1. The position of faith which sees in this the proof of an
imperceptible to sense in itself--an absolute.
2. The position of science which sees in this a consequence of the
imaginative faculty. Its ally is philosophical scepticism--or rather,
criticism, chiefly as represented by Hume.
3. That position formulated by Kant with his “thing in itself,” which
may be briefly characterized as a position of the most resolute
indifference towards this most important of all epistemological
phenomena. When in his _History of Materialism_, Lange, in agreement
with Kant, says: “What right have we to occupy ourselves with ‘things
in themselves’ at all?” this simply means, “What right have we to think
at all?” By this stroke, which Kant carried out by the formulation of
his “thing in itself,” he has proved himself one of the most hurtful of
all noxious creatures found on the tree of the mental life of humanity.
Here he has done as much harm as scholastic obtuseness only can do
when it steps forth in the polished, mirror-clear armour of a complete
logic. But this is not the place to enter any further into that matter.
Upon all these three possibilities the Buddha sheds a simultaneous
flood of light, illuminating sceptical criticism especially, in the
most exceptional manner.
This latter proves in entirely incontestable fashion that a _substans_
seated at the root of things has no existence, yet all its proving
possesses not the slightest conclusiveness. Hume, with all his
acuteness, falls completely under that paradigm given by R. Avenarius
in his _Kritik der reinen Erfahrung_, where a savage contends with a
missionary as to whether or no a spirit inhabits in all things. The
(unbelieving) missionary is made to say, “I have investigated all these
things and never anywhere have I found the spirit.” To which the savage
counters, “I have investigated them all too, and never anywhere have
I failed to find the spirit.” Indeed, this example admits of being
extended thus far in that the savage must feel himself reinforced
in his notion of an immaterial _substans_ by the very fact that the
other, despite all his search, has found nothing. He would say, “Just
_because_ you have found nothing, therefore I am right!”
Like the two opposing views of the world, criticism also operates with
a contradiction of itself. To be consistent, the criticism of Hume, as
every criticism, ought to run somewhat as follows:--
“A _substans_ in things is not demonstrable; these present themselves
to me only as a bundle of relation-values. If there is no _substans_
in things, how comes it that the idea of a _substans_ finds a place in
me? Through experience? That, here, were a contradiction in itself;
for this idea exists in me, the critic, only in so far as I deny its
existence. Consequently there must be something given in me which
supplies the foundation for this idea. But I can unravel myself also,
to the very last thread and here, too, find nothing but a bundle of
relation-values. The one thing in this bundle which I cannot embrace in
my comprehension, is this my own capacity of unravelling myself, _i.e._
my consciousness. On this, consequently, I must in fairness withhold
myself from passing any judgment.”
With this, thought would have so prepared itself--so far as such a
thing is possible from its own resources--as to be able to take up and
work out the Buddha-thought as inciting impulsion.