POLITICS
The apparently purposeless and kaleidoscopic changes in Spanish politics
are very apt to puzzle foreign observers, who cannot understand what has
happened to bring about the resignation of a Minister or an entire
Cabinet, for which the cause, if any, alleged in the papers seems wholly
inadequate. Internal and external affairs appear to be pursuing a
tranquil course: no disputed question is agitating the country or the
Cortes, when suddenly comes a bolt from the blue in the shape of an
announcement of a Ministerial crisis, and the Government is changed.
Thus, early in the year 1910, Señor Moret, who after overthrowing the
Government of Maura in the previous October, seemed to be pretty firmly
seated in the saddle, suddenly resigned, in spite of the fact that at
the municipal elections a month or so before his policy had been
endorsed by overwhelming majorities all over the country. One of the
English newspapers, in commenting on this seemingly inexplicable change
of Ministry, frankly confessed that it was useless for foreigners to
attempt to understand Spanish politics.
Generally speaking, Ministerial changes in Spain are the outcome of a
tacit arrangement made some thirty years ago between Canovas and
Sagasta, the then leaders of the two main parties, the Liberals and the
Conservatives, and continued by their successors, that each side should
have its fair share of the loaves and fishes. After one party had been
in office three or four years it was agreed by common consent that the
time had come for the other side to have a turn. Thus, as Major Martin
Hume says:[21] “Dishonest Governments are faced in sham battle by
dishonest Oppositions, and parliamentary institutions, instead of being
a public check upon abuses, are simply a mask behind which a large
number of politicians may carry on their nefarious trade with impunity.”
But sometimes, though more rarely, another cause operates to upset
Governments, and that is the underground intrigues of disappointed
place-hunters. If the Premier in his distribution of appointments
happens to omit any important person or section of people who think
themselves entitled to a share in the plums of office, they will not
hesitate to join with political opponents and turn out their own nominal
leader, if circumstances happen to make this possible.
It is often said by foreign critics that the people--the mass of the
nation--are to blame for the sins of their Governments. They have the
franchise: if they are not satisfied, why do they not elect better men?
This criticism proceeds from ignorance of an important factor in Spanish
politics--one of the tentacles of the octopus of corruption which holds
the whole country in its grip.
The simple fact is that the great mass of the people have no voice at
all in the election of their representatives. Nominally voting is free:
actually it is not.[22]
The whole administrative system is centralised in Madrid, and the
various Government offices interfere in local affairs to an extent
inconceivable to an Englishman, accustomed for generations to manage his
own affairs his own way. One result of this is that the elections to the
Cortes are, in fact if not in theory, conducted from Madrid. In every
small town and rural district there is a person known as the _Cacique_,
usually a large employer of labour or a moneylender, to whom most of the
working population of the district look for employment, or in whose debt
they are. So enormous is the usury that once a loan has been raised,
many a borrower has been unable to free himself from debt for the rest
of his life. I have known cases where as much as 75 per cent. per annum
has been paid for a trifling loan. Thus the _Cacique_, whether as
employer or moneylender, or both, has the majority of the constituency
under his thumb. He receives his instructions from Madrid, and issues
his orders accordingly. If by chance the voting goes wrong, the returns
are falsified; but this does not often happen, for the voters are so
convinced that the exercise of their legal right of choice, if in
opposition to the wish of the authorities, will result in loss of
employment, that either they abstain or they vote as they are ordered.
The existence of the _Cacique_ is one of the great obstacles to any
effective decentralisation. If the villages and rural districts were
given the management of their own affairs, the _Cacique_ would be more
absolute than ever. One can hardly open a paper without finding a report
of some case of his arbitrary interference with local matters. If he is,
as he usually is, the friend or creature of the Civil Governor of the
Province, who is the nominee of the Ministry, he does what he likes and
there is no redress against his illegal and oppressive action.
The following stories illustrate the method of conducting elections in
Spain.
* * * * *
One man complained that a Conservative had given him a dollar for his
vote, and after he had voted he found that the dollar was bad. “Had I
not already voted, how gladly would I have given you gentlemen the
advantage!” he said to a group of Liberals. “But you see I am left
without my vote in exchange for a bad dollar. Never again will I sell my
vote to the Conservatives!”
* * * * *
Another rascal went to the office of a Liberal paper to complain that “a
thief” had contracted with him to engage some twenty fellow-rogues to
vote to order. He fulfilled his part of the contract and took his twenty
to the poll, but when he went to claim his pay the contractor had
disappeared.
“And here I am many pesetas out of pocket,” he lamented; “for not only
have I lost the large profit the thief offered me, but I had to pay my
friends two reals apiece before they would stir out of the wine-shop.”
* * * * *
In one district the Liberals boasted that for years they had never
bought a vote. “Partly,” as my informant ingenuously said, “because we
have always had a safe majority, but partly also because we prefer to be
honest. But,” he continued, “we learnt this time that a party of
Conservatives intended to interfere with us, so we prepared a party of
the same kind to receive them. ‘Do not begin to fight,’ said my father,
‘but if they begin, hit hard.’ They did begin, and our leader obeyed
orders. He hit the leader of the other side so hard that he knocked out
four of his front teeth, and that was the end of the fighting in our
district.”
* * * * *
All these incidents are said to have occurred in the municipal elections
of 1909. One more is worth mentioning.
In a town of some twenty thousand inhabitants, where for many years past
an Ultramontane _Cacique_ has been supreme, that gentleman rose early on
the polling-day and personally roused the dwellers in the gipsy
quarters--mostly the biggest ruffians in the place--out of their beds.
“Get up, my sons,” he said, “and go and vote, and there will be a dollar
apiece for you when you leave the polling-booth.”
“They said they would go and vote,” said my informant, “and they got
their dollars. But the Republicans came out at the head of the poll, and
the Liberals next, and the _Cacique_ and his Conservatives were
nowhere.”
* * * * *
I happen to be aware that the _Cacique_ in this instance is a man of
great wealth and high social position, whose clericalist leanings are
well known. If, indeed, it be the fact that the working classes have
gained courage to defy men like him, the rising in Cataluña, the Maura
regime of repression, and the campaign led against Spain by
Ultramontanes and Socialists abroad will have borne fruit.
There is, however, one political leader in Spain who stands for purity
of election and is the lifelong foe of the “caciquism” and corruption
which paralyse any and every effort at political regeneration. Don
Segismundo Moret has thrice been Premier of Spain. Each time he could
have retained office had he consented to purchase the favour of the
place-hunters by giving posts in the Ministry, not to those best
qualified for the work, but to those who could command the largest
following among the “Liberal mercenaries” who, as long as the system of
“caciquism” continues, can make or mar electoral majorities. This he has
never consented to do. So it has happened that each time that he has
been in office he has had to sacrifice place and power rather than
pander to an evil system.
The story of his late short tenure of the Premiership, and of the
intrigues by which he was ousted is worth telling at some little length,
because it throws light on the workings of the political machine, and on
some of the difficulties with which a reformer has to contend in Spain.
Moret took office in 1909 against his own better judgment, for he would
have preferred that the Conservatives should bear the responsibility of
their own misdeeds, and solve the many difficulties resulting from
Maura’s “policy of repression.” But the country had been brought to such
a pitch of irritation and unrest by the reactionaries that the
situation was becoming dangerous. The Riff question was attracting the
unfriendly attention of foreign diplomatists; Barcelona was impatient
under a rigid application of martial law, and the Ferrer incident had
called forth a storm of condemnation from all the countries where the
assumption that a prisoner is innocent until he has been proved guilty
is an axiom of criminal law, while the advanced parties in the State
were getting out of hand and had begun to defy the Government, as,
_e.g._, in the matter of the demonstrations already referred to.
From the moment that Moret accepted office he was assailed by a stream
of the most virulent abuse, not only by the Carlist but also by the
Conservative and Ultramontane newspapers. He was “the destruction of
Spain,” “the ruin of the nation,” “the arch-priest of irreligion and
immorality,” and not only was his policy attacked in terms of unmeasured
vilification, but the editors of these papers, which are owned and
supported by some of the best born and wealthiest men in the country,
did not hesitate to descend to vulgar personal abuse. His “grey hair,”
for instance, was a favourite subject of their ridicule, and his
“vacillation,” “infirmity of purpose,” and “inability to keep his party
together” were accounted for by jeers at his “senile decay,” his
“failing intellect,” his “body bent double by the weight of years,” and
so forth, while the party led by him are usually spoken of in the
clericalist organs as _canaille_.
But on his acceptance of the Premiership the aspect of affairs underwent
a complete and immediate change. The political horizon began to clear.
Terms of peace were arrived at in Morocco. Foreign susceptibilities were
soothed. Cataluña was immediately relieved from the burden of martial
law, and the constitutional rights were restored in Barcelona. The
troops began to return from the war and were received with the greatest
enthusiasm; the trials of persons arrested in connection with the
disorders in Cataluña, who had been kept in prison on suspicion for four
or five months, were pushed forward, and numbers of them were released
for want of any evidence against them. Most of the lay schools were
reopened, on showing that nothing seditious had been taught in them. The
depleted treasury was replenished, and means were found to provide three
months’ pay for the Melilla forces, which the outgoing Ministry had left
out of account. A great project of irrigation was vigorously promoted by
Moret’s Minister of Public Works, Gasset, who has devoted practically
the whole of his political life to this subject, and has produced a
scheme which would convert vast tracts, now arid waste, into fertile
land. And the municipal elections, which took place about six weeks
after the change of Government, were conducted, so far as time had
permitted any modification of existing conditions, according to law,
with the result that the Liberal-Monarchists swept the board all over
the country. The official figures were as follows: Liberal-Monarchists,
2,961; Conservatives, 1,213; Carlists, 185; Republicans, 193;
Socialists, 4. Thus Moret’s party nearly doubled the Conservatives,
Carlists, and Republicans put together. The smallness of the Socialist
vote should be noticed.
In any other country it would have been certain that a leader who could
so well and so quickly convert popular indignation into contentment and
hope was in for a long term of office. Not so in Spain.
During his four months of office, from October, 1909, to February, 1910,
Moret tried hard to obtain the decree of dissolution of the Conservative
Cortes, in order that the nation might have an opportunity of expressing
its opinion on recent events. At first it almost seemed as if he would
obtain the King’s consent to dissolve. But the place-hunters were
afraid, and the Ultramontanes were more afraid. They played so
successfully into each other’s hands that the decree of dissolution was
postponed day after day, while all his enemies proclaimed the incapacity
of a Premier who was “afraid” to go to the country.
The first attempt to upset him was a so-called “military demonstration”
in front of the offices of the _Ejercito Español_, a military paper
which had been confiscated for publishing an article written by a
Carlist, accusing the Premier of unjust favouritism in the distribution
of rewards for good service in Melilla. The demonstration was described
by the Conservative papers as of “overwhelming importance,” and the
number of demonstrators was placed by some of them at two thousand. The
truth is that it was confined to a few officers well known for their
Carlist leanings, and the rank and file of their regiments stood
resolutely aloof. Moret and his Minister of War, General Luque, retired
the Captain-General of Madrid and the colonels of the regiments in
question for failure to maintain discipline, and ordered the actual
participants a couple of months’ arrest--a proceeding which called forth
general applause from all except the reactionaries. The small
significance of the affair was made manifest when it came out that
these arrests did not exceed half a dozen, including the editor (also an
officer) responsible for the publication of the seditious article.
The result of this fiasco was still more to strengthen Moret’s influence
with the nation, and it became evident that he would sweep the country
should he obtain the long-deferred decree of dissolution. All the
ingenuity of the Church was therefore exercised to secure his fall
before this could take place, and the cupidity of a cabal of
disappointed candidates for place was skilfully used to bring about--the
catastrophe, I was going to say, but the triumph of morality would be a
truer expression.
At the municipal elections in December, 1909, an endeavour had been made
by Moret to secure something in the direction of freedom of voting for
the working classes, and the result, as I have shown, was a triumph for
the Liberal-Monarchists. The Republicans--to their honour be it said,
for they did not do as well in these elections as they had
expected--worked harder than ever after this to secure to the electors
the free exercise of their legal privileges, and Moret accepted their
programme, so far as it was designed to help in cleansing the Augean
stable of corruption by limiting the powers of the local _Caciques_.
This gave an opportunity to those who live by political immorality, and
the intrigue which followed is typical of Spanish politics.
In the December elections Madrid returned a Republican majority to the
Town Council. The Alcalde, Señor Aguilera, an old and staunch ally of
Señor Moret’s, although himself a Monarchist, ranged himself on the side
of the Republicans by supporting their demand for the limitation of the
Alcalde’s power to appoint and thus control the votes of the very
numerous municipal employees. It was proposed that the Alcalde, instead
of being, as now, nominated by the Government, should be elected by the
Councillors, who in their turn have been elected by the popular vote,
and that the posts under the Council should be filled by open
competition.
Most of the Alcaldes, even in the small towns, enter office poor and
leave rich. But it is admitted even by his opponents that Señor
Aguilera, a man with but small private means, who has twice been Alcalde
of Madrid under Moret, has each time gone out of office as poor as when
he came in.
A crisis was deliberately provoked by the President of the so-called
“Liberal” election committees of Madrid, Count Romanones, a man who held
office under Moret in a former Cabinet, and has long been suspected of
aspiring to the Premiership of the party to which he belongs. The
election committees, represented by Count Romanones, although nominally
Liberal, objected to the proposed limitation of the power of the
Alcalde, and finding Moret firm on the point, went so far as to hand him
an ultimatum. Briefly, their terms were, “Leave to the Alcaldes” (often
the _Caciques_) “throughout Spain the appointment of the municipal
employees, or we will refuse to act, and leave you without any electoral
organisation at all when the Cortes are dissolved.” It is not denied
that this resolution was handed to the Premier by Count Romanones a day
or two before his resignation. Meanwhile other opponents took advantage
of Aguilera’s temporary alliance with the Republicans, and represented
that if a programme of electoral reform supported by that party were
carried out, the Throne would be endangered by a Republican majority in
the new Cortes. This danger was imaginary, for there is no doubt that
both the numerical strength of the Republicans and their hostility to
the reigning House have always been greatly exaggerated by all the
various factions desirous of clogging the wheels of reform.
Señor Moret of course declined to compromise with Count Romanones on
any terms, which in a man of his recognised probity was a certainty,
doubtless counted upon by the “Liberal” cabal and by the Ultramontanes.
He then once more asked the King for the decree of dissolution, that he
might place his programme of reform before those whom it most concerned.
Exactly what passed at this interview was not divulged, but at its
conclusion he placed his resignation in Don Alfonso’s hands. It was
accepted, and the veteran Liberal-Monarchist, after forty years’ service
to the Throne and the country, found himself dismissed at a moment’s
notice, through the machinations of the opponents of electoral reform.
No plausible reason was given for the dismissal of Moret. It was
reported that “the representative men of the party,” when applied to by
the King for advice, recommended the appointment of Canalejas, on the
ground that Moret had lost their confidence. But it was not stated who
these representative men were. The _Daily Mail_ gave half a dozen names,
which had been telegraphed by its correspondent in Madrid, but that list
was obviously untrustworthy because Montero Rios figured in it, and it
is well known that the leader of the Radical group sets the unity of the
party above every other consideration, and has always urged loyalty to
Moret upon Liberals of all shades.
The circumstances were calculated to embitter the most even temper;
nevertheless Moret’s first thought was for the welfare of the nation,
whose whole governmental machinery was thrown out of gear. Some of his
followers wanted to make a complete split with Canalejas, and one or two
articles were published in the heat of the moment, expressed in terms
tending to a final division in the Liberal camp. But in his own
utterances for the Press Moret showed himself true to his ideal--the
good of the country before personal ambition.
“The most serious feature in this crisis,” he said, “is that both the
event and its solution were foretold by the reactionary newspapers,
proving the intervention of the reactionary party in the intrigue. They
interfered because they wish to prevent my conducting the elections in
accordance with my programme of electoral reform.”
Moret’s assertion that the intrigue which brought about his fall was
engineered by the Ultramontanes received confirmation from the _Correo
Catalan_, a Carlist paper, which committed itself to the following
prophecy:
“Canalejas will govern without altering the Cabinet until the autumn.
Before the re-opening of the Cortes there will be ministerial changes.
And in order to make compensation to Señor Moret a couple of
unconditional friends of his will enter the Government. In the autumn
Maura will have become tired of acting as guardian to Canalejas, who
will fall irremediably. The Maurist restoration will be inaugurated next
year.”
Working-class opinion on the situation was quite definite. For a day or
two satisfaction was expressed, because Canalejas was reputed to be
devoted to the interests of the people. But no sooner was suspicion
aroused that his elevation to the Premiership had been engineered by the
Ultramontanes than the poor were up in arms: the mere suggestion that
the Jesuits were at work being sufficient to revive all the irritation
and anxiety that Moret had succeeded in allaying.
“Canalejas talks a great deal, and we have long looked upon him as our
friend,” a journeyman mason remarked to me. “But here we are again with
everything in a state of confusion, and work in every direction waiting
while our employers are busy with their politics. We shall get nothing
done now till things have quieted down, so I don’t see what advantage it
is to us to have Canalejas in power.”
[Illustration:
GENERAL MARINA. SEÑOR CANALEJAS.
Commander-in-Chief at Melilla. Leader of the Liberal Democrats.
[To face page 244.]
“If it is true that Canalejas is in league with the Jesuits to bring
Maura back, there will be trouble,” said another man. “We will not have
Maura ruining the country again just when it was beginning to pick up. I
would rather shoot him myself. The poor can’t live under Maura, so I
should lose nothing by killing him, even if I paid for it with my life.”
A woman burst out crying when she heard her husband talking about Maura.
“Why does the good God let that man live?” she sobbed. “If it is true
that he is coming into power again, all our sons will be sent to Melilla
to be killed. And we have been so contented because we thought we had
got rid of him!”
The hope of the Ultramontanes was that the downfall of Moret would bring
about a final and irremediable split in the Liberal party, which would
facilitate the overthrow of Canalejas when the time came. And at first
it seemed probable that this hope would be realised, for practically the
whole of Moret’s Cabinet resigned with him, and refused to take office
under Canalejas, while Canalejas himself at first acted as though he
desired a permanent breach, by claiming that his appointment as Premier
necessarily carried with it the leadership of the party--a proposition
to which the party was by no means disposed to agree. But in time better
counsels prevailed, and an interview between the Premier and his
predecessor has lately been reported in the Press, in the course of
which Canalejas frankly admitted the obligations of the party to Moret
and the need that exists for his co-operation and advice--which Moret
for his part professed himself quite ready to give, as indeed he had
done ever since his resignation. So that it looks as though the danger
of a breach had been avoided, at any rate for the present.
It is worth noting that the Government of Spain can be carried on for an
indefinite time without the sessions of the Cortes. The Cortes adjourned
for the summer recess in June, 1909, before the troubles began in
Barcelona, and never met again. Throughout his tenure of office Moret
tried without success to obtain the Royal decree for a dissolution.
Canalejas was in office two months before he could get the decree
signed, but at length, in April, 1910, it was announced that the General
Election would definitely be held in May. The outgoing Cortes has a
Conservative majority: what the next will be no man can say, although,
having regard to the fact that a Liberal Ministry is in power, the
presumption is that a Liberal majority will be returned. There is,
however, no shadow of doubt that if the elections were conducted fairly
and freely and the people could vote in accordance with their
convictions, a Cortes would be returned with an overwhelming majority in
favour of the Constitutional Monarchy, reform of abuses, and the
destruction of the political influence and privileges of the Church.
POLITICAL PARTIES