In Oldenburg’s _Buddha_ one reads:--

“The art of definition was something which the era of the Buddha did

not possess; that of demonstration was only evolved as far as the

first rudiments. An especially characteristic feature of this mode of

thinking ... is a decided antipathy to pursuing the consideration of

things back to their ultimate principles.”

Misericordia! What shall one say of the herd when the leading bull

points in such paths! A teaching whose greatness resides in the fact

that it shows how all definitions are only essays which owe their

existence to the faulty formulation of the question, is reproached with

its lack of definitions! A teaching which points out that the fact

“_I_” of necessity implies life and the beginninglessness of life,

is reproached that it does not involve itself in the blind alley of

contraries called in the language of logic, “principles.” The Buddha’s

one and only concern is to teach, to point out that there is nothing in

the world to be defined; hence, also, no instruments for this purpose:

principles. That herewith the whole of science goes by the board--what

matters that to the seeker for truth! Hearken, good people! Here goes

by the board a great deal more than science!

To see how the Buddha bore himself with reference to this question of

principles, one ought to read the magnificent Kevaddha Sutta--Sutta

XI. of the _Dīgha Nikāya_--where a monk craves information as to the

behaviour of the primal elements of matter. The Buddha meets the

question as the genuine thinker alone can, with the weapon of humour.

For absurdities cannot be dealt with at all otherwise, if one would not

drown in them past hope of help. The scene in the court of Mahā Brahmā,

the great Brahma, is perhaps the most gigantic that human humour has

ever conceived. Here music alone, the humour of Beethoven’s symphonies,

perhaps may risk comparison.

To the Buddha naught exists save actualities, eternally fermenting,

seething, simmering actualities that melt and dissolve all drosses of

definitions in their fiery glow or ever they are able to come to birth.

“The art of demonstration was only evolved as far as the first

rudiments.” I maintain that every single word in this sentence is

false or incorrect. The art of demonstration in the philosophical

systems that surged all about the Buddha, was developed to a height

it never can reach among us for the simple reason that our speech and

our brains have lost the necessary flexibility. One has only to read

those great Suttas that I might call the transcendental Suttas, such

as the Brahmajāla Sutta of the _Dīgha Nikāya_, in order to see that as

well speech as brain with us have become so stiff in mechanical views

as to be no longer capable of following up and thinking out all these

possibilities, all these species and sub-species of idealistic and

materialistic views. But it is just for this reason that the Buddha

is called the “Master-guide.” Like the guide in the catacombs, where

at every step the unacquainted are threatened with irretrievable

errors, calmly and surely he takes his way through this wild tangle

of method, through this rigid logic of the absurd. Serene and clear

he recognizes, perceives, “It is altogether conditioned; it is all of

the mind’s own devising.” Again we have the delicate irony that comes

of commanding insight, when in another discourse he says, “There are

wise men who call day night, and night day.” How could one hit off more

aptly certain tendencies of modern science--that astounding faculty it

displays for interpreting actuality in accordance with preconceived

ideas? All those imposing definitions that for our minds and for the

human mind in all ages, have possessed such an intoxicating quality,

are only possible where one fabricates artificial cores around which

dialectical processes can crystallize, and crystallize out all the more

splendidly the more carefully one protects them from the rude shocks of

actuality. The loftiness and subtlety of our conceptual constructions

is nothing but the water-mark that indicates the height of our

ignorance. There is certainly much that is confusing for our thought,

brought up as that has been under the sway of Aristotelian logic, to

see concepts merge and blend upon whose clear differentiation the

logical possibility of the entire system seems to rest--such concepts,

for example, as _kamma_ and _sankhāra_, _kamma_ and _viññāṇa_, _kamma_

and _taṇhā_, and so forth. It may easily happen that the seeker for

truth may suffer shipwreck on such apparent contradictions. But in

such case it is with him as with one who is stranded on the lighthouse

itself--blinded by its very light!

To be able to follow the Buddha here, one must have understood him.

What Jesus said of himself in terms of emotion, that, but in terms

of understanding, the Buddha also can say, “Blessed is he that is not

offended in me.”

So long as one continues to take the concepts with which he is

operating for positive, firmly established realities, so long is it

quite impossible to avoid all these violations of exact thinking. It

is said, “If Sankhāra is the process, it cannot be the energy itself,

and _vice versa_.” One insists, like the countryman, upon getting one’s

bill, and has the feeling of intellectual superiority into the bargain.

But there is this to be considered: When, for instance, I wish to

define a combustion process, I am at liberty to do so just as it

happens to occur to me, either as light, or as heat, or as chemical

action, and so forth. On each such occasion I include the whole

combustion process in its entirety, and yet none will say, “If the

combustion process is at any one time light, it cannot also be heat,

for in that case light and heat would be just the same thing. That

would be a violation of the law of contradictories,” “argal” ... as

the grave-digger in _Hamlet_ says. But such grave-digger’s logic is

followed out in every particular by exact thought when it deals with

actuality. It is the pure content of actuality in the Buddha’s teaching

that renders it irreconcilable with logic. That teaching is not

illogical, but simply a-logical. The model of the syllogism does not

apply to it at all. For even thus are things in actuality: What at one

moment one thinks to have grasped, comprehended, that, next moment, is

swept away in the never resting flow of Becoming. Actuality does not

play a game that complies with the established rules and regulations

called logic: one game only does it play--the grim game of necessity.

And this game may be won, not by him who with abstract fences and walls

and dykes for a brief space fashions to himself a little world-garden

of his own, but only by him who dares to vibrate in unison with the

iron rhythm of a beginningless necessity.

It is the indispensable task of every earnest thinker who would

really follow the Buddha, experience him in himself, to make clear to

himself, and ever and again make clear, that our whole mental life,

our concept-world is based upon artificial premisses, in which, in

the strictest sense of the words, not life must serve truth but truth

life. As the spider itself flings forth its web over the abyss, so from

out ourselves we fling forth in the form of concepts an inextricable

network of airy roots. As the ape from bough to bough, so springs the

human mind from concept to concept, and has itself borne aloft by the

entire network, where any single thread would rend beneath him, each

individual bough snap under him and precipitate him into the bottomless

gulfs of an endless infinitude. All that circulates in daily life in

the way of mental values are pure concept-values, bills of exchange

upon actuality. But in the hurry and bustle of traffic no one has

time or inclination to go and get these bills turned into actual

currency. Just as they stand they are passed along “like a basket

from hand to hand.” Hence the terrible predominance of ideals, the

tyranny they exercise over our minds, and so over genuine education and

culture. Whoso has experienced in himself the collapse of ideals, the

taking up of the bills of current concept-values at the counter of

actuality,--he well understands why the Buddha calls his intuition an

“awakening.” It is the awakening out of the dream-world of concepts.

A Buddha, in short, is a man who dares to _live_ this his insight that

there are no concepts and accordingly nothing conceived, but only a

“conceiving.” Hence his attitude towards many questions, and above all

to that question as to how one ought to picture to oneself a Buddha, or

one who after this life is re-born no more.

The scheme of the questions runs thus: 1. Where is he re-born? 2. Is he

not re-born? 3. Is he re-born as well as not re-born? 4. Is he neither

re-born nor yet not re-born?

To all these sophistical questions the stereotyped answer of the Buddha

is, “That does not apply”--an answer, naturally, which gives plenty of

scope for the profoundest conjectures and hypotheses, but which only

means that the question is wrongly put and therefore renders impossible

any answer at all. A being that with this as his last existence, is

proceeding towards extinction, that will never again be re-born _is no

longer existent_, even in the form of concept; hence the whole question

is meaningless.

Here, again, it is impossible to do anything like justice to the

whole problem with the chess-moves of a profound play of thought:

only a witticism meets the case. All this ingenious logic that would

fain take the measure of actuality with the laws of identity and

contradictories as with some yard-stick, which advances against truth

with the apparently irresistible demonstrating force of its “aut ...

aut,” resembles nothing so much as those ingenious questions with

which the child is wont to tease the grown-up person as to the nature

and dwelling-place of Santa Claus. Another child would be able to

answer these questions with an equal ingenuity; the grown-up person

is powerless to meet them. In the same way the scholars of the west

would be perfectly capable of meeting and satisfying the questions of

a Vacchagotta with equal “acuteness of logic.” The Buddha cannot do

it. All he can do is to try to sweep away the accumulated rubbish of

misunderstood concepts, and on the thus cleared foundation, cause a new

clean structure of thought to arise, the essence whereof resides in

comprehending that such a thing as the foregoing question refers to has

no existence, neither abstractly nor actually; hence, that the question

is in itself devoid of meaning.

This is the whole secret here lying hidden. The interpretation given

by Oldenburg to the words of the nun Khemā, are based upon a complete

misunderstanding of the entire Buddha-thought, as is everything else he

says concerning the final goal of Buddhism. But that pertains properly

to the Nibbāna teaching.

Buddhism is the doctrine of actuality, and its value as a view of the

world from the standpoint of epistemology, lies in the fact that it

teaches us to accept actuality as actuality. To this idea it is itself

a martyr, inasmuch as its own teaching here is nothing ideally fixed

and fast, but only an incitation to experience it in one’s own self; it

is “a raft, designed for escape; not designed for retention.” Hence,

is it said in the powerful Dhātuvibhañga Sutta--Sutta CXL., _Majjhima

Nikāya_--“‘I am,’ monk, is a believing. ‘Such am I,’ is a believing. ‘I

shall be,’ is a believing. ‘I shall not be,’ is a believing. ‘I shall

have a form,’ is a believing. ‘I shall be formless,’ is a believing.

‘I shall have perception,’ is a believing. ‘I shall be devoid of

perception,’ is a believing. To entertain believings is to be ill. To

entertain believings is to be infirm. To entertain believings is to be

sick. When, however, all entertaining of believings is overcome, then

is one called a right thinker.”

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Buddhism & science · 第 78 / 90 题