THE WAR OF THE DYNASTIES
OCCUPATION OF KYOTO BY ASHIKAGA
IN July, 1336, Takauji entered Kyoto and established his headquarters
at the temple Higashi-dera. Go-Daigo had previously taken refuge at
the Hiei-zan monastery, the ex-Emperors, Hanazono and Kogon,
remaining in the capital where they looked for the restoration of
their branch of the Imperial family. The Ashikaga leader lost no time
in despatching a force to attack Hiei-zan, but the Imperialists,
supported by the cenobites, resisted stoutly, and no impression was
made on the defences for a considerable time. In one of the
engagements, however, Nawa Nagatoshi, who had harboured Go-Daigo
after the flight from Oki, met his death, and the Imperialist forces
gradually dwindled. Towards the close of August, Takauji caused
Prince Yutahito (or Toyohito, according to gome authorities), younger
brother of Kogon, to be proclaimed Emperor, and he is known as Komyo.
Characteristic of the people's political ignorance at that time is
the fact that men spoke of the prince's good fortune since, without
any special merit of his own, he had been granted the rank of
sovereign by the shogun.
Meanwhile, the investment of the Hiei monastery made little progress,
and Takauji had recourse to treachery. At the close of October he
opened secret communications with Go-Daigo; assured him that the
Ashikaga did not entertain any disloyal purpose; declared that their
seemingly hostile attitude had been inspired by the enmity of the
Nitta brothers; begged Go-Daigo to return to Kyoto, and promised not
only that should all ideas of revenge be foregone, but also that the
administration should be handed over to the Court, and all their
ranks and estates restored to the Emperor's followers.
Go-Daigo ought surely to have distrusted these professions. He must
have learned from Takauji's original impeachment of Yoshisada how
unscrupulous the Ashikaga leader could be on occasion, and he should
have well understood the impossibility of peace between these two
men. Yet his Majesty relied on Takauji's assurances. It was in vain
that Horiguchi Sadamitsu recounted Yoshisada's services, detailed the
immense sacrifices he had made in the Imperial cause, and declared
that if the Emperor were determined to place himself in Takauji's
hands, he should prepare his departure from Hiei-zan by summoning to
his presence Yoshisada with the other Nitta leaders and sentencing
them to death. Go-Daigo was not to be moved from his purpose. He gave
Yoshisada fair words indeed: "I profoundly praise your loyal
services. My wish is to pacify the country by the assistance of your
family, but heaven has not yet vouchsafed its aid. Our troops are
worn out and the hour is unpropitious. Therefore, I make peace for
the moment and bide my time. Do you repair to Echizen and use your
best endeavours to promote the cause of the restoration. Lest you be
called a rebel after my return to Kyoto, I order the Crown Prince to
accompany you."
Thus Go-Daigo, truly faithful neither to the one side nor to the
other, set out for the capital. That night, Yoshisada prayed at the
shrine of Hiyoshi: "Look down on my loyalty and help me to perform my
journey safely so that I may raise an army to destroy the insurgents.
If that is not to be, let one of my descendants achieve my aim." Two
hundred and six years later, there was born in Mikawa of the stock of
Yoshisada one of the greatest generals and altogether the greatest
ruler that Japan has ever produced, Minamoto Ieyasu. Heaven answered
Yoshisada's prayer tardily but signally.
TAKAUJI'S FAITH
Not one of Takauji's promises did he respect. He imprisoned Go-Daigo;
he stripped all the courtiers of their ranks and titles; he placed in
confinement all the generals and officers of the Imperial forces, and
he ordered the transfer of the insignia to the sovereign of his own
nomination, Komyo. Tradition has it that Go-Daigo, victim of so many
treacheries, practised one successful deception himself: he reserved
the original of the sacred sword and seal and handed counterfeits to
Komyo. This took place on November 12, 1336. Some two months later,
January 23, 1337, Go-Daigo, disguised as a woman for the second time
in his career, fled from his place of detention through a broken
fence, and reached Yoshino in Yamato, where he was received by
Masatsura, son of Kusunoki Masashige, and by Kitabatake Chikafusa.
Yoshino now became the rendez-vous of Imperialists from the home
provinces, and Go-Daigo sent a rescript to Yoshisada in Echizen,
authorizing him to work for the restoration.
Thus commenced the War of the Dynasties, known in history as the
Conflict of the Northern and Southern Courts, terms borrowed from the
fact that Yoshino, where Go-Daigo had his headquarters, lay to the
south of Kyoto. Hereafter, then, the junior branch of the Imperial
Family will be designated the Southern Court and the senior branch
will be spoken of as the Northern Court.
The struggle lasted from 1337 to 1392, a period of fifty-five years.
Much has been written and said about the relative legitimacy of the
two Courts. It does not appear that there is any substantial material
for doubt. Go-Daigo never abdicated voluntarily, or ever surrendered
the regalia. Before his time many occupants of the throne had stepped
down at the suggestion of a Fujiwara or a Hojo. But always the
semblance of free-will had been preserved. Moreover, the transfer of
the true regalia constituted the very essence of legitimate
succession. But these remained always in Go-Daigo's possession.
Therefore, although in the matter of lineage no distinction could be
justly set up between the Northern and the Southern Courts, the
collaterals of legitimacy were all with the latter.
Of course each complied with all the forms of Imperialism. Thus,
whereas the Southern Court used the year-name Engen for 1336-1339,
the North kept the year-name Kemmu for two years, and as there were
different nengo names for half a century, a new element of confusion
was added to the already perplexing chronology of Japan. In
administrative methods there was a difference. The Northern Court
adhered to the camera system: that is to say, the actual occupant of
the throne was a mere figurehead, the practical functions of
Government being discharged by the cloistered sovereign. In the
Southern Court the Emperor himself, nominally at all events, directed
the business of administration. Further, the office of shogun in the
Southern Court was held generally by an Imperial Prince, whereas in
the Northern Court its holder was an Ashikaga. In brief, the
supporters of the Northern Court followed the military polity of the
Bakufu while the Southern adopted Imperialism.
NATURE OF THE WAR
As the question at issue lay solely between two claimants to the
succession, readers of history naturally expect to find the war
resolve itself into a campaign, or a succession of campaigns, between
two armies. Such was by no means the case. Virtually the whole empire
was drawn into the turmoil, and independent fighting went on at
several places simultaneously. The two Courts perpetually made Kyoto
their objective. Regardless of its strategical disadvantages, they
deemed its possession cardinal. Takauji had been more highly lauded
and more generously rewarded than Yoshisada, because the former had
recovered Kyoto whereas the latter had only destroyed Kamakura. Thus,
while Go-Daigo constantly struggled to capture Kyoto, Komyo's
absorbing aim was to retain it. This obsession in favour of the
Imperial metropolis left its mark upon many campaigns; as when, in
the spring operations of 1336, Yoshisada, instead of being allowed to
pursue and annihilate Takauji, was recalled to guard Kyoto, and when,
in July of the same year, Kusunoki Masashige was sent to his death
rather than temporarily vacate the capital. It must have been fully
apparent to the great captains of the fourteenth century that Kyoto
was easy to take and hard to hold. Lake Biwa and the river Yodo are
natural bulwarks of Yamato, not of Yamashiro. Hiei-zan looks down on
the lake, and Kyoto lies on the great plain at the foot of the hill.
If, during thirteen generations, the Ashikaga family struggled for
Kyoto, they maintained, the while, their ultimate base and
rallying-place at Kamakura, and thus, even when shattered in the
west, they could recuperate in the east. The Southern Court had no
such depot and recruiting-ground. They had, indeed, a tolerable place
of arms in the province of Kawachi, but in the end they succumbed to
topographical disadvantages.
DEATHS OF YOSHISADA AND AKIIYE
In the fact that he possessed a number of sons, Go-Daigo had an
advantage over his fourteen-year-old rival, Komyo, for these Imperial
princes were sent out to various districts to stimulate the loyal
efforts of local bushi. With Yoshisada to Echizen went the Crown
Prince and his brother Takanaga. They entrenched themselves at
Kana-ga-saki, on the seacoast, whence Yoshisada's eldest son,
Yoshiaki, was despatched to Echigo to collect troops, and a younger
brother, Yoshisuke, to Soma-yama on a similar errand. Almost
immediately, Ashikaga Takatsune with an army of twenty thousand men
laid siege to Kanaga-saki. But Yoshiaki and Yoshisuke turned in their
tracks and delivered a rear attack which scattered the besiegers.
This success, however, proved only temporary. The Ashikaga leader's
deep resentment against Yoshisada inspired a supreme effort to crush
him, and the Kana-ga-saki fortress was soon invested by an
overwhelming force on sea and on shore. Famine necessitated
surrender. Yoshiaki and Prince Takanaga committed suicide, the latter
following the former's example and using his blood-stained sword. The
Crown Prince was made prisoner and subsequently poisoned by Takauji's
orders. Yoshisada and his brother Yoshisuke escaped to Soma-yama and
rallied their partisans to the number of three thousand.
The fall of Kana-ga-saki occurred in April, 1338, and, two months
later, Go-Daigo took the very exceptional course of sending an
autograph letter to Yoshisada. The events which prompted his Majesty
were of prime moment to the cause of the Southern Court. Kitabatake
Akiiye, the youthful governor of Mutsu and son of the celebrated
Chikafusa, marched southward at the close of 1337, his daring project
being the capture, first, of Kamakura, and next, of Kyoto The nature
of this gallant enterprise may be appreciated by observing that Mutsu
lies at the extreme north of the main island, is distant some five
hundred miles from Kyoto, and is separated from the latter by several
regions hostile to the cause which Akiiye represented. Nevertheless,
the brilliant captain, then in his twenty-first year, seized Kamakura
in January, 1338, and marched thence in February for Yoshino. He
gained three victories on the way, and had nearly reached his
objective when, at Ishizu, he encountered a great army of Ashikaga
troops under an able leader, Ko no Moronao, and after a fierce
engagement the Southern forces were shattered, Akiiye himself falling
in the fight. This disaster occurred on June 11, 1338. A brave rally
was made by Akiiye's younger brother, Akinobu. He gathered the
remnants of the Mutsu army and occupied Otokoyama, which commands
Kyoto.
It was at this stage of the campaign that Go-Daigo resorted to the
exceptional measure of sending an autograph letter to Yoshisada, then
entrenched at Somayama, in Echizen. His Majesty conjured the Nitta
leader to march to the assistance of Akinobu at Otoko-yama. Yoshisada
responded at once. He despatched his brother, Yoshisuke, with twenty
thousand men, remaining himself to cover the rear of the expedition.
But Otoko-yama surrendered before this succour reached it, and the
Nitta brothers then combined their forces to operate against the
Ashikaga. Nothing decisive resulted, and in September, 1338,
Yoshisada fell in an insignificant combat near the fortress of
Fujishima in Echizen. He caused a comrade to behead him and carry off
the head, but the enemy identified him by means of the Imperial
letter found on his person.
Yoshisada was only thirty-eight at the time of his death (September,
1338). Rai Sanyo (1780-1832), the great Japanese historian, says: "I
saw a letter written by Yoshisada with his own hand for the purpose
of admonishing the members of his family. In it he wrote: 'An officer
in command of an army should respect the sovereign; treat his
subordinates with clemency but decision; leave his fate in heaven's
hands, and not blame others.' Yoshisada is open to criticism for not
pursuing the Ashikaga when they fled westward from Kyoto; yet it must
be remembered that he had no firm base, being hurried from one
quarter to another. The strategy he used was not his own free choice
nor were the battles he fought contrived by himself. But his devotion
to the Imperial cause, his unfailing loyalty, and his indifference to
self-interest have kept his memory fresh and will always keep it
fresh. If, two hundred years after his death, a chieftain was born of
his blood to carry the Minamoto name to the pinnacle of glory, who
shall say that heaven did not thus answer the prayer put up by
Yoshisada at the shrine of Hiyoshi?"
DEATH OF GO-DAIGO
During these events, Go-Daigo sojourned at Yoshino, which was
protected by Kusunoki Masatsura, Wada Masatomo, and others. At the
close of August, 1339, his Majesty falling ill, and feeling that his
end was near, resigned the throne to his twelve-year-old son, the
Crown Prince Yoshinaga, whose historical name is Go-Murakami.
Go-Daigo's will declared that his only regret in leaving the world
was his failure to effect the restoration, and that though his body
was buried at Yoshino, his spirit would always yearn for Kyoto.
Tradition says that he expired holding a sword in his right hand, the
Hokke-kyo-sutra in his left, and that Kitabatake Chikafusa spoke of
the event as a dream within a dream.
It is recorded to Ashikaga Takauji's credit that, when the news
reached Kyoto, he ordered five days' mourning; that he himself
undertook to transcribe a sacred volume by way of supplication for
the repose of Go-Daigo's spirit, and that he caused a temple to be
built for the same purpose. Of course, these events cast a cloud over
the fortunes of the Southern Court, but its adherents did not abate
their activities. Everywhere they mustered in greater or less force.
The clearest conception of their strength may be obtained by
tabulating the names of their families and of the latter's
localities:
FAMILIES PROVINCES
Kitabatake Mutsu and Ise
Nitta Musashi, Shimotsuke, Echizen
Kusunoki Kawachi
Kojima, Sakurayama, Arii, Yoshikawa Sanyo-do
Nawa and Misumi Sanin-do
Kikuchi, Matsura, Kusano Saikai-do
Doi, Tokuno, Yuasa, Yamamoto Nankai-do
Ii Totomi
Neo Mino
Shinto officials Atsuta
This table suggests that partisans of the Southern Court existed in
almost every part of the empire. So, in truth, they did. But friends
of the Northern Court existed also, and thus it resulted that at no
time throughout the fifty-five years of the struggle were the
provinces free from strife. It resulted also that frequent changes of
allegiance took place, for a family had often to choose between total
ruin, on the one hand, and comparative prosperity at the sacrifice of
constancy, on the other. Some historians have adduced the incidents
of this era as illustrating the shallowness of Japanese loyalty. But
it can scarcely be said that loyalty was ever seriously at stake. In
point of legitimacy there was nothing to choose between the rival
branches of the Imperial family. A samurai might-pass from the
service of the one to that of the other without doing any violence to
his reverence for the Throne.
What was certainly born of the troubled era, however, was a sentiment
of contempt for central authority and a disposition to rely on one's
own right arm. It could not have been otherwise. In several provinces
official nominees of both Courts administered simultaneously, and men
were requisitioned for aid, to-day, to the Northern cause, to-morrow,
to the Southern. To be strong enough to resist one or the other was
the only way to avoid ruinous exactions. From that to asserting one's
strength at the expense of a neighbour who followed a different flag
was a short step, if not a duty, and thus purely selfish
considerations dictated a fierce quarrel and inspired many an act of
unscrupulous spoliation. A few cases are on record of families which
resorted to the device of dividing themselves into two branches, each
declaring for a different cause and each warring nominally with the
other. Thus the sept as a whole preserved its possessions, in part at
any rate, whichever Court triumphed. But such double-faced schemes
were very rare. A much commoner outcome of the situation was the
growth of powerful families which regulated their affairs by means of
a council of leading members without reference to Kamakura, Kyoto, or
Yoshino. At the same time, minor septs in the neighbourhood saw the
advantage of subscribing to the decisions of these councils and
deferring to their judgments.
"This was an important step in the development of the feudal system.
Another was the abolition of feudal fiefs, as well as of the
succession of women to real estate, and a curtailment of the
inheritance, not so much of younger sons, as of all sons except the
one selected as lord of the clan."* The shugo (high constables) also
became a salient element of feudalism. Originally liable to frequent
transfers of locality, some of them subsequently came to hold their
office hereditarily, and these, together with the great majority of
their confreres who had been appointed by the Bakufu, espoused the
Ashikaga cause; a choice which impelled many of the military families
in their jurisdiction to declare for the Southern Court. The Ashikaga
shugo ultimately became leading magnates, for they wielded twofold
authority, namely, that derived from their power as owners of broad
estates, and that derived from their commission as shogun's delegates
entitled to levy taxes locally. The provincial governors, at the
outset purely civil officials, occasionally developed military
capacity and rivalled the hereditary shugo in armed influence, but
such instances were rare.
*Murdoch's History of Japan.
THE COURSE OF THE WAR
After the death of Kusunoki Masashige, of Nitta Yoshisada, and of
Kitabatake Akiiye, the strategical direction of the war devolved
mainly upon Kitabatake Chikafusa, so far as the Southern Court was
concerned. The greater part of the nation may be said to have been in
arms, but only a small section took actual part in the main campaign,
the troops in the distant provinces being occupied with local
struggles. Chikafusa's general plan was to menace Kyoto and Kamakura
simultaneously. Just as the eight provinces of the Kwanto formed the
base of the Ashikaga armies, so the eight provinces constituting the
Kii peninsula--Yamato, Kawachi, Izumi, Ise, Iga, Shima, Kii (in
part), and Omi (in part)--served as bases for the partisans of the
South. To strike at Kyoto from this base required the previous
subjugation of Settsu, and, on the other hand, a strong army in
Settsu menaced Yoshino.
Chikafusa's plan, then, was to marshal in Kawachi force sufficient to
threaten, if not to overrun, Settsu, and then to push on into the
metropolitan province from Omi and Iga, the Ashikaga having been
previously induced to uncover Kyoto by the necessity of guarding
Kamakura. From the Kii peninsula the obvious route to the Kwanto is
by sea. Therefore, the Southerners established a naval base at
Shingu, on the east coast of the peninsula, and used it for the
purpose not only of despatching a force northward, but also of
maintaining communications with Shikoku and Kyushu, where they had
many partisans. Chikafusa himself led the oversea expedition to the
Kwanto, but the flotilla was wrecked by a storm, and he reached Yedo
Bay with only a small following. Nevertheless, he established himself
at Oda, in Hitachi, and being there joined by many of the Ashikaga's
enemies, he managed, not indeed to seriously menace Kamakura, but at
all events to give occupation to a large force of the Northerners.
Driven out at last (1343), after more than four years' operations, he
returned to Yoshino, where he found Kusunoki Masatsura, son of
Masashige, carrying on from Kawachi a vigorous campaign against the
Ashikaga in Settsu.
After many minor engagements, in all of which he was successful,
Masatsura inflicted such a severe defeat on his opponents at
Sumiyoshi that the Bakufu became alarmed, and mustering an army of
sixty thousand men, sent it under Ko Moronao and his brother,
Moroyasu, to attack Masatsura. This was in December, 1347. Then
Masatsura and his younger brother, Masatoki, together with Wada
Katahide and other bushi, to the number of 140, made oath to conquer
in fight or to die. They repaired to Yoshino, and having taken leave
of the Emperor, Go-Murakami, they worshipped at the shrine of the
late sovereign, Go-Daigo, inscribed their names upon the wall, and
wrote under them:
We that our bows here
Swear nevermore to slacken
Till in the land of life we
Cease to be counted,
Our names now record.
It was in February, 1348, that the battle took place at Shijo-nawate
in Kawachi. Moronao had sixty thousand men at his disposal; Masatsura
only three thousand. The combat raged during six hours, the Kusunoki
brothers leading thirty charges, until finally they were both covered
with wounds, and only fifty men remained out of the sworn band. Then
this remnant committed suicide. Moronao, following up his victory,
marched into Yamato, and set fire to the palace there. Go-Murakami
escaped to Kanao, and presently the Nitta family in the east and the
Kitabatake in the west showed such activity that the Southern cause
recovered its vitality, a turn of events largely promoted by
dissensions in the Northern camp and by the consequent return of
Moronao's forces to Kyoto. It is necessary, therefore, to direct our
eyes for a moment to the course of affairs on the side of the
Ashikaga.
THE ASHIKAGA POLITY
Ashikaga Takauji's original idea was to follow the system of Yoritomo
in everything. Kamakura was to be his capital and he assumed the
title of shogun. This was in 1335. Three years later he received the
shogunate in due form from the Northern sovereign, Komyo. But he now
discovered that Kyoto must be his headquarters so long as the War of
the Dynasties lasted, and he therefore established the Bakufu at
Muromachi in that city, modelling it on the lines of Yoritomo's
institution, but dispensing with a regent (shikkeri) and substituting
for him a second shitsuji. The first two shitsuji at Muromachi were
Ko Moronao, the great general, and Uesugi Tomosada, a connexion of
Takauji. Kamakura was not neglected, however. It became a secondary
basis, Takauji's eight-year-old son, Yoshiakira, being installed
there as governor-general (kwanryo) of the Kwanto under the
guardianship of Uesugi Noriaki as shitsuji, and the old
administrative machinery of the Hojo was revived in the main.
Takauji's brother, Tadayoshi, became chief of the general staff in
Kyoto, and "several Kamakura literati--descendants of Oye, Nakahara,
Miyoshi, and others--were brought up to fill positions on the various
boards, the services of some of the ablest priests of the time being
enlisted in the work of drafting laws and regulations."*
*Murdoch's History of Japan.
To these priests and literati was entrusted the task of compiling a
code based on the Joei Shikimoku of the Hojo regents, and there
resulted the Kemmu Shikimoku, promulgated in 1337.* This was not a
law, properly so called, but rather a body of precepts contained in
seventeen articles. They have much interest as embodying the ethics
of the time in political circles. "Economy must be universally
practised. Drinking parties and wanton frolics must be suppressed.
Crimes of violence and outrage must be quelled. The practice of
entering the private dwellings of the people and making inquisitions
into their affairs must be given up." Then follow two articles
dealing with the ownership of vacant plots and rebuilding of houses
and fireproof godowns in the devastated sections of the capital. The
subsequent paragraphs provide that men of special ability for
government work should be chosen for the office of shugo; that a stop
must be put to the practice of influential nobles and women of all
sorts and Buddhist ecclesiastics making interested recommendations
(to the sovereign); that persons holding public posts must be liable
to reprimand for negligence and idleness; that bribery must be firmly
put down; that presents made from all quarters to those attached to
the palace, whether of the inside or outside service, must be sent
back; that those who are to be in personal attendance on the rulers
must be selected for that duty; that ceremonial etiquette should be
the predominant principle; that men noted for probity and adherence
to high principle should be rewarded by more than ordinary
distinction; that the petitions and complaints of the poor and lowly
should be heard and redress granted; that the petitions of temples
and shrines should be dealt with on their merits, and that certain
fixed days should be appointed for the rendering of decisions and the
issue of government orders.**
*Kemmu was the Northern Court's name of the year-period 1334 to 1338:
see p. 398.
**The Kemmu Shikimoku by Mr. Consul-General Hall, in the
"Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan;" epitomized by
Murdoch.
THE JINNO SHOTOKI
Before proceeding with the history of this troubled era, it is
advisable to speak of a great political brochure which was compiled
by Kitabatake Chikafusa during the period (1340-1343) of his attempt
to harass the Ashikaga from the direction of Hitachi. This was a work
designed to establish the divine claim of the sovereign of the
Southern Court. Hence the title of the treatise, Correct Genealogy
(Shotoki) of the Divine Emperor (Jinno). The reader knows that when,
in the eighth century, Japan went to Chinese sources for
jurisprudential inspiration, she had to eliminate the Confucian and
Mencian doctrine that the sceptre may not be wielded by anyone whose
virtues do not qualify him for the task in the eyes of the nation.
This same doctrine permeated by construction the commentaries that
accompanied the articles of the Kemmu Shikimoku as quoted above, and
in that fact Chikafusa saw an opportunity of winning adherents for
the Southern Court by proclaiming its heaven-conferred rights.
"Great Yamato," Kitabatake wrote, "is a divine country. It is only
our land whose foundations were first laid by the divine ancestor. It
alone has been transmitted by the Sun goddess to a long line of her
descendants. There is nothing of this kind in foreign countries.
Therefore it is called the divine land. . . It is only our country
which from the time when the heaven and earth were first unfolded,
has preserved the succession to the throne intact in one single
family. Even when, as sometimes naturally happened, it descended to a
lateral branch, it was held according to just principles. This shows
that the oath of the gods (to preserve the succession) is ever
renewed in a way which distinguishes Japan from all other countries.
. . . It is the duty of every man born on the Imperial soil to yield
devoted loyalty to his sovereign, even to the sacrifice of his own
life. Let no one suppose for a moment that there is any credit due to
him for doing so. Nevertheless, in order to stimulate the zeal of
those who came after, and in loving memory of the dead, it is the
business of the ruler to grant rewards in such cases (to the
children). Those who are in an inferior position should not enter
into rivalry with them. Still more should those who have done no
specially meritorious service abstain from inordinate ambitions. I
have already touched on the principles of statesmanship. They are
based on justice and mercy, in the dispensing of which firm action is
requisite. Such is the clear instruction vouchsafed to us by the Sun
goddess."*
*Aston's Japanese Literature.
It is not to be supposed that these doctrines produced any
wide-spread influence on public opinion at the time of their
promulgation. In the first place they were not generally accessible;
for not until the year 1649 was Kitabatake's brochure printed. That
it remained in manuscript during three centuries after its
compilation is not attributable to technical difficulties. The art of
blockprinting came to Japan from China in very early times, and it is
on record that, in 770, the Empress Shotoku caused a million Buddhist
amulets to be printed. But the Jinno Shotoki did not fall on fruitful
soil. Either its teaching was superfluous or men were too much
engrossed with fighting to listen to academical disquisitions.
Chikafusa's work was destined to produce great and lasting effects in
future ages, but, for the moment, it accomplished little.
DISCORD IN THE CAMP OF THE ASHIKAGA
A prominent feature of the Ashikaga family's annals was continuity of
internecine strife. The Hojo's era had been conspicuously free from
any such blemish; the Ashikaga's was markedly disfigured by it, so
much so that by the debilitating effects of this discord the
supremacy of the sept was long deferred. The first outward
indications of the trouble were seen in 1348, when the able general,
Ko Moronao, instead of following up his victory over the Southern
Court after the death of Kusunoki Masatsura, turned suddenly
northward from Yamato and hastened back to Kyoto. His own safety
dictated that step. For during his absence from the capital on
campaign, a plot to effect his overthrow had matured under the
leadership of Ashikaga Tadayoshi and Uesugi Shigeyoshi.
The latter held the office of shitsuji, and was therefore Moronao's
comrade, while Tadayoshi, as already stated, had the title of
commander-in-chief of the general staff and virtually directed
administrative affairs, subject, of course, to Takauji's approval.
Moronao undoubtedly possessed high strategical ability, and being
assisted by his almost equally competent brother, Moroyasu, rendered
sterling military service to the Ashikaga cause. But the two brothers
were arrogant, dissipated, and passionate. It is recorded of Moronao
that he abducted the wife of Enya Takasada, and of Moroyasu that he
desecrated the grave of Sugawara in order to enclose its site within
his mansion, both outrages being condoned by the shogun, Takauji, In
truth, even in the days of Taira overlordship, Kyoto was never so
completely under the heel of the military as it was in early Ashikaga
times.
Rokuhara did not by any means arrogate such universal authority as
did Muromachi. The Court nobles in the middle of the fourteenth
century had no functions except those of a ceremonial nature and were
frankly despised by the haughty bushi. It is on record that Doki
Yorito, meeting the cortege of the retired Emperor Kogon, pretended
to mistake the escorts' cry of "In" (camera sovereign) for "inu"
(dog), and actually discharged an arrow at the Imperial vehicle.
Yorito suffered capital punishment, but the incident illustrates the
demeanour of the military class.
The two Ko brothers were conspicuously masterful and made many
enemies. But the proximate cause of the plot alluded to above was
jealousy on the part of Ashikaga Tadayoshi and Uesugi Shigeyoshi, who
resented the trust reposed by Takauji in Moronao and Moroyasu. The
conspirators underestimated Moronao's character. Reaching Kyoto by
forced marches from Yamato, he laid siege to Tadayoshi's mansion, and
presently Tadayoshi had to save himself by taking the tonsure, while
Shigeyoshi was exiled to Echizen, whither Moronao sent an assassin to
make away with him. The Ashikaga chief, whose trust in Moronao was
not at all shaken by these events, summoned from Kamakura his eldest
son, Yoshiakira, and entrusted to him the functions hitherto
discharged by his uncle, Tadayoshi, replacing him in Kamakura by a
younger son, Motouji.
Yoshiakira was not Takauji's eldest son; he was his eldest legitimate
son. An illegitimate son, four years older, had been left in Kamakura
as a priest, but was recognized as the possessor of such abilities
that, although his father refused to meet him, his uncle, Tadayoshi,
summoned him to Kyoto and procured for him the high office of tandai
of the west. This Tadafuyu was discharging his military duties in
Bingo when news reached him of Moronao's coup d'etat in Kyoto and of
his own patron, Tadayoshi's discomfiture. At once Tadafuyu crossed
the sea to Higo in Kyushu, where a large number of discontented
samurai rallied to his banner, and Shoni, the Ashikaga tandai of
Kyushu, soon found himself vigorously attacked. The struggle
presently assumed such importance that Kyoto's attention was
attracted. The normal course would have been for Moronao to take the
field against Tadafuyu. But Moronao was looking always for an
opportunity to compass the death of his enemy, Tadayoshi, and
thinking that his chance had now come, he persuaded Takauji to take
personal command of the expedition to Kyushu, the idea being to
finally dispose of Tadayoshi during the absence of the Ashikaga
shogun from Kyoto. Tadayoshi, however, obtained timely information of
this design and escaping to Yamato, offered to surrender to the
Southern Court. This was in January, 1350.
The advisers of the Emperor Go-Murakami differed radically in their
counsels, but it was finally decided that every effort should be made
to widen the rift in the Ashikaga lute, and the Court commissioned
Tadayoshi to attack Takauji and recover Kyoto. Thus was presented the
spectacle of a father (Takauji) fighting against his son (Tadafuyu),
and a brother (Tadayoshi) fighting against a brother (Takauji).
Tadayoshi was joined by many men of note and puissance whom the
arrogance of the two Ko, Moronao and Moroyasu, had offended. A
desperate struggle ensued, and the Ko generals had to retreat to
Harima, where they joined with Takauji, the latter having abandoned
his expedition to Kyushu. Meanwhile, Yoshiakira, Takauji's eldest
son, had escaped from Kyoto and entered his father's camp. After a
time negotiations for peace were concluded (1351), one of the
conditions being that Moronao and Moroyasu should lay down their
offices and enter the priesthood. But the blood of the shitsuji,
Uesugi Shigeyoshi, was still fresh on Moronao's hands. Shigeyoshi's
son, Akiyoshi, waylaid the two Ko on their route to Kyoto to take the
tonsure, and Moronao and Moroyasu were both killed.
YEAR-PERIODS AND COURTS
Three years before the death of Moronao, that is to say, in 1348, the
sovereign of the Northern Court, Komyo, abdicated in favour of Suko.
Ever since 1332 there had been a dual year-period, outcome of the
divided Imperialism, and history was thus not a little complicated.
It will be convenient here to tabulate, side by side, the lines of
the two dynasties:
SOUTHERN COURT NORTHERN COURT
96th Sovereign, Go-Daigo 1318-1339 Kogon 1332-1335
97th " Go-Murakami 1339-1368 Komyo 1335-1348
98th " Chokei 1368-1372 Suko 1348-1352
99th " Go-Kameyama 1372-1392 Go-Kogon 1352-1371
Go-Enyu 1371-1382
100th " Go-Komatsu 1392-1412 Go-Komatsu 1382-1412
It is observable that the average duration of a Southern sovereign's
reign was eighteen years, whereas that of a Northern sovereign was
only thirteen years.
DEATH OF TADAYOSHI
The peace concluded between the Ashikaga chief and his brother,
Tadayoshi, was of brief duration; their respective partisans
distrusted one another too much. The Nikki, the Hosokawa, the Doki,
and the Sasaki, all followed Takauji, but the Ishido, the Uesugi, and
the Momonoi adhered to Tadayoshi. At last the situation became so
strained that Tadayoshi withdrew to Echizen and from thence made his
way to Kamakura. In these circumstances, Takauji desired to take the
field himself, but since to do so would have exposed Kyoto to danger
from the south, he attempted to delude the Court at Yoshino into
crediting his loyalty and his willingness to dethrone Suko by way of
preliminary to welcoming the return of Go-Murakami to Kyoto.
Takauji's professions were now appraised at their true value,
however. The Court at Yoshino commissioned him to punish his
rebellious brother, but took steps, as will presently be seen, to
turn the resulting situation to its own advantage. Takauji now placed
himself at the head of a strong army, and moving eastward, marched to
Kamakura practically unopposed. Tadayoshi escaped to Izu, where he
took poison, or was given it. Takauji remained in the Kwanto during
the greater part of two years (1352-1353). The task of restoring
order and re-establishing the Ashikaga supremacy demanded all his
ability and resources. "In the Kwanto alone, during these two years,
more battles were fought--some of considerable magnitude--than during
the thirty years between 1455 and 1485 in England."*
*Murdoch's History of Japan.
THE SOUTHERN COURT IN KYOTO
In this state of affairs the Southern Court found its opportunity. In
accepting Takauji's overtures, Kitabatake Chikafusa, who directed the
politics and strategy of the Southern Court, had designed to dethrone
Suko, to adopt the year name, Shohei, solely, and to establish an
administrative council in Kyoto under his own presidency. He knew
well that Takauji's surrender had not been sincere, but he counted on
an access of strength from the partisans of Tadayoshi, and he looked
for some occasion capable of being turned to advantage. Yoshiakira,
who ruled Kyoto in the absence of his father, Takauji, made no
difficulty about dethroning Suko and requesting the return of the
Southern sovereign, Go-Murakami. Neither did he hesitate to hand over
the false insignia which had been given by Go-Daigo to the Northern
Court. In February, 1352, Go-Murakami paid a visit to Otoko-yama on
the southeast of Kyoto, and ordered a number of officials, under
Kitabatake Chikafusa and Kusunoki Masanori, to enter the capital and
conduct affairs. But his Majesty did not trust his own person into
the city. He waited until his plans were mature, and then a strong
force of Southern troops was launched against Kyoto, while a powerful
army of Kwanto bushi, led by the Nitta brothers, Yoshioki and
Yoshimune, as well as by Wakiya Yoshiharu, marched into Musashi and
defeated Takauji on the Kotesashi moor.
The invaders actually got possession of Kamakura, but the superior
strategy of the Ashikaga chief ultimately reversed the situation.
Yoshimune had to fly to Echigo with a petty remnant of followers, and
Yoshioki and Yoshiharu, evacuating Kamakura, took refuge in the
Kawamura fortress. Meanwhile, in Kyoto, things had fared in a
somewhat similar manner. The Southern generals carried everything
before them at the outset, and Yoshiakira had to fly to Omi. But,
after a brief period of quiet, the Northern troops rallied and
expelled the Southern. Yoshiakira found himself again supreme. A
strange dilemma presented itself, however. There was no sovereign.
The retired sovereigns, Kogon, Komyo, and Suko, had all been carried
to a place well within the Southern lines, and even the false regalia
were not available. Nevertheless, Yoshiakira, regardless of forms,
raised to the throne the younger brother of Suko, who is known in
history as Go-Kogon. Thenceforth, on the accession of a Northern
sovereign a merely nominal ceremony of transferring the sacred
regalia sufficed. As for the ex-Emperors Kogon and Komyo, they turned
their backs finally on the world and became priests of the Zen sect
of Buddhism.
CAPTURE AND RE-CAPTURE OF KYOTO
In 1353, the Southern court received a signal accession of strength
in the allegiance of the Yamana family and of Tadafuyu. The latter
has already been spoken of as an illegitimate son of Takauji, who,
through the influence of his uncle, Tadayoshi, was appointed tandai
of the western provinces. The death of his patron inclined this able
captain to join the Southern Court, and his inclination was
translated into action early in 1353, owing to need of support
against the partisans of the Ashikaga in the island of Kyushu and the
western provinces. As for the Yamana, they were of Minamoto lineage;
their influence was supreme in Hoki and Inaba, and they faithfully
espoused the Ashikaga cause until an unfulfilled promise of a manor
alienated their good-will. For to such considerations of
self-interest men not infrequently sacrificed their duty of
allegiance in the troublous times of the fourteenth century.
Thus re-enforced, the Southern troops, under the supreme command of
Tadafuyu, marched against Kyoto in July, 1353, and captured the city.
Yoshiakira, guarding the young sovereign, Go-Kogon, effected his
escape, and the Southern Emperor, Go-Murakami, issued a decree
depriving of their official ranks and possessions all Court nobles
who had assisted at the ceremony of the fugitive monarch's
coronation. But the supremacy of the South did not last long. In
August, Yoshiakira was strong enough to countermarch against the
capital and to drive out Tadafuyu. Moreover, Takauji himself now
found it safe to leave the Kwanto. Placing his son Motouji in charge
at Kamakura, he returned to Kyoto accompanying the Emperor Go-Kogon,
and thenceforth during nearly two years the supremacy of the North
was practically undisputed.
DEATH OF CHIKAFUSA
Fate willed that while his enemies were thus triumphant, death should
overtake the great statesman, strategist, and historian, Kitabatake
Chikafusa. He died in 1354, at the age of sixty-two. Japanese
annalists say of Chikafusa: "It was through his ability that the
Southern forces were co-ordinated and kept active in all parts of the
empire. It was due to his clever strategy that Kyoto lay under
constant menace from the south. If the first great protagonists in
the struggle between the Northern and the Southern Courts were Prince
Morinaga and Takauji, and those of the next were Nitta Yoshisada and
Takauji, the third couple was Kitabatake Chikafusa and Takauji."
Chikafusa was of wide erudition; he had a wonderful memory, and his
perpetual guides were justice and righteousness. After his death the
Southern Court fell into a state of division against itself; and its
spirit sensibly declined.
DEATH OF TAKAUJI
Takauji survived Chikafusa by only four years; he expired in 1358.
Undoubtedly his figure is projected in very imposing dimensions on
the pages of his country's history, and as the high mountain in the
Chinese proverb is gilded by the sunbeams and beaten by the storm, so
condemnation and eulogy have been poured upon his head by posterity.
An annalist of his time says: "Yoritomo was impartial in bestowing
rewards, but so severe in meting out punishments as to seem almost
inhuman. Takauji, however, in addition to being humane and just, is
strong-minded, for no peril ever summons terror to his eye or
banishes the smile from his lip; merciful, for he knows no hatred and
treats his foes as his sons; magnanimous, for he counts gold and
silver as stones or sand, and generous, for he never compares the
gift with the recipient, but gives away everything as it comes to
hand. It is the custom for people to carry many presents to the
shogun on the first day of the eighth month, but so freely are those
things given away that nothing remains by the evening, I am told."
A later historian, Rai Sanyo (1780-1832), wrote: "There were as brave
men and as clever in the days of the Minamoto as in the days of the
Ashikaga. Why, then, did the former never dare to take up arms
against the Bakufu, whereas the latter never ceased to assault the
Ashikaga? It was because the Minamoto and the Hojo understood the
expediency of not entrusting too much power to potential rivals,
whereas the Ashikaga gave away lands so rashly that some families--as
the Akamatsu, the Hosokawa, and the Hatakeyama--came into the
possession of three or four provinces, and in an extreme case one
family--that of Yamana--controlled ten provinces, or one-sixth of the
whole empire. These septs, finding themselves so powerful, became
unmanageable. Then the division of the Ashikaga into the Muromachi
magnates and the Kamakura chiefs brought two sets of rulers upon the
same stage, and naturally intrigue and distrust were born, so that,
in the end, Muromachi was shaken by Hosokawa, and Kamakura was
overthrown by Uesugi. An animal with too ponderous a tail cannot wag
it, and a stick too heavy at one end is apt to break. The Ashikaga
angled with such valuable bait that they ultimately lost both fish
and bait. During the thirteen generations of their sway there was no
respite from struggle between family and family or between chief and
vassal." Takauji's record plainly shows that deception was one of his
weapons. He was absolutely unscrupulous. He knew also how to entice
men with gain, but he forgot that those who came for gain will go
also for gain. It would seem, too, that he sacrificed justice to the
fear of alienating his supporters. Not otherwise can we account for
his leniency towards the Ko brothers, who were guilty of such
violations of propriety.
THE SECOND ASHIKAGA SHOGUN
Takauji was succeeded in the shogunate by his eldest son, Yoshiakira,
of whom so much has already been heard. The fortunes of the Southern
Court were now at low ebb. During the year (1359) after Takauji's
death, Kamakura contributed materially to the support of the Ashikaga
cause. The Kwanto was then under the sway of Takauji's fourth son,
Motouji, one of the ablest men of his time. He had just succeeded in
quelling the defection of the Nitta family, and his military power
was so great that his captains conceived the ambition of marching to
Kyoto and supplanting Yoshiakira by Motouji. But the latter, instead
of adopting this disloyal counsel, despatched a large army under
Hatakeyama Kunikiyo to attack the Southern Court. Marching by the two
highways of Settsu and Kawachi, this army attacked Yoshino and gained
some important successes. But the fruits of these victories were not
gathered. The Hatakeyama chief developed ambitions of his own, and,
on returning to the Kwanto, was crushed by Motouji and deprived of
his office of shitsuji, that post being given again to Uesugi
Noriaki, "who had been in exile since the death of Tadayoshi in 1352.
At, or shortly after, this time, Kai and Izu and, later on, Mutsu,
were put under Kamakura jurisdiction, and their peaceful and orderly
condition formed a marked contrast to the general state of the rest
of the empire."*
*Murdoch's History of Japan.
The next event of cardinal importance in this much disturbed period
was the defection of Hosokawa Kiyouji, one of the shitsuji in Kyoto.
This powerful chief, disappointed in his expectations of reward, went
over to the Southern Court in 1361, and the result was that the
Ashikaga shogun had to flee from Kyoto, escorting Go-Kogon. The
situation soon changed however. Hosokawa Kiyouji, returning to his
native province, Awa, essayed to bring the whole of Shikoku into
allegiance to the Southern Court, but was signally worsted by his
cousin, Hosokawa Yoriyuki--afterwards very famous,--and scarcely a
month had elapsed before Yoshiakira was back in the capital. In the
same year (1362), the Northerners received a marked increase of
strength by the accession of the Yamana family, which was at that
time supreme in the five central provinces of eastern Japan--namely,
Tamba, Inaba, Bizen, Bitchu, and Mimasaka. During ten years this
family had supported the Southern Court, but its chief, Tokiuji, now
yielded to the persuasion of Yoshiakira's emissaries, and espoused
the Ashikaga cause on condition that he, Tokiuji, should be named
high constable of the above five provinces.
Meanwhile, the partisans of the late Tadayoshi--the Kira, the Ishido,
the Momonoi, the Nikki, and others--constituted a source of perpetual
menace, and even among the Ashikaga themselves there was a rebel
(Takatsune). Yoshiakira became weary of the unceasing strife. He
addressed overtures to the Southern Court and they were accepted on
condition that he made formal act of surrender. This the shogun
refused to do, but he treated Go-Murakami's envoy with every mark of
respect, and though the pourparlers proved finally abortive, they had
continued for five months, an evidence that both sides were anxious
to find a path to peace. Yoshiakira died in the same year, 1367.
THE SOUTHERN COURT
Previously to this event, a new trouble had occurred in the Southern
Court. The Emperor Go-Murakami signified his desire to abdicate, and
thereupon the Court nobles who had followed the three ex-Emperors
into the Southern lines in 1352 fell into two cliques, each
advocating the nomination of a different successor. This discord
exercised a debilitating influence, and when Go-Murakami died (1368),
the Southerners found themselves in a parlous condition. For his son
and successor, Chokei, failing to appreciate the situation,
immediately planned an extensive campaign against Kyoto from the east
and the south simultaneously. Then Kusunoki Masanori passed into the
Northern camp. Few events have received wider historical comment in
Japan. The Kusunoki family stood for everything loyal and devoted in
the bushi's record, and Masanori was a worthy chief of the sept. So
conspicuous were his virtues and so attractive was his personality
that a samurai of the Akamatsu family, who had planned a vendetta
against him, committed suicide himself rather than raise his hand to
slay such a hero.
How, then, are we to account for Masanori's infidelity to the cause
he had embraced? The answer of his country's most credible annalists
is that his motive was to save the Southern Court. He saw that if the
young Emperor. Chokei, persisted in his design of a general campaign
against Kyoto, a crushing defeat must be the outcome, and since the
sovereign would not pay heed to his remonstrances, he concluded that
the only way to arrest the mad enterprise was his own defection,
which would weaken the South too much to permit offensive action.
Ashikaga Yoshimitsu was then shogun at Muromachi. He had succeeded to
that office in 1367, at the age of nine, and his father, then within
a year of death, had entrusted him to the care of Hosokawa Yoriyuki,
one of the ablest men of his own or any generation. There are strong
reasons for thinking that between this statesman and Masanori an
understanding existed. So long as Yoriyuki remained in power there
was nothing worthy of the name of war between the two Courts, and
when, after his retirement in 1379, the struggle re-opened under the
direction of his successor (a Yamana chief), Masanori returned to his
old allegiance and took the field once more in the Southern cause.
His action in temporarily changing his allegiance had given ten
years' respite to the Southerners.
PEACE BETWEEN THE TWO COURTS
The Southern Emperor, Chokei, coming to the throne in 1368, abdicated
in 1372 in favour of his brother, known in history as Go-Kameyama.
During his brief tenure of power Chokei's extensive plans for the
capture of Kyoto did not mature, but he had the satisfaction of
seeing the whole island of Kyushu wrested from Ashikaga hands. It is
true that under the able administration of Imagawa Sadayo (Ryoshun),
a tandai appointed by the Ashikaga, this state of affairs was largely
remedied during the next ten years, but as the last substantial
triumph of the Yoshino arms the record of Chokei's reign is
memorable. It was, in truth, the final success. The decade of
comparative quiet that ensued on the main island proved to be the
calm before the storm.
The most prominent figures in the closing chapter of the great
dynastic struggle are Hosokawa Yoriyuki and Yamana Mitsuyuki. When
the second Ashikaga shogun, Yoshiakira, recognized that his days were
numbered, he summoned his trusted councillor, Hosokawa Yoriyuki, and
his son Yoshimitsu, and said to the latter, "I give you a father,"
and to the former, "I give you a son." Yoriyuki faithfully discharged
the trust thus reposed in him. He surrounded his youthful charge with
literary and military experts, and secured to him every advantage
that education could confer. Moreover, this astute statesman seems to
have apprehended that if the cause of the Southern Court were not
actually opposed, it would die of inanition, and he therefore
employed all his influence to preserve peace. He endeavoured also to
enforce strict obedience to the economical precepts of the Kemmu
code, and altogether the ethics he favoured were out of harmony with
the social conditions of Kyoto at the time and with the natural
proclivities of the young shogun himself. In fine, he had to leave
the capital, too full of his enemies, and to retire to his native
province, Awa.
During ten years he remained in seclusion. But, in 1389, a journey
made by the shogun to Miya-jima revealed so many evidences of
Yoriyuki's loyalty that he was invited to return to Kyoto, and with
his assistance the organization of the Ashikaga forces at Muromachi
was brought to a high state of efficiency, partly because the astute
Yoriyuki foresaw trouble with the Yamana family, which was then
supreme in no less than ten provinces, or nearly one-sixth of all
Japan. In 1391 Yamana Ujikiyo and his kinsman Mitsuyuki took the
field against Kyoto under the standard of the Southern Court. He
commanded a great army, and there resulted a desperate struggle known
in history as the Meitoku War, after the name of the year-period when
it occurred. The Yamana leader was killed and his army completely
routed. In the following year, the great Hosokawa Yoriyuki died. He
had lived to see the ten provinces recovered from Yamana rule and
partitioned among the Muromachi generals.
But he expired just before the final triumph to which his genius had
so materially contributed. For within a few months of his demise the
War of the Dynasties came at last to a close. The proximate cause was
the fall of the Kusunoki stronghold, which had been built by
Masashige, and during sixty years had remained unconquered. With its
reduction, preceded as it had been by the annihilation of the Yamana,
the fortunes of the Southern Court had become hopeless, and overtures
carried from Kyoto by one of the most distinguished of the Muromachi
generals, Ouchi Yoshihiro, were accepted. Go-Komatsu then occupied
the Northern throne. He had succeeded Go-Enyu, in 1382, and the
latter, had succeeded Go-Kogon, in 1371. Go-Komatsu, having been only
six years of age at the time of his accession, was in his sixteenth
year when the two Courts came to an agreement.
For a time the terms proved very difficult of adjustment, but
ultimately it was decided that the Southern sovereign, Go-Kameyama,
should abdicate in favour of the Northern, the former being
thenceforth treated as the latter's father. This compact having been
concluded, the sacred insignia were transported from Yoshino to Kyoto
with all solemnity. Six Court nobles accompanied them from the South;
twenty went out from the North to receive them, and a numerous body
of troops formed the escort. The retiring Emperor spent ten days at
the palace in Kyoto, throughout which time a magnificent banquet was
held to celebrate the conclusion of the fifty-five years' war.
Yoshino and other districts were assigned for the support of the
ex-Emperor, and pensions or domains were conferred on the Court
nobles of the South, some of whom, however, declining to compromise
their sense of honour by accepting favours from the North, withdrew
to the provinces; and their exile was shared by several of the
military leaders who had remained true to the South throughout. There
can be little doubt that among these apparent implacables were some
of a selfishly calculating disposition, who, anticipating a reversion
to the system of alternate succession, as instituted by the Hojo
interpreters of Go-Saga's testament, looked for greater personal
advantage when the Crown should come to the Southern branch than
anything that could be hoped for by submitting to the Northern. They
were mistaken. That testament, which had done so much mischief in its
time, was ignored from the close of the War of the Dynasties. It did
not fall into total abeyance, however, without some further
bloodshed, and the facts may be interpolated here so as to dispose
finally of the subject.
In 1412, the abdication of Go-Komatsu should have been followed by
the accession of a Southern prince had the principle of alternation
been pursued. It was not so followed. On the contrary, the sceptre
fell to Shoko--101st sovereign--son of Go-Komatsu. Hence, in 1413,
Date Yasumune, in Mutsu, and, in 1414, Kitabatake Mitsumasa, in Ise,
made armed protests, gallant but ineffective. Again, in 1428, on the
childless death of Shoko, the claims of the Southern line were
tacitly ignored in favour of Go-Hanazono, grandson of the third
Northern Emperor, Suko. The same Mitsumasa now took the field, aided
this time by Masahide, head of the ever loyal house of Kusunoki, but
signal failure ensued. The last struggle in behalf of the Southern
line took place in 1443, when "a band of determined men under
Kusunoki Jiro and the Court noble, Hino Arimitsu, suddenly assailed
the palace from two directions; all but succeeded in killing or
capturing the Emperor, and actually got possession of the regalia.
They were soon driven out, however, and in their flight to Hiei-zan,
where one body of them entrenched themselves, the mirror and the
sword were dropped and recovered by the pursuers. The other body made
good their escape to the wilds of Odai-ga-hara, carrying with them
the seal; and it was not till a year later that it found its way back
to Kyoto, when the rebels had been destroyed."*
*Murdoch's History of Japan.
ENGRAVING: KOZUKA AND MENUKI (SWORD FURNITURE)