A CHAPTER IN BALKAN DIPLOMACY
Watching through many exciting weeks the course of a Balkan Peace
Conference, I had the opportunity of seeing another phase of the Near
Eastern character in its various sub-divisions--the Turkish, the
Grecian, the Roumanian, the Bulgarian, and the Serbian. It was in
certain general characteristics the same character with certain points
of difference, ranging from almost purely Oriental through various
grades until it reached to a phase which was rather more than half
European. In various aspects it was naïve, wily, deceitful,
vainglorious, truculent, servile, stubborn, supple. At times it was very
trying. Usually it was distinctly amusing. There were some exceptions
among the Balkan statesmen, but as a rule they were men of very ordinary
ability and very extraordinary conceit. Close association with them
dissipated for a time the extremely good impression that Bulgarian,
Serbian, Grecian, and Roumanian peasants and officials and traders had
made on me, meeting them as soldiers or as wayside hosts.
When the Bulgarian progress towards Constantinople was stopped at
Chatalja, the Bulgarian authorities favoured negotiations for peace. To
this Greece very strenuously, and Serbia more gently, objected. They
offered as an alternative suggestion to send aid to the Chatalja lines
to help Bulgaria to force things to a conclusion there. But by this time
the Balkan Allies were at least as much suspicious of one another as
they were hostile to the Turk. The troubles after the fall of Salonica
had given a picturesque illustration of the hollowness of the Balkan
League. Greece and Bulgaria had raced armies down for the capture of
that city, and the Greeks had won in the race by bribing the Turkish
commander to surrender to them--the Bulgarians said sourly (an absurd
accusation!). Now Bulgarian and Greek were at the point of open war in
Salonica, and were doing a little odd killing of one another to keep
their hands in practice. Around Adrianople Bulgarian and Serbian were
growling at one another, the Bulgarians treating their friends rather
badly, so far as I could judge. Both racial sections of the army of
siege were inclined to do very little, because each was waiting for the
other to begin. Bulgaria, too, was extremely anxious to have no more
friendly allied troops in the areas which she had marked out for
herself. She was aware that the Greek population of Thrace was agitating
for an autonomous Thrace instead of a Bulgarian annexation, and feared
that the presence of a Greek army in the province would strengthen this
movement.
In the upshot Serbia and Montenegro supported Bulgaria in the signing of
an armistice. Greece refused to sign an armistice, but joined in the
negotiations for a final peace which opened at the Conference of St.
James's, London, in December 1912. This Conference quickly resolved
itself into a wonderful acrobatic display of ground and lofty fiction,
of strange childish "bluffs," of complicated efforts at mystery which
would not deceive a Punch-and-Judy show audience.
In the East and the Near East, the man who wants to buy a horse goes to
the market-place in the first instance, and curses publicly all horses
and thoughts of horses. He proclaims that he will see his father's tomb
defiled before he will ever touch a horse again. Hearing of this, a man
who wishes to sell a horse appears in public, and proclaims that the
horse he has in his stall is the sun and the moon and the stars of his
life: that sooner than part with it he would eat filth and become as a
dog. At this stage the negotiations for a bargain are in fair progress.
After some days--the East and the Near East is not very thrifty with
time--a satisfactory bargain is struck.
The Balkan Peace Conference was carried on very much on those lines. In
a London winter atmosphere, among the unimaginative and matter-of-fact
London population, the effect was strangely fantastic. In an early stage
of the negotiations the Turkish delegates (who were out to gain time in
the desperate hope that something would turn up) said one day that they
must ask for instructions on some point, about which they were as fully
instructed as it was possible to be: said the next sitting day that
unfortunately their instructions had not arrived: and the next sitting
day that their instructions had arrived but unfortunately they could
not decipher some of the words, and must refer to Constantinople again!
With all this it was difficult to believe that we lived in a civilised
age of telegraphs and newspapers and railway trains. The mind was
transported back insensibly to the times of the great Caliph of Bagdad.
Whilst the Turks dallied in the hope that something would turn up, and
devoted a painstaking but painfully obvious industry to the task of
trying to sow dissensions among the Balkan Allies, these Balkan Allies
engaged among themselves in a vigorous Press campaign of mutual abuse
and insinuation. The seeds of dissension which the Turk was scattering
refused to germinate, because already the field which was sown had a
full-grown crop. But the Balkan Allies had one point of elementary
common sense. They were resolved to take from the Turk all that was
possible before they fell out among themselves as to the division of the
spoil. (As it happened, they forgot to take into account the contingency
that after the division it would still be within the power of the Turk
to seek some revenge if they abandoned their League of Alliance, which
alone had made the humiliation of the Turkish Empire possible.)
The first squabble between the Allies was over the appointment of a
leader or chief spokesman of the Balkan delegates. If there had been a
touch of imagination and real friendliness between them they would have
selected the senior Montenegrin delegate in acknowledgment of the
gallantry which had kept Montenegro during all the centuries unsubdued
by the Turkish invader. Or there were reasons why the chief Greek
delegate should have been chosen, as he was Prime Minister in his own
country, and therefore the senior delegate in official position. But
there was not enough good feeling among the Allies to allow of any such
settlement. The delegation was left without an official spokesman and
there had to be a roster of Presidents in alphabetical order as the only
way to soothe the embittered jealousies of rival allies. That was the
first of a series of childish incidents.
Some of the delegates talked with the utmost freedom to the Press: and
if what they told was not always accurate it was nearly always
interesting. The loathsome wiles of the other Balkan fellow and his
black treachery were explained at length. It seemed seriously to be
thought that British and European opinion would be influenced by this
sort of fulmination in the more irresponsible Press.
Diplomacy under these conditions was bound to fail. The Turkish position
was at the time plainly desperate if only military considerations were
taken into account. A united front on the part of the Balkan delegates,
combining firmness with some suavity, would have convinced even the
procrastinating Turkish mind that the game was up and the only thing to
do was to make a peace on lines of "cutting the loss." But the constant
quarrels of the Balkan States' representatives between themselves
encouraged the Turks day by day to think that a definite split must come
between the Allies, and with a split the chance for Turkey to find a way
out of her desperate position. As it happened, Turkey played that game
too long: and the war was resumed and further heavy bloodshed caused.
Then the Peace Conference resumed with Turkey and Bulgaria, apparently
very anxious for peace on terms dictated by the Powers: and Greece and
Serbia anxious now for delays because they had made up their minds that
it was necessary to defend themselves against Bulgaria, and they wished
time for their preparations.
[Illustration: _Underwood & Underwood_
ROUMANIAN SOLDIERS IN BUCHAREST]
Throughout both Conferences Roumania hovered about in the offing waiting
confidently for an opportunity for pickings. Roumania had learned well
the lesson taught her by European diplomacy after the War of Liberation.
Then she had done great work, made enormous sacrifices, and won not
rewards but robberies. In the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 she stood apart,
risking nothing, and waiting for the exhaustion of the combatants to put
in her claims.
The second session of the Balkan Peace Conference came to an abrupt end
through practically an ultimatum from the British Foreign Secretary, Sir
Edward Grey, that peace with Turkey on the lines determined by the
Powers must be signed at once. The Grecian and Serbian delegates saw
then that the game of delay could no longer be played, signed the Peace
of London, and hurried away to their homes expecting an attack from
Bulgaria.
Some strange infatuation drove the Bulgarian leaders at that time to a
fit of madness. They had just wrung the last atom of concession from
Turkey, and had an enormous undisputed access of territory in Thrace and
in eastern Macedonia, with a good coastal frontage on the Aegean. True,
they were faced with a demand for a small territorial concession by
Roumania, and Greece disputed the right of Bulgaria to an area of
northern Macedonia, and Serbia disputed with her over her Macedonian
area. It would have been quite within the rules of Balkan diplomacy for
Bulgaria to have sought the help of one of her neighbours, so that she
might withstand the others. With proper adroitness she might have robbed
each in turn with the help of the others. But Bulgaria elected to fight
all of them at once. To Roumania she was rude, to Serbia stiff, to
Greece provocative. By joining hands with Serbia, which had helped her
very gallantly at Adrianople, and was now much injured by the decision
of the Powers that she was not to keep the Adriatic territory which she
had won in the war, Bulgaria might have coerced Greece and Turkey at
least, and perhaps have struck a better bargain with Roumania. But she
had conciliation for none.
The events that followed are as tragical as any that I can recall in
history. Bulgaria had within a few weeks raised herself to a position
which promised her headship of a Balkan Confederation. She might have
been the Prussia of a new Empire. Within a few days her blunders, her
intolerance, and her bad faith had humbled her to the dust. As soon as
she attacked Greece and Serbia--to attack such a combination was
absurd--Roumania moved down upon her northern frontier, and the Turk
moved up from the south. Neither Roumanian nor Turk were opposed. The
whole Bulgarian strength was kept for her late Allies: and yet the
Bulgarian forces were decisively routed by both Serbians and Greeks.
Of the dark incidents of that fratricidal war no history will ever tell
the truth. No war correspondents nor military _attachés_ accompanied the
forces. From the accusations and counter-accusations of the combatants,
from the eloquent absence of prisoners, from the ghastly gaps in the
ranks of the armies when they returned from the field, it is clear that
the war was carried on as a rule without mercy and without chivalry.
There was no very plentiful supply of ammunition on either side. That
fact enabled the combatants to approach one another more closely and to
inflict more savage slaughter. During the course of the war with Turkey
the Balkan Allies lost 75,000 slain. During the war between themselves,
though it lasted only a few days, it is said that this number was
exceeded.
Roumania, whose army though invading Bulgaria engaged in no battle,
finally dictated terms of peace. The Peace of Bucharest supplanted the
Peace of London. Bulgaria, beaten to the ground, had to give up all that
Roumania demanded, and practically all that Greece and Serbia demanded.
It was a characteristic incident of Balkan diplomacy that the unhappy
Bulgarians, having the idea of conciliating Roumania, conveyed the
territory to that state with expressions of joy and gratitude, to which
expressions the wily Roumanians gave exactly their true value.
[Illustration: _Exclusive News Agency_
ADRIANOPLE
View looking across the Great Bridge]
Turkey, meanwhile, had taken full advantage of the opportunity given to
her by Bulgaria. Beaten decisively she had had to agree to give up all
her European possessions with the exception of those beyond a line drawn
from Enos on the Black Sea to Midia on the Aegean. She saw now Bulgaria
powerless and calmly marched back, and seized again practically all
Thrace, including Adrianople, over which had been fought such great
battles, and Kirk Kilisse. The Bulgarians protested, appealed to Europe,
to Roumania in vain, then accepted the situation and professed a warm
friendship for Turkey. There seemed to be a movement for a joint
Turkish-Bulgarian attack upon Greece, which would have put the last
touch upon this tragic comedy of the Balkans. But the Powers vetoed this
enterprise if ever it were contemplated, and the Balkans for a while,
except for a little massacring in Macedonia and Albania, enjoyed an
unquiet peace. But the forces of hate and revenge waited latent.
The city which figured most prominently in the Balkan Wars of 1912-13
and the intervening diplomacy was Adrianople, the city founded by the
Emperor Adrian. It has seen more bloodshed probably than any other city
of the world. It was before Adrianople that the Roman Emperor Valerius
and his army were destroyed by the Goths, and the fate of the Roman
Empire sealed (a.d. 378). It was Adrianople that was first captured by
the Turkish invaders of the Balkans to serve as their capital until they
could at a later date capture Constantinople. Many sieges and battles it
saw until 1912, when the Bulgarians and Serbians gathered around its
marshy plains, and after several months of siege finally carried it by
assault. Finally it was re-captured by a mere cavalry patrol of the
Turks.
Adrianople has its beauties seen from afar. The great mosque with four
slender minarets shines out from the midst of gardens and picturesque
villas over the wide plain which marks the confluence of the Maritza and
the Tchundra Rivers. But on nearer examination Adrianople, like all
other Turkish towns, is dirty, unkempt, squalid. Most Turkish towns in
the Balkans--Mustapha Pasha on the Maritza was an exception, looking
dirty and unattractive from any point of view--have a certain
enchantment when they first catch the eye of the traveller. It is the
custom of the richer Turks to build their villas on the high ground
around a town if there is any, and to surround them with gardens. These
embowered houses and the slender fingers pointing skyward of the
minarets, give a first impression of ample space, of delicacy in
architecture. Closer knowledge discloses the town as a herd of hovels,
irregularly set in a sea of mud (in dry weather a dirty heap of dust),
with the hilly outskirts alone tolerable.
I regret the wild Balkan diplomacy which doomed that Adrianople should
go back to the Turks. The Bulgarians would have made a fine clean city
of it: and had a project to canalise the Maritza and bring to the old
city of Adrian all the advantages of a seaport. Possibly, that will come
in the near future if, in renewing their strength, the Bulgarian nation
learn also some sense of diplomacy and moderation in using it.
Now the position is that for the first time for very many years the old
principle has been broken that the Turkish tide may retreat but must
never advance in Europe. During the negotiations of the first session of
the Balkan Peace Conference, the Balkan Committee--a London organisation
which exists to befriend the Balkan States--urged:
Any district which should be restored to Turkish rule would be not
only beyond the possibility of rehabilitation, but would suffer the
second scourge of vengeance.... It would be intolerable that any
such districts should meet the fate meted out to Macedonia in 1878.
There is no ground for such restoration except the claim arising
from the continued Turkish possessions of Adrianople. But
compensation for the brief period during which Adrianople may still
be defended would be represented by a district adjoining Chatalja,
not exceeding, at all events, the vilayet of Constantinople....
It is clearly our duty to call attention to the governing principle
laid down by Lord Salisbury that any district liberated from
Turkish rule should not be restored to misgovernment.... The
ostensible ground for the action of Europe, and particularly of
England in 1878, was that the Powers themselves undertook the
reform of Turkish government in the restored provinces. They have
since that day persistently restrained the small States from
undertaking reform or liberation, while notoriously neglecting the
task themselves. The promise to undertake reform was regarded in
1878 in many quarters as sincere. But renewed restoration of
Christian districts to Turkey to-day would, after the experiences
of the past, be devoid of any shred of sincerity....
The restoration of European and civilised populations to Turkish
rule would be resented now, not merely by those who have
sympathised with the Balkan Committee, but by the entire public,
which recognises that the Allies have achieved a feat of arms of
which even the greatest Power would be proud.
In 1914 no more was heard of "Lord Salisbury's principle," and in public
repute the Balkan States were in a position worse than any they had
occupied for half a century. Coming after a successful war such a result
condemns most strongly Balkan statesmen and diplomats.
[Illustration: _Exclusive News Agency_
GENERAL VIEW OF STARA ZAGORA, BULGARIA]
Roumanian diplomacy during 1912-13 was subtle, wily, and unscrupulous,
enough to delight a Machiavelli. With all its ethical wickedness it was
the most stable element in the wild disorders of 1913; was efficacious
in insisting upon peace: and imposed a sort of rough justice on all
parties. Grecian diplomacy was of the same character as the Roumanian,
but not so supremely able. The difference, it appeared to me, was that
the Roumanian sought a grand advantage with a humble air: the Greek
would seek an advantage, even a humble one, with a grand air. A lofty
dignity sits well on the diplomacy which is backed by great force: there
should be something more humble in the bearing of the diplomat relying
upon subtle wiles. The Greek is a little too conscious of his heroic
past not to spoil a little the working of his otherwise very pliant
diplomacy. The Serbian in diplomacy was not so childish as the Bulgarian
and a great deal more amiable and modest. Europe has long given the
Serbian a bad reputation for bounce and bluster. In the events of
1912-13 he did nothing to earn such ill-repute. His work in the field
was done excellently and with little _réclame_. In Conference he was not
aggressive, but moderate, and, in my experience, more truthful than
other Balkan types.