CHAPTER XXXI

THE FALL OF THE ASHIKAGA

TWO BRANCHES OF THE ASHIKAGA

THE Ashikaga family was divided into two main branches, both

descended from Takauji. The representatives of one, the senior,

branch had their headquarters at Muromachi in Kyoto and held the

office of shogun as a hereditary right. There were fifteen

generations:

Name Born Succeeded Abdicated Died

(1) Takauji 1305 1338 .... 1358

(2) Yoshiakira 1330 1358 1367 1368

(3) Yoshimitsu 1358 1367 1395 1408

(4) Yoshimochi 1386 1395 1423 1428

(5) Yoshikazu 1407 1423 .... 1425

(6) Yoshinori 1394 1428 .... 1441

(7) Yoshikatsu 1433 1441 .... 1443

(8) Yoshimasa 1435 1443 1474 1490

(9) Yoshihisa 1465 1474 .... 1489

(10) Yoshitane (#1) 1465 1490 1493 ....

(11) Yoshizumi 1478 1493 1508 1511

Yoshitane (#2) .... 1508 1521 1522

(12) Yoshiharu 1510 1521 1545 1550

(13) Yoshiteru 1535 1545 .... 1565

(14) Yoshihide 1565 1565 .... 1568

(15) Yoshiaki 1537 1568 1573 1597

The apparent clashing of dates in the case of the fourth and fifth

shoguns, Yoshimochi and Yoshikazu, is due to the fact that on the

death of the latter, in 1425, the former resumed the office and held

it until his own death, in 1428.

THE KAMAKURA KWANRYO AND KUBO

Born Died

(1) Motouji 1340 1367

(2) Ujimitsu 1357 1398

(3) Mitsukane 1376 1409

(4) Mochiuji 1398 1439

(5) Shigeuji 1434 1497

(6) Masatomo .... 1491

(7) Takamoto .... ....

(8) Haruuji .... 1560

(9) Yoshiuji .... ....

The title "kwanryo," as already stated, signifies "governor-general,"

and the region governed was the eight provinces of the Kwanto,

together with Izu and Kai. The first of the Ashikaga kwanryo,

Motouji, was Takauji's youngest son, and the following eight names on

the above list were direct descendants. But not all had the title of

kwanryo or wielded the extensive power attached to that office. Only

the first four were thus fortunate. From the days of the fifth,

Shigeuji, evil times overtook the family. Driven out of Kamakura by

the Uesugi, who had hitherto served as manager (shitsuji), they were

obliged to change their domicile to Koga in Shimosa; their sphere of

jurisdiction was reduced to four provinces, namely, Shimosa,

Shimotsuke, Kazusa, and Awa; their official title was altered to

gosho or kubo, and their former title of kwanryo passed to the Uesugi

family who also replaced them at Kamakura. These things fell out in

1439, when Mochiuji died. To avoid confusion it is necessary to note

that the chief official in the shogun's court at Muromachi in Kyoto

was also called kwanryo. He had originally been termed "manager"

(shitsuji), but, in 1367, this was changed to "governor-general," and

the corresponding functions were practically those discharged by the

regent (shikken) in the polity of the old Bakufu. The first Muromachi

kwanryo was Shiba Yoshimasa, and it became the ultimate custom to

give the post to a member of one of three families, the Shiba, the

Hosokawa, and the Hatakeyama.

STATE OF THE PROVINCES

When swords were sheathed after the long and wasting War of the

Dynasties, the Ashikaga found themselves in a strong position. Having

full control of the Court, they could treat as a rebel anyone

opposing them by force of arms, and their partisans were so numerous

in Kyoto and its vicinity that they could impose their will upon all.

In the east, the Kwanto was effectually ruled by a branch of their

own family, and in the north as well as in the south they were

represented by tandai, who governed stoutly and loyally. But trouble

began very soon. In Kyushu the office of tandai was held by Imagawa

Ryoshun, a man ever memorable in Japanese history as the author of

the precept that military prowess without education is worse than

useless. Ryoshun had been selected for service in Kyushu by the great

shitsuji of Muromachi, Hosokawa Yoriyuki, who saw that only by the

strongest hands could the turbulent families of the southern island

be reduced to order--the Shimazu, the Otomo, the Shoni, and the

Kikuchi. Everything went to show that Imagawa would have succeeded

had not that familiar weapon, slander, been utilized for his

overthrow. The Otomo chief persuaded Ouchi Yoshihiro to traduce

Ryoshun, and since the Ouchi sept exercised great influence in the

central provinces and had taken a prominent part in composing the War

of the Dynasties, the shogun, Yoshimitsu, could not choose but listen

to charges coming from such a source. Imagawa Ryoshun was recalled

(1396), and thenceforth Kyushu became the scene of almost perpetual

warfare which the Muromachi authorities were powerless to check.

THE OUCHI FAMILY

It was to the same Ouchi family that the Muromachi shogun owed his

first serious trouble after the close of the War of the Dynasties.

The ancestor of the family had been a Korean prince who migrated to

Japan early in the seventh century, and whose descendants, five and a

half centuries later, were admitted to the ranks of the samurai. The

outbreak of the War of the Dynasties had found the Ouchi ranged on

the Southern side, but presently they espoused the Ashikaga cause,

and distinguished themselves conspicuously against the Kikuchi in

Kyushu and, above all, in promoting the conclusion of the dynastic

struggle.

These eminent services were recognized by Ouchi Yoshihiro's

appointment to administer no less than six provinces--Nagato, Suwo,

Aki, Buzen, Kii, and Izumi. In fact he guarded the western and

eastern entrances of the Inland Sea, and held the overlordship of

western Japan. At his castle in Sakai, near Osaka, he amassed wealth

by foreign trade, and there he received and harboured representatives

of the Kusunoki and Kikuchi families, while at the same time he

carried on friendly communications with the Doki, the Ikeda, and the

Yamana. In short, he grew too powerful to receive mandates from

Muromachi, especially when they came through a kwanryo of the

Hatakeyama family who had just risen to that distinction.

Suddenly, in November, 1399, the Ouchi chief appeared in Izumi at the

head of a force of twenty-three thousand men, a force which received

rapid and numerous accessions. His grounds of disaffection were that

he suspected the shogun of a design to deprive him of the two

provinces of Kii and Izumi, which were far remote from the other five

provinces in his jurisdiction and which placed him within arm's

length of Kyoto, and, further, that no sufficient reward had been

given to the family of his younger brother, who fell in battle. There

were minor grievances, but evidently all were pretexts: the real

object was to overthrow Muromachi. The shogun, Yoshimitsu, acted with

great promptitude. He placed Hatakeyama Mitsuiye at the head of a

powerful army, and on January 18, 1400, Sakai fell and Yoshihiro

committed suicide. Thereafter the province of Kii was placed under

the jurisdiction of the Hatakeyama family, and Izumi under that of

Hosokawa, while the Shiba ruled in Echizen, Owari, and Totomi. In

short, these three families became the bulwarks of the Ashikaga.

KAMAKURA AND MUROMACHI

An important episode of the Ouchi struggle was that Mitsukane, the

third Kamakura kwanryo of the Ashikaga line, moved an army into

Musashi to render indirect assistance to the Ouchi cause. In truth,

from an early period of Kamakura's tenure by an Ashikaga

governor-general of the Kwanto, there had been an ambition to

transfer the office of shogun from the Kyoto to the Kamakura branch

of the family. The matter was not mooted during Takauji's lifetime,

but when, on his demise, the comparatively incompetent Yoshiakira

came into power at Muromachi, certain military magnates of the

eastern provinces urged the Kamakura kwanryo, Motouji, to usurp his

brother's position. Motouji, essentially as loyal as he was astute,

spurned the proposition. But it was not so with his son and

successor, Ujimitsu. To him the ambition of winning the shogunate

presented itself strongly, and was only abandoned when Uesugi

Noriharu committed suicide to add weight to a protest against such an

essay. Japanese annals contain many records of lives thus sacrificed

on the altar of devotion and loyalty. From the outset the Uesugi

family were the pillars of the Ashikaga kwanryo in Kamakura. Uesugi

Noriaki served as shitsuji in the time of the first kwanryo, and the

same service was rendered by Noriaki's son, Yoshinori, and by the

latter's nephew, Tomomune, in the time of the second kwanryo,

Ujimitsu. Confusing as are the multitude of names that confront the

foreign student of Japanese history, it is necessary to note that

from the time of their appointment as shitsuji at Kamakura, Yoshinori

took the family name of Yamanouchi, and Tomomune that of Ogigayatsu.

Balked in his design against Kyoto, Ujimitsu turned his hand against

the Nitta, old enemies of his family, and crushing them, placed the

Ashikaga power on a very firm basis in the Kwanto. His son,

Mitsukane, had the gift of handling troops with great skill, and in

his time the prestige of the Kamakura kwanryo reached its highest

point.

In the eyes of the military men of the eastern provinces, the

shogun in distant Kyoto counted for little compared with the

governor-general in adjacent Kamakura. The latter's mansion was

called gosho (palace); its occupant was termed kubo, an epithet

hitherto applied to the shogun only, and the elder and younger

branches of the Uesugi family, in which the office of kwanryo of

Muromachi was hereditary, were designated Ryo Uesugi (the Two

Uesugi). Mitsukane, when he abetted the Ouchi's attempt to overthrow

the Kyoto shogun, persuaded himself that he was only carrying out his

father's unachieved purpose, and the shogun, Yoshimitsu, took no step

to punish him, preferring to accept his overtures--made through

Uesugi Tomomune.

THE EXTRAVAGANCE OF YOSHIMITSU

There is little question that whatever applause history can extend to

the administration of the third Ashikaga shogun, Yoshimitsu, was won

for him by his profoundly sagacious guardian and chief minister,

Hosokawa Yoriyuki. After the latter's death, in 1392, many abuses and

few meritorious acts appear in the shogun's record. Alike, the wise

self-effacement and the admirable frugality which distinguished the

Hojo rule were wholly foreign to the mood of Yoshimitsu. He insisted

on being raised to the post of chancellor of the empire, and he

openly spoke of himself as "king," designating as Go-sekke (Five

Regent Houses) the families of Shiba, Hosokawa, Hatakeyama, Rokkaku,

and Yumana. At the ceremony of his investiture as chancellor (dajo

daijiri) he presented to the Throne a sword forged by Kunimitsu; one

hundred pieces of white silk; one thousand silver coins; ten tigers'

skins, and fifty pounds of dyed silk. To the ex-Emperor he gave a

thousand silver coins; fifty pieces of white silk, and a sword, and

among the Imperial princes and Court nobles he distributed ten

thousand pieces of silver. Such was his parade of opulence.

ENGRAVING: ASHIKAGA YOSHIMITSU

The chief obstacle to conferring on him the title of chancellor had

been that the records contained only one instance of a military man's

appointment to that exalted post. That instance was Taira no

Kiyomori, whose example should have been deterrent to a Minamoto.

Yoshimitsu overcame the difficulty by nominally transferring his

military functions to his son Yoshimochi (1423), and constituting

himself the patron of literature. It was now that his love of luxury

and splendour assumed its full dimensions. He had already beautified

his Muromachi mansion by constructing there a park so spacious and so

brilliant at all seasons that it went by the name of Hana no Gosho

(Palace of Flowers). This he now assigned as a residence for his son

and successor, Yoshimochi, transferring his own place of abode to the

site occupied by the Saionji family, to whom was given in exchange an

extensive manor in Kawachi. Here the Ashikaga chancellor built a

palace of such dimensions that sixteen superintendents and twenty

assistant superintendents were required to oversee the work. Most

conspicuous was the Kinkaku-ji, or golden pavilion shrine, so called

because its interior was gilt, the gold foil being thickly superposed

on lacquer varnish. On this edifice, on the adjacent palace, and on a

park where deer roamed and noble pine trees hung over their own

shadows in a picturesque lake, immense sums were expended. Works of

art were collected from all quarters to enhance the charm of a palace

concerning which the bonze Sekkei declared that it could not be

exchanged for paradise.

Yoshimitsu prayed the Emperor to visit this unprecedentedly beautiful

retreat and Go-Komatsu complied. During twenty days a perpetual round

of pastimes was devised for the entertainment of the sovereign and

the Court nobles--couplet composing, music, football, boating,

dancing, and feasting. All this was typical of the life Yoshimitsu

led after his resignation of the shogun's office. Pleasure trips

engrossed his attention--trips to Ise, to Yamato, to Hyogo, to

Wakasa, and so forth. He set the example of luxury, and it found

followers on the part of all who aimed at being counted fashionable,

with the inevitable result that the producing classes were taxed

beyond endurance. It has to be noted, too, that although Yoshimitsu

lived in nominal retirement at his Kita-yama palace, he really

continued to administer the affairs of the empire.

INTERNATIONAL HUMILIATION

It is not for arrogance, or yet for extravagance, that Japanese

historians chiefly reproach Yoshimitsu. His unpardonable sin in their

eyes is that he humiliated his country. From the accession of the

Ming dynasty (1368) China made friendly overtures to Japan,

especially desiring the latter to check the raids of her corsairs

who, as in the days of the Hojo after the repulse of the Mongol

armada, so also in the times of the Ashikaga, were a constant menace

to the coastwise population of the neighbouring continent. Upon the

attitude of the shogun towards these remonstrances and overtures

depended the prosecution of commerce with the Middle Kingdom, and the

profits accruing from that commerce were too considerable to be

neglected by a ruler like Yoshimitsu, whose extravagance required

constant accessions of revenue. Moreover, the Muromachi shogun was a

disciple and patron of the Zen sect of Buddhism, and the priests of

that sect always advocated peaceful intercourse with China, the

source of philosophic and literary learning.

All these considerations induced the Ashikaga chief not only to issue

orders for the restraint of the corsairs, but also to receive from

the Chinese Court despatches in which he was plainly designated the

king of a country tributary to China, and to make answer in language

unequivocally endorsing the propriety of such terminology. In one

despatch, dated February, 1403, Yoshimitsu described himself as a

"subject of Ming" and, "prostrate, begged to present twenty horses,

ten thousand catties of sulphur, thirty-two pieces of agate, three

gold-foil folding screens, one thousand lances, one hundred swords, a

suit of armour, and an ink-stone." It is recorded that he even

humbled himself so far as to ask for supplies of Chinese coins, and

certainly these comparatively pure copper tokens remained largely in

circulation in Japan down to Tokugawa times, under the name of

Eiraku-tsuho, Eiraku being the Japanese sound of the Chinese

year-period, Yunglo (1403-1422).

DEATH OF YOSHIMITSU

Yoshimitsu died in 1408. He was accorded by the Court the posthumous

rank of Dajo Tenno (ex-Emperor), a proof of the extraordinary

confusion of etiquette caused by his arrogant pretensions. The

Chinese sovereign, Yunglo, sent a message of sympathy to the Japanese

potentate's son, Yoshimochi, in which the deceased was designated

"Prince Kung-hsien," but Yoshimochi, though not distinguished for

ability, had sufficient wisdom ultimately to adopt the advice of the

kwanryo, Shiba Yoshimasa, and to decline the rank of Dajo Tenno, as

well as to break off relations with the Ming ruler. Yoshimochi also

handed over the magnificent edifice at Kita-yama to the Buddhist

priesthood.

THE EMPEROR SHOKO

In 1412, the Emperor Go-Komatsu abdicated in favour of his son Shoko

(101st sovereign), then twelve years old. This sovereign abandoned

himself to the profligacy of the era. It is doubtful whether his

reason was not unhinged. Some accounts say that he fell into a state

of lunacy; others, that he practised magic arts. At all events he

died childless in 1428, and was succeeded by a grandson of the

Emperor Suko, Go-Hanazono, then in his tenth year. Thus, the claims

of the Southern dynasty were ignored twice consecutively, and its

partisans made armed protests in the provinces, as has been already

noted. But these struggles proved abortive, and thereafter history is

no more troubled with such episodes. The Daikagu-ji line disappears

altogether from view, and the throne is occupied solely by

representatives of the Jimyo-in. There can be very little doubt that

the former was the legitimate branch; but fortune was against it.

YOSHIMOCHI, YOSHIKAZU, AND YOSHINORI

Yoshimochi, son of Yoshimitsu, became shogun (1395) at the age of

nine, and the administration was conducted by Hosokawa Mitsumoto,

Shiba Yoshishige, and Hatakeyama Mitsuiye. Twenty-eight years later,

that is to say, in 1423, he abdicated in favour of his son,

Yoshikazu. The cause of that step deserves notice. Yoshimitsu had

intended to pass over Yoshimochi, his first-born, in favour of his

second son, Yoshitsugu, but death prevented the consummation of that

design. Yoshimochi, however, knew that it had been entertained.

Therefore, after the death of their father, he seized Yoshitsugu,

threw him into prison, and ultimately caused him to be killed. With

the blood of his younger brother on his hands he abdicated in favour

of his own sixteen-year-old son, Yoshikazu. But the latter died--some

historians say that dissipation destroyed him--in two years, and

having no second son to succeed, Yoshimochi himself resumed the

office of shogun, holding it until his death, in 1428.

During his thirty-three years' tenure of power this ruler seems to

have aimed solely at enjoying the sweets of ease and tranquillity. He

left the provinces severely alone and thought only of the peace of

the metropolis. Turbulent displays on the part of self-appointed

partisans of the Southern Court; intrigues in the Kwanto; revolts

among his own immediate followers--all these things were treated by

Yoshimochi with gloved hands so long as the atmosphere of Kyoto was

not troubled. In 1428, he fell sick, and, the end being in sight, he

ordered his advisers to consult about his successor. Some advocated

the appointment of his kinsman, Mochiuji, governor-general of the

Kwanto, and Mochiuji himself prayed that it should be so. But the

choice ultimately fell on Yoshimochi's younger brother, Gien, who had

embraced religion and was then serving as abbot of the temple

Shoren-in.

This man, then in his thirty-fourth year, hesitated to accept the

nomination, but was induced to do so. He changed his name to

Yoshinori, and assuming the office in 1428, showed high talents and

great intrepidity. He was, in truth, a ruler as efficient as his

predecessor had been perfunctory. One of the most important events of

his time was the ruin of the Ashikaga Bakufu at Kamakura. Between

Kamakura and Muromachi there had been friction from an early date. We

have seen the second and third governors-general of the Kwanto,

Ujimitsu and Mitsukane, plotting to supplant the elder branch of

their family in Kyoto, and we have seen how the accession of the

priest, Yoshinori, had disappointed the ambition of the fourth

governor-general, Mochiuji, who, if unable to become shogun himself,

would fain have obtained that high office for his son, Yoshihisa.

Several years previously, namely, in 1417, there had occurred a feud

between the Yamanouchi and the Ogigayatsu branches of the Uesugi

family in the Kwanto, the former represented by Norimoto, the latter

by Ujinori. The Uesugi stood next to the Ashikaga at Kamakura, the

important office of manager (shitsuji) being invariably held by the

head of the former house. It would have been well-nigh impossible

therefore for the governor-general to view such a feud with

indifference. Mochiuji, then in his twentieth year, sympathized with

Norimoto, and in the sequel, Ujinori, with whom was allied Mochiuji's

younger brother, Mochinaka, took the field at the head of such a

force that the governor-general must have succumbed had not the

shogun, Yoshimochi, rendered aid.

This should have placed Kamakura under a heavy debt of gratitude to

Muromachi. But Mochiuji was not subject to such emotions. He rebelled

vehemently against the lenient treatment accorded to Ujinori's son

after their father's death, and the shogun had difficulty in

placating him. So long, however, as Yoshimochi ruled in Kyoto, the

Kamakura kwanrya abstained from further intrigues; but on the

accession of the sometime bonze, Yoshinori, to the shogunate, all

sense of restraint was removed. The governor-general now made no

attempt to conceal his hostility to the Muromachi shogun. Certain

family rights imperatively demanding reference to the shogun were not

so referred, and Mochiuji not only spurned the remonstrances of the

manager (shitsuji), Uesugi Norimoto, but even attempted to kill the

latter's son, Norizane. All efforts to reconcile the Kwanto and the

shitsuji proved futile, and Norizane had to flee to Kotsuke. No

sooner did these things come to the ears of the shogun, Yoshinori,

than he obtained an Imperial commission to quell the insurgents, and

placing an army under the orders of Mochifusa, a son of Ujinori,

directed him to march against Kamakura.

At first it seemed as if the Kamakura men would emerge victorious. At

the easily defended passes of Hakone they inflicted several

successive though not signal defeats upon Mochifusa's army. But the

appearance of Norizane in the field quickly changed the complexion of

the campaign. Very soon the Kamakura force was shattered, and

Mochiuji himself fled to the temple Shomyo-ji in Kanazawa, where he

begged to be allowed to retire from the world. But the shogun

declined to pardon him and remained obdurate in spite of earnest and

repeated petitions from Norizane, praying that Mochiuji should be

forgiven and allowed to retire in favour of his son, Yoshihisa. In

the end, Mochiuji, his son, his uncle, and many others all died by

their own hands. These things happened in 1439. The redeeming feature

of the sombre family feud was the fine loyalty of Norizane. Though it

had been against him chiefly that Mochiuji raged, and though his

death was certain had he fallen under the power of the Kamakura

kwanryo, Mochiuji's fate caused him such remorse that he attempted to

commit suicide and finally became a priest. Thenceforth, the title of

governor-general of the Kwanto passed to the Uesugi, two of whom were

appointed to act simultaneously. As for the Kamakura Ashikaga, the

three remaining sons of Mochiuji fled to Koga in Shimosa, where two

of them were subsequently killed by a Kamakura army, and the third,

Shigeuji, fared as has already been described.

ASSASSINATION OF THE SHOGUN

It has been shown that Akamatsu Norimura was among the captains who

contributed most to the triumph of the Ashikaga cause. In recognition

of his distinguished services the offices of high constable in the

five provinces of Settsu, Inaba, Harima, Mimasaka, and Bizen were

given to his three sons. Mitsusuke, grandson of the eldest of these,

administered three of the above provinces in the days of the fourth

Ashikaga shogun, Yoshimochi. A puny man of contemptible presence,

Mitsusuke received little consideration at Muromachi, and the shogun

was induced to promise his office of high constable to a handsome

kinsman, Mochisada. Enraged at such partiality, Mitsusuke set fire to

his mansion in Kyoto and withdrew to his castle at Shirahata in

Harima. When, however, the shogun would have sent an army against

him, none was found to take command, Mochisada having given universal

offence by his haughty arrogance. In the sequel, Mitsusuke had to be

pardoned and Mochisada ordered to kill himself.

After the death of the shogun, Yoshimochi, Mitsusuke fell into fresh

trouble. The new shogun, Yoshinori, belonged to a very different

category of men from his immediate predecessors. He conquered the

Kitabatake family in Ise; repressed the remnants of the Southern

Court league; crushed the military monks by capturing Nara and

Hiei-zan; put an end finally to Kamakura's intrigues; obtained

control of the west, and quelled his enemies in all directions. It

now became his task to bend to his will the overstrong and

over-presumptuous among the concerted families of the Ashikaga.

Foremost of these were the Akamatsu, their chief, a man whose

personality invited contumely. The shogun disliked Mitsusuke, and

found it an agreeable occupation to slight him. Gradually the

Akamatsu leader became bitterly estranged. Moreover, he saw his

younger sister executed for disobedience though she was the shogun's

mistress; he saw the nephew of his old enemy, Mochisada, treated with

marked favour by the Muromachi potentate, and he learned, truly or

untruly, that his own office of high constable was destined to be

bestowed on this favourite.

It was now the time when Kamakura's mischievous potentialities had

been finally destroyed, and to commemorate the event, entertainments

in the shogun's honour were organized by the heads of the great

military families. On the 6th of August, 1441, it fell to Akamatsu

Mitsusuke to act as his host. So soon as the shogun and his personal

attendants had passed the portals of the Akamatsu mansion, the horses

in the stables were set free as though by accident; the gates were

closed to prevent the escape of the animals; Yoshinori with his small

retinue, being thus caught in a trap, were butchered; the mansion was

fired, and Mitsusuke with seven hundred followers rode off in broad

daylight to his castle in Harima, whence, assisted by the monk,

Gison, he sent circulars in all directions inciting to revolt. Thus

miserably perished a ruler whose strong hand, active brain, and

fearless measures, had he been spared a few years longer, might have

saved his country from some of the terrible suffering she was

destined to undergo in the century and a half subsequent to his

death. He did not live long enough to reach a high place in history.

But all his measures were designed to make for the eradication of

immorality and corruption, and for the restoration of law and order

throughout the country. His fault seems to have been precipitancy. So

many suffered by his reforms, and in such quick succession, that the

hatred he provoked could scarcely have been kept within control. In

the matter of finance, too, he resorted, as will be presently seen,

to devices quite irreconcilable with just administration.

YOSHIKATSU AND YOSHIMASA

The murder of Yoshinori left the shogun's office without any

designate occupant, but the heads of the great military families lost

no time in electing Yoshikatsu*, the eight-year-old son of Yoshinori,

and at the latter's nominal instance the Emperor ordered him to

attack his father's assassin. The three Yamana chiefs, Mochitoyo

(called also Sozen, or the "Red Monk," one of the ablest captains of

his country), Noriyuki, and Norikiyo; the Hosokawa chief, Mochitsune;

and Sadamura, representing the Akamatsu family, all joined forces for

the expedition, and presently an army of fifty thousand men sat down

before Shirahata Castle. In October, 1441, the stronghold fell.

Mitsusuke perished, and the three provinces he had administered were

transferred to the Yamana--Harima to Mochitoyo, Mimasaka to Norikiyo,

and Bizen to Noriyuki.

*To be distinguished from Yoshikazu (shogun 1423-1425), son of

Yoshimochi.

We have seen how, in 1392, the Yamana family was shattered in a

revolt against the authority of the shogun, Yoshimitsu. We now see

the fortunes of the family thoroughly rehabilitated. The young

shogun, however, did not long survive the punishment of his father's

murderers. He died in 1443, at the age of ten, and was succeeded by

his brother Yoshimasa, then in his eighth year. During the latter's

minority, the administration fell into the hands of Hatakeyama

Mochikuni and Hosokawa Katsumoto, who held the office of Muromachi

kwanryo alternately. The country now began to experience the

consequences of Yoshinori's death before his plans to limit the power

of the great military septs had matured. Disorder became the normal

condition in the provinces. The island of Kyushu took the lead. There

the Shoni, the Kikuchi, the Otomo, and the Shiba had always defied a

central authority, and now Norishige, a younger brother of the

assassin, Akamatsu Mitsusuke; found among them supporters of a scheme

to restore the fortunes of his house. In the Kwanto partisans of the

late kwanryo, Mochiuji, raised their heads. In the home provinces the

warrior-priests of Nara sought to avenge the chastisement they had

suffered at Yoshinori's hands, and among the immediate entourage of

Muromachi, the Hosokawa, the Hatakeyama, the Shiba, and others

engaged in desperate struggles about questions of succession.

ENGRAVING: ASHIKAGA YOSHIMASA

THE TOKUSEI

Even when he reached man's estate, Yoshimasa proved wholly

incompetent to deal with these complications. He abandoned himself to

dissipation and left everything, great or small, to be managed by his

wife, Fujiwara Tomiko, and by his consort, Kasuga no Tsubone. Bribery

and corruption were the motive forces of the time. The innocent were

punished; the unworthy rewarded. The shogun remained indifferent

even when his mandates were neglected or contravened. The building

of splendid residences, the laying out of spacious parks, the

gratification of luxurious tastes, and the procuring of funds to

defray the cost of his vast extravagance--these things occupied his

entire attention.

Associated with the Ashikaga shogunate is a financial device known in

history as tokusei, a term signifying "virtuous administration."

Originally imported from China, the tokusei meant nothing more than

a temporary remission of taxes in times of distress. But during

the financial straits to which the country was reduced after the

Mongol invasion, the Hojo deemed it necessary to afford relief to

landowners who had mortgaged their property, and thus, in 1297, a

law--tokusei-rei--was enacted, providing that eviction for debt must

not be enforced. Under the Ashikaga, the tokusei received a still

wider import. It was interpreted as including all debts and pecuniary

obligations of any kind. In other words, the promulgation of a

tokusei ordinance meant that all debtors, then and there, obtained

complete relief. The law was not construed exactly alike everywhere.

Thus, in Nara a debtor must discharge one-third of his obligation

before claiming exemption, and elsewhere a nominal sum had to be paid

for release. Naturally, legislation so opposed to the fundamental

principles of integrity led to flagrant abuses. Forced by riotous

mobs, or constrained by his own needs, the Muromachi shogun issued

tokusei edicts again and again, incurring the hot indignation of the

creditor class and disturbing the whole economic basis of society.

Yoshimasa was conspicuously reckless; he put the tokusei system into

force thirteen times.

EXTRAVAGANCE AND INCOMPETENCE OF YOSHIMASA

It is stated in the records of the Onin era (1467-1469) that

Yoshimasa subordinated his duties altogether to his pleasures, and

that his thoughts seemed to turn wholly on banquets and fetes. His

favourites, especially females, had the control of affairs and were

the final arbiters in all important matters. Thus, a domain which had

been in the undisputed possession of a family for generations might

be alienated in favour of any claimant sufficiently unscrupulous and

sufficiently rich to "commend" his title, and a judgment delivered by

a court of law in the morning was liable to be reversed in the

evening by the fiat of the ladies in the Muromachi "palace."

Stability of policy had no existence. In a period of twenty-four

years (1444-1468), three sentences each of punishment and pardon were

pronounced in the case of the Hatakeyama family, and in twenty years,

Yoshikado and Yoshitoshi of the Shiba sept were each punished and

pardoned three times. In Kyoto it became a current saying that loyal

acts, not evil deeds, were penalized, and the truth of the comment

found confirmation in the case of an official, Kumagaya, who was

dismissed from his post and deprived of his property for venturing to

memorialize the shogun in a critical manner.

These same records of the Onin year-period also make clear that one

of the factors chiefly responsible for the disturbance was

Yoshimasa's curious lack of sympathy with the burdens of the people.

Even one grand ceremony in the course of from five to six years

sufficed to empty the citizens' pockets. But in Yoshimasa's time

there Were nine of such fetes in five years, and four of them had no

warrant whatever except pleasure seeking--as a performance of the

Sarugaku mime on an immense scale; a flower-viewing party; an

al-fresco entertainment, and a visit to the cherry blossoms. On each

of these occasions the court officials and the military men had to

pawn their estates and sell their heirlooms in order to supply

themselves with sufficiently gorgeous robes, and the sequel was the

imposition of house taxes and land taxes so heavy that the provincial

farmers often found vagrancy more lucrative than agricultural

industry. Pawnshops were mercilessly mulcted. In the days of

Yoshimitsu, they were taxed at each of the four seasons; in

Yoshinori's time the same imposts were levied once a month, and under

Yoshimasa's rule the pawnbrokers had to pay nine times in November,

1466, and eight times in December of the same year.

Even after full allowance has been made for exaggeration, natural in

the presence of such extravagance, there remains enough to convict

Yoshimasa of something like a mania for luxury. He built for himself

a residence so splendid that it went by the name of the Palace of

Flowers (Hana no Gosho) and of materials so costly that the outlay

totalled six hundred thousand strings of cash;* and he built for his

mother, Shigeko, a mansion concerning which it is recorded that two

of the sliding doors for the interior cost twenty thousand strings.**

Yet at times this same Yoshimasa was reduced to such straits for

money that we read of him borrowing five hundred "strings" on the

security of his armour, to pay for a parturition chamber.

*£4,500,000--$22,000,000.

**£150,000--$7,300,000.

The Palace of Flowers came into existence in 1459, just on the eve of

a period of natural calamities which culminated in famine and

pestilence. In 1462, these conditions were at their worst. From

various, provinces people flocked to the capital seeking food, and

deaths from starvation became frequent in the city. A Buddhist

priest, Gwana, constructed grass huts to which the famished sufferers

were carried on bamboo stretchers to be fed with soft, boiled millet.

It is recorded that, during the first two months of 1462, the number

of persons thus relieved totalled eighty-two thousand. Another

Buddhist priest erected a monument to the dead found in the bed of

the river below the bridge, Gojo. They aggregated twelve hundred.

Scores of corpses received no burial, and the atmosphere of the city

was pervaded with a shocking effluvium.

But even the presence of these horrors does not seem to have sobered

the Muromachi profligate. The costly edifices were pushed on and the

people's resources continued to be squandered. Even the Emperor,

Go-Hanazono, was sufficiently shocked to compose a couplet indirectly

censuring Yoshimasa, and a momentary sense of shame visited the

sybarite. But only momentary. We find him presently constructing in

the mansion of his favourite retainer, Ise Sadachika, a bath-house

which was the wonder of the time, a bath-house where the bathers were

expected to come robed in the most magnificent costumes. One of the

edifices that formed part of his palace after his retirement from

active life, in 1474, was a "Silver Pavilion" intended to rival the

"Golden Pavilion" of his ancestor, Yoshimitsu. During the last

sixteen years of his life--he died in 1490--he patronized art with a

degree of liberality that atones for much of his previous profligacy.

In the halls of the Jisho-ji monastery, constructed on a grand scale

as his retreat in old age, he collected chefs d'oeuvre of China and

Japan, so that the district Higashi-yama where the building stood

became to all ages a synonym for choice specimens, and there, too, he

instituted the tea ceremonial whose votaries were thenceforth

recognized as the nation's arbitri elegantiarum. Landscape gardens

also occupied his attention. Wherever, in province or in capital, in

shrine, in temple, in private house, or in official residence, any

quaintly shaped rock or picturesque tree was found, it was

immediately requisitioned for the park of Higashi-yama-dono, as men

then called Yoshimasa, and under the direction of a trio of great

artists, So-ami, Gei-ami, and No-ami, there grew up a plaisance of

unprecedented beauty, concerning which a poet of the time wrote that

"every breeze coming thence wafted the perfume of tea." The pastimes

of "listening to incense," of floral arrangement, of the dramatic

mime, and of the parlour farce were all practised with a zest which

provoked the astonishment even of contemporary annalists.

ENGRAVING: A PICNIC DURING THE FLOWER SEASON IN THE ASHIKAGA PERIOD

All this contributed materially to educate the nation's artistic

faculties, but the cost was enormous and the burden of taxation

correspondingly heavy. It was under this financial pressure that

Yoshimasa approached the Ming emperor seeking pecuniary aid. Thrice

the shogun's applications were successful, and the amounts thus

obtained are said to have totalled three hundred thousand strings of

cash (equivalent of £450,000, or $2,200,000). His requests are said

to have assumed the guise of appeals in behalf of famine-stricken

people, but there is no evidence that any of the presents were

devoted to that purpose. Partial apologists for Yoshimasa's

infatuation are not wanting. Thus, it is alleged that he was weary of

failure to reform the administration; that the corruption and

confusion of society induced him to seek consolation in art; that

outside the precincts of his palace he was restrained by the

provincial magnates, and inside he had to obey the dictation of his

wife, Tomi, of her brother, Katsumitsu, and of his own favourite

page, Ise Sadachika, so that only in his tea reunions and his private

theatricals could a semblance of independence be obtained; that his

orders were not obeyed or his injunctions respected by any save the

artists he had gathered around him, and that in gratifying his

luxurious tastes, he followed the example of his grandfather,

Yoshimitsu. But such exculpations amount to saying that he was an

essentially weak man, the slave of his surroundings.

THE KWANTO TUMULT

The lawlessness of the time and the indifference with which the

shogun's mandates were treated find illustration in the story of the

Kwanto. When (1439) Mochiuji perished, the only member of his family

that survived was his five-year-old son, Shigeuji. This child placed

himself under the protection of Muromachi. It will be remembered that

Uesugi Norizane, lamenting his unwilling share in Mochiuji's

destruction, had entered religion. His son, Noritada, was then

appointed to act as manager (shitsuji) to Shigeuji, his colleague

being Uesugi Akifusa (Ogigayatsu Uesugi). But the Yuki family, who

had given shelter to two sons of Mochiuji, objected to bow their

heads to the Uesugi, and persuaded Shigeuji to have Noritada killed.

Therefore, the partisans of the murdered man placed themselves under

the banner of his brother, Fusaaki, and having received a commission

from Muromachi as well as a powerful contingent of troops under

Imagawa Noritada, they marched in great force against Kamakura from

Kotsuke, Kazusa, and Echigo.

Kamakurawas well-nigh reduced to ruins, but Shigeuji retired to the

fortress of Koga in Shimosa, and his cause against the Uesugi was

espoused by the eight families of Chiba, Koyama, Satomi, Satake, Oda,

Yuki, Utsunomiya, and Nasu, thenceforth known as the "eight generals"

of the Kwanto. Against such a league it was difficult to operate

successfully. Masatomo, a younger brother of Yoshimasa, built for

himself a fortress at Horigoe, in Izu, which was thereafter known as

Horigoe Gosho (the Horigoe Palace), Shigeuji in his castle of Koga

being designated Koga Kuba (the Koga shogun). Castle building

acquired from this time greatly increased vogue. Uesugi Mochitomo

fortified Kawagoe in Musashi; Ota Sukenaga (called also Dokan), a

vassal of the Ogigayatsu Uesugi, built at Yedo a fort destined to

have world-wide celebrity, and his father, Sukekiyo, entrenched

Iwatsuki in the same province of Musashi. Thus the Kwanto became the

arena of warring factions.

PREFACE TO THE ONIN WAR

We now arrive at a chapter of Japanese history infinitely perplexing

to the reader. It is generally called the Onin War because the

struggle described commenced in the year-period of that name, but

whereas the Onin period lasted only two years (1467-1469), the Onin

War continued for eleven years and caused shocking destruction of

life and property. When war is spoken of, the mind naturally

conjectures a struggle between two or perhaps three powers for a

cause that is respectable from some points of view. But in the Onin

War a score of combatants were engaged, and the motive was invariably

personal ambition. It has been described above that when the Ashikaga

chief, Takauji, undertook to re-establish the Minamoto Bakufu, he

essayed to overcome opposition by persuasion rather than by force.

Pursuing that policy, he bestowed immense estates upon those that

yielded to him, so that in time there came into existence holders of

lands more extensive than those belonging to the shogun himself.

Thus, while the landed estates of the Muromachi shogun measured only

15,798 cho* there were no less than eight daimyo more richly endowed.

They were:

*A cho at that time represented 3 acres. It is now 2.5 acres.

Daimyo Area of Estates in cho (3 acres)

(1) Yanada Takasuke 32,083

(2) Uesugi Akisada 27,239

(3) Ouchi Mochiyo 25,435

(4) Hosokawa Katsumoto 24,465

(5) Shiba Mochitane 23,576

(6) Sasaki Takayori 16,872

(7) Hatakeyama Yoshmari 16,801

(8) Sasaki Mochikiyo 16,725

If we examine the list still more minutely, we find no less than

twenty-two families, each of whose estates was equal to, or larger

than, one-half of the Muromachi manors. Some families consisted of

several branches whose aggregate properties represented an immense

area. This was notably the case of the Yamana; their five branches

held lands totalling 45,788 cho. The owners of such estates must not

be confounded with the high constables (shugo). Thus Yamana Sozen, as

the high constable of Harima province, held administrative authority

in fourteen districts covering an area of 10,414 cho, and if to this

be added the expanse of his fief, namely, 8016 cho, we get a total

nearly equal to the manors of Hosokawa Katsumoto. Again, Shiba

Yoshitoshi, in addition to owning 10,816 cho, officiated as tandai of

Kyushu, which gave him jurisdiction over another extent of 106,553

cho, though it is true that his authority was defied in the provinces

of Satsuma and Osumi. The military owner of one of these great

estates levied a revenue on a scale which will be presently

discussed, but the high constable was nominally empowered to collect

and transmit only such taxes as were payable to the Bakufu, namely,

the "military dues" (buke-yaku) and the "farmers' dues"

(hyakusho-yaku), whereof the former were originally assessed at two

per cent., and subsequently raised to five per cent., of a family

income; and the latter varied from one to two per cent, of a

homestead's earnings. So long as a high constable or a tandai was

loyal to the Bakufu, the latter received the appointed quota of

imposts; but in times of insurrection, the shugo or tandai

appropriated to his own purposes the proceeds alike of the buke-yaku

and the hyakusho-yaku.

Not merely inequalities of wealth operated to produce political

unrest. It has also to be noted that each great military family

supported a body of armed retainers whose services were at all times

available; further, we must remember that the long War of the

Dynasties had educated a wide-spread spirit of fighting, which the

debility of the Ashikaga Bakufu encouraged to action. The Onin

disturbance had its origin in disputes about inheritance. It has been

recorded that the high post of kwanryo (governor-general) in the

Muromachi polity was filled by a member of one of three families, the

Hosokawa, the Hatakeyama, and the Shiba. The Hosokawa were the most

powerful, and had for representative in the middle of the fifteenth

century an administrator, Katsumoto, who to extensive erudition and a

profound knowledge of medicine added very exceptional gifts of

statecraft and organizing ability. The Hatakeyama had for head

Mochikuni, called also Tokuhon, a man of parts; and it happened that

the rival family of Yamana was led by Mochitoyo, or Sozen, who, on

account of his powerful physique, shaved head, and peculiar

complexion, sometimes received the name of the "Red Monk"

(Aka-nyudo).

Tokuhon being without a legitimate son, adopted his nephew, Masanaga,

but subsequently desired to secure the succession to Yoshinari, a son

borne to him by a concubine. This change was not viewed with

equanimity by all the vassals of Tokuhon, and to solve the problem

the latter appealed to the shogun, Yoshimasa, who authorized the

death of Masanaga. Tokuhon, in his capacity of kwanryo, naturally had

much weight with the shogun, but Yoshimasa's conduct on that occasion

must be attributed mainly to a laisser-aller mood which he had then

developed, and which impelled him to follow the example set by the

Imperial Court in earlier times by leaving the military families in

the provinces to fight their own battles. Masanaga sought succour

from Hosokawa Katsumoto, and that magnate, welcoming the opportunity

of avenging an old injury at the hands of the Hatakeyama, laid siege

to the mansion of Tokuhon, who barely escaped with his life, his son,

Yoshinari, fleeing to the fortress of Wakae, in Kawachi, whence he

was presently driven by the forces of Katsumoto and Sozen, then

acting in conjunction but destined afterwards to become bitter

enemies.

The shogun, true to his complacent policy, now recognized Masanaga as

head of the house of Hatakeyama, Tokuhon having just died (1455). But

Yoshinari did not acquiesce. In 1456, he marched with a Kawachi army

against Masanaga, and a deadly struggle was barely prevented by the

intervention of the shogun. Thenceforth, the Hatakeyama became

divided into two families, Masanaga's branch being the more powerful,

but Yoshinari obtaining favour at Muromachi and being nominated

kwanryo. Owing, however, to some petty causes, the shogun's good-will

was subsequently estranged, and Yoshinari had to flee from Kyoto,

pursued by Masanaga, who now held a commission from Muromachi to kill

him. A seven-years' fight (1460-1467) ensued in Kawachi and Yamato.

Yoshinari displayed greatly superior skill as a strategist, and

finally Yamana Sozen, who had always entertained a good opinion of

him even while opposing his succession at the outset, openly espoused

Yoshinari's cause. The immediate result was that Masanaga, who had

been named kwanryo in 1464, had to give way to SOzen's nominee, Shiba

Yoshikado, and found himself in deadly peril.

It is necessary here to recall the murder of the shogun Yoshinori, in

1441. That crime had resulted in the fall of the Akamatsu family, the

direct agent of its overthrow being the united forces of Hosokawa,

Takeda, and Yamana. There were no bonds of genuine friendship between

the Hosokawa chief, Katsumoto, and Yamana Sozen. Their union was

primarily due to Katsumoto's ambition. He desired to break the power

of Hatakeyama Tokuhon, and with that ultimate object he courted the

alliance of Sozen, giving his own daughter to the latter in marriage

and himself adopting Sozen's son, Koretoyo. Thus, the two chiefs were

subsequently found acting together against Tokuhon's attempt to

substitute his son, albeit illegitimate, for his nephew, as heir to

the Hatakeyama estates. Neither Katsumoto nor Sozen cared anything

about the succession itself. Their object was simply to crush the

Hatakeyama; and Sozen, who never relied on argument where force was

applicable, lost no time in attacking Tokuhon and driving him from

his burning mansion, as has been already stated. From the legal

consequences of that violence, Sozen was saved by Katsumoto's

intercession at Muromachi, and the alliance (1454) between the

Hosokawa and the Yamana seemed stronger than ever. But Sozen did not

greatly trust his crafty ally, with whose gifts of political strategy

he was well acquainted. He suspected Katsumoto of a design to restore

the fortunes of the once powerful Akamatsu family, and he began to

muster forces for the great struggle which he anticipated. Therefore

it was that, in 1467, as shown above, he not only espoused the cause

of Hatakeyama Yoshinari, in whom he recognized an able captain, but

also championed Shiba Yoshikado.

With regard to this latter, it is necessary to recognize that he also

figured in a succession dispute. The great family of Shiba being

without a direct heir, a relative was appointed to the headship in

1452. This successor, Yoshitoshi, attempting to enforce the

acquiescence of one of his vassals, was defeated and became a

fugitive, a successor, Yoshikado, being nominated by the Shiba

vassals. But a sister of the fugitive subsequently married the

shogun's favourite, Ise Sadachika, and through her influence the

shogun was induced (1466) to recall Yoshitoshi and to declare him

rightful head of the Shiba family. Yamana Sozen, who had given his

daughter in marriage to Yoshitoshi's rival, Yoshikado, immediately

set a powerful army in motion for Kyoto, and the alarmed shogun

(Yoshimasa) not only recognized Yoshikado and drove out Yoshitoshi,

but also nominated the former to be kwanryo.

From this grievously complicated story the facts which emerge

essentially and conspicuously are: first, that Yamana Sozen now

occupied the position of champion to representatives of the two great

families of Hatakeyama and Shiba; secondly, that the rival successors

of these families looked to Hosokawa Katsumoto for aid; thirdly, that

the relations between Sozen and Katsumoto had become very strained,

and fourthly, that the issue at stake in every case was never more

lofty than personal ambition.. The succession to the shogunate also

was in dispute. Yoshimasa, being childless, desired to adopt as his

heir his younger brother who had entered religion under the name of

Gijin. The latter declined the honour until Yoshimasa swore that were

a son subsequently born to him, it should be made a priest but never

a shogun. Gijin then took the name of Yoshimi, and was for a time

recognized as heir-apparent, Hosokawa Katsumoto being appointed

manager (shitsuji). Presently, however, the shogun's consort, Tomi,

gave birth to a boy, Yoshihisa, and the mother persuaded Yoshimasa to

contrive that her son should supplant the sometime priest. Of

necessity, the aid of Sozen was sought to accomplish this scheme,

Katsumoto being already officially attached to Yoshimi. The Yamana

chief readily assented, and thus the situation received its final

element, a claimant whose right rested on a deliberately violated

oath.

THE ONIN WAR

By the close of 1466, the two great protagonists, Katsumoto and

Sozen, had quietly collected in Kyoto armies estimated at 160,000 and

110,000 men, respectively. The shogun attempted to limit the area of

disturbance by ordering that the various rival inheritors should be

left to fight their own battles, and by announcing that whoever

struck the first blow in their behalf would be proclaimed a rebel.

Such injunctions were powerless, however, to restrain men like Sozen.

In February, 1467, his followers attacked the former kwanryo,

Hatakeyama Masanaga, and drove him from the capital. Katsumoto made

no move, however; he remained on the watch, confident that thus the

legitimacy of his cause would obtain recognition. In fact, the shogun

was actually under guard of the Hosokawa troops, who, being encamped

on the east and north of Muromachi, received the name of the Eastern

Army; the Yamana forces, which were massed on the west and south,

being distinguished as the Western Army.

It was evident that if either side retreated, the other would

perforce be acknowledged by the Bakufu, and both were reluctant to

put their fortunes to the final test. At length, early in July, 1467,

a petty skirmish precipitated a general engagement. It was

inconclusive, and the attitude of mutual observation was resumed. Two

months later re-enforcements reached the Western Army, and

thereafter, for nearly two years, victory rested with the Yamana. But

Katsumoto clung desperately to his position. Kyoto was reduced almost

completely to ruins, the Imperial palace, Buddhist temples, and other

mansions being laid in ashes, countless rare works of art being

destroyed, and the Court nobles and other civil officials being

compelled to flee to the provinces for shelter. A celebrated poet of

the time said that the evening lark soared over moors where formerly

there had been palaces, and in the Onin Records it is stated that the

metropolis became a den for foxes and wolves, and that Imperial

mandates and religious doctrines were alike unheeded.

At one time things looked as though the ultimate triumph must be with

Sozen. But what Katsumoto lacked in military ability he more than

compensated in statecraft. From the outset he took care to legalize

his cause by inducing the Emperor and the ex-Emperor to remove to

Muromachi, where they were guarded by the Hosokawa troops, and the

defections to which this must ultimately expose Sozen's ranks were

supplemented by fomenting in the domains of the Yamana and their

allies intrigues which necessitated a diversion of strength from the

Kyoto campaign. Curious and intricate was the attitude of the

Hosokawa towards the rival aspirants to the shogunate. Sozen's aid,

as related above, had originally been invoked and exercised in behalf

of Yoshimasa, the shogun's son by the lady Tomi.

Hence, it is not surprising to find the Yamana leader turning his

back upon the sometime bonze, Yoshimi, in October, 1469. But it is

surprising to see him openly espouse this same Yoshimi's cause two

months later. The fact was that Sozen might not choose. He had been

outmanoeuvered by his astute opponent, who now held complete control

of the shogun, and who not only obtained an Imperial decree depriving

Yoshimi of his offices, but also contrived that, early in 1469, the

lady Tomi's four-year-old son, Yoshihisa, should be officially

declared heir to the shogunate. In this matter, Katsumoto's

volte-face had been nearly as signal as Sozen's, for the former was

Yoshimi's champion at the beginning. Henceforth the war assumed the

character of a struggle for the succession to the shogunate. The

crude diplomacy of the Yamana leader was unable to devise any

effective reply to the spectacular pageant of two sovereigns, a

shogun, and a duly-elected heir to the shogunate all marshalled on

the Hosokawa side. Nothing better was conceived than a revival of the

Southern dynasty, which had ceased to be an active factor

seventy-eight years previously. But this farce did little service to

the cause of the Yamana. By degrees the hostile forces withdrew from

the capital, of which the western half (called Saikyo) alone remained

intact, and the strategy of the hostile leaders became concerned

chiefly about preserving their own commissariat or depriving the

enemy of his.

In 1472, a new feature was introduced: Hatakeyama joined the Eastern

Army by order of the shogun, Yoshimasa. This was not merely a great

accession of numerical strength, it also opened the road to the north

where the Hatakeyama estates lay, and thus the Eastern Army found a

solution of the problem which dominated the situation at Kyoto--the

problem of provisions. The scale of success now swung in the

direction of Hosokawa and his allies. But still no crushing victory

was won, and meanwhile the war had continued seven years, with

immense loss of life and treasure. There is evidence that alike

Katsumoto and Sozen were fain to sheathe the sword in 1472, but

during the long struggle conditions had developed which rendered

peace difficult. In May, 1473, Sozen died and was followed to the

grave in less than a month by Katsumoto. Still the struggle went on

in a desultory way until December, 1477, when the Yamana forces

burned their cantonments and withdrew, Yoshimi coming to terms with

Muromachi and retiring to Mino. Peace at length dawned for Kyoto. But

not yet for the provinces. There the sword was not immediately

sheathed. In Echizen, Owari, and Totomi the great Shiba family was

subjected to weakening onsets by the Asakura, the Oda, and the

Imagawa. In Kaga, the Togashi house was divided against itself. In

Kyushu there were bitter struggles between the Shimazu and the Ito,

the Sagara and the Nawa, and the Otomo, the Shoni, and the Ouchi.

Finally, Shinano, Suruga, and Mikawa were all more or less convulsed.

YOSHIHISA

In 1474, Yoshimasa retired from office and, at the close of the year,

his nine-year-old son, Yoshihisa, succeeded him as shogun, the

kwanryo being that Hatakeyama Yoshinari whose appearance in the field

practically terminated the Onin War. The shogun Yoshimasa was in his

thirty-ninth year at the time of this abdication, and he survived for

sixteen years, not the least dissipated of his life, in which he

instituted costly art reunions and carried self-indulgence to its

extreme. During these years Tomi and her younger brother, Ise

Sadachika, acquired such influence as to interfere in the

administration, and under the pretext of procuring funds to rebuild

the palace destroyed during the Onin War, they restored the

toll-gates which had previously stood at the seven chief entrances to

Kyoto, appropriating all the proceeds.

The young Yoshihisa could scarcely fail to be tainted by such an

environment. Much to his credit, however, he showed sagacity and

diligence, eschewing his father's luxurious habits, studying

literature and military art, and taking lessons in statecraft from

the ex-regent, Ichijo Kaneyoshi. Very early he became familiar with

scenes of violence, for, goaded to madness by the taxes exacted at

the seven toll-gates, a mob of the metropolitan citizens rose in

arms, beat off the troops sent to quell them and threatened to sack

the city, when, they were appeased by the issue of a tokusei

ordinance, which, as already explained, meant the remission of all

debts and the cancellation of all financial obligations. Socialism in

such a genial form appealed not only to the masses but also to bushi

who had pledged their property as security for loans to meet warlike

outlays or the demands of luxurious extravagance.

Alike in the home provinces and in distant Kaga, Noto, Etchu, and the

south, tokusei riots took place. Notably incompatible with any

efficient exercise of Muromachi authority was the independence which

the provincial magnates had now learned to display. They levied what

taxes they pleased; employed the proceeds as seemed good to them;

enacted and administered their own laws; made war or peace as they

wished, and granted estates or revenues to their vassals at will. In

short, the bushi had gradually constructed for themselves a full suit

of feudal garments, and to bring them once again under the effective

control of the sovereign or the shogun was almost a hopeless task.

Yoshihisa might perhaps have refrained from attempting it had the

empire been at peace. But, in truth, the empire was on the threshold

of a century-long struggle compared with which the Onin War proved a

bagatelle. The mutterings of the coming storm made themselves very

audible during the years of Yoshihisa's early manhood. The Uesugi

septs, and the Hojo and the Satomi, were fighting in the Kwanto; the

western provinces, the central provinces, and Kyushu were the scenes

of constant conflicts, and no prospect of tranquillity presented

itself. Yoshihisa determined to undertake the work of subjugating the

whole country as Yoritomo had done effectually and as Takauji had

done partially. But he died in his twenty-fifth year when engaged in

conducting a campaign against the Rokkaku branch of the Sasaki

family, in Omi province; a campaign which but for his death would

certainly have been successful.

YOSHITANE

Yoshihisa, whose death took place in 1489, left no son, and his

father, the ex-shogun Yoshimasa, made tardy atonement to his brother,

Yoshimi, the sometime priest, by obtaining the high office of shogun

for the latter's son, Yoshitane, a youth of twenty-five. In the

following year Yoshimasa died, and, two years later (1492), Yoshitane

placed himself at the head of an army to resume the Omi campaign

which Yoshihisa's death had interrupted. His opponent was of Minamoto

lineage, head of the Rokkaku branch of the Sasaki family, whose

representative in the days of the Kamakura Bakufu had been high

constable of four provinces, Omi, Izumo, Aki, and Iwami.

That the shogun, Yoshihisa, and his successor, Yoshitane, turned

their weapons so resolutely against this magnate was due to a cause

illustrative of the abuses of the era. From the outset the Ashikaga

sway over the provinces had been a vanishing quantity, and had

disappeared almost entirely during the Onin War. Not alone did the

writ of the sovereign or the shogun cease to run in regions outside

Kyoto and its immediate vicinity, but also the taxes, though duly

collected, did not find their way to the coffers of either Muromachi

or the Court. Shugo there still existed, and jito and kokushi; but

neither high constable nor land-steward nor civil governor acted as

practical representative of any Central Government: each functioned

for his own hand, swallowing up for his own use, or for inclusion in

some local fief, the manors which had once been the property of the

State or of the Court nobility.

It was evidently of prime necessity from the Muromachi point of view

that a state of affairs which crippled the shogun by impoverishing

him should be remedied. Sasaki Takayori, head of the Rokkaku house,

was a conspicuous product of his time. He had seized the manors of

nearly fifty landowners in the province of Omi, and to punish his

aggressions signally would furnish a useful object lesson. That was

done effectually by Yoshitane's generals, and Sasaki had to flee from

Omi. But the young shogun's triumph was short lived. He allowed

himself to be drawn by Hatakeyama Masanaga into a private feud. We

have already seen this Masanaga engaged with Yoshinari in a struggle

for the Hatakeyama succession on the eve of the Onin War. Yoshinari

was no longer alive, but he had bequeathed to his son, Yoshitoyo, a

heritage of resentment against Masanaga, and the latter, who now held

the post of kwanryo for the fourth time, induced the shogun to order

an attack upon Yoshitoyo in the provinces of Kii and Kawachi. But

Yoshitoyo managed to enlist the aid of the recently discomfited

Sasaki, of the soldier-monks of Kofuku-ji, and, above all, of

Hosokawa Masamoto, son of Hatakeyama Masanaga's old opponent,

Hosokawa Katsumoto. With these co-operated the Yamana, the Isshiki,

and other septs, so that Yoshitane found himself between two powerful

armies, one in Kyoto, the other in Kii. In the sequel, Masanaga

committed suicide, and the shogun, Yoshitane, escaped to Suwo.

YOSHIZUMI AND YOSHIHARU

Hosokawa Masamoto was now master of the situation in Kyoto. It was

for him to nominate a new shogun in lieu of the fugitive Yoshitane.

He went to the Kwanto for a candidate. In 1461, Masatomo, brother of

Yoshimasa, had been nominated governor-general (kwanryo) of the eight

eastern provinces. His son, Yoshizumi, was chosen by Hosokawa to rule

at Muromachi, and Hosokawa himself became kwanryo. The new shogun

held office in name only; all administrative power was usurped by the

kwanryo and his nominees. Now, as Hosokawa Masamoto practised

asceticism for the better pursuit of necromancy, in which he was a

believer, he had no offspring. Therefore he adopted three sons: the

first, Sumiyuki, being the child of the regent, Fujiwara Masamoto;

the second and third, Sumimoto and Takakuni, being kinsmen of his

own. The first of these three was entrusted to Kasai Motochika; the

last two were placed in the care of Miyoshi Nagateru. These guardians

were Hosokawa's principal vassals in Shikoku, where they presently

became deadly rivals. Motochika, believing that Hosokawa's ultimate

intention was to elevate Sumimoto to the shogunate, in which event

the latter's guardian, Nagateru, would obtain a large access of

power, compassed the murder of Hosokawa, the kwanryo, and proclaimed

Sumiyuki head of the Hosokawa house. Thereupon Miyoshi Nagateru moved

up from Shikoku at the head of a strong army, and, after a fierce

conflict, Motochika and Sumiyuki were killed, and Sumimoto, then in

his eleventh year, became chief of the Hosokawa family, receiving

also the office of kwanryo.

The Motochika faction, however, though defeated, were not destroyed.

They conceived the plan of reinstating the shogun, Yoshitane, then a

fugitive in the province of Suwo, and of securing the office of

kwanryo for Takakuni, third son (by adoption) of the late Hosokawa

Masamoto. The powerful Ouchi sept, which had its manors in Suwo,

espoused the conspiracy, and escorted Yoshitane to Kyoto with a great

army, the result being that the shogun, Yoshizumi, had to flee to

Omi; that Yoshitane took his place, and that Ouchi Yoshioki became

deputy kwanryo.

These things happened in 1508. Thenceforth, the great protagonists in

the Kyoto arena were the two factions of the Hosokawa house, led by

Sumimoto and Takakuni, respectively; the former championing the cause

of the shogun, Yoshizumi, and in alliance with the Miyoshi; the

latter supporting the shogun, Yoshitane, and aided by the Ouchi. One

reverse befell the Yoshitane-Ouchi combination, but they quickly

recovered from it, and from 1508 until 1518 a gleam of peace and

prosperity shone once more in Kyoto under the administration of Ouchi

Yoshioki, who governed with skill and impartiality, and whose

influence seemed likely to restore the best days of the Bakufu. But,

in 1518, he was recalled to his province by an attack from the shugo

of Izumo, and by financial embarrassment resulting from his own

generosity in supplying funds to the Crown and the shogun.

Hosokawa Takakuni now became kwanryo, exercising his authority with a

high hand. Then the Sumimoto branch of the Hosokawa, taking advantage

of Ouchi's absence, mustered a force in Shikoku and moved against

Kyoto. Takakuni found himself in a difficult position. In the capital

his overbearing conduct had alienated the shogun, Yoshitane, and from

the south a hostile army was approaching. He chose Hyogo for

battle-field, and, after a stout fight, was discomfited and fled to

Omi, the position of kwanryo being bestowed on his rival, Sumimoto,

by the shogun. In a few months, however, Takakuni, in alliance with

the Rokkaku branch of the Sasaki family under Sadayori, marched into

Kyoto in overwhelming force. Miyoshi Nagateru retired to Chion-in,

where he committed suicide; Sumimoto fled to Awa, dying there a few

months later, and Yoshitane, after brief refuge in the island of

Awaji, died in Awa, in 1523. Thus, Hosokawa Takakuni found himself

supreme in Kyoto, and he proceeded to appoint a shogun, without

awaiting the demise of Yoshitane. Yoshizumi, the eleventh shogun,

who, as related above, fled from Kyoto in 1508, dying three years

later in exile, left two sons: Yoshiharu, whom he committed to the

charge of Akamatsu Yoshimura, and Yoshikore, whom he entrusted to

Hosokawa Sumimoto. In 1521, Takakuni invited Yoshiharu, then eleven

years old, to the capital and procured his nomination to the

shogunate.

ANARCHY

From this time forward the confusion grows worse confounded. The

Miyoshi of Awa are found in co-operation with Yanamoto Kataharu

espousing the cause of the shogun's younger brother, Yoshikore, and

of Harumoto, a son of Hosokawa Sumimoto. We see this combination

expelling Yoshiharu and Takakuni from Kyoto, and we see the fugitives

vainly essaying to reverse the situation. Thereafter, during several

years, there is practically no government in the capital. Riot and

insurrection are daily features, and brigandage prevails unchecked.

Kataharu, though not holding the office of kwanryo, usurps its

functions so ostentatiously that the assassin's dagger is turned

against him. Again the two Hosokawa chiefs, Takakuni and Harumoto,

fight for power, and, in 1531, Takakuni is killed, Harumoto becoming

supreme. Soon the Miyoshi brothers, Motonaga and Masanaga, engage in

a fierce quarrel about their inheritance, and the former, with

Yoshikore as candidate for the shogunate and Hatakeyama as auxiliary,

raises the standard against Harumoto, who, aided by the

soldier-priests of Hongwan-ji, kills both Yoshitaka and Motonaga and

takes Yoshikore prisoner. Thereafter, Harumoto quarrels with the

Hongwan-ji bonzes, and being attacked by them, obtains the aid of

Rokkaku Sadayori and the Nichiren priests, with the result that the

splendid fane of Hongwan-ji is reduced to ashes. A reconciliation is

then effected between Harumoto and the shogun, Yoshiharu, while

Miyoshi Masanaga is appointed to high office. Yet once more the

untiring Takakuni, aided by Miyoshi Norinaga, Motonaga's son, called

also Chokei, drives Yoshiharu and Harumoto from the metropolis, and

presently a reconciliation is effected by the good offices of Rokkaku

Sadayori, the real power of the kwanryo being thenceforth exercised

by the Miyoshi family. Japanese historians have well called it an age

of anarchy.

YOSHITERU

In 1545, the shogun, Yoshiharu, resigned in favour of his son,

Yoshiteru. Two years of quiet ensued in Kyoto, and then the old feud

broke out once more. The Hosokawa, represented by Harumoto, and the

Miyoshi, by Chokei, fought for supremacy. Victory rested with the

Miyoshi. The Hosokawa's power was shattered, and Chokei ruled in

Kyoto through his vassal, Matsunaga Hisahide. The era is memorable

for the assassination of a shogun. Yoshiteru had become reconciled

with Chokei and was suffered to live quietly at Muromachi. But after

Chokei's death (he was poisoned by Hisahide), Yoshiteru's cousin,

Yoshihide, a son of Yoshikore, sought to be nominated successor to

the shogunate through the aid of Masanaga and Hisahide. In 1565, this

plot matured. Hisahide suddenly sent a force which attacked

Yoshiteru's palace and killed the shogun. Yoshihide replaced the

murdered potentate, and the Matsunaga family succeeded to the power

previously wielded by the Miyoshi. Yoshiteru's younger brother,

Yoshiaki, fled to Omi, but afterwards made his way to Owari, where

Oda Nobunaga took him by the hand and ultimately placed him in the

shogun's seat at Kyoto.

REVIEW OF THE ASHIKAGA

Among the fifteen representatives of the Ashikaga, two were slain by

their own vassals, five died in exile, and one had to commit suicide.

From the accession of Takauji, in 1338, to the death of Yoshiaki, in

1597, a period of 259 years, there was not so much as one decade of

signal success and efficient government. With justice the story of

the time has been summed up in the epithet "ge-koku-jo," or the

overthrow of the upper by the lower. The appreciation of the eminent

historian, Rai Sanyo, is most faithful. Every great conflict

throughout the era was marked by similar features. It is a weary

record of broken promises, violated allegiances, and family feuds. If

the Hatakeyama, the Hosokawa, and the Miyoshi set their own interests

above those of the shogun, the Ashikaga, in turn, sacrificed the

interests of the Throne on the altar of their own ambition. A river

cannot be purer than its source. If the Miyoshi vassals plotted

against their chiefs, so did the latter against the Hosokawa; so did

the Hosokawa against the Ashikaga; so did the Ashikaga against the

Imperial family, and so did one branch of the Imperial family against

another. Everywhere there was lack of loyalty.

The loyalty wanting among masters was equally deficient among

servants. There is no more treacherous episode in the Middle Ages

than Matsunaga Hisahide's poisoning of his liege lord to compass the

downfall of the Miyoshi family and slaying the shogun, Yoshiteru, to

overthrow the Ashikaga, though he enjoyed the confidence of both. The

Dai Nihon-rekishi (History of Great Japan) observes that the ethical

primers, with which a literary education had formerly familiarized

the nation, lost their influence in this military era. There was no

inordinate desire for landed property until the Gen-Hei epoch, when a

manor became the principal reward of a successful soldier.

Thereafter, greed for domains acquired strength every year. Again,

when Yoritomo became so-tsuihoshi (commander-in-chief) and so-jito

(general steward) of the whole country, and his meritorious vassals

were appointed shugo and jito in each province, local authority

passed from the Throne to the military families, and when, after the

Shokyu struggle, the shugo and the jito came into actual possession

of the estates they had previously administered, military feudalism

was practically established. The Hojo, by their just administration

and astute measures, brought this system into esteem, but under the

Ashikaga regime the reality of landed possession grew to be the

unique aim of existence, and, to achieve it, sons forgot their

paternal relation and vassals lost sight of fealty. The nation

engaged in an armed scramble; individualism became paramount, and

social obligations were ignored. This is the more noteworthy because

loyalty is so typical a Japanese virtue.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ASHIKAGA

The common saying that the Kamakura Bakufu brought the entire country

under one administrative control requires modification. It was not

until Tokugawa days in the seventeenth century that the whole sixty

provinces passed under one feudal ruler. Still as between the

Kamakura Bakufu and the Muromachi, the latter, though its military

supremacy was less complete, may be said to have extended its

influence theoretically over the whole of the lands throughout the

empire except the Chokodo estates.

In another respect, also, the advantage lay with the Muromachi

shogunate. During the Kamakura era, the Court magnates continued to

despise the Bakufu adherents, and the distance between the capital

and Kamakura imparted to the latter an element of rusticity. But with

the establishment of the Muromachi shogunate a change took place. The

Bakufu, the visible repository of power, stood side by side with the

Court, and opportunities for close relations existed constantly.

Moreover, the Court nobles, notably antagonistic to the military

regime, followed the fortunes of the Southern dynasty, those alone

remaining in the capital who were on more or less intimate terms with

the military. Such were the Nijo, the Saionji, the Hino, and so

forth. These observed the behests of the Bakufu, sought to acquire

the latter's confidence, and always paid respect to the Hana no

Gosho, as the shogun was called. So close were the relations that for

ceremonial purposes at the Bakufu, it was customary to employ Court

officials, and witty writers of the time discourse amusingly on the

often clumsy efforts made by the courtiers to ape the customs and

acquire the dialects of the provincial soldiers.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CENTRAL BAKUFU

The administrative power having been transferred from the Court to

the Bakufu, it may be said that the sei-i tai-shogun exercised

supreme authority throughout the empire. But the shogun himself did

not actually discharge administrative duties. That was done by the

kwanryo with the shogun's consent. Originally this official was

called shitsuji (manager), and his functions were to look after the

affairs of a provincial magnate's establishment. During the Kamakura

era, the Ashikaga family occupied a high place. Of Minamoto origin,

it was connected with the Hojo by marriage, and for generations its

shitsuji had been a member of the Ko family. Ashikaga Takauji

made Ko no Moronao his shitsuji, and a highly competent captain

he proved himself. Subsequently, in 1362, Shiba Yoshimasa was

appointed shitsuji, but soon his title was changed to kwanryo

(governor-general), and it thenceforth became customary for the

latter position to be occupied by a member of one of the three

families, Shiba, Hosokawa, and Hatakeyama, in succession.

Speaking broadly, the kwanryo corresponded to the skikken (regent) of

Kamakura days. But whereas, the Kamakura shikken exercised virtually

autocratic authority, the shogun being a minor, the Muromachi

kwanryo, nominally, at all events, was under the control of an adult

shogun. In fact, the kwanryo in the Muromachi polity resembled the

betto of the Man-dokoro in Yoritomo's time. For the rest, the

Muromachi Bakufu was organized on practically the same lines as its

Kamakura prototype. There was a Man-dokoro, a Monju-dokoro, and a

Samurai-dokoro, and the staff of these offices was taken originally,

as far as possible, from the families of men who had distinguished

themselves as legislators and administrators at Kamakura. There were

also officials called bugyo (commissioners) who directed the

enforcement of laws and ordinances. These commissioners numbered

thirty-six, and each had his own sphere of duties: as the shonin

bugyo, who controlled judicial affairs; the tosen bugyo, who dealt

with affairs of foreign trade; the jisha bugyo, who superintended

temples and shrines; the onsho bugyo, who had to do with official

rewards, etc.

ORGANIZATION OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS

At Kamakura, also, there was a kwanryo to guard the eastern provinces

(Kwanto). In Takauji's time, his second son, Motouji, was appointed

to this office, and it was thenceforth inherited for some

generations, the Uesugi family furnishing a shitsuji. Ultimately the

Kamakura kwanryo became a powerful military satrap, hostile to the

Muromachi shogun. The holder of the office then received the title of

kubo, and the hitherto shitsuji became kwanryo. In other respects the

Kamakura polity retained the form it had under Yoritomo: a Hyojo-shu

(Council), a Hikitsuke-shu, a Monju-dokoro, a Samurai-dokoro, and

various bugyo. In Kyushu and Dewa, the principal officer was called

shugo, that post being of special importance; while in the other

provinces shugo and jito (high constables and land-stewards)

continued to officiate as before.

The jurisdiction of these high constables--great military magnates or

relatives of the shogun--extended to two or more provinces, and the

shugo were then called kuni-mochi-shu (province-holder). A daimyo

(great name, i.e. feudal lord), in communicating with Muromachi, had

to make a kuni-mochi his medium. For the Kwanto and Shikoku, the

Hosokawa house was the kunimochi; for Shinano, Etchu, Echigo, and

Kaga, the Hatakeyama; for Ise, Kai, and Suruga, the Yamana; and for

Kyushu, the tandai. After the power of the tandai had declined, the

Ouchi family took its place. In the days of Yoshinori's shogunate,

there were twenty-two shugo in the country, and seven of them

administered three provinces or more, each. The provincial governors

appointed by the Southern Court disappeared, for the most part,

during the War of the Dynasties, and on the restoration of peace the

only one of these high officials that remained was Kitabatake of Ise.

SHUGO AND JITO

Originally appointed for administrative and fiscal purposes only, the

shugo said jito acquired titles of land-ownership from the beginning

of the Ashikaga era. To plunder and annex a neighbouring province

became thenceforth a common feat on the part of these officials. In

1390, tracts of land measuring from one-half of a province to two or

three provinces are found to have been converted from the shugo's

jurisdictional areas into military domains. Such magnates as Yamana

Tokiuji held from five to eleven provinces. These puissant captains

had castles and armies of their own. At first, they respected the

requisitions of the Bakufu. Thus, in 1463, when an elaborate Buddhist

ceremony had to be performed on the decease of Yoshimasa's mother, a

tax in the form of cotton cloth was levied from the shugo, a ruler of

three provinces contributing ten thousand pieces; a ruler of two

provinces, five thousand, and so on.*

*A "piece" was 40 feet, approximately. When the castle of Edo was

built in Tokugawa days--seventeenth century--each daimyo had to

contribute "aid" (otetsudai), after the Ashikaga custom.

But after the Onin War (1467-1469), military magnates resided wholly

on their own domains and paid no attention to requisitions from the

Bakufu. Further, these magnates compelled all jito and go-kenin

within their jurisdiction to serve as their vassals. Previously to

the Onin era the shugo had resided, for the most part, in Kyoto,

delegating the discharge of their provincial functions to deputies

(shugo-dai), chosen by the shugo and approved by the Bakufu.

Presently, the process of selection was dispensed with, and the

office became hereditary. Thus, Yusa of the Hatakeyama, Oda of the

Shiba, Uragami of the Akamatsu, and so forth are examples of deputies

who resided permanently in the provinces concerned and acquired

influence there superior even to that of their principals. The

deputies, in turn, had their vice-deputies (ko-shugo-dai), to whom

the name daikwan (another term for "deputy") was often given. These

daikwan were selected from among the members or vassals of a shugo's

family to act provisionally as shugo-dai. As for the jito, from the

middle of the Kamakura epoch their posts became mere sinecures, the

emoluments going to support their families, or being paid over to a

temple or shrine. Occasionally the office was sold or pawned. The

comparatively small areas of land within which the jito officiated

soon came to be recognized as their private domains, but after the

Onin commotion this system underwent a change, the jito becoming

vassals of the shugo. Many, however, held their original position

until the middle of the sixteenth century. In the days of Toyotomi

Hideyoshi and Oda Nobunaga--namely, the second half of the sixteenth

century--the name jito was given to the headman of a village or

district, who served as the immediate representative of authority.

FINANCE

Cultivated land (koden) was the great source of official revenue. The

area under rice--the principal staple of production--in the middle of

the fifteenth century was about a million of cho,* or two and a half

million acres; and this was owned by the Court, the Court nobles, the

military magnates, the temples, and the shrines. From an uncertain

date, but probably the close of the Kamakura Bakufu, the area of a

domain ceased to be calculated in terms of cho and tan and was

expressed in kwan (one thousand cash, or mori). The use of the

kwanior this purpose had reference to the military service leviable

upon the land. Thus, when land of one hundred kwan-mon was mentioned,

an area capable of supporting military service valued at one hundred

kwan-mon was understood. The calculation was very simple: one tsubo

corresponded to one mon, so that one kwan-mon represented one

thousand tsubo for the purposes of this assessment.**

*The cho was equal to 10 tan, and the tan comprised 360 tsubo, the

tsubo being a square of 6 feet side. At present the area under

cultivation is some 3 millions of cho (7.5 millions of acres).

**In the Ashikaga era the unit of currency may be said to have been

the copper cash of China--called Eiraku-sen after the name (Chinese,

Yunglo) of the Chinese year period when it was issued. Gold and

silver coins were also in use; namely, the gold ryo, which was

equivalent to 10 silver ryo; but their circulation was comparatively

small. The gold ryo was equal to 2000 mon of copper coins, and as 100

mon purchased 1 to (one-tenth part of a koku) of rice, it follows

that the gold ryo represented 2 koku, or 30 yen of modern currency,

the silver ryo representing 3 yen (1 yen=2 shillings-50 cents). It

follows also that 10 strings of cash (one kwan) were worth a koku of

rice, or 15 yen. As for silk piece-goods, 1 roll (hiki = 48 yards) of

the best kind was worth 45 yen, and the second and third-class kinds

ranged from 33 to 22.5 yen. Finally, in the year 1498, the records

show that the daily wage of a labourer was some 16 sen of modern

money (about 4 pence or 8 cents).

From various documents it appears that the three grades of

land--best, medium, and inferior--were taxed at the rate of sixty,

forty, and thirty per cent., respectively, of the yield. In other

words, the average land-tax was forty per cent, of the yield--called

shi-ko roku-min--or four parts to the Government and six to the

farmer. If we consider the rates between the current price of land

and the tax, there is a record, dated 1418, which shows that the tax

levied by a temple--Myoko-ji--was twenty per cent, of the market

price of the land. But it would seem that the ratio in the case of

Government taxation was much smaller, being only one and a half per

cent, of the market value. There were, however, other imposts, which,

though not accurately stated, must have brought the land-tax to much

more than forty per cent, of the yield.

Turning to the Imperial Court, we find it supported by domains

hereditarily held; by contributions from the seizei (expediency

taxes, that is to say, taxes set aside for extraordinary State

requirements); by occasional presents, and by revenues from kugoden

(private Imperial land). The Court nobles had their own domains,

usually small. All these estates, those of the Crown, of princes, and

of Court nobles, were subject to a system called hansai. That is to

say, one-half of their revenues were leviable for military purposes.

Originally this impost was understood to be a loan to the Bakufu, but

ultimately it came to be regarded as a normal levy, though its

practical effect was to reduce the revenue from such domains by

one-half. Moreover, as the arrogance of the military magnates in the

provinces grew more insistent, and as the Bakufu's ability to oppose

them became less effective, the domain of the Court nobles suffered

frequent encroachments.

REVENUES OF THE BAKUFU

One source of revenue for the Bakufu was its domains in various

places; another was the buke-yaku, or military-house dues. These were

at first two per cent, of the land-tax of the house concerned, but

afterwards they increased to five per cent. Thus an estate paying one

hundred koku in the form of land-tax, had to pay a further five koku

as buke-yaku, the latter proceeds being sent to Kyoto for the use of

the shogun's household. Another important levy was the tansen, which,

as its name implies, was a land-rate levied at so much per tan

(one-quarter of an acre), the proceeds being devoted to special

purposes, as, for example, to defray the cost of grand ceremonials or

of new edifices. The records show one payment of tansen which works

out at fifty mon per tan. Another document indicates that the monthly

expenses of the Man-dokoro were some sixty kwanmon and that they were

defrayed by levying taxes upon pawnbrokers and sake-dealers in Kyoto

and in Omi province. The latter tax (shuko-zei) is shown to have

been, on one occasion, two kwan eight hundred mon per house. The

Bakufu collected dues on foreign commerce, also, and miscellaneous

imposts of an irregular character made no small addition to its

income.

REVENUE OF SHRINES AND TEMPLES

Temples and shrines derived part of their income from port-dues and

barrier-tolls. Thus, the Hachiman temple of Iwashimizu received tolls

from all traffic passing the Yamazaki barrier; Kofuku-ji levied

duties on vessels entering Hyogo port, and Engaku-ji of Kamakura

collected tolls at the Hakone barrier (sekisho). Such taxes proving

very prolific and easy to levy, the number of barriers increased

rapidly, to the no small obstruction of trade and travel. Further,

the priests were constantly enriched with donations of land and

money, in addition to the rents and taxes obtained from their own

domains, and thus it resulted that several of the great monasteries

possessed much wealth. To that fact is to be attributed the numerous

establishments of soldier-priests maintained at Enryaku-ji, on

Hiei-zan, and at Kofuku-ji, in Nara. To that also is to be ascribed

in part the signal development of literature among the friars, and

the influence wielded by the Shinto officials of Kitano and the betto

of Hachiman.

REVENUE OF JITO

A special tax levied by the jito was the hyakusho-yaku, or farmers'

dues. These were one per cent, of the land-tax originally, but the

rate was subsequently doubled. Other heavy imposts were frequently

and arbitrarily enacted, and there can be no doubt that financial

disorder contributed materially to bringing about the terrible

calamities of the Battle era (Sengoku Jidai), as the period of eleven

decades ending in 1600 is called. For, if the fiscal system was thus

defective during the comparatively prosperous age of the Ashikaga, it

fell into measureless confusion at a later date. It has been stated

above that the area under rice cultivation at the middle of the

fifteenth century was about one million did; at the close of that

century the figure was found to have decreased by more than fifty

thousands of cho. From such a result, opposed as it is to all records

of normal development, the unhappy plight of the agricultural classes

may be inferred.

TOKENS OF CURRENCY

Minting operations also were discontinued under the Ashikaga. Cotton

cloth and rice served as principal media of exchange. Fortunately,

commerce with China in the days of the Ming rulers, and Yoshimasa's

undignified though practical requests, brought a large supply of

Yunglo (Japanese, Eiraku) copper cash, which, with other Chinese

coins of the Tang and Sung dynasties, served the Japanese as media.

This fortuitous element was conspicuous in all the domain of finance,

especially after the Onin War, when the territorial magnates fixed

the taxes at their own convenience and without any thought of

uniformity. One of the only sincere and statesmanlike efforts of

reform was made, in 1491, by Hojo Soun. He reduced the rate then

ruling, namely, equal parts to the tax-collector and to the taxpayer,

and made it forty per cent, to the former and sixty to the latter,

and he ordained that any jito collecting so much as a mon in excess

of the official figure, should be severely punished. How the people

fared elsewhere it is not possible to say accurately, but the records

show that extraordinary imposts were levied frequently, and that the

tansen was exacted again and again, as also were taxes on trades. As

for the Imperial household, such was its condition that it barely

subsisted on presents made by certain military magnates, so complete

was the decentralization of the empire in this period.

ATTITUDE OF THE ASHIKAGA TOWARDS THE THRONE

The policy of the Ashikaga towards the Daikagu-ji line (the Southern

Court) of the Imperial house was evidently one of complete

elimination at the outset. But the impossibility of achieving such a

programme soon came to be recognized and reconciliation was

substituted. Thenceforth, in appearance at all events, the

representatives of the Daikagu-ji line received due consideration and

were sufficiently provided with incomes, as witness the treatment of

the ex-Emperor Go-Kameyama by Yoshimitsu. But subsequent and repeated

neglect of the claims of the Southern branch in regard to the vital

matter of the succession betrayed the insincerity of the Ashikaga,

and provoked frequent appeals to arms.

The situation may be said to have been saved by the habit inaugurated

at the close of the Heian epoch. From that time princes and nobles

who saw no prospect of secular distinction began to take the tonsure,

and this retirement to the cloister was assiduously encouraged by the

Muromachi shoguns. A similar policy commended itself in the case of

princes of the Jimyo-in branch (the Northern Court). It is true that,

from the first, the representatives of this line had relied on the

Bakufu, whether of Kamakura or of Muromachi. But in their hearts they

deeply resented the usurpation of the shogunate, and the latter,

fully cognisant of that sentiment, guarded against its effective

display by providing only meagre allowances for the support of the

Imperial household (Kinri) and the ex-Emperor's household (Sendo),

and by contriving that only young and delicate princes should succeed

to the throne. Thus, of seven sovereigns who reigned between 1336 and

1464, the oldest was only sixteen at the time of his succession and

the youngest was six. When an Emperor reached maturity, it was usual

that he should abdicate and administer thenceforth from the Inchu.

Thus the influence of the Court was divided between the Kinri and the

Sendo--the reigning sovereign and the retired. But the real

depository of power was the shikken (regent) of the Inchu, to which

office a member of the Hino family, maternal relatives of the Bakufu,

was habitually appointed. When Yoshinori was shogun, he himself acted

as shikken of the Inchu. As for the Court officials properly so

called, from the kwampaku downwards, they were mere figureheads.

Holding their posts, indeed, as of old, they constituted, not

administrative actors, but an audience.

YOSHIMITSU AND THE THRONE

The shogun Yoshimitsu instituted the custom of inviting the sovereign

to his mansion, and thenceforth such visits became a recognized

feature of the relations between the Imperial and the Muromachi

Courts. Yoshimitsu himself frequently repaired to the Kinri and the

Sendo, and frequently accompanied the Empresses and their ladies on

social visits or pleasure excursions. He is said to have gone in and

out at the Imperial palaces without the slightest reserve, and on

more than one occasion history accuses him of flagrantly

transgressing the limits of decency in his intercourse with

Suken-mon-in, mother of the Emperor Go-Enyu. As a subverter of public

morals, however, the palm belongs, not to Yoshimitsu, but to his

immediate successor, Yoshimochi. He is said to have visited the Kinri

and the Sendo six or seven times every month, and to have there

indulged in all kinds of licence. History says, indeed, that he was

often unable to appear at Court owing to illness resulting from

intoxication.

PRINCES AND PRIESTS

As to the fact that, from the close of the Heian epoch, the cloister

often proved a prison for Imperial princes whose ambition might have

been troublesome had they remained at large, the following figures

are eloquent:

Number

entering

religion

Of 8 sons born to Emperor Fushimi (1287-1298) 7

9 " " " Emperor Go-Fushimi (1298-1301) 9

4 " " " Emperor Hanazono (1307-1318) 4

2 " " " Emperor Suko (1348-1352) 2

9 " " " Prince Sadatsune, 8

grandson of the Emperor Suko

14 " " " Emperor Go-Kogon (1352-1371) 14

Absolute accuracy is not claimed for these figures, but they are

certainly close approximations. In fact, under the Muromachi Bakufu,

every son of a sovereign, except the Prince Imperial, was expected to

become a monk. The Ashikaga adopted a similar system and applied it

ruthlessly in their own families. In truth, the Ashikaga epoch was

notorious for neglect of the obligations of consanguinity. Father is

found pitted against son, uncle against nephew, and brother against

brother.

ENGRAVING: TILES OF THE DAIBUTSUDEN OF TODAI-JI

ENGRAVING: DECORATION OF TOKONOMA (AN ALCOVE IN A JAPANESE

PARLOUR)--Muromachi Period