FOREIGN RELATIONS AND THE DECLINE OF THE TOKUGAWA: (Continued)
THE TWELFTH SHOGUN, IEYOSHI (1838-1853)
FROM the period of this shogun the strength of the Bakufu began to
wane steadily, and the restoration of the administrative power to the
sovereign came to be discussed, with bated breath at first, but
gradually with increased freedom. It is undeniable, however, that the
decline of the Tokugawa was due as much to an empty treasury as to
the complications of foreign intercourse. The financial situation in
the first half of the nineteenth century may be briefly described as
one of expenditures constantly exceeding income, and of repeated
recourse by the Bakufu to the fatal expedient of debasing the
currency. Public respect was steadily undermined by these displays of
impecuniosity, and the feudatories in the west of the empire--that is
to say, the tozama daimyo, whose loyalty to the Bakufu was weak at
the best--found an opportunity to assert themselves against the Yedo
administration, while the appreciation of commodities rendered the
burden of living constantly more severe and thus helped to alienate
the people.
SUMPTUARY LAWS
While with one hand scattering abroad debased tokens of exchange, the
Bakufu legislators laboured strenuously with the other to check
luxury and extravagance. Conspicuous among the statesmen who sought
to restore the economical habit of former days was Mizuno Echizen no
Kami, who, in 1826 and the immediately subsequent years, promulgated
decree after decree vetoing everything in the nature of needless
expenditures. It fared with his attempt as it always does with such
legislation. People admired the vetoes in theory but paid little
attention to them in practice.
FAMINE IN THE TEMPO ERA (1830-1844)
From 1836 onward, through successive years, one bad harvest followed
another until the prices of rice and other cereals rose to
unprecedented figures. The Bakufu were not remiss in their measures
to relieve distress. Free grants of grain were made in the most
afflicted regions; houses of refuge were constructed where the
indigent might be fed and lodged during a maximum period of 210 days,
each inmate receiving in addition a daily allowance of money which
was handed to him on leaving the refuge, and this example of charity
was obeyed widely by the feudatories. It is on record that twenty
thousand persons availed themselves of these charitable institutions
in Yedo alone. One particularly sad episode marks the story. Driven
to desperation by the sight of the people's pain and by his own
failure to obtain from wealthy folks a sufficient measure of aid,
although he sold everything he himself possessed by way of example, a
police official, Oshio Heihachiro, raised the flag of revolt and
became the instrument of starting a tumult in which eighteen thousand
buildings were destroyed in Osaka. In a manifesto issued before
committing suicide in company with his son, Heihachiro charged the
whole body of officials with corrupt motives, and declared that the
sovereign was treated as a recluse without any practical authority;
that the people did not know where to make complaint; that the
displeasure of heaven was evinced by a succession of natural
calamities, and that the men in power paid no attention to these
warnings.
The eleventh shogun, Ienari, after fifty-one years of office,
resigned in favour of his son, Ieyoshi, who ruled from 1838 to 1853.
Ienari survived his resignation by four years, during which he
resided in the western castle, and, under the title of o-gosho,
continued to take part in the administration. As for Ieyoshi, his
tenure of power is chiefly notable for the strenuous efforts made by
his prime minister, Mizuno Echizen no Kami, to substitute economy for
the costly luxury that prevailed. Reference has already been made to
this eminent official's policy, and it will suffice here to add that
his aim was to restore the austere fashions of former times. The
schedule of reforms was practically endless. Expensive costumes were
seized and burned; theatres were relegated to a remote suburb of the
city; actors were ostracized; a censorship of publications checked
under severe penalties the compilation of all anti-foreign or immoral
literature, and even children's toys were legislated for.
At first these laws alarmed people, but it was soon found that
competence to enforce was not commensurate with ability to compile,
and the only result achieved was that splendour and extravagance were
more or less concealed. Yet the Bakufu officials did not hesitate to
resort to force. It is recorded that storehouses and residences were
sealed and their inmates banished; that no less than 570 restaurants
were removed from the most populous part of the city, and that the
maidservants employed in them were all degraded to the class of
"licensed prostitutes." This drastic effort went down in the pages of
history as the "Tempo Reformation." It ended in the resignation of
its author and the complete defeat of its purpose.
TOKUGAWA NARIAKI
Contemporaneous with the wholesale reformer, Mizuno, was Tokugawa
Nariaki (1800-1860), daimyo of Mito, who opposed the conciliatory
foreign policy, soon to be described, of Ii Naosuke (Kamon no Kami).
Nariaki inherited the literary tastes of his ancestor, Mitsukuni, and
at his court a number of earnest students and loyal soldiers
assembled. Among them were Fujita Toko (1806-1855) and Toda Tadanori,
who are not less remarkable as scholars and historians than as
administrators.
RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES
Japan now began to make the acquaintance of American citizens, who,
pursuing the whaling industry in the seas off Alaska and China,
passed frequently in their ships within easy sight of the island of
Yezo. Occasionally, one of these schooners was cast away on Japan's
shores, and as a rule, her people were treated with consideration and
sent to Deshima for shipment to Batavia. Japanese sailors, also, were
occasionally swept by hurricanes and currents to the Aleutian
Islands, to Oregon, or to California, and in several cases these
mariners were sent back to Japan by American vessels. It was on such
an errand of mercy that the sailing ship Morrison entered Yedo Bay,
in 1837, and being required to repair to Kagoshima, was driven from
the latter place by cannon shot. It was on such an errand, also, that
the Manhattan reached Uraga and lay there four days before she was
compelled to take her departure. It would seem that the experiences
collected by Cooper, master of the latter vessel, and published after
his return to the United States, induced the Washington Government to
essay the opening of Japan. A ninety-gun ship of the line and a
sloop, sent on this errand, anchored off Uraga in 1846, and their
commander, Commodore Biddle, applied for the sanction of trade. He
received a positive refusal, and in pursuance of his instructions to
abstain from any act calculated to excite hostility or distrust, he
weighed anchor and sailed away.
GREAT BRITAIN AND OTHER POWERS
In this same year, 1846, a French ship touched at the Ryukyu
archipelago, and attempted to persuade the islanders that if they
wished for security against British aggression, they must place
themselves under the protection of France. England, indeed, was now
much in evidence in the seas of southern China, and the Dutch at
Deshima, obeying the instincts of commercial rivalry, warned Japan
that she must be prepared for a visit from an English squadron at any
moment. The King of Holland now (1847) intervened. He sent to Yedo a
number of books together with a map of the world and a despatch
urging Japan to open her ports. This was not done for Japan's sake.
The apparent explanation is that the trade at Deshima having ceased
to be worth pursuing, the Dutch East India Company had surrendered
its monopoly to the Netherlands Government, so that the latter's
advice to Japan is explained. But his Majesty's efforts had no
immediate result, though they doubtless augmented Japan's feeling of
anxiety.
Twelve months later, the Preble, an American brig under Commander
Glynn, anchored off Nagasaki and threatened to bombard the town
unless immediate delivery was made of fifteen foreign seamen held by
the Japanese for shipment to Batavia. The castaways were surrendered,
and Commander Glynn found evidence to prove that Japan was by no
means ignorant of American doings in Mexico, and that she was
beginning to comprehend how close the world was approaching her
shores. Once again in the following year (1849), the King of Holland
wrote, telling the Japanese to expect an American fleet in their
waters twelve months later, and to look for war unless they agreed to
international commerce. This was no empty threat. The Washington
Government had actually addressed to European nations a memorandum
justifying an expedition to Japan on the ground that it would inure
to the advantage of all, and the King of Holland appended to his
letter a draft of the treaty which would be presented in Yedo. "All
these things render it obvious that in the matter of renewing their
relations with the outer world, the Japanese were not required to
make any sudden decision under stress of unexpected menace; they had
ample notice of the course events were taking."
THE 121ST SOVEREIGN, THE EMPEROR KOMEI (A.D. 1846-1867)
The Emperor Ninko died in 1846 and was succeeded by his son, Komei,
the 121st sovereign. The country's foreign relations soon became a
source of profound concern to the new ruler. Among the Court nobles
there had developed in Ninko's reign a strong desire to make their
influence felt in the administration of the empire, and thus to
emerge from the insignificant position to which the Bakufu system
condemned them. In obedience to their suggestions, the Emperor Ninko
established a special college for the education of Court nobles, from
the age of fifteen to that of forty. This step does not seem to have
caused any concern to the Bakufu officials. The college was duly
organized under the name of Gakushu-jo (afterwards changed to
Gakushu-iri). The Yedo treasury went so far as to contribute a
substantial sum to the support of the institution, and early in the
reign of Komei the nobles began to look at life with eyes changed by
the teaching thus afforded. Instructors at the college were chosen
among the descendants of the immortal scholars, Abe no Seimei,
Sugawara no Michizane, and others scarcely less renowned. The Emperor
Ninko had left instructions that four precepts should be inscribed
conspicuously in the halls of the college, namely:
Walk in the paths trodden by the feet of the great sages.
Revere the righteous canons of the empire.
He that has not learned the sacred doctrines, how can he govern
himself?
He that is ignorant of the classics, how can he regulate his own
conduct?
A manifest sign of the times, the portals of this college were soon
thronged by Court nobles, and the Imperial capital began to awake
from its sleep of centuries. The Emperor himself evinced his
solicitude about foreign relations by fasting and by praying at the
shrines of the national deities, his Majesty's constant formula of
worship being a supplication that his life might be accepted as a
substitute for the safety of his country. The fact was that the
overthrow of the Yedo Bakufu had begun to constitute an absorbing
object with many of the high officials in Kyoto. It had hitherto been
an invariable rule that any policy contemplated in Yedo became an
accomplished fact before a report was presented in the Imperial
capital. But very soon after his coronation, the Emperor Komei
departed from this time-honoured sequence of procedure and formally
instructed the Bakufu that the traditional policy of the empire in
foreign affairs must be strictly maintained. The early Tokugawa
shoguns would have strongly resented such interference, but times had
changed, and Ieyoshi bowed his head quietly to the new order.
Thenceforth the Bakufu submitted all questions of foreign policy to
the Imperial Court before final decision.
COMMODORE PERRY
In the year 1853, Commodore Perry of the United States Navy appeared
in Uraga Bay with a squadron of four warships and 560 men. The advent
of such a force created much perturbation in Yedo. Instead of dealing
with the affair on their own absolute authority, the Bakufu summoned
a council of the feudatories to discuss the necessary steps.
Meanwhile, the shogun, who had been ill for some time, died, and his
decease was pleaded as a pretext for postponing discussion with the
Americans. Perry being without authority to resort to force, did not
press his point. He transmitted the President's letter to the
sovereign of Japan, and steamed away on the 17th of July, declaring
his intention to return in the following year. This letter was
circulated among the feudatories, who were invited to express their
opinions on the document. Their replies are worthy of perusal as
presenting a clear idea of Japanese views at that time with regard to
foreign intercourse. The gist of the replies may be summarized as
follows:
-The ultimate purpose of foreigners in visiting Japan is to
reconnoitre the country. This is proved by the action of the Russians
in the north. What has been done by Western States in India and China
would doubtless be done in Japan also if opportunity offered. Even
the Dutch are not free from suspicion of acting the part of spies.
-Foreign trade, so far from benefitting the nation, cannot fail to
impoverish it, inasmuch as oversea commerce simply means that,
whereas Japan receives a number of unnecessary luxuries, she has to
give in exchange quantities of precious metals.
-To permit foreign intercourse would be to revoke the law of
exclusion which has been enforced for centuries, and which was the
outcome of practical experience.
These opinions were subscribed by a great majority of the
feudatories. A few, however, had sufficient foresight and courage to
advocate foreign intercourse. The leaders of this small minority
were, Ii Naosuke, baron of Hikone, historically remembered as Ii
Kamon no Kami; Toda Izu no Kami, bugyo of Uraga; Takashima Kihei
(called also Shirodayu, or Shuhan); Egawa Tarozaemon, bugyo of
Nirayama; and Otsuki Heiji, a vassal of the baron of Sendai. The
views of these statesmen may be briefly summarized as follows:
-It is not to be denied that many illustrious and patriotic men,
anticipating injury to the country's fortunes and perversion of the
nation's moral canons, are implacably opposed to foreign intercourse.
But the circumstances of the time render it impossible to maintain
the integrity of the empire side by side with the policy of
seclusion. The coasts are virtually unprotected. The country is
practically without a navy. Throughout a period of nearly two and a
half centuries the building of any ship having a capacity of over one
hundred koku has been forbidden, and in the absence of war-vessels
there is no means of defence except coast batteries, which are
practically non-existent.
-When inaugurating the policy of seclusion, the Bakufu Government
took care to leave China and Holland as a bridge between Japan and
the rest of the world. It will be wise to utilize that bridge for
dealing with foreign States, so as to gain time for preparations of
defence, instead of rushing blindly into battle without any supply of
effective weapons. If the Americans have need of coal, there is an
abundant supply in Kyushu. If they require provisions and water,
their needs can easily be satisfied. As for returning distressed
foreign seamen, that has hitherto been done voluntarily, and an
arrangement on this subject can be made through the medium of the
Dutch. As for foreign trade, the times have changed radically since a
veto was imposed on all commercial transactions, and it by no means
follows that what was wise then is expedient now. Japan must have
ocean-going vessels, and these cannot be procured in a moment. Her
best way is to avail herself of the services of the Dutch as
middlemen in trade, and to lose no time in furnishing herself with
powerful men-of-war and with sailors and gunners capable of
navigating and fighting these vessels.
-In short, the wisest plan is to make a show of commerce and
intercourse, and thus gain time to equip the country with a knowledge
of naval architecture and warfare. The two things most essential are
that Christianity should not be admitted in the train of foreign
trade, and that the strictest economy should be exercised by all
classes of the people so as to provide funds for the building of a
navy and the fortification of the coasts.
The question alluded to at the close of the above, namely, the
question of finance, was a paramount difficulty for the Bakufu. In
the very year of Perry's coming, a member of the Cabinet in Yedo
wrote as follows to Fujita Toko, chief adviser of the Mito feudatory:
"Unless I tell you frankly about the condition of the treasury you
cannot appreciate the situation. If you saw the accounts you would be
startled, and would learn at a glance the hopelessness of going to
war. The country could not hold out even for a twelvemonth, and there
is nothing for it except that everyone should join in saving money
for purposes of equipment. If we keep the peace now and toil
unremittingly for ten years, we may hope to restore the situation."
In truth, the Bakufu had practically no choice. "On one hand,
thousands of publicists, who believed themselves patriotic, clamoured
for the policy of seclusion, even at the cost of war; on the other,
the Yedo Government knew that to fight must be to incur crushing
defeat." The Bakufu then issued the following temporizing decree:
"With regard to the despatch from the United States Government, the
views of competent men have been taken and have been carefully
considered by the shogun. The views expressed are variously worded
but they advocate either peace or war. Everyone has pointed out that
we are without a navy and that our coasts are undefended. Meanwhile,
the Americans will be here again next year. Our policy shall be to
evade any definite answer to their request, while at the same time
maintaining a peaceful demeanour. It may be, however, that they will
have recourse to violence. For that contingency we must be prepared
lest the country suffer disgrace. Therefore every possible effort
will be made to prepare means of defence. Above all it is imperative
that everyone should practise patience, refrain from anger, and
carefully observe the conduct of the foreigners. Should they open
hostilities, all must at once take up arms and fight strenuously for
the country."
A less vertebrate policy could scarcely have been formulated, but the
conduct of the Bakufu statesmen was more stalwart than their
language. Under the guidance of Abe Masahiro, one of the ablest
statesmen that Yedo ever possessed, batteries were built at Shinagawa
to guard the approaches to Yedo; defensive preparations were made
along the coasts of Musashi, Sagami, Awa, and Kazusa; the veto
against the construction of ocean-going ships was rescinded, and the
feudatories were invited to build and arm large vessels; a commission
was given to the Dutch at Deshima to procure from Europe a library of
useful books; cannon were cast; troops were drilled, and everyone who
had acquired expert knowledge through the medium of the Dutch was
taken into official favour.
But all these efforts tended only to expose their own feebleness, and
on the 2nd of November, 1853, instructions were issued that if the
Americans returned, they were to be dealt with peacefully. "In short,
the sight of Perry's steam-propelled ships, their powerful armament,
and the specimens they carried of Western wonders had practically
broken down the barriers of Japan's isolation without any need of
treaties or conventions." Thus, when the American commodore returned
in the following February with ten ships and crews numbering two
thousand, he easily obtained a treaty by which Japan promised kind
treatment to shipwrecked sailors; permission to foreign vessels to
obtain stores and provisions within her territory, and an engagement
that American vessels might anchor in the ports of Shimoda and
Hakata. Much has been written about Perry's judicious display of
force and about his sagacious tact in dealing with the Japanese, but
it may be doubted whether the consequences of his exploit did not
invest its methods with extravagant lustre.
TREATIES OF COMMERCE
Russia, Holland, and England speedily obtained treaties similar to
that concluded by Commodore Perry in 1854. These, however, were not
commercial conventions. It was reserved for Mr. Townsend Harris,
American consul-general in Japan, to open the country to trade.
Arriving in August, 1856, he concluded in March, 1857, a treaty
securing to United States citizens the right of permanent residence
at Shimoda and Hakodate, as well as that of carrying on trade at
Nagasaki and establishing consular jurisdiction. Nevertheless,
nothing worthy to be called commercial intercourse was allowed by the
Bakufu, and it was not until Mr. Harris, with infinite patience and
tact, had gone to Yedo alter ten months' delay that he secured the
opening of ports other than Nagasaki to international commerce. In
this achievement he was assisted by Hotta Masamutsu, successor to the
great Masahiro, and, like most of his colleagues, a sincere advocate
of opening the country.
Japan has been much blamed for her reluctance in this matter, but
when we recall the danger to which the Yedo administration was
exposed by its own weakness, and when we observe that a strong
sentiment was growing up in favour of abolishing the dual form of
government, we can easily appreciate that to sanction commercial
relations might well have shaken the Bakufu to their foundations. It
was possible to construe the Perry convention and the first Harris
convention as mere acts of benevolence towards strangers, but a
commercial treaty would not have lent itself to any such
construction. We cannot wonder that the shogun's ministers hesitated
to take an apparently suicidal step. They again consulted the
feudatories and again received an almost unanimously unfavourable
answer.
In fact, history has preserved only one unequivocal expression of
consent. It was formulated by Matsudaira Yoshinaga, baron of Echizen.
He had been among the most ardent exclusionists in the first council
of feudatories; but his views had subsequently undergone a radical
change, owing to the arguments of one of his vassals, Hashimoto
Sanae--elder brother of Viscount Hashimoto Tsunatsune, president of
the Red Cross Hospital, who died in 1909. "Not only did this
remarkable man frankly advocate foreign trade for its own sake and as
a means of enriching the nation, thus developing its capacity for
independence, but he also recommended the fostering of industries,
the purchase of ships and firearms, the study of foreign arts and
sciences, and the despatch of students and publicists to Western
countries for purposes of instruction. Finally, he laid down the
principle that probity is essential to commercial success." Such
doctrines were then much in advance of the time. Nevertheless, Harris
achieved his purpose. He had audience of the shogun in November,
1857, and, on the 29th of the following July, a treaty was concluded
opening Yokohama, from the 1st of July, 1858, to commerce between the
United States and Japan.
This treaty was concluded in spite of the failure of two attempts to
obtain the sanction of the Throne. Plainly the Bakufu shrank from
openly adopting a policy which, while recognizing its necessity, they
distrusted their own ability to force upon the nation. They had,
however, promised Mr. Harris that the treaty should be signed, and
they kept their word at a risk, of whose magnitude the American
consul-general had no conception. Mr. Harris had brought to this
conference exceptional diplomatic skill and winning tact, but it
cannot be denied that he derived assistance from contemporaneous
events in China, where the Peiho forts had just been captured and the
Chinese forced to sign a treaty. He was thus able to warn the
Japanese that the British and the French fleets might be expected at
any moment to enter Yedo Bay, and that the best way to avert irksome
demands at the hands of the British was to establish a comparatively
moderate precedent by yielding to the American proposals.
THE THIRTEENTH SHOGUN, IESADA (1853-1858)
Between the conclusion of the Harris commercial treaty and its
signature, the Bakufu prime minister visited Kyoto, for the purpose
of persuading the Imperial Court to abandon its anti-foreign
attitude. His mission was quite unsuccessful, the utmost concession
obtained by him being that the problem of the treaty should be
submitted to the feudatories. Another question raised on this
occasion in Kyoto was the succession to the shogunate. The twelfth
shogun, Ieyoshi, had died in 1853, and was succeeded by Iesada, a
physically incompetent ruler. Iesada had been married to the daughter
of the Satsuma feudatory, as planned by the former Bakufu premier,
Abe, who hoped thus to cement friendly relations with the great
southern baron, a hereditary enemy of the Tokugawa. There was no
issue of the marriage, and it being certain that there could be no
issue, two candidates for the shogunate were proposed. They were
Keiki, son of Nariaki of Mito a man of matured intellect and high
capacities, and Iemochi, son of Nariyuki of Kii, a boy of thirteen.
Public opinion supported the former, and his connexion with the house
of Mito seemed to assure an anti-foreign bias. Chiefly for the latter
reason, the Court in Kyoto favoured his nomination.
But Keiki was not really an advocate of national seclusion. Had the
succession been given to him then, he would doubtless have adopted a
liberal policy. On the other hand, his appointment would have been
equivalent to the abdication of Iesada, and in order to avert that
catastrophe, the shogun's entourage contrived to obtain the
appointment of Ii Kamon no Kami to the post of prime minister in
Yedo. This baron was not less capable than courageous. He immediately
caused the young daimyo of Kii to be nominated successor to the
shogunate, and he signed the Harris treaty. A vehement outcry ensued.
It was claimed that the will of the Imperial Court had been set at
nought by signing the treaty without the sovereign's sanction, and
that unconditional yielding to foreign demands was intolerable. The
Mito baron headed this opposition. But it is observable that even he
did not insist upon the maintenance of absolute seclusion. All that
he and his followers demanded was that a delay should be imposed in
order to obtain time for definite preparation, whereas the premier,
Ii, was for the immediate opening of the country.
THE FOURTEENTH SHOGUN, IEMOCHI (1858-1866)
Iesada died in 1858, and the reluctance of the Imperial Court to
sanction the succession of Iemochi was evidenced by a long delay in
the transmission of the necessary Imperial document. During that
interval, the feudatories of Mito and Echizen had a memorable
interview with the premier, Ii, whose life seemed at that time to
hang by a thread, but who, nevertheless, advanced unflinchingly
towards his goal. The three feudatories offered to compromise; in
other words, they declared their willingness to subscribe the
commercial convention provided that Keiki was appointed shogun; the
important fact being thus established that domestic politics had
taken precedence of foreign. Ii not only declined this offer, but
also did not hesitate to punish the leaders of the opposition by
confinement and by temporary exclusion from the Court.
FOREIGN MILITARY SCIENCE
It was during the days of the thirteenth shogun that Japan may be
said to have commenced her practical study of foreign military
science. Instructors were imported from Holland, and a college was
established at Nagasaki. Among its graduates were several historical
characters, notably Katsu Rintaro, after-wards Count Katsu, minister
of Marine in the Meiji Government. A naval college (Gunkan Kyojujo)
also was organized at Tsukiji, in Yedo, while at Akunoura, in
Nagasaki, an iron-foundry was erected. There, the first attempt at
shipbuilding on foreign lines was made, and there, also, is now
situated the premier private dockyard in Japan, namely, that of the
Mitsubishi Company. Already, in 1854, the Dutch Government had
presented to Japan her first steamship, the Kanko Maru.
FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES AND THE BAKUFU
An indirect consequence of these disputes between the Throne and the
Court nobles, on one side, and the Bakufu officials, on the other,
was to perplex the foreign representatives who were now residing in
Yedo. These representatives learned to believe that the shogun's
ministers were determined either to avoid making treaties or to evade
them when made. However natural this suspicion may have been, it
lacked solid foundation. That is proved by a memorial which the Yedo
statesmen addressed to the Throne after the negotiation of the Harris
treaty. They made it quite plain that they were acting in perfect
good faith, the only doubtful point in the memorial being that, after
the organization of a competent army and navy, the problem of peace
or war might be decided. "If peaceful relations be maintained by
ratifying the treaty," they wrote, "the avaricious aliens will
definitely see that there is not much wealth in the country, and
thus, abandoning the idea of gain, they will approach us with
friendly feelings only and ultimately will pass under our Emperor's
grace. They may then be induced to make grateful offerings to his
Majesty, and it will no longer be a question of trade but of
tribute." Something of sinister intention seems to present itself
between the lines of this document. But we have to remember that it
was addressed ultimately to the Kyoto nobles, whose resentment would
have been at once excited by the use of friendly or self-effacing
language.
There is also on record correspondence that passed between the Bakufu
premier, Ii, and certain friends of his in the Imperial capital. From
these letters it appears that Yedo was advised by the far-seeing
section of the Kyoto statesmen to simulate the policy of bringing
aliens under Japanese influence, and of using for purposes of
military and naval development the wealth that would accrue from
oversea trade. In a word, the Bakufu had to disguise their policy in
terms such as might placate the Kyoto conservatives, and this
deception was once carried so far that an envoy sent to Kyoto from
Yedo represented the shogun as hostile at heart to foreigners, though
tolerating them temporarily as a matter of prudence. It cannot be
wondered at that the foreign representatives found much to perplex
them in these conditions, or that at the legations in Yedo, as well
as among the peoples of Europe and America, an uneasy feeling grew up
that Japan waited only for an opportunity to repudiate her treaty
engagements.
INTRIGUES IN KYOTO
About this time there began to assemble in the Imperial capital a
number of men who, though without social or official status, were at
once talented; patriotic, and conservative. At their head stood Umeda
Genjiro, who practised as a physician and wrote political brochures
under the nom de plume of Umpin. He soon became the centre of
a circle of loyalists whose motto was Son-0 Jo-I (Revere the
sovereign, expel the barbarians), and associated with him were
Rai Miki, a son of Rai Sanyo; Yanagawa Seigan; Yoshida Shoin; Saigo
Kichinosuke--better known as Saigo Takamori, the leader of the
Satsuma rebellion of 1877,--Hashimoto Sanae, and others who have been
not unjustly described as the real motive force that brought about
the Restoration of 1867.
These men soon came to exercise great influence over the Court
nobles--especially Konoe, Takatsukasa, Ichijo, Nijo, and Sanjo--and
were consequently able to suggest subjects for the sovereign's
rescripts. Thus his Majesty was induced to issue an edict which
conveyed a reprimand to the shogun for concluding a treaty without
previously referring it to the feudatories, and which suggested that
the Mito and Owari feudatories should be released from the sentence
of confinement passed on them by Ii Kamon no Kami. This edict
startled the Bakufu. They at once sent from Yedo envoys to
remonstrate with the conservatives, and after a controversy lasting
four months, a compromise was effected by which the sovereign
postponed any action for the expulsion of foreigners and the shogun
declared that his tolerance of international commerce was only
temporary. This was regarded as a victory for the shogunate. But the
Yedo envoys, during their stay in Kyoto, discovered evidences of a
plot to overthrow the Bakufu. Great severity was shown in dealing
with this conspiracy. The leaders were beheaded, banished, or ordered
to commit suicide; the Mito feudatory being sentenced to perpetual
confinement in his fief; the daimyo of Owari, to permanent
retirement; and Keiki, former candidate for the succession to the
shogunate, being deprived of office and directed to live in
seclusion. Many other notable men were subjected to various
penalties, and this "Great Judgment of Ansei"--the name of the
era--caused a profound sensation throughout the empire. The nation
mourned for many sincere patriots who had been sentenced on the
flimsiest evidence, and the whole incident tended to accentuate the
unpopularity of foreign intercourse.
ENGRAVING: II NAOSUKE
THE SECRET EDICT
The compromise mentioned above as having been effected between Yedo
and Kyoto had the effect of stultifying the previously drafted edict
which condemned the shogun for concluding a treaty without consulting
the feudatories. The edict had not been publicly promulgated, but it
had come into the possession of the Mito feudatory, and by his orders
had been enclosed in the family tomb, where it was guarded night and
day by a strong troop of samurai. The Bakufu insisted that to convey
such a document direct from the Throne to a feudatory was a plain
trespass upon the shogun's authority. Mito, however, refused to
surrender it. The most uncompromising conservatives of the fief
issued a manifesto justifying their refusal, and, as evidence of
their sincerity, committed suicide.
ASSASSINATION OF II
Nariaki, the Mito baron, now instructed his vassals to surrender the
edict. He may have shared the views of his retainers, but he was not
prepared to assert them by taking up arms against his own family. In
the face of this instruction the conservative samurai had no choice
but to disperse or commit suicide. Some twenty of them, however, made
their way to Yedo bent upon killing Ii Kamon no Kami, whom they
regarded as the head and front of the evils of the time. The deed was
consummated on the morning of the 24th of March, 1860, as Ii was on
his way to the shogun's castle. All the assassins lost their lives or
committed suicide.
ATTITUDE OF THE JAPANESE SAMURAI
The slaying of Ii was followed by several similar acts, a few against
foreigners and several against Japanese leaders of progress. Many
evil things have been said of the men by whom these deeds of blood
were perpetrated. But we have always to remember, that in their own
eyes they obeyed the teachings of hereditary conviction and the
dictates of patriotism towards their country as well as loyalty
towards their sovereign. It has been abundantly shown in these pages
that the original attitude of the Japanese towards foreigners was
hospitable and liberal. It has also been shown how, in the presence
of unwelcome facts, this mood was changed for one of distrust and
dislike. Every Japanese patriot believed when he refused to admit
foreigners to his country in the nineteenth century that he was
obeying the injunctions handed down from the lips of his most
illustrious countrymen, Hideyoshi, Ieyasu, and Iemitsu--believed, in
short, that to re-admit aliens would be to expose the realm to
extreme peril and to connive at its loss of independence. He was
prepared to obey this conviction at the cost of his own life, and
that sacrifice seemed a sufficient guarantee of his sincerity.
THE FIRST FOREIGNERS
It must be conceded, too, that the nineteenth-century foreigner did
not present himself to Japan in a very lovable light. His demeanour
was marked by all the arrogance habitually shown by the Occidental
towards the Oriental, and though the general average of the oversea
comers reached a high standard, they approached the solution of all
Japanese problems with a degree of suspicion which could not fail to
be intensely irksome to a proud nation. Even the foreign
representatives made it their habit to seek for trickery or abuse in
all Japanese doings, official or private, and though they doubtless
had much warrant for this mood, its display did not tend to
conciliate the Japanese. Many instances might be cited from the pages
of official records and from the columns of local newspapers, but
they need not be detailed here.
Moreover, there were difficulties connected with trade. The framers
of the treaties had found it necessary to deal with the currency
question, and their manner of dealing with it was to stipulate that
foreign coins should be exchangeable with Japanese, weight for
weight. This stipulation did not take into any account the ratio
between the precious metals, and as that ratio was fifteen to one in
Europe and five to one in Japan, it is obvious that, by the mere
process of exchange, a foreign merchant could reap a rich harvest. Of
course this was never intended by the framers of the treaty, and when
the Japanese saw the yellow metal flowing away rapidly from the
realm, they adopted the obvious expedient of changing the relative
weights of the gold and silver coins.
It may be doubted whether any state would have hesitated to apply
that remedy. Yet by the foreigner it was censured as a "gross
violation of treaty right" and as "a deliberate attempt on the part
of the Japanese authorities to raise all the prices of the native
produce two hundred per cent, against the foreign purchaser." The
British representative, Sir Rutherford Alcock, in a despatch written
to his Government, at the close of 1859, penned some very caustic
comments on the conduct of his countrymen, and did not hesitate to
declare that "in estimating the difficulties to be overcome in any
attempt to improve the aspect of affairs, if the ill-disguised enmity
of the governing classes and the indisposition of the Executive
Government to give partial effect to the treaties be classed among
the first and principal of these, the unscrupulous character and
dealings of foreigners who frequent the ports for purposes of trade
are only second and scarcely inferior in importance, from the
sinister character of the influence they exercise."
It is only just, however, to note the other side of the picture, and
to observe that the foreign merchant had many causes of legitimate
dissatisfaction; that his business was constantly hampered and
interrupted by Japanese official interference; that the ready
recourse which Japanese samurai had to deeds of blood against
peaceful strangers seemed revoltingly cruel; that he appeared to be
surrounded by an atmosphere of perplexity and double dealing, and
that the large majority of the Anglo-Saxon tradesmen visiting Japan
in the early days of her renewed intercourse had nothing whatever in
common with the men described in the above despatch.
KYOTO
In order to follow the sequence of events, it is necessary to revert
to Kyoto, which, as the reader will have perceived, was the centre of
national politics in this troublous era. An incident apparently of
the greatest importance to the Bakufu occurred in 1861. The shogun
received the Emperor's sister in marriage. But the auspicious event
had to be heavily paid for, since the Bakufu officials were obliged
to pledge themselves to expel foreigners within ten years. This
inspired new efforts on the part of the conservatives. A number of
samurai visited Yokohama, and promised death to any Japanese merchant
entering into transactions with the aliens. These conservatives
further announced the doctrine that the shogun's title of sei-i
(barbarian-expelling) indicated explicitly that to expel foreigners
was his duty, and the shogun's principal officials were so craven
that they advised him to apologize for failing to discharge that duty
instead of wholly repudiating the extravagant interpretation of the
anti-foreign party.
Encouraged by these successes, the extremists in Kyoto induced the
sovereign to issue an edict in which, after speaking of the
"insufferable and contumelious behaviour of foreigners," of "the loss
of prestige and of honour constantly menacing the country," and of
the sovereign's "profound solicitude," his Majesty openly cited the
shogun's engagement to drive out the aliens within ten years, and
explicitly affirmed that the grant of an Imperial princess' hand to
the shogun had been intended to secure the unity required for that
achievement. Such an edict was in effect an exhortation to every
Japanese subject to organize an anti-foreign crusade, and it
"publicly committed the Bakufu Court to a policy which the latter had
neither the power to carry out nor any intention of attempting to
carry out."
But at this juncture something like a reaction took place in the
Imperial capital. A party of able men, led by Princes Konoe and
Iwakura, had the courage to denounce the unwisdom of the extremists,
at whose head stood Princes Arisugawa and Sanjo. At that time the
most powerful fiefs in Japan were Satsuma and Choshu. Both were
hereditarily hostile to the Tokugawa, but were mutually separated by
a difference of opinion in the matter of foreign policy, so that when
the above two cabals were organized in Kyoto, the Choshu men attached
themselves to the extremists, the Satsuma to the moderates. The
latter contrived to have an Imperial rescript sent to Yedo by the
hands of the Satsuma feudatory, Shimazu Hisamitsu. This rescript
indicated three courses, one of which the shogun was asked to choose:
namely, first, that he himself should proceed to Kyoto for the
purpose of there conferring with the principal feudatories as to the
best means of tranquillizing the nation; secondly, that the five
principal littoral fiefs should be ordered to prepare coast defences,
and, thirdly, that Keiki of Mito and the feudatory of Echizen should
be appointed to high office in the Bakufu administration.
To obey this rescript was to violate the fundamental law of the
Bakufu, namely, that all interference in administrative affairs was
forbidden to the Kyoto Court. The only dignified course for the
shogun to take was to refuse compliance or to resign, and probably
had he done so he would have recovered the power of which he had
gradually been deprived by the interference of Kyoto. But his
advisers lacked courage to recommend such a course. At their
suggestion the shogun signified his willingness to comply with the
first and the third of the conditions embodied in the edict. The
Satsuma feudatory strongly counselled that the shogun should decline
to proceed to Kyoto and should reject all proposals for the expulsion
of foreigners, but the Bakufu ignored his advice.
THE NAMAMUGI INCIDENT
At this time there occurred an incident which had the most
far-reaching consequences. A party of British subjects, three
gentlemen and a lady, met, at Namamugi on the Tokaido, the cortege of
the Satsuma feudatory as he was returning from Yedo. Unacquainted
with the strict etiquette enforced in Japan in such situations, the
foreigners attempted to ride through the procession, the result being
that one, Mr. Richardson, was killed, and two of the others were
wounded. The upshot of this affair was that the British Government,
having demanded the surrender of the samurai implicated in the
murder, and having been refused, sent a naval squadron to bombard
Kagoshima, the capital of the Satsuma baron. In this engagement, the
Satsuma men learned for the first time the utter helplessness of
their old weapons and old manner of fighting, and their conversion to
progressive ideas was thoroughly effected.
CONTINUED INTRIGUES IN KYOTO
The submissive attitude of the Bakufu towards the Imperial Court
encouraged the extremists in Kyoto to prefer fresh demands. Instead
of waiting for the shogun to repair to Kyoto, as he had pledged
himself to do in compliance with the edict mentioned above, they
contrived the issue of another rescript, requiring the Bakufu to
proclaim openly the adoption of the alien-expelling policy, and to
fix a date for its practical inception. Again the Bakufu yielded.
They did not, indeed, actually take the steps indicated in the
rescript, but they promised to consider its contents as soon as the
shogun arrived in Kyoto. The extremists, however, could not reconcile
themselves to even that delay. In the spring of 1863, they
constrained Keiki, who had been appointed guardian to the shogun and
who was then in Kyoto, to give an engagement that on the shogun's
return to Yedo decisive measures to put an end to foreign intercourse
should be begun. This engagement the shogun found awaiting him on his
arrival in the Imperial capital, and at the same time messages daily
reached him from Yedo, declaring that unless he returned at once to
Yedo to settle the Namamugi affair, war with Great Britain would be
inevitable. But the conservatives would not allow him to return. They
procured the issue of yet another Imperial decree directing that "if
the English barbarians wanted a conference, they should repair to
Osaka Harbour and receive a point-blank refusal; that the shogun
should remain in Kyoto to direct defensive operations, and that he
should accompany the Emperor to the shrine of the god of War where a
'barbarian-quelling sword' would be handed to him." Illness saved the
shogun from some of his perplexities and, in his absence, the Yedo
statesmen paid the indemnity required by Great Britain for the
Namamugi outrage and left her to exact whatever further redress she
desired. Accordingly, in July, 1863, a British squadron proceeded to
Kagoshima and bombarded it as already described.
THE SHIMONOSEKI COMPLICATION
If the Satsuma men thus received a conclusive lesson as to the
superiority of Western armaments, the Choshu fief was destined to be
similarly instructed not long afterwards. It will have been perceived
that at this epoch the Imperial Court was very prolific in
anti-foreign edicts. One of these actually appointed the 11th of May,
1863, as the date for commencing the barbarian-expelling campaign,
and copies of the edict were sent direct to the feudatories without
previous reference to the shogun. The Choshu daimyo found the edict
so congenial that, without waiting for the appointed day, he opened
fire on American, French, and Dutch merchantmen passing the Strait of
Shimonoseki, which his batteries commanded. The ships suffered no
injury, but, of course, such an act could not be condoned, and the
Bakufu Government being unwilling or unable to give full reparation,
the three powers whose vessels had been fired on joined hands with
England for the purpose of despatching a squadron to destroy the
Choshu forts, which result was attained with the greatest ease. This
"Shimonoseki Expedition," as it was called, enormously strengthened
the conviction which the bombardment of Kagoshima had established.
The nation thoroughly appreciated its own belligerent incapacity when
foreign powers entered the lists, and patriotic men began to say
unhesitatingly that their country was fatally weakened by the dual
system of government.
CHANGE OF OPINION IN KYOTO
The sway exercised by the extremists in Kyoto now received a check
owing to their excessive zeal. They procured the drafting of an
Imperial edict which declared the Emperor's resolve to drive out the
foreigners, and announced a visit by his Majesty to the great shrines
to pray for success. This edict never received the Imperial seal. The
extremists appear to have overrated their influence at Court. They
counted erroneously on his Majesty's post facto compliance, and they
thus created an opportunity of which the moderates took immediate
advantage. At the instance of the latter and in consideration of the
fictitious edict, Mori Motonori of Choshu, leader of the extremists,
was ordered to leave the capital with all the nobles who shared his
opinions. Doubtless the bombardment of Kagoshima contributed not a
little to this measure, but the ostensible cause was the irregularity
of the edict. There was no open disavowal of conservatism, but, on
the other hand, there was no attempt to enforce it. The situation for
the extremists was further impaired by an appeal to force on the part
of the Choshu samurai. They essayed to enter Kyoto under arms, for
the ostensible purpose of presenting a petition to the Throne but
really to make away with the moderate leaders. This political coup
failed signally, and from that time the ardent advocates of the
anti-foreign policy began to be regarded as rebels. Just at this time
the Shimonoseki expedition gave an object lesson to the nation, and
helped to deprive the barbarian-expelling agitation of any semblance
of Imperial sanction.
CHOSHU AND THE BAKUFU
When the Choshu feudatory attempted to close the Shimonoseki Strait
by means of cannon, the Bakufu sent a commissioner to remonstrate.
But the Choshu samurai insisted that they had merely obeyed the
sovereign's order, and the better to demonstrate their resolution,
they put the commissioner to death. Thus directly challenged, the
Bakufu mustered a powerful force and launched it against Choshu. But
by this time the two great southern clans, having learned the madness
of appealing to force for the purpose of keeping the country closed,
had agreed to work together in the interests of the State. Thus, when
the Bakufu army, comprising contingents from thirty-six feudatories,
reached Choshu, the latter appealed to the clemency of the invading
generals, among whom the Satsuma baron was the most powerful, and the
appeal resulted in the withdrawal of the punitory expedition without
the imposition of any conditions. The Bakufu were naturally much
incensed. Another formidable force was organized to attack Choshu,
but it halted at Osaka and sent envoys to announce the punishment of
the rebellious fief, to which announcements the fief paid not the
least attention.
THE HYOGO DEMONSTRATION
While things were at this stage, Sir Harry Parkes, representative of
Great Britain, arrived upon the scene in the Far East. A man of
remarkably luminous judgment and military methods, this distinguished
diplomatist appreciated almost immediately that the ratification of
the treaties by the sovereign was essential to their validity, and
that by investing the ratification with all possible formality, the
Emperor's recovery of administrative power might be accelerated. He
therefore conceived the idea of repairing to Hyogo with a powerful
naval squadron for the purpose of seeking, first, the ratification of
the treaty; secondly, the reduction of the import tariff from an
average of fifteen per cent, ad valorem (at which figure it had been
fixed by the original treaty) to five per cent., and, thirdly, the
opening of the ports of Hyogo and Osaka at once, instead of nearly
two years hence, as previously agreed.
Among the penalties imposed upon Choshu by the four powers which
combined to destroy the forts at Shimonoseki was a fine of three
million dollars, and the Bakufu, being unable to collect this money
from Choshu, had taken upon themselves the duty of paying it and had
already paid one million. Sir Harry Parkes's plan was to remit the
remaining two millions in consideration of the Government endorsing
the three demands formulated above. It need hardly be said that the
appearance of a powerful squadron of foreign warships at the very
portals of the Imperial palace threw the nation into a ferment. The
eight vessels cast anchor off Hyogo in November, 1866, and it seemed
to the nation that the problem of foreign intercourse had been
revived in an aggravated form.
Once again the anti-foreign agitators recovered their influence, and
inveighed against the Bakufu's incompetence to avert such trespasses
even from the sacred city. Under the pressure brought to bear by
these conservatives, the Emperor dismissed from office or otherwise
punished the ministers appointed by the shogun to negotiate with the
foreign representatives, and in the face of this humiliating
disavowal of Bakufu authority, the shogun had no alternative except
to resign. He did so. But the Imperial Court hesitated to accept the
responsibilities that would have resulted from sanctioning his
resignation. The Bakufu were informed that the Emperor sanctioned the
treaties and that the shogun was authorized to deal with them, but
that steps must be taken to revise them in consultation with the
feudatories, and that Hyogo and Osaka must not be opened, though the
proposed change of tariff-rate would be permitted. Nothing definite
was said about remitting the two million dollars remaining from the
Choshu fine, and Sir Harry Parkes was able to say triumphantly that
he had obtained two out of three concessions demanded by him without
having given any quid pro whatever.
THE LAST OF THE TOKUGAWA SHOGUNS
The measures against Choshu were now recommenced, but with complete
unsuccess, and thus a final blow was given to the prestige of the
Yedo Government. It was at this time (1866) that the fourteenth
shogun, Iemochi, passed away and was succeeded by Yoshinobu, better
known, as Keiki. Whatever the political views of this nobleman may
have been when he was put forward by the conservatives, in 1857, as a
candidate for succession to the shogunate, he no sooner attained that
dignity, in 1866, than he became an ardent advocate of progress.
French experts were engaged to remodel the army, and English officers
to organize the navy; the shogun's brother was sent to the Paris
Exposition, and Occidental fashions were introduced at the ceremonies
of the Bakufu Court.
SATSUMA AND CHOSHU
When Keiki assumed office he had to deal speedily with two problems;
that is to say, the complication with Choshu, and the opening of
Hyogo. The Emperor's reluctant consent to the latter was obtained for
the beginning of 1868, and an edict was also issued for the
punishment of Choshu. The result was two-fold: fresh life was
imparted to the anti-foreign agitation, and the Satsuma and Choshu
feudatories were induced to join hands against the Tokugawa. Alike in
Satsuma and in Choshu, there were a number of clever men who had long
laboured to combine the forces of the two fiefs in order to unite the
whole empire under the sway of the Kyoto Court. Saigo and Okubo on
the Satsuma side, Kido and Sanjo on the Choshu became leading figures
on the stage of their country's new career. Through their influence,
aided by that of Ito, afterwards prince, and Inouye, afterwards
marquis, the two great clans were brought into alliance, and when, in
1867, the shogun, Keiki, sought and obtained Imperial sanction for
the punishment of Choshu, Satsuma agreed to enter the lists on the
latter's side.
TOSA MEMORIAL
An incident of a most striking and unexpected nature now occurred.
Yodo, the Tosa feudatory, addressed to the shogun a memorial exposing
the helpless condition of the Bakufu and strongly urging that the
administration should be restored to the Emperor in order that the
nation might be united to face the dangers of its new career. It is
necessary to note here that, although the feudatories have been
frequently referred to in these pages as prominent figures in this or
that public drama, the feudal chiefs themselves exercised, in
Tokugawa days, very little influence on the current of events. A
modern historian speaks justly when he says:
"In this respect the descendants of the great Tokugawa statesman
found themselves reduced to a position precisely analogous to that of
the emperor in Kyoto. Sovereign and shogun were alike mere
abstractions so far as the practical work of the government was
concerned. With the great mass of the feudal chiefs things fared
similarly. These men who, in the days of Nobunaga, Hideyoshi and
Ieyasu, had directed the policies of their fiefs and led their armies
in the field, were gradually transformed, during the lone peace of
the Tokugawa era, into voluptuous fainéants or, at best, thoughtless
dilettanti, willing to abandon the direction of their affairs to
seneschals and mayors, who, while on the whole their administration
was able and loyal, found their account in contriving and
perpetuating the effacement of their chiefs. Thus, in effect, the
government of the country, taken out of the hands of the shogun and
the feudatories, fell into those of their vassals. There were
exceptions, of course, but so rare as to be mere accidental. . . The
revolution which involved the fall of the shogunate, and ultimately
of feudalism, may be called democratic with regard to the personnel
of those who planned and directed it. They were, for the most part,
men without either rank or social standing."*
*Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Edition; article "Japan," by
Brinkley.
Keiki himself, although the memorial was directed against him, may
fairly be reckoned among these longsighted patriots. The Tosa
memorial appealed so forcibly to the convictions he entertained that
he at once summoned a council of all feudatories and high officials
then in Kyoto; informed them of his resolve to adopt the advice of
the memorialist, and, on the following day, handed in his resignation
to the Emperor. This memorable event took place on the 14th of
October, 1867; and the answer of the Emperor before the assembly of
December 15th marked the end of the shogunate.
THE 122ND SOVEREIGN, THE EMPEROR MUTSUHITO (A.D. 1867-1912)
The throne was occupied at this time by Mutsuhito, who had succeeded
on the 13th of February, 1867, at the death of his father, Komei, and
who himself died on the 29th day of July 1912. At the time of his
accession, the new monarch was in his fifteenth year, having been
born on the 3rd of November, 1852.
IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCE OF THE RESIGNATION
Undoubtedly Keiki's resignation was presented in all good faith. It
deserves to rank among the most memorable incidents of the world's
history, for such a sacrifice has seldom been made by any ruler in
the interests of his nation. But by the Satsuma and Choshu
feudatories, the sincerity of the shogun was not recognized. Through
their influence the youthful Emperor was induced to issue an edict
calling Keiki a traitor, accusing him of arrogance and disloyalty,
declaring that he had not hesitated to violate the commands of the
late Emperor, and directing that he should be destroyed. In obedience
to this rescript the Tokugawa officials were treated with such
harshness that Keiki found it impossible to calm their indignation;
it culminated in an abortive attack upon Kyoto. Thereupon, Keiki
retired to Yedo, which city he subsequently surrendered
unconditionally. But all his former adherents did not show themselves
equally placable. An attempt was made to set up a rival candidate for
the throne in the person of the Imperial lord-abbot of the Ueno
monastery in Yedo; the Aizu clan made a gallant and unsuccessful
resistance in the northern provinces, and the shogun's admiral,
Yenomoto (afterwards viscount), essayed to establish a republic in
Yezo, whither he had retired with the Tokugawa warships. But these
petty incidents were altogether insignificant compared with the great
event of which they were a sequel.
THE MEIJI GOVERNMENT AND FOREIGN INTERCOURSE
The year-name was now changed to Meiji (Enlightened Government), from
January 1, 1868, a term fully justified by events. One of the
earliest acts of the new Government was to invite the foreign
representatives to the Imperial city, where the Emperor himself
received them in audience, an act of extreme condescension according
to Japanese canons of etiquette. Thereafter, an Imperial decree
announced the sovereign's determination to cement amicable relations
with foreign nations, and declared that any Japanese subject guilty
of violence to a foreigner would be acting in contravention of his
sovereign's commands, as well as injuriously to the dignity and good
faith of the country in the eyes of the powers with which his Majesty
had pledged himself to maintain friendship. So signal was the change
that had taken place in the demeanour of the nation's leaders towards
foreign intercourse! Only two years earlier, the advent of a squadron
of foreign war-vessels at Hyogo had created almost a panic and had
caused men to cry out that the precincts of the sacred city of Kyoto
were in danger of desecration by barbarian feet. But now the Emperor
invited the once hated aliens to his presence, treated them with the
utmost courtesy, and publicly greeted them as welcome guests. Such a
metamorphosis has greatly perplexed some students of Japanese
history. Yet the explanation is simple. The Kagoshima and Shimonoseki
expeditions had taught Japan that she was powerless in the face of
Western armaments; she had learned that national effacement must be
the sequel of seclusion, and, above all, she had come to an
understanding that her divided form of government paralyzed her for
purposes of resistance to aggression from abroad.
ENGRAVING: STONE AND WOODEN LANTERNS ERECTED IN FRONT OF SHRINES