congress of Frankfort
claimed various restitutions from France. However, Germany being then
greatly threatened by the Turks, the majority of the princes restrained
their irritation; they had even tried to obtain the king’s support and
assistance. Louis XIV held out hopes to them, but solely for the purpose
of resuming in the empire the influence which he had had there at the
time of the league of the Rhine, and in order to play the part of saviour.
In 1683 Louis organised practice camps in Flanders, on the Saar, in
Alsace, and on the Saône. On the 1st of September, just as Vienna was
thought to be on the point of succumbing [to the Turks], 35,000 men
entered Belgium. The Spaniards protested, retaliated by occupying
French territories in their turn, and on the 26th of October launched a
declaration of war. The French invested Courtrai which was dismantled,
entered both it and Dixmude without difficulty and bombarded Luxemburg.
In March, 1684, Humières bombarded Oudenarde. In April Créqui,
accompanied by Vauban, besieged Luxemburg which, strong in natural
fortifications, was also heroically defended; but the genius of Vauban
and the great resources of which he disposed triumphed over these
difficulties and this resistance. On the 4th of June the garrison
surrendered. Créqui then marched on Treves and filled up the town moats,
in defiance of the elector’s protest. At the same time Schomberg assisted
the elector of Cologne, an ally of France, to restore his authority at
Liège, which had shaken it off. Finally a French division under the
command of Marshal de Bellefonds was sent into Catalonia.
Meantime Spain, in no condition to continue the war alone, was asking the
Dutch and the emperor for their support or mediation. The struggle which
the Germans were continuing in Hungary against the Turks compelled the
powers to postpone their plans for a coalition. The Dutch assumed the
character of mediators. Louis XIV again assumed an attitude of generosity
and accepted their proposals on condition that they should recall a body
of troops furnished by them to the governor of the Spanish Netherlands.
A twenty years’ truce was signed at Ratisbon--with Spain on the 11th of
August, with the empire on the 15th. France kept Luxemburg, Beaumont,
Bouvines, and Chimay, on consideration of restoring Courtrai and Dixmude.
The empire recognised all the reunions effected, even that of Strasburg
and of Kehl, on the sole condition that Louis XIV should abandon Tökely
and the Hungarian rebels.[140]
RELATIONS WITH TURKS AND BERBERS
[Sidenote: [1681-1685 A.D.]]
During this time the Turks were again beginning to threaten Europe. Led
by the Köprilis, viziers who were also great men, they had fallen on
Poland, whose divisions seemed to deliver her up to them as a prey; and
as they were suzerains of Transylvania they incessantly fomented revolts
in Hungary against Austria. Louis XIV, in order to keep the empire’s
forces in check, took care to constantly favour the disturbances in
Hungary and to maintain good relations with the porte.
The Turks were too proud and too distrustful; commercial privileges,
annulled or evaded by the hostility of the pashas, were nothing but
a cause of perpetual dispute. The piracies committed by the Berbers,
tributaries of the grand seignior, were another. In 1681 some corsairs
of Tripoli, pursued by Duquesne, took refuge under the protection of the
pasha of Chios. Duquesne required that they should be delivered up to
him and on the pasha’s refusal cannonaded the town. The sultan sent his
fleet to Chios; the French ambassador, Guilleragues, only succeeded in
appeasing him by considerable presents. The following year Louis XIV,
displeased with the divan, gave orders to Duquesne to punish the pirates
of Algiers.
A shipbuilder of Bayonne, Renau, had just conceived the idea of a new
form of vessel for use in bombardments. Duquesne made trial of it at
Algiers and the trial was a complete success. The town was bombarded a
first time August 30th, 1682, then twice more in June and August, 1683.
The Algerians by way of reprisals set the European prisoners at the mouth
of their cannons; the dey, who would have yielded, was put to death
and replaced by one of his officers. The lack of ammunition, for these
maritime bombardments were extremely costly, compelled Duquesne to retire
before he had brought the enemy to terms. However, the Algerians ended by
negotiating. Tourville, whom the admiral had left to cruise about with a
squadron in sight of their port, signed the peace April 25th, 1684. The
Algerians made reparation, restored the merchandise and captives they had
carried off, engaged not to countenance other pirates, and gave all the
guarantees required of them. Morocco had not expected to be attacked. In
1682 it had granted all the stipulations desirable, renewed the treaty
of 1631, and consented to the institution or reorganisation of French
consulates.[b]
Meanwhile a Christian city had been treated as though it were a den of
pirates. The Genoese had sold arms and powder to the Algerians, and had
built in their shipyards four war vessels for Spain, which had none of
her own. Louis XIV forbade the Genoese to equip these ships; and, on
their refusal, Duquesne and Seignelay in a few days threw 14,000 shells
into the city, destroying a number of the palaces of Genoa la Superba
(May, 1684). The doge had to come to Versailles to implore the king’s
pardon, in spite of an ancient law requiring the chief magistrate never
to absent himself from the city. He was asked what was the strangest
thing he saw at Versailles: “To see myself there,” he replied.[c]
The significance of this humbling of Genoa is that this power was forced
to abandon Spain, with which it had so long been in alliance, and become
dependent upon France. Such a turn of affairs on the Mediterranean, added
to the aggressions already made on the frontier, made war inevitable;
but the old ally of Francis I, the Turk, was again the friend of the
most Christian king. The emperor was too busy on his eastern frontier
to pay attention to the west; and the accession of James II in England
made William of Orange hesitate to act. In another year, however, the
situation had changed.[a]
SECOND COALITION: THE LEAGUE OF AUGSBURG (1686 A.D.)
[Sidenote: [1686-1689 A.D.]]
In the first months of 1686 various treaties were signed between Holland
and Sweden, Sweden and Brandenburg, Brandenburg and the empire. All these
states pledged themselves to guarantee the treaties of Westphalia, of
Nimeguen, and of Ratisbon, and protested against the reunions effected by
Louis XIV. On the 9th of July the emperor, Spain, and Sweden as members
of the empire, the elector of Bavaria, the circles of Bavaria and of
Franconia, the princes of Saxony and others besides, formed at Augsburg
a secret league, ostensibly for the preservation of the twenty years’
truce, in reality to put an army of 60,000 men into the field against
France. The league was to last for three years unless it were prorogued,
and the command was to be given to the elector of Bavaria. The reason or
pretext was the claim brought forward by Louis XIV to some territories
which he maintained should belong to Madame as the heritage from her
father, the elector palatine, who had died the preceding year.
William of Orange was again the soul of this coalition, although for
the moment he affected to remain outside it; the king of Sweden was its
principal promoter. The league was soon completed by the adhesion of
Victor Amadeus and the other princes of Italy, though this was secret.
The league in spite of very heterogeneous elements acquired a cohesive
force which was quite new and held itself in readiness to take the
offensive as soon as required.
Louis had flattered himself on converting the twenty years’ truce into
a definite peace, but the diet of Ratisbon formally refused this in
January, 1687. He felt that he could not take a step without unchaining
the tempest. Nevertheless he braved the pope and picked a quarrel with
him.[b]
The Catholic ambassadors at Rome had stretched the right of asylum and
immunity assumed from all time, and with reason, for their residences to
the quarter in which they lived. Innocent XI wished to abolish this abuse
which turned half the city into a den of criminals. He obtained without
difficulty the consent of the other kings, but Louis, irritated against
the pontiff on account of the _régal_ (see chapter XIX) replied with
haughtiness, that he had never acted on the example of others, and that
it was for him to serve as an example. He sent the marquis de Lavardin
with 800 armed _gentilshommes_ to maintain himself in the possession of
this unjust privilege. The pope excommunicated the ambassador; the king
seized Avignon.
The matter was straightened out under Innocent XI’s successor, but
this pontiff conceived an intense dislike for him that was not without
influence in the war of 1688. The occasion of this war was indeed the
pope’s opposition to France’s candidate for the archiepiscopal see of
Cologne, the cardinal von Fürstenberg who had thrown open the gates of
Strasburg. He was elected by a majority of the chapter, fifteen votes
against nine for his opponent, Clement of Bavaria. Nevertheless Innocent
gave the latter the investiture.[c] Louis XIV had the papal nuncio put in
prison and the Venaissin occupied by one of his officers, La Trousse, who
expelled the vice-legate.
War was now begun against Europe and against the pope. Louis resolved
to occupy Kaiserslautern and the cities of the Rhine. The dauphin, then
twenty-six years old, was put at the head of the army of Germany. To
assist him he was given Marshal de Duras, nephew of Turenne, and as
lieutenant-generals Catinat, Montclar, Vauban, and Chamlay. “In sending
you to command my army,” Louis XIV said to him, “I give you opportunities
of exhibiting your merit; go and show it to all Europe, so that when I
come to die it may not be noticed that the king is dead.”
Open preparations had been avoided, but the dispositions had been so well
taken that a few days sufficed to collect the troops before Philippsburg.
The necessary artillery was drawn from Strasburg and Breisach, and the
siege began the 27th of September; whilst Humières occupied the district
of Liège with a first division, Bouffiers with a second invaded the
Cis-Rhenish Palatinate and seized Kaiserslautern, and finally Huxelles
entered Speier with a third. Philippsburg was defended by the graf von
Starhemberg. Vauban pressed the siege with his usual prudence and vigour
in spite of the difficulties offered by the marshes which formed a girdle
round the place. These difficulties were still further augmented by
continual rains and a disastrous season.
Louvois requested the electors of Mainz and Treves to allow him to occupy
Mainz and Coblenz. He had no idea of using moderation. The elector of
Mainz admitted a French garrison into the capital. The markgraf of
Baden-Durlach surrendered Durlach and Pforzheim. Heilbronn and Heidelberg
opened their gates. But the elector of Treves refused to allow Coblenz to
be occupied. The town was bombarded by Bouffiers under Louvois’ orders;
the elector persisted in his refusal. Philippsburg capitulated on the
29th of October. The siege was murderous, especially for the engineers
whom Vauban calls the “martyrs of the infantry.” The siege of Mannheim
was proceeded to without delay and occupied only a few days; the ill-paid
soldiers of the elector palatine forced the governor to deliver up the
town and citadel. Frankenthal surrendered in less than forty-eight hours
and the French beheld themselves complete masters of the Palatinate.
Hitherto the French had had only inadequate garrisons to contend with.
The only hostile force which had appeared was a corps of 3,000 men from
Brandenburg which had entered Cologne under the orders of Schomberg,
one of the refugee French Protestants. But Louvois permitted himself no
illusions: all Germany was to be agitated in the ensuing campaign and if
William of Orange, the soul of the league of Augsburg, had not taken the
field, it was because he was at that very moment (November, 1688) taking
possession of the throne of England. On the 26th of November war was
declared between France and Holland. It did in fact exist between France
and the emperor and the empire, although the official declaration of the
diet of Ratisbon did not take place till somewhat later, the 24th of
January, 1689.
THE REVOLUTION IN ENGLAND (1688 A.D.)
The English Revolution gave the greatest hopes to the league of Augsburg
and the European coalition. Charles II had died in 1685. James II (the
duke of York), who succeeded him, joined to the courage of a tried
soldier more pride and decision of character. But his mediocrity, which
afterwards impressed everyone in France, was early pointed out by the
French envoys to the court of London. He resumed the projects formed
before the Treaty of Dover--that is to say, he aimed at restoring
Catholicism in his dominions, giving himself a permanent army, and
suppressing the laws, such as that of _habeas corpus_, which seemed to
encroach on his prerogative. These plans obliged him to seek the alliance
of Louis XIV.
Now this alliance harmed more than it served him. The revocation of
the Edict of Nantes alarmed the English Protestants, who believed, or
affected to believe, that with a Catholic sovereign allied to Louis XIV
their faith was in peril. James II addressed to all the foreign courts,
as well as to his own subjects, declarations in which he blamed the
persecution of the Huguenots; nowhere did he obtain credence.[b]
[Sidenote: [1689-1690 A.D.]]
The Revolution which overthrew this “tyranny,” and gave William III
the throne of James II, was more than a mere substitution of royal
personages. It changed royalty by divine right into royalty by consent,
and founded the English constitutional or parliamentary monarchy. A new
right, that of peoples, now arose in modern society, in the face of the
absolute right of kings, which for two centuries had ruled them, and
which was now finding in France its most glorious personification. There
was nothing astonishing in the fearful struggle which now broke out
between France and England. There was something more than two opposing
interests; there were two different political ideas. In the sixteenth
century, France had defended Protestantism and the liberties of Europe.
In the seventeenth she threatened the conscience of the people and the
independence of the states.
The rôle which France abandoned England now took up; she was to be
the centre of all the coalitions against the house of Bourbon, as
France had been the centre of resistance to the house of Austria. This
political change upset all the conditions of war. While Louis was keeping
England neutral by pensioning her kings, France had no one to fear on
the continent, for, protected by the Pyrenees, the Alps, and the sea,
she could face the Rhine and fight with both hands, without having to
look behind. England now openly joined the league (1689). It was now
necessary, not only to have armies on the Schelde, the Rhine, and in the
Alps, but also fleets on the ocean, and in the most distant seas. It was
the double effort that exhausted France.[c]
WAR OF THE LEAGUE OF AUGSBURG (1688-1697 A.D.)
War was declared on France by the diet of the empire, in the month of
January, 1689; by England and Holland, in March; in April, by the elector
of Brandenburg, and in May by Spain.[b]
Louis had, to oppose the coalition, 350,000 soldiers and 264 vessels
or frigates. Single-handed against these princes, badly united among
themselves, and obeying each other but badly, he mapped out a plan at the
same time simple and bold. To overthrow William III would end the war at
one stroke. Louis XIV intrusted a fleet to James II to aid him to remount
his throne. Spain and Savoy were the two most feeble states of the
league; the king turned against them the majority of his forces. On this
side he attacked; on the Rhine, the whole of whose left bank almost to
Coblenz he was occupying, he assumed the defensive, calculating that the
Turks, whom he had just succeeded in inducing to break off negotiations
with the emperor, would give that prince so much occupation on the lower
Danube that France would have no fear of his sending a large force to
the Rhine. Turenne, Condé, and Duquesne were dead; but Louis found able
leaders to replace them--Luxemburg, Catinat, Boufflers, Lorges, and
Tourville.
_Attempts to restore James II (1689-1692 A.D.)_
The war in favour of James II was fortunate at first. A squadron of
thirteen large vessels carried the prince in May, 1689, to Ireland,
Catholic like himself, and always groaning under the yoke of England.
Convoys of troops, arms, and munitions left Le Havre, Brest, and
Rochefort, protected by Château Renaud, D’Estrées, and Tourville. The
English and Dutch attempted to head them off. Château Renaud defeated
one of these fleets in Bantry Bay; Tourville with 78 sail attacked their
fleet off Beachy Head on the Sussex coast. Sixteen of the enemies’ ships
were sunk or burned on the shore, July 10th, 1690. This brilliant victory
gave the empire of the ocean to Louis XIV for some time. But James II did
not know how to follow it up. He had lost precious time at the siege of
Londonderry, and William III attacked him on the Boyne, July 11th, 1690.
The Irish, with their king, fled at the first attack; the French alone
made some resistance. A regiment of Calvinist refugees under Marshal
de Schomberg were especially prominent in routing the French. James II
returned to France.
[Illustration: ANNE HILARION DE COTENTIN, COMTE DE TOURVILLE
(1642-1701)]
[Sidenote: [1690-1692 A.D.]]
Louis XIV now prepared a descent on England itself; 20,000 men were
assembled between Cherbourg and La Hogue; 300 transports were made ready
at Brest. Tourville was to escort them with the 44 vessels he commanded
and 30 others which D’Estrées was bringing him from Toulon. But the wind
changed, and the Mediterranean fleet could not arrive in time. Louis XIV,
accustomed to force a victory, and reckoning that a number of the English
captains would pass to him, ordered his admiral to go seek the enemy, 99
sail strong. This was the battle of La Hogue, May 29th, 1692. Although
there was no defection, Tourville held his own victoriously, for ten
hours, against the Anglo-Dutch, who in spite of their numbers were more
badly battered than the French. But it was impossible the next day to
renew this heroic temerity: Tourville would at least have made a glorious
retreat if he had had a port behind him; the breakwater at Cherbourg
was not built at that time. He gave the signal to retire to Brest and
St. Malo. Seven of his vessels gained the former port; the rest of the
fleet entered the navigable channel off the Cotentin shore; twenty-two
passed through the race at Blanchard and arrived at St. Malo, but the
tide reached low ebb, and the rest were prevented from following. Three
stopped in front of Cherbourg and their captains, unable to defend them,
set them on fire. Twelve took refuge in the harbour of La Hogue, which
was no better prepared to offer shelter.
Tourville landed his guns, his stores, and his fittings, and on the
approach of the English applied the torch to the hulls of his ships.
The enemy could not boast of having taken a single one. This was the
first blow dealt to the French navy, but it is not true, as has often
been said, that it was its tomb, for the next year France was able to
oppose equal if not superior fleets to the English and the Dutch. At
any rate the re-establishment of the Stuarts in England was becoming an
impossibility and the most important part of Louis XIV’s plan had fallen
through.[c]
DEVASTATION OF THE PALATINATE (1688-1689 A.D.)
[Sidenote: [1688-1689 A.D.]]
The attention of Louis XIV and Louvois was especially directed to
the side of Germany where France would have to face the coalition.
Philippsburg and the Palatinate having been occupied, Louvois wished to
remain on the defensive. France was already secured by a girdle of towns,
of which the principal were Hüningen, Belfort, Landau, Philippsburg, and
Mont-Royal, an important position on the Moselle which had been occupied
and fortified after having been taken under various pretexts from the
elector of Treves. Louvois resolved to demolish all the towns beyond it
and to ravage the country for a great distance so as to oppose a desert
to the enemy.
Louvois according to his custom kept his plan a profound secret. He began
by giving Montclar orders to blow up the walls of Heilbronn and ravage
Würtemberg as far as the Danube (November and December, 1688). This order
being executed he gave one to destroy the castle and town of Heidelberg;
432 houses, delivered over to the flames, were demolished or suffered
enormous damage. Mannheim was likewise razed.
[Illustration: RUINS OF HEIDELBERG CASTLE
(Destroyed by order of Louvois)]
Devastation, savage and systematic, such as had not been seen even in the
Thirty Years’ War, was spread over the Palatinate and the territories of
the three ecclesiastical electors. The sinister glow of conflagrations
lighted the passage of the French troops. Trees and vines were cut down;
palaces, temples, convents, and hospitals were destroyed. At Heidelberg
the castle of the elector palatine, was destroyed like the rest. At
Mannheim the very stones of the ruins were thrown into the Rhine. A crowd
of unfortunates dying of cold and hunger and reduced to expatriating
themselves streamed along the snow-covered roads. The greater part,
refusing the shelter offered to them in Alsace or Lorraine, went to beg
from the enemies of France and still further to raise their indignation
against her. This treatment was meted out to the elector palatine without
any scruple.
There was at first some hesitation to sacrifice Speier and Worms, but
Duras and Chamlay represented that it was important not to spare them.
In consequence Worms and Oppenheim were burned on the 31st of May,
1689, and Speier on the 1st of June. Bingen also had its turn. The fire
spared neither churches nor palaces. All, say the memoirs of the times,
was burned and reburned. The cathedral of Speier contained the tombs
of eight emperors; the tombs were burned and the ashes they enclosed
thrown to the winds. Treves had been condemned; Louis XIV withdrew the
order as though frightened at the general cry called forth by this work
of destruction. A concert of recriminations rose against him. Whilst
he accused the Catholic princes of supporting the Protestant states,
Europe reproached him for allying himself with the Turks and carrying on
a war more cruel and more barbarous than the Turks themselves. English
caricatures called him the Most Christian Turk.[b]
The king’s discontent with these actions might have been the prelude of a
disgrace had not Louvois died of apoplexy in July, 1691. He was replaced
by his son, Barbezieux, who, with many more deficiencies, had none of his
good qualities. The duke de Lorges, Turenne’s nephew, and successor to
Marshal de Duras in 1691, contented himself with covering Alsace against
the imperials, who finding themselves as in a desert in the Palatinate
could not subsist there. Therefore the war remained defensive on the
Rhine, and the great blows were struck elsewhere.
_The War in Savoy and Piedmont (1689-1693 A.D.)_
[Sidenote: [1689-1693 A.D.]]
Catinat was now commanding in Italy. This general, without birth, had
raised himself by force of merit. Like Vauban, whose friend he was, he
joined civic virtues to military qualities and by his wise and methodic
tactics resembled, although slightly, Turenne. He was opposed by Victor
Amadeus, duke of Savoy. In order to bring his adversary to decisive
action before the arrival of the German troops, Catinat devastated the
fields of Piedmont, cut the trees, tore up the vines, and burned the
villages. Victor Amadeus could not contain himself in the face of these
ravages, and gave battle at Staffarda near Saluzzo on August 18th, 1690.
He lost 4,000 men while the French numbered scarcely 500 killed. Savoy,
Nice, and the greater part of Piedmont found themselves in the power of
the French. But a relative of the duke, Prince Eugene, whose services
Louis XIV had refused and who then had offered them to Austria, arrived
with strong reinforcements. The French returned to France, whither
the Piedmontese followed them. Dauphiné suffered a cruel retaliation
for the burning of the Palatinate and the ravages in Piedmont (1692).
Catinat, however, recrossed the Alps and a second battle took place
near Marsaglia, a few leagues from Staffarda, on October 4th, 1693. It
was as disastrous for Victor Amadeus as the first had been. Nothing now
remained to him but Turin, and Catinat would have taken this also if the
ministry had not reduced his forces. All that he could do was to keep his
conquests.
_The War in the Netherlands (1690-1692 A.D.)_
Luxemburg, posthumous son of that count de Bouteville whom Richelieu had
had decapitated, began his military career under the Great Condé, whom
he resembled in boldness and accuracy of prompt decision. In 1690, he
found himself near Fleurus in front of the prince of Waldeck. By a bold
and skilful manœuvre he carried his right wing across a small stream
which covered the hostile army. The prince suddenly attacked in his
flank, made a backward movement. Luxemburg took advantage of this, came
upon him suddenly in the midst of a disorderly march, killed 6,000 of
his men, captured 100 flags, his guns, his baggage, and 8,000 prisoners.
This was the first French victory of Fleurus, July 1st, 1690. Master of
the region, Luxemburg invested Mons, the capital of Hainault. Louis XIV
assisted at the siege.
William III, rid of James II, hastened thither with 80,000 men, but was
unable to prevent the capitulation of the city in April, 1691, after nine
days of entrenchment. The following year Luxemburg besieged Namur, the
strongest place in the Netherlands and at the confluence of the Sambre
and the Maas, and took it, again under the eyes of Louis XIV and the
army of the enemy (June, 1692). This was one of the great sieges of the
seventeenth century. Vauban’s rival, Coehoorn, defended the place, a
part of whose fortifications he had built. But William, always beaten,
never gave in. On August 3rd, 1692, he surprised Luxemburg at Steenkerke
(Steinkirk) in Hainault.[c]
_Steenkerke and Neerwinden (1692-1693 A.D.)_
A spy whom the French general had in William’s ranks was discovered;
he was forced, before being put to death, to write a false despatch to
Marshal de Luxemburg.[d] The latter was thrown off his guard, persuaded
by the false despatch that William had a totally different plan than to
take the offensive on that day.[e]
The sleeping army was attacked at daybreak, and a brigade was already
in flight before the general knew what was happening. Without an excess
of diligence and bravery all would have been lost. Luxemburg was lying
ill--a fatal circumstance at a moment demanding strong activity: but
the danger gave him strength; prodigies were necessary to be kept from
being beaten, and he performed them. To change his position, to give a
battle-field to the army which had none, to re-form the right wing where
all was confusion, to rally the troops three times, to charge three times
at the head of the household cavalry, was the work of less than ten
hours. Luxemburg had in his army Philip, duke de Chartres, the future
duke of Orleans and regent, who was just eighteen years of age. He could
not be useful in striking a decisive blow, but it was a great thing to
spur the soldiers on that a grandson of France should be charging with
the king’s household troops, be wounded in the fight, and return again to
the charge in spite of his wound.
A grandson and a grand-nephew of the Great Condé were both serving as
lieutenant-generals--the one, Louis de Bourbon, commonly addressed
as Monsieur le Duc, and the other François Louis, prince of Conti,
his rival in courage, spirit, ambition, and reputation. The prince of
Conti was the first to restore order, rallying some of the brigades and
making others advance. M. le Duc accomplished the same manœuvre without
need of emulation. The duke de Vendôme, grandson of Henry IV, was also
lieutenant-general in the army, where he had been serving since the age
of twelve, and although he was forty he had never been given a leading
command. It was necessary for all these princes, with the duke de
Choiseul, to put themselves at the head of the household troops, to drive
off a body of English who were holding an advantageous position upon the
possession of which the success of the battle depended.
The household troops and the English were the finest soldiers in the
world and the carnage was great. The French, encouraged by the number
of princes and young nobles who fought around their general, finally
carried the position. The Champagne regiment routed King William’s
English guards, and when the English were beaten the rest had to give
in. Boufflers, afterwards marshal of France, rushed up at this moment
from another part of the battle-field with the dragoons and completed
the victory. King William, having lost about 7,000 men retreated in as
fine order as he had attacked; and always beaten, though always to be
feared, still kept up the campaign. The victory due to the valour of the
young princes and the finest scions of the nobility created an effect at
the court, in Paris, and in the provinces which no victory had ever done
before.
[Sidenote: [1693-1695 A.D.]]
M. le Duc, the prince of Conti, Vendôme, and their friends found, on
returning, the roads lined with people; the acclamations and joy mounted
to frenzy; all the women were eager to attract their glance. The men were
wearing at that time lace cravats which were arranged at the expense of
much time and trouble; but the princes, who had jumped into their clothes
for the battle, twisted their cravats carelessly around their necks.
Women now wore ornaments in imitation of this; they were called _Stein
Kerques_. All novelties of ornament were _à la steinkerque_.[d]
The following year Louis XIV had a fine opportunity to conquer, perhaps,
the Netherlands and make peace. William ventured close to Louvain with
only 50,000 men. Louis was in the neighbourhood with more than 100,000.
The whole army believed that a great blow would be struck; but it was
represented to the king that he could not commit his person to the
hazards of a battle, and in spite of Luxemburg, who, it is said, threw
himself on his knees, he declared the campaign at an end and returned to
Versailles. From that day he never appeared with the army. His reputation
suffered much from this abroad; biting satires paraphrased Boileau’s
famous verses:
_Louis, les animant du feu de son courage,_
_Se plaint de sa grandeur qui l’attache au rivage._
Nevertheless it was not personal courage that was wanting. His conduct
in camp was perfectly conventional--no particular recklessness, but no
timidity. He exposed himself sufficiently. At the siege of Namur, if
Dangeau is to be believed, men behind him were wounded. The victories of
Namur and Steenkerke had delivered Hainault and the province of Namur
into Luxemburg’s hands; he penetrated into southern Brabant but found
William, strongly entrenched in the village of Neerwinden between Liège
and Louvain opposing him, July 29th, 1693. Few days were more murderous;
Neerwinden was carried in two assaults by the infantry which, the first
time, made a stout bayonet charge, an example which Catinat’s regiments
followed two months later at Marsaglia. For four hours the French cavalry
were under the deluging fire of 80 pieces of cannon; and William, who
observed them waver only to close up their ranks as the rows were mowed
down, exclaimed in admiration and vexation, “Oh the insolent nation!”
There were about 20,000 dead, of which 12,000 were on the side of the
allies. After this success it might have been possible to march upon
Brussels and dictate terms of peace, but the French were content to
besiege and take Charleroi. It is true that by doing this they held
the important line of the Sambre, whence an army might dominate the
Netherlands and make most perilous any attempt of the enemy against
Flanders or Artois.
_Last Years of the War; Treaty with Savoy (1693-1696 A.D.)_
The victory of Neerwinden was the last triumph of Luxemburg, “the
upholsterer of Notre Dame,” as he was called by the prince of Conti on
account of the many banners with which he had decorated that cathedral.
The following campaign was uneventful, and he died in the month of
January, 1695. His successor, the duke de Villeroi, did not accomplish
very much, in spite of an army of 80,000 men; he did not even prevent
the prince of Orange from retaking Namur (August, 1695). But in Spain
Vendôme entered Barcelona (August, 1695), after a memorable siege and
a victory over the army of relief. The year 1695 passed without any
military events. The allies destroyed the French stores gathered together
at Givet, and the two armies of the Netherlands had enough to do to
exist, without thinking of attacking.
[Sidenote: [1695-1696 A.D.]]
On the sea Tourville had avenged in 1693 the disaster of La Hogue, by a
victory in the bay of Lagos near Cape St. Vincent. During the following
years the great armaments were suspended, because Seignelay was dead;
but the corsairs, Jean Bart, Duguay-Trouin, Pointis, Nesmond, destroyed
the commerce of the English and the Dutch, who to revenge themselves
attempted to land on the French coasts, and trained engines of war
against St. Malo, Le Havre, Dieppe, Calais, and Dunkirk--vain and ruinous
threats which terminated “in breaking windows with guineas.” Dieppe alone
suffered from them. In America the count de Frontenac bravely defended
Canada, by taking the offensive always, although the province had not
above eleven or twelve thousand inhabitants and the English colonies had
ten times as many. Hudson’s Bay, and nearly the whole of Newfoundland
were conquered.
Meanwhile the war languished; everybody was exhausted. An attempted
assassination of William, which would have been followed by a French
invasion, having failed, Louis proposed peace. Charles II of Spain was
near death, this time in real earnest; he was leaving no child, and the
question of the Spanish succession began to be raised. It was important
to the king that the European coalition should be dissolved before this
great event. He showed an unaccustomed moderation; in the first place
detaching from the league the duke of Savoy (1696), he gave back to him
all his towns, not excepting Pinerolo, and proposed to him the marriage
of his daughter with the young duke of Burgundy, son of the Grand
Dauphin. In return the duke had to promise the neutrality of Italy, and
in case of need to join his forces with those of France.[c]
[Illustration: JEAN BART
(1651-1702)]
After the treaty with Savoy Louis XIV made the concessions which had
hitherto been most repugnant to his pride. He consented to accept the
treaties of Westphalia and Nimeguen as bases of the negotiations, taking
into consideration certain reservations with regard to Luxemburg and
Strasburg, and to recognise William III as king of England. Henceforth
the war had no further object. Commerce between France and Holland was
re-established October 1st, 1696. Preliminary _pourparlers_ between
France and the maritime powers took place at the Hague. Sweden obtained
acceptance of the mediation she had proposed several years before and
a congress was agreed upon which was to be held at Ryswick, a country
house belonging to William and situated between the Hague and Delft.
Caillères, Crécy, and Harlay were designated to represent France.
[Sidenote: [1696-1697 A.D.]]
The king intended to bring pressure to bear on the deliberations of the
congress of Ryswick, to render the empire and Spain more tractable and
to bring the maritime powers to abandon them or force their hands. He
counted the more on this since William III, a mark for the recriminations
of his allies, was already replying to them with acrimony and a deserved
haughtiness.
France made for the campaign of 1697 the same preparations as in other
years. One hundred and fifty thousand men, forming three armies under
the orders of Villeroi, Bouffiers, and Catinat, entered Belgium,
whilst two other armies under Choiseul and Vendôme were carrying on
campaigns in Germany and Catalonia. All that was done in the Netherlands
reduced itself to the taking of Ath which Catinat and Vauban forced to
capitulate on June 7th; a demonstration was made against Brussels but
William hurried up and covered the town. In Germany, the opposing armies
contented themselves with watching one another. It was otherwise in
Catalonia. Louis XIV had long meditated the taking of Barcelona but he
could only execute this project on condition of being master of the sea.
He took advantage of the circumstance that this year the Anglo-Dutch
fleet did not appear in the Mediterranean. The Toulon squadron, commanded
by Vice-admiral D’Estrées and the bailli de Noailles, surrounded the
harbour. Vendôme, who had 30,000 men, repulsed a relieving army and
forced Barcelona to surrender, August 10th, fifty-two days after the
trenches had been opened and after two assaults.
Shortly before, a squadron composed of ships belonging to the state
but equipped at the expense of private persons and commanded by an
experienced sailor, Pointis, had made a successful and brilliant cruise
in America. Pointis attacked Cartagena de las Indias, in New Granada, the
principal _entrepôt_ of the trade of Spain with Peru. He took possession
of the town and carried thence bullion to the value of nine millions,
besides rich merchandise. He had the address to escape the enemy’s fleets
which set out in pursuit of him and to return safely to France with his
prize.
THE TREATY OF RYSWICK (1697 A.D.)
The congress which had begun at Ryswick May 9th, 1697, proceeded with
the usual slowness. On the 10th of September three treaties were signed
with Holland, England, and Spain. By the first two France on the one
side, Holland and England on the other mutually restored all that they
had taken on the continent, on the seas, and in the colonies. The most
important of these restitutions were that of Pondicherry, which the
English had taken from France in 1693, and that of Orange which was
surrendered to William. Liberty of trade was completely re-established.
Louis XIV recognised William as king of England. A reciprocal amnesty
was granted to the French and English who had borne arms against their
own country, but Louis XIV refused to recall the banished Calvinists
to France; he maintained that questions of religion were questions of
the internal government of each state and he would not allow even a
discussion of this point.
By the treaty with Spain France restored her conquests in Catalonia, the
town and duchy of Luxemburg, with the county of Chiny, Charleroi, Mons,
Ath, Courtrai, with their dependencies, and the dependencies of Namur.
She surrendered Dinant to the bishop of Liège. She retained only a small
number of towns or villages dependent on Charlemont and Maubeuge.
On the 30th of October a fourth treaty was signed between France and the
empire and the emperor. Louis XIV surrendered all that he had occupied
in Germany except Strasburg, which was ceded to him in full sovereignty.
Kehl, Hüningen, and the forts of the Rhine were to be razed so as to
secure the free navigation of the river which had now become a frontier
from Hüningen to Landau. It was the same with Trarbach and Mont-Royal on
the Moselle. Louis XIV restored Lorraine to Duke Leopold on the terms of
the treaty of 1670, that is to say, while retaining Marsal and a right
of passage, besides Longwy and Saarlouis. It was agreed that the duke
should marry a daughter of Monsieur. Prince Clement of Bavaria remained
in possession of the electorate of Cologne; but Cardinal von Fürstenberg
recovered his titles and his confiscated property. The claims of Madame,
duchess of Orleans, on the heritage of her father, the former elector
palatine, were compounded for in money. The official gazettes and the
panegyrics still vaunted the glory acquired by ten years of struggle
against Europe in coalition, the brilliance of the captures of cities,
and that of victories. But if these are noble subjects of pride or rather
of consolation, the majesty with which Louis XIV effected to give peace
rather than to submit to it created no more illusion in France than
in the rest of Europe. No one could believe in his moderation or his
generosity. Those most disposed to admire his policy imagined that he had
had a deep laid scheme and a secret design.
In reality Louis XIV had been obliged to go back to the year 1679 or at
least to 1681. The necessity for making restitutions had always been
admitted but there was no idea that they would have to be so complete. On
the whole, if the Peace of Ryswick saved the honour of the country, it
was impossible not to see in it the final check and condemnation of the
policy pursued since Nimeguen.[b]
LOUIS XIV AND THE POLISH THRONE (1697 A.D.)
While Louis was arranging the Peace of Ryswick, the throne of Poland
became vacant. This was the only one in the world which at that time was
elective--citizens and even foreigners might aspire to it.
The abbé de Polignac, afterwards cardinal, had the ability to incline
the suffrage in favour of that prince of Conti, known for his valourous
actions at Steenkerke and at Neerwinden. He balanced with eloquence and
promises the money which Augustus, elector of Saxony, lavished for the
same purpose.
The prince of Conti was elected king by a majority, June 27th, 1697, and
proclaimed by the primate of the realm. Augustus was elected two hours
later by a much smaller vote, but he was a sovereign and powerful prince,
and had troops ready on the Polish frontier. The prince of Conti was
absent, without money, without troops, and without power; he had nothing
in his favour but his name and Polignac. It was necessary that Louis XIV
should either prevent Conti from accepting the throne or provide him the
means of taking it from his rival. The French ministry took the stand
that they had already done too much in sending the prince of Conti,
and too little in giving him only a feeble squadron and a few letters
of credit with which he arrived in the harbour of Dantzic. The prince
was not only not received at Dantzic, but his letters of credit were
protested. The intrigues of the pope, those of the emperor, the money and
troops of Saxony already assured the crown to his rival. Conti returned
with the glory of having been elected. France had the mortification of
letting it be seen that she had not enough strength to create a king of
Poland.[d]
THE QUESTION OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION (1697-1700 A.D.)
[Sidenote: [1697-1700 A.D.]]
Immediately the Peace of Ryswick was signed, the attention of the powers
became fastened on the uncertainties of the Spanish succession. Charles
II had, since his infancy, gone entirely against all the unfavourable
prophecies inspired by his frail and sickly constitution. He had grown
to manhood and even married. Louis XIV had made him, in 1679, wed, as we
have seen, a daughter of the duke of Orleans in the hope of fortifying
French influence at Madrid and circumventing the designs of Austria;
for the emperor was leaving nothing undone to assure to himself the
alliance of Spain for the present and the succession for the future. The
indefinite treaty of partition, signed in 1669 between the courts of
Versailles and Vienna, had been entirely abandoned. Leopold, uneasy at
the thought of the influence a French queen might acquire, insisted that
one of his own sons, the archduke Charles, be accorded the title of heir
presumptive at Madrid as long as Charles II had no children; but France
succeeded in preventing this.
Marie Louise of Orleans, queen of Spain, succumbed in 1689, like
her mother, to a sudden illness and at the same age. Charles II
remarried--this time a German princess, Maria Anna of Neuburg, the
empress’ sister. The new queen, vain, pretentious, and extremely hostile
to France, never ceased to favour the wishes and schemes of Austria at
Madrid.
Two things were very necessary to Spain--that the heir to the crown
should be designated in advance, and that the already enfeebled monarchy
should not be dismembered. Charles II adopted the electoral prince of
Bavaria and by will declared him his heir.
It is necessary to enumerate here the claimants and give an idea of their
relationship. Philip III had two daughters--Anne of Austria married to
Louis XIII, and Maria Anna married to the emperor Ferdinand III. Philip
IV had married his two daughters in the same fashion--Maria Theresa to
Louis XIV and Margarita Theresa to the emperor Leopold. The Spanish
princesses married in France were the elder in their generations, but had
renounced the succession. The question was whether these renunciations
were valid. Louis XIV claimed that they were not, at least as regards
Maria Theresa. In this case the closest heirs to the Spanish crown were
the dauphin and his three sons, the dukes of Burgundy, Anjou, and Berri.
If, on the contrary, the French branch was outlawed, the succession
passed to the German line. Leopold had had a single daughter by his
marriage with Margarita Theresa, Maria Antonia-Josepha, the wife of the
Bavarian elector; who in turn had one son, still a child, whom Charles II
designated his heir.
But Leopold, although maternal grandfather of the young Bavarian
prince, raised another claim. On marrying his daughter he had imposed
a renunciation upon her, and henceforth he claimed that he himself was
the nearest heir through his mother Maria Anna, daughter of Philip III;
and his scheme was to transmit his personal rights to the sons of his
second marriage with Elizabeth of Neuburg. As the elder of these princes,
Joseph, elected king of the Romans in 1690, would succeed him in the
empire, Leopold aspired to make the second, the archduke Charles, king
of Spain--a combination which, without confounding the empire and Spain,
would perpetuate the rule of both branches of the Austrian house in these
two countries and recommence the work of Charles V.
Count von Harrach, Leopold’s envoy at Madrid, obtained with the queen’s
aid the annulment of the will in favour of the Bavarian prince. But he
wanted more, and insisted that the archduke Charles be declared heir
presumptive. The unfortunate king, worn out with these insistances, and
believing at moments that he had a new hold on life, announced that he
would await the day when the viaticum should be brought him before again
appointing his successor.
Louis XIV sent the marquis d’Harcourt to Madrid in the month of December,
1697, with instructions to keep watch on Charles’ court and to obstruct
the emperor’s plots; but knowing that he would obtain nothing directly
from the court of Madrid, he thought the surest and wisest plan was to
negotiate the bases of a partition with England and Holland, which would
be a means of proving his pacific disposition to Europe and would also
bear upon the emperor and the empire. Consequently Pomponne, whom he
had recalled to the head of foreign affairs, and Torcy, son of Colbert
de Croissy, invested with the office of secretary of state since 1689,
in March, 1699, made overtures to Lord Portland (Bentinck), English
ambassador at Paris. Tallard was sent to London to come to an agreement
with William III directly.
The negotiations, embarrassed by conflicting claims, lasted six months.
Finally a first treaty of partition was signed at the Hague on October
11th by Tallard and Briord, ambassadors of France to England and Holland.
It was agreed that the dauphin should have Naples, Sicily, the Spanish
towns on the coasts of Tuscany, the marquisate of Finale and Guipuzcoa,
that the archduke should have the Milanese, and that the electoral prince
of Bavaria should reign over Spain, the Indies, and the Netherlands. As
this last prince was only four years old and might die, it was decided
that in that event the elector, his father, should succeed him.
Charles II was not long in hearing that the succession had been regulated
without consulting him. He therefore convened an extraordinary council,
and to prevent the dismemberment of his state he constituted the prince
of Bavaria his sole heir (November, 1698) in spite of the fact that the
elector, father of the young prince, had consented to the treaty of
partition. This decision, in cutting short the dispute, was of a nature
to satisfy neither France nor Austria, and the death of the young prince
of Bavaria, which occurred unexpectedly at Brussels, on the 8th of
February, 1699, reopened the question. It annulled not only the will of
the king of Spain, but also the signed treaty of partition between France
and the maritime powers.
Louis XIV immediately undertook negotiations for a second treaty with the
powers, only more secretly, in order to be considerate of the last days
of Charles II and not to wound the susceptibilities of the Spaniards.
Tallard demanded that the Milanese should be added to the dauphin’s
portion, in consideration of which he offered to let the archduke rule
over Spain and the Indies, and to allow England and Holland the choice
of a sovereign for the Netherlands. Louis XIV hoped to attain with the
help of the maritime power the adherence of the emperor, if necessary, by
force, if Leopold made war.
Villars had left for Vienna in June, 1699, with the title of envoy
extraordinary and a suite of unusual splendour. But to his vague
overtures he received even more vague replies. Leopold had a rather
undecided character, and he was convinced that he would obtain from
Charles II a will in favour of the archduke Charles. He contested the
fundamental principles of the arrangement proposed by France, and finally
formally declined the acceptance of any treaty whatever (October, 1699).