CHAPTER XLIV

FOREIGN RELATIONS AND THE DECLINE OF THE TOKUGAWA

FOREIGN TRADE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

FROM what has been stated in previous chapters, it is clearly

understood that Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and Ieyasu were all well

disposed towards foreign intercourse and trade, and that the Tokugawa

chief made even more earnest endeavours than Hideyoshi to

differentiate between Christianity and commerce, so that the fate of

the former might not overtake the latter. Ieyasu, indeed, seems to

have kept three objects steadfastly in view, namely, the development

of oversea trade, the acquisition of a mercantile marine, and the

prosecution of mining enterprise. To the Spaniards, to the

Portuguese, to the English, and to the Dutch, he offered a site for a

settlement in a suburb of Yedo, and had the offer been accepted,

Japan might never have been closed to foreign intercourse. At that

time the policy of the empire was free trade. There were no customs

dues, though it was expected that the foreign merchants would make

liberal presents to the feudatory into whose port they carried their

wares. The Tokugawa baron gave plain evidence that he regarded

commerce with the outer world as a source of wealth, and that he

wished to attract it to his own domains. On more than one occasion he

sent an envoy to Manila to urge the opening of trade with the regions

in the vicinity of Yedo, and to ask the Spaniards for expert naval

architects. His attitude is well shown by a law enacted in 1602:

"If any foreign vessel by stress of weather is obliged to touch at

any principality or to put into any harbour of Japan, we order that,

whoever these foreigners may be, absolutely nothing whatever that

belongs to them, or that they may have brought in their ship, shall

be taken from them. Likewise, we rigorously prohibit the use of any

violence in the purchase or sale of any of the commodities brought by

their ship, and if it is not convenient for the merchants of the ship

to remain in the port they have entered, they may pass to any other

port that may suit them, and therein buy and sell in full freedom.

Likewise, we order, in a general manner, that foreigners may freely

reside in any part of Japan they choose, but we rigorously forbid

them to propagate their faith."

In the year 1605, the Tokugawa chief granted a permit to the Dutch

for trade in Japan, his expectation being that the ships which they

undertook to send every year would make Uraga, or some other place

near Yedo, their port of entry. In this he was disappointed. The

first Hollanders that set foot in Japan were eighteen survivors of

the crew of the wrecked Liefde. These men were at first placed in

confinement, and during their detention they were approached by

emissaries from the feudatory of Hirado, who engaged some of them to

instruct his vassals in the art of gun casting and the science of

artillery, and who also made such tempting promises with regard to

Hirado that the Dutch decided to choose that place for headquarters,

although it was then, and always subsequently remained, an

insignificant little fishing village. The Dutch possessed one great

advantage over their rivals from Manila and Macao: they were prepared

to carry on commerce while eschewing religious propagandism. It was

this element of the situation that the Hirado feudatory shrewdly

appreciated when he enticed the Dutchmen to make Hirado their port of

entry.

With regard to the desire of Ieyasu to exploit the mining resources

of his country, the fact is demonstrated by an incident which

occurred at the time. The governor--general of the Philippines

(Rodrigo Yivero y Velasco), whose ship had been cast away on the

coast of Japan while en route for Acapulco, had an interview with

Ieyasu, and in response to the latter's application for fifty mining

experts, the Spaniards made a proposal, to the terms of which,

onerous as they were, Ieyasu agreed; namely that one half of the

produce, of the mines should go to the miners; that the other half

should be divided equally between Ieyasu and the King of Spain; that

the latter might send officials to Japan to protect his mining

interests, and that these officials might be accompanied by priests,

who would have the right to erect public churches, and to hold

religious services there.* These things happened in 1609. Previous to

that time, the Tokugawa chief had repeatedly imposed a strict veto on

Christian propagandism; yet we now find him removing that veto

partially, for the sake of obtaining foreign expert assistance. Like

Hideyoshi, Ieyasu had full confidence in himself and in his

countrymen. He did not doubt his ability to deal with emergencies if

they arose, and he made no sacrifice to timidity. But his courageous

policy died with him, and the miners never came. Moreover, the

Spaniards seemed incapable of any successful effort to establish

trade with Japan. Fitful visits were paid by their vessels at Uraga,

but the Portuguese continued to monopolize the commerce.

*It is to be understood, of course, that these ministrations were

intended to be limited to Spaniards resident in Japan.

ENGRAVING: OLD SPANISH CLOCK PRESERVED IN KUNOZAN.

That commerce, however, was not without rude interruptions. One,

especially memorable, occurred at the very time when Rodrigo's vessel

was cast away. "In a quarrel at Macao some Japanese sailors lost

their lives, and their comrades were compelled by the commandant,

Pessoa, to sign a declaration exonerating the Portuguese. The

signatories, however, told a different tale when they returned to

Japan, and their feudal chief, the daimyo of Arima, was much

incensed, as also was Ieyasu In the following year (1609), this same

Pessoa arrived at Nagasaki in command of the Madre de Dios, carrying

twelve Jesuits and a cargo worth a million crowns. Ieyasu ordered the

Arima feudatory to seize her. Surrounded by an attacking force of

twelve hundred men in boats, Pessoa fought his ship for three days,

and then, exploding her magazine, sent her to the bottom with her

crew, her passenger-priests, and her cargo."

Fifty-eight years before the date of this occurrence, Xavier had

conveyed to Charles V a warning that if ships from New Spain

"attempted to conquer the Japanese by force of arms, they would have

to do with a people no less covetous than warlike, who seem likely to

capture any hostile fleet, however strong." It was a just

appreciation. The Portuguese naturally sought to obtain satisfaction

for the fate of Pessoa, but Ieyasu would not even reply to their

demands, though he made no attempt to prevent the resumption of trade

with Macao.

OPENING OF ENGLISH AND DUTCH TRADE

In the year 1609, Ieyasu had reason to expect that the Spaniards and

the Dutch would both open trade with Japan. His expectation was

disappointed in the case of the Spaniards, but, two years later, the

Dutch flag was seen in Japanese waters. It was flown by the Brack, a

merchantman which, sailing from Patani, reached Hirado with a cargo

of pepper, cloth, ivory, silk, and lead. Two envoys were on board the

vessel, and her arrival in Japan nearly synchronized with the coming

of the Spanish embassy from Manila, which had been despatched

expressly for the purpose of "settling the matter regarding the

Hollanders." Nevertheless, the Dutch obtained a liberal patent from

Ieyasu.

Twelve years previously, the merchants of London, stimulated by a

spirit of rivalry with the Dutch, had organized the East India

Company, which at once began to send ships eastward. As soon as news

came that the Dutch were about to establish a trading station in

Japan, the East India Company issued orders that the Clove, commanded

by Saris, should proceed to the Far Eastern islands. The Clove

reached Hirado on the 11th of June, 1613. Her master, Saris, soon

proved that he did not possess the capacity essential to success. He

was self-opinionated, suspicious, and of shallow judgment. Though

strongly urged by Will Adams to make Uraga the seat of the new trade;

though convinced of the excellence of the harbour there, and though

instructed as to the great advantage of proximity to the shogun's

capital, he appears to have harboured some distrust of Adams, for he

finally selected Hirado in preference to Uraga, "which was much as

though a German going to England to open trade should prefer to

establish himself at Dover or Folkestone rather than in the vicinity

of London." Nevertheless he received from Ieyasu a charter so liberal

that it plainly displayed the mood of the Tokugawa shogun towards

foreign trade:

"(1) The ship that has now come for the first time from England over

the sea to Japan may carry on trade of all kinds without hindrance.

With regard to future visits (of English ships), permission will be

given in regard to all matters.

"(2) With regard to the cargoes of ships, requisition will be made by

list according to the requirements of the shogunate.

"(3) English ships are free to visit any port in Japan. If disabled

by storms they may put into any harbour.

"(4) Ground in Yedo in the place which they may desire shall be given

to the English, and they may erect houses and reside and trade there.

They shall be at liberty to return to their country whenever they

wish to do so, and to dispose as they like of the houses they have

erected.

"(5) If an Englishman dies in Japan of disease or any other cause,

his effects shall be handed over without fail.

"(6) Forced sales of cargo and violence shall not take place.

"(7) If one of the English should commit an offence, he should be

sentenced by the English general according to the gravity of his

offence."*

*In this article, Ieyasu recognizes the principle of

extra-territorial jurisdiction.

The terms of the above show that Saris was expected to make Yedo his

headquarters. Had he done so he would have been practically free from

competition; would have had the eastern capital of the empire for

market, and would have avoided many expenses and inconveniences

connected with residence elsewhere. But he did not rise to the

occasion, and the result of his mistaken choice as well as of bad

management was that, ten years later (1623), the English factory at

Hirado had to be closed, the losses incurred there having aggregated

£2000--$10,000. It has to be noted that, a few months after the death

of Ieyasu, the above charter underwent a radical modification. The

original document threw open to the English every port in Japan; the

revised document limited them to Hirado. But this restriction may be

indirectly traced to the blunder of not accepting a settlement in

Yedo and a port at Uraga. For the foreign policy of the Tokugawa was

largely swayed by an apprehension that the Kyushu feudatories, many

of whom were not over-well disposed to the rule of the Bakufu, might

derive from the assistance of foreign trade such a fleet and such an

armament as would ultimately enable them to overthrow the Tokugawa.

Therefore, the precaution was adopted of confining the English and

the Dutch to Hirado, the domain of a feudatory too petty to become

formidable, and to Nagasaki, which was one of the four Imperial

cities, the other three being Yedo, Kyoto, and Osaka.

ENGRAVING: THE "ATAKA MARU" (Shogun's Barge)

It is easy to see that an English factory in Yedo and English ships

at Uraga would have strengthened the Tokugawa ruler's hand instead of

supplying engines of war to his political foes; and it must further

be noted that the question of locality had another injurious outcome.

For alike at Hirado and at Nagasaki, the foreign traders "were

exposed to a crippling competition at the hands of rich Osaka

monopolists, who, as representing an Imperial city and therefore

being pledged to the Tokugawa interests, enjoyed special indulgences

from the Bakufu. These shrewd traders who were then, as they are now,

the merchant-princes of Japan, not only drew a ring around Hirado,

but also sent vessels on their own account to Cochin China, Siam,

Tonkin, Cambodia, and other foreign lands with which the English and

the Dutch carried on trade." One can scarcely be surprised that

Cocks, the successor of Saris, wrote, in 1620, "which maketh me

altogether aweary of Japan."

It is, however, certain that the closure of the English factory at

Hirado was voluntary; from the beginning to the end no serious

friction had occurred between the English and the Japanese. When, the

former withdrew from the Japanese trade, their houses and stores at

Hirado were not sold, but were left in the safe-keeping of the local

feudatory, who promised to restore them to their original owners

should the English company desire to re-open business in Japan. The

company did think of doing so on more than one occasion, but the idea

did not mature until the year 1673, when a merchantman, the Return,

was sent to obtain permission. "The Japanese authorities, after

mature reflection, made answer that as the king of England was

married to a Portuguese princess, British subjects could not be

permitted to visit Japan. That this reply was suggested by the Dutch

is very probable; that it truly reflected the feeling of the Japanese

Government towards Roman Catholics is certain."*

*Encyclopaedia Britannica (11th Edition)'; article "Japan," by

Brinkley.

END OF THE PORTUGUESE TRADE WITH JAPAN

In the year 1624, the expulsion of the Spaniards from Japan took

place, and in 1638 the Portuguese met the same fate. Two years prior

to the latter event, the Yedo Bakufu adopted a measure which

effectually terminated foreign intercourse. They ruled that to leave

the country, or to attempt to do so, should constitute a capital

crime; that any Japanese subject residing abroad should be executed

if he returned; that the entire kith and kin of the Spaniards in

Japan should be expelled, and that no ships of ocean-going dimensions

should be built in Japan. This meant not only the driving out of all

professing Christians, but also the imprisonment of the entire nation

within the limits of the Japanese islands, as well as an effectual

veto on the growth of the mercantile marine. It is worth noting that

no act of spoliation was practised against these tabooed people.

Thus, when those indicated by the edict--to the number of 287--left

the country for Macao, they were allowed to carry away with them

their whole fortunes.

The expulsion of the Spaniards did not leave the Portuguese in an

improved condition. Humiliating restrictions continued to be imposed

upon them. If a foreign priest were found upon any galleon bound for

Japan, such priest and the whole of the crew of the galleon were

liable to be executed, and many other irksome conditions were

instituted for the control of the trade. Nor had the aliens even the

satisfaction of an open market, for all the goods carried in their

galleons had to be sold at a fixed price to a ring of licensed

Japanese merchants from Osaka. In spite of all these deterrents,

however, the Portuguese continued to send galleons to Nagasaki until

the year 1637, when their alleged connexion with the Shimabara

rebellion induced the Japanese to issue the final edict that

henceforth any Portuguese ship coming to Japan should be burned,

together with her cargo, and everyone on board should be executed.

This law was not enforced with any undue haste; ample time was given

for compliance with its provisions. Possibly misled by this

procrastination, the Portuguese at Macao continued to strive for the

re-establishment of commercial relations until 1640, when a very sad

event put an end finally to all intercourse. Four aged men, selected

from among the most respected citizens of Macao, were sent to

Nagasaki as ambassadors. Their ships carried rich presents and an

earnest petition for the renewal of commercial intercourse. They were

at once imprisoned, and having declined to save their lives by

abjuring the Christian faith, the four old men and fifty-seven of

their companions were decapitated, thirteen only being left alive for

the purpose of conveying the facts to Macao. To these thirteen there

was handed at their departure a document setting forth that, "So long

as the sun warms the earth, any Christian bold enough to come to

Japan, even if he be King Philip himself or the God of the

Christians, shall pay for it with his head." One more effort to

restore the old intimacy was made by the Portuguese in 1647, but it

failed signally, and would certainly have entailed sanguinary results

had not the two Portuguese vessels beat a timely retreat.

THE DUTCH AT DESHIMA

In 1609, the Dutch made their appearance in Japan, and received an

excellent welcome. Ieyasu gave them a written promise that "no man

should do them any wrong and that they should be maintained and

defended as his own vassals." He also granted them a charter that

wherever their ships entered, they should be shown "all manner of

help, favour, and assistance." Left free to choose their own trading

port, they made the mistake of selecting Hirado, which was eminently

unsuited to be a permanent emporium of interstate commerce.

Nevertheless, owing partly to their shrewdness, partly to their

exclusive possession of the Spice Islands, and partly to their

belligerent co-operation with the English against the Spaniards, they

succeeded in faring prosperously for a time.

The day came, however, when, being deprived of freedom of trade and

limited to dealings with a guild of Nagasaki and Osaka merchants,

they found their gains seriously affected. Other vicissitudes

overtook them, and finally the Japanese concluded that the safest

course was to confine the Dutch to some position where, in a moment

of emergency, they could easily be brought under Japanese control.

Nagasaki was chosen as suitable, and there a Dutch factory was

established which, for a time, flourished satisfactorily. From seven

to ten Dutch vessels used to enter the port annually--their cargoes

valued at some eighty thousand pounds (avdp.) of silver, and the

chief staples of import being silk and piece-goods. Customs duties

amounting to five per cent, were levied; 495 pounds of silver had to

be paid annually as a rent for the little island of Deshima, and

every year a mission had to proceed to Yedo from the factory,

carrying presents for the chief Bakufu officials, which presents are

said to have aggregated some 550 pounds of silver on each occasion.

The Dutch traders, nevertheless, found their business profitable

owing to purchases of gold and copper, which metals could be procured

in Japan at much lower rates than they commanded in Europe. Thus, the

now familiar question of an outflow of specie was forced upon

Japanese attention at that early date, and, by way of remedy, the

Government adopted, in 1790, the policy of restricting to one vessel

annually the Dutch ships entering Nagasaki, and forbidding that

vessel to carry away more than 350 tons of copper.

EFFECTS PRODUCED UPON JAPAN BY THE POLICY OF EXCLUSION

Whatever losses Japan's policy of seclusion caused to the nations

which were its victims, there can be no doubt that she herself was

the chief sufferer. During two and a half centuries she remained

without breathing the atmosphere of international competition, or

deriving inspiration from an exchange of ideas with other countries.

While the world moved steadily forward, Japan stood practically

unchanging, and when ultimately she emerged into contact with the

Occident, she found herself separated by an immense interval from the

material civilization it had developed.

The contrast between the Japan of the middle of the sixteenth and

that of the middle of the seventeenth century has often been made by

the historian of foreign influence. In 1541 the country was open to

foreign trade, foreign civilization and foreign ideas and these were

welcomed eagerly and, in accordance with the remarkable natural

aptitude of the Japanese for adaptation, were readily assimilated.

Not only were foreign traders allowed to come to Japan, but Japanese

were allowed to go abroad. And all this was in the line of a

long-continued Japanese policy--the policy thanks to which Chinese

influence had made itself so strongly felt in Japan, and which had

brought in Buddhism and Confucianism, not to speak of arts and

letters of foreign provenance.

At the close of the hundred years, in 1641, all was changed. Japan

was absolutely isolated. Foreigners were forbidden to enter, except

the Dutch traders who were confined to the little island of Deshima.

And natives were forbidden to go out, or to accept at home the

religious teachings of foreigners. Only ships suited for the

coastwise trade might be built. The nation's intercourse with

Occidental civilization was shut off, and its natural power of change

and growth through foreign influences was thus held in check. The

wonder is that it was not destroyed by this inhibition. The whole

story of foreign intercourse as it has so far been told makes it

plain that the reason why it was prohibited was in the nature of

foreign propaganda and not in any unreadiness of the Japanese for

western civilization.

SECOND ERA OF FOREIGN TRADE

Japan's seclusion was maintained unflinchingly. But, though her goods

found a market in China, only during her period of self-effacement,

the reputation of her people for military prowess was such that no

outside nation thought of forcing her to open her ports. A British

seaman, Sir Edward Michelborne, in the sequel of a fight between his

two ships and a Japanese junk near Singapore, left a record that "The

Japanese are not allowed to land in any part of India with weapons,

being a people so desperate and daring that they are feared in all

places where they come." Nevertheless, Russian subjects, their shores

being contiguous with those of Japan, occasionally found their way as

sailors or colonists into the waters of Saghalien, the Kuriles, and

Yezo. The Japanese did not then exercise effective control over Yezo,

although the island was nominally under their jurisdiction. Its

government changed from one hand to another in the centuries that

separated the Kamakura epoch from the Tokugawa, and in the latter

epoch we find the Matsumae daimyo ruling all the islands northward of

the Tsugaru Straits. But the Matsumae administration contented itself

with imposing taxes and left the people severely alone. Thus, when in

1778, a small party of Russians appeared at Nemuro seeking trade, no

preparations existed to impose the local government's will on the

strangers. They were simply promised an answer in the following year,

and that answer proved to be that all Japan's oversea trade must by

law be confined to Nagasaki.

The Russians did not attempt to dispute this ruling. They retired

quietly. But their two visits had shown them that Yezo was capable of

much development, and they gradually began to flock thither as

colonists. Officials sent from Japan proper to make an investigation

reported that Kamchatka, hitherto a dependency of Japan, had been

taken possession of by Russians, who had established themselves in

the island of Urup and at other places. The report added that the

situation would be altogether lost unless resolute steps were taken

to restore it. Unfortunately, the death of the tenth shogun having

just then occurred, the Yedo Court found it inconvenient to take

action in remote Yezo. Thus, Russian immigration and Japanese

inaction continued for some time, and not until 1792 were commissions

again despatched from Yedo to inquire and report. They made an

exhaustive investigation, and just as it reached the hands of the

Bakufu, a large Russian vessel arrived off Nemuro, carrying some

ship-wrecked Japanese sailors whom her commander offered to restore

to their country, accompanying this offer with an application for the

opening of trade between Russia and Japan. Negotiations ensued, the

result being that Nagasaki was again referred to as the only port

where foreign trade might be lawfully conducted, and the Russians,

therefore, declared their intention of proceeding thither, a passport

being handed to them for the purpose. It does not appear, however,

that they availed themselves of this permit, and in the mean while

the Yedo commissioners pursued their journey northward, and pulled up

a number of boundary posts which had been erected by the Russians in

Urup.

The Bakufu now began to appreciate the situation more fully. They

took under their own immediate control the eastern half of Yezo,

entrusting the western half to Matsumae. The next incident of note

was a survey of the northern islands, made in 1800 by the famous

mathematician, Ino Tadayoshi, and the despatch of another party of

Bakufu investigators. Nothing practical was done, however, and, in

1804, a Russian ship arrived at Nagasaki carrying a number of

Japanese castaways and again applying for permission to trade. But it

soon appeared that the Bakufu were playing fast and loose with their

visitors and that they had no intention of sanctioning general

foreign commerce, even at Nagasaki. Incensed by such treatment, the

Russians, in 1806, invaded Saghalien, carried away several Japanese

soldiers, and partially raided Etorop and other places. They

threatened further violence in the following year unless

international trade was sanctioned.

The Bakufu had now a serious problem to solve, and their ideas of its

solution were almost comical. Thus, one statesman recommended the

organization of a special force recruited from the ranks of vagrants

and criminals and stationed permanently in the northern islands, A

more practical programme was the formation of a local militia. But

neither of these suggestions obtained approval, nor was anything done

beyond removing the Matsumae feudatory and placing the whole of the

islands under the direct sway of the Bakufu.

For a period of five years after these events the Russians made no

further attempt to establish relations with Japan, and their next

essay, namely, the despatch of a warship--the Diana--to survey the

Yezo coasts, was unceremoniously interrupted by the Japanese. Another

vessel flying the Russian flag visited Kunajiri, in 1814. On that

occasion the Japanese managed to seize some members of the Russian

crew, who were ultimately saved by the shrewdness of one of their

officers. These events imparted fresh vigour to Japan's prejudices

against foreign intercourse, but, as for the Russians, not a few of

them found their way to Saghalien and settled there without any

resolute attempt on the part of the Bakufu to expel them.

COAST DEFENCE

One effect of the events related above was to direct Japanese

attention to the necessity of coast defence, a subject which derived

much importance from information filtering through the Dutch door at

Nagasaki. Under the latter influence a remarkable book (Kai-koku

Hei-dan) was compiled by Hayashi Shibei, who had associated for some

time with the Dutch at Deshima. He urged frankly that Japan must

remain helpless for naval purposes if her people were forbidden to

build ocean-going vessels while foreigners sailed the high seas, and

he further urged that attention should be paid to coast defence, so

that the country might not be wholly at the mercy of foreign

adventurers. The brave author was thrown into prison and the

printing-blocks of his book were destroyed, but his enlightenment

bore some fruit, for immediately afterwards the Bakufu prime minister

made a journey along the coasts of the empire to select points for

the erection of fortifications, and to encourage the feudatories to

take steps for guarding these important positions.

FOREIGN LITERATURE

It has already been stated that in the days of the shogun Yoshimune

(1716-1745) the veto against studying foreign books was removed. But

for some time this liberal measure produced no practical effect,

since there did not exist even a Dutch-Japanese vocabulary to open

the pages of foreign literature for Japanese study. Indeed, very few

books were procurable from the Dutch at Deshima. The most accessible

were treatises on medicine and anatomy, and the illustrations in

these volumes served as a guide for interpreting their contents.

Earnestness well-nigh incredible was shown by Japanese students in

deciphering the strange terms, and presently the country was placed

in possession of The History of Russia, Notes on the Northern

Islands, Universal Geography, A Compendium of Dutch Literature,

Treatises on the Art of Translation, a Dutch-Japanese Dictionary and

so forth, the immediate result being a nascent public conviction of

the necessity of opening the country,--a conviction which, though not

widely held, contributed materially to the ultimate fall of the

Bakufu.

The Yedo Court, however, clung tenaciously to its hereditary

conservatism. Thus, in 1825, the Bakufu issued a general order that

any foreign vessel coming within range of the coast batteries should

at once be fired upon, and not until 1842 was this harsh command

modified in the sense that a ship driven into a Japanese port by

stress of weather might be given food, water, and provisions, but

should be warned to resume her voyage immediately. Meanwhile,

strenuous efforts were made to strengthen the littoral defences, and

a very active revival of the study of the military art took place

throughout the empire, though, at the same time, the number of

patriots sufficiently brave and clear-sighted to condemn the policy

of seclusion grew steadily.

ENGRAVING: "OHARAME" (A FEMALE LABOURER IN THE SUBURBS OF KYOTO)

ENGRAVING: TWO DRUMS AND TSUZUMI--A and D are Drums; B and C are

Tsuzumi.

A history of the Japanese people · 第 46 / 51 章