All human thinking, without exception, operates with the concept of a
_substans_ lying at the root of things. Thou also, the critic, must
conform thyself to the rule. It is a _necessity of thought_. The ground
of this is, that in point of fact a _substans_ does lurk in things; not
as a “constant in itself,” however,--such a thing, to be sure, thou
canst through thy rigid analysis exclude--but solely as _that which
gives the continuity of the process_, its maintenance, as an _actual_
law of formation. This law of formation _becomes_ accessible to thee,
the individual, in consciousness. To see into that, however, thou
must be taught. So long as that does not come to pass, it is a matter
of taste or of natural inclination as to whether thou wilt interpret
the facts accessible to sense as significant of _substans_, or of the
absence of _substans_. For in the facts themselves there lies nothing
that impels either in the one direction or the other. The decision lies
solely with that unique something _by means of which_ you bring all
these facts before yourself--namely, with consciousness. To bring this
itself before you, however, as a “fact,” this is as impossible as that
any one should be able to bring his back before him though he should
turn himself about never so swiftly and dexterously. To comprehend this
unique something--for this, instruction is needed; and following upon
this instruction, _growing insight_ (intuition). If, however, thou wilt
permit thyself to be instructed, then shalt thou learn that both these
thought-necessities--that of adequate cause as that of _substans_--here
merge into one. _The idea of “substans”_ here becomes a form of the law
of adequate cause. Both necessities of thought--that of adequate cause
and that of _substans_--merge and blend into one in the Kamma teaching
of the Buddha.
With this the circle is closed; the end interlocks with the
beginning. We have discharged our self-imposed task of assigning the
Buddha-thought its place in the life of the mind.
Nothing has been said touching the problem of the freedom of the will,
nor on the problem of deity which involves that of immortality.
The former of these is the problem of morality; the latter, the problem
of religion. Their due place is in the successor to this volume.