WATERLOO.
The year, with which this narrative must for the present be brought to
an end, was an eventful one. The same year which witnessed the great
battle of Waterloo was the hundredth of the Regiment’s existence. How
marvellous was the development of England’s Artillery between 1716 and
1815, cannot be better seen than in contrasting the two struggling
companies of the former year with the magnificent force of Artillery
collected in Belgium in 1815, of which its commander, [Sidenote: To D.
A. G. dated Brussels, 16 May, 1815.] Sir George Wood, wrote: “I do
believe there never was in the world such a proportion of Artillery so
well equipped. The result must be felt by Europe.”
The growing importance of the arm is apparent from the following
statistics. The proportion of guns per 1000 men in the British armies at
Marlborough’s three famous battles was as follows: Blenheim, 1·2;
Ramilies, 2; and Malplaquet, 1·1. In the Peninsula, the proportion was
somewhat higher: at Corunna, 3; Talavera, 1·2; Albuera, 1·2; Salamanca,
2; Vittoria, 1·3; Nivelle, 1·3; Orthes, 1·3; and Toulouse, 1·2. But
during the whole of the Peninsular War, the Duke of Wellington
complained that he was inadequately supplied with Artillery; and as soon
as war was inevitable in 1815, he urged upon the Government at home to
send him a large proportion of that arm. The result was that in the
British army at the battle of Waterloo the proportion of guns per 1000
men was no less than 3·7.
The circumstances, which led to this great battle, must first be briefly
stated. It will be in the reader’s recollection that in February 1815,
Napoleon quitted Elba; and on the 20th March entered the Tuileries. As
he had foreseen, the army rallied round him; but to his mortification he
found coldness and even mistrust on the part of the Chambers, and a
decided apathy on the part of the civil population. He beheld also the
whole of continental Europe resolving to arm against him,--to stamp out
the man, who had so audaciously violated the solemn Convention of Paris;
while England--to compensate for the weakness of her military
contingent--furnished money to the other Powers, and a General whose
name was in itself a host. No uncertain sound came from the European
council, which sat at Vienna; and Napoleon saw before him a stern and
growing resolution for war to the bitter end. He was not sorry. If he
could win battles, he knew that he would have found a cure for all
coldness at home:--the army, which had again placed him on the throne,
would, if victorious, consolidate his power, and make him independent of
all who distrusted him. He commenced, therefore, to reorganize and equip
a force which should sweep all before it. He hastened his preparations,
in the hope of encountering his enemies in detail, before they should
have effected that concentration of their armies along the entire
eastern frontier of France, which he knew they contemplated. It will be
seen, hereafter, that on more than one occasion during this last of
Napoleon’s campaigns, he was guilty of unaccountable lack of energy; but
no one can fail to admire the spirit and ability with which in the short
spring of that fatal year he organized the army, which was to ensure his
complete success, or witness his utter ruin.
To realise his difficulties, one must bear in mind the state [Sidenote:
Hooper.] of the country which he governed. “France had exhausted her
vigour in the unrestrained indulgence of her passion for military glory.
Her blood was impoverished,--her muscles relaxed, her nerves unstrung,
her moral force debilitated by twenty-three years of almost
uninterrupted warfare. The laurels gathered in a hundred battles were
poor compensation for a paralyzed industry and a crippled commerce,--for
desolate corn-fields and half-cultured vineyards. She was ’la belle
France’ no longer;--she had used her prime in the debauch of war!” And
yet from this country, Napoleon, before the middle of June, had raised
the effective force of the regular army to no less than 276,000 men;
besides having 200,000 other and inferior troops.
He determined to carry the war first into Belgium. For concentrating an
army with this view, the line of fortresses on the French frontier to
the north-east offered special advantages. And, on crossing it in force,
he hoped to defeat the Prussians and English separately,--to make by
this means the war and the Government unpopular in England,--and to
detach from the Allies some whom he believed to be but half-hearted in
their opposition to him. Another and important reason for selecting
Belgium as the theatre of his operations, was the undoubted presence in
that country of many who on his first success would flock to his
standard.
On the night of the 14th June, Napoleon had collected on the French side
of the frontier an army ready to march on the following morning,
consisting of 128,000 men, and 344 guns. Of this number, 22,000 were
cavalry; and the whole force was divided into five corps d’armée,
besides the Imperial Guard, and four corps of reserve cavalry. On that
night he slept at Avesnes, which he made his head-quarters, and from
which he issued a characteristic address to his troops. Leaving him
there,--with the great mass of his [Sidenote: Hooper.] army “gathered,
so to speak, to a head at Beaumont,” and pointing directly upon
Charleroi,--the reader is invited to turn to the English army, and
examine its constitution and disposition.
A force of Artillery had been in Holland for some time with Sir T.
Graham,--under the command of Sir G. A. Wood; and this formed the
nucleus of the contingent of that arm in the Duke of Wellington’s army
in Belgium. Many names familiar to the reader re-appear in the lists of
those who fought at Waterloo. Colonel--now Sir Alexander--Dickson was
still in America; but arrived in time for the battle. Others, who had
received honours for their Peninsular services, were also there: Sir
Augustus Frazer, Sir John May, Sir Hew Ross, and Sir Robert Gardiner.
Norman Ramsay, transferred to another troop in order to be present, had
also joined; and was already, as Sir Augustus Frazer [Sidenote: Frazer’s
Letters, p. 532.] wrote, “adored by his men:--kind, generous, and manly,
he is more than the friend of his soldiers.” Other names will appear, as
the narrative proceeds; suffice it at present to say that it is doubtful
if ever in one field, or even in one generation, the Regiment has had so
many able men gathered together.
Sir George Wood was enthusiastic, and revelled in his command. His
enthusiasm, while not forbidding him to point out his wants, aided him
in remedying or bearing them. They were at first but two in number; but
they were rather important to a force, for they were officers and men.
Fortunately for him and the Corps, General Macleod was still Deputy
Adjutant-General of the Royal Artillery, and was indefatigable in
supplying Sir George Wood’s demands. As fast as the companies and
drivers arrived from America, they were sent to Belgium; but the demand
still exceeded the supply. Only six days before the battle, it is
recorded that no fewer than 1000 drivers were wanting. This had been
partly caused by the Duke of Wellington insisting on the formation of
three brigades of 18-pounders, to be placed under the command of Sir
Alexander Dickson; and partly by the demands of the small-arm ammunition
trains. He would neither hire nor enlist Belgian drivers, saying that he
placed too much consequence on his Artillery to trust it to such a crew;
and he ordered Sir George Wood to write to General Macleod, requesting
that four companies of foot Artillery might be sent out to act as
drivers. It was not often that the Duke tried to coax the Board, or
honoured [Sidenote: Sir G. Wood to D. A. G. Brussels, 9 June, 1815.] it
with his reasons; but on this occasion he did. He said that he was well
aware that it was not the particular duty of Artillery soldiers to take
care of horses, but he was confident that should the Master-General be
pleased to allow that duty to be performed by gunners for the present,
the service would receive much greater benefit,--“the Artillery officers
having more power over their own men, than any given number from the
Line;” and that in the case of a siege they might do their Artillery
duties in the trenches, as at Antwerp in 1814.
It was on the 4th April, 1815, that the Duke of Wellington reached
Brussels. Less fortunate than Sir George Wood, he found that his
demands, at first, were merely made excuses by the authorities at home
for the exercise of official patronage. He at last ironically suggested
to them that it would be well, before sending him any more Generals, to
send him some men for them to command. The local arrangements, as far as
the Artillery was concerned, are graphically described in Sir A.
Frazer’s letters, and in General Mercer’s journal of the Waterloo
campaign. The historian must, however, draw his information from a less
sparkling stream,--the official letters of Sir George Wood and others.
From these it is ascertained that Ostend was the principal port of
disembarkation for artillery and stores: that Sir George Wood himself,
and afterwards Sir A. Frazer and Lieutenant-Colonel S. G. Adye,
superintended the arrival of these at Ostend, and their removal to
various places; and that in these matters they were assisted by a man
whom all united to pronounce marvellously able, Mr. Commissary Stace.
[Sidenote: Sir G. Wood to D. A. G. Ostend, 1 May, 1815.]
It appears that the urgent demands for more Horse Artillery came from
Sir A. Frazer, who was appointed to the command of that branch; whereas
the Duke himself at first seemed more anxious to get drivers for the
brigades, and foot Artillerymen for the garrisons of Mons, Oudenarde,
Ghent, and Ath. As early as the beginning of May, the Duke almost broke
Captain Whinyates’s heart by deciding on changing his rocket troop into
an ordinary troop: nor was it without much difficulty and pleading, that
Sir G. Wood succeeded in obtaining permission for him to carry
[Sidenote: Mercer’s Journal, vol. i. p. 166.] a proportion of 12-pounder
rockets with his guns. The Duke’s prejudice against rockets was
unmistakable; and his unofficial language on this occasion was somewhat
unfeeling; but the official reason he gave was that when he [Sidenote:
Sir G. A. Wood to D. A. G. 1 May, 1815.] had a proper proportion of
Artillery attached to his army, as all other nations had, then he would
bring the Rocket Corps into play; but that he thought, situated as he
was, the gun a superior weapon. The argument, which had most weight in
support of the request to retain a proportion of [Sidenote: To D.-A.-G.
8 May, 1815.] rockets, was thus stated by Sir G. Wood: “The Duke was
determined at first to place the rockets in depôt, but after the good
appearance of our friend Whinyates’s troop, and the plan and mode he
suggested to his Grace, he has permitted him to take into the field
eight hundred rounds of rockets with his six guns, which makes him very
complete.”
The horsing of the Horse and Field Batteries during the Waterloo
campaign was admirable; but the Field Artillery excelled in this
particular to such an extent, that Sir George [Sidenote: Ibid.] Wood
wrote: “the Horse Artillery are really jealous of their appearance.” The
Duke had inspected the 9-pounder Field Brigade, commanded by Captain C.
F. Sandham, and had been so pleased that he desired General Maitland to
write to that officer as follows: “The Duke of Wellington has desired me
to communicate to you (and I have to request you will do so to the
officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers under your command),
his _unqualified approbation_ of the appearance of the brigade. I feel
gratified in being able to assure you that he commented on the horses,
appointments, and every part of it, with peculiar approbation.” This
company, which was No. 9 of the 3rd Battalion, and fired the first shot
at Waterloo, was--alas!--reduced in 1819. In forwarding a copy of the
above complimentary letter to the Ordnance, Sir G. Wood said: “All the
other brigades are equal, if not better, in horses.” What a contrast to
the Field Brigades of Egypt, and the first years of the Peninsula!--how
staunchly had the lessons taught by the experience of the latter been
studied and accepted!
[Sidenote: Sir G. Wood to D.-A.-G. Brussels, 12 May, 1815.]
On the 12th May, the Duke desired Sir G. Wood to write to the Ordnance,
requesting that two troops of Horse Artillery, in addition to the six
already in Belgium, should be sent out; stating, as his reason, the
deficiency of Field Brigades, and the impossibility of getting drivers
in sufficient numbers. He would gladly have taken 1000 drivers over his
actual artillery wants, for service with the small-arm ammunition
waggons, which he had succeeded in horsing in the country. Sir H.
Ross’s, the Chestnut Troop, and [Sidenote: Frazer’s Letters, p.
530-533.] Major Beane’s, were accordingly despatched; and arrived, the
former, at Ghent, on the 9th June, and the latter on the 10th, at
Ostend.
Constant changes in the armament of the troops of Horse Artillery in
Belgium had been suggested with a view to increasing the weight of
metal, and some of a tentative description were made in the beginning of
May. On the 16th of that month, the following armament was finally
[Sidenote: M.S. Return to D.-A.-G. with Letter from Col. Adye, 30 May,
1815, and Sir G. Wood, to D.-A.-G. 2 June, 1815.] decided upon:--
-----------------------------+------+------+-- ------+------+------+------+---------+---------+------
| Guns. | Ammunition Carriages.
+------+------+---------+------+------+------+---------+---------+------
|9-prs.|Light |Hvy. |Total.|9-prs.|Light |Hvy. |Caissons.|Total.
| |6-prs.|5½-in.| | |6-prs.|5½-in.| |
| | | how^s. | | | | how^s. | |
-----------------------------+------+------+---------+------+------+------+---------+---------+------
Sir H. D. Ross’s Troop| 5 | 5 | 1 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 2 | | 9
Sir R. Gardiner’s ” | | 5 | 1 | 6 | | 7 | 2 | | 9
Lt.-Col. Webber Smith’s ” | | | 1 | 6 | | | 2 | | 9
Captain Mercer’s (G) ” | 5 | | 1 | 6 | 7 | | 2 | | 9
Major Ramsay’s ” | 5 | | 1 | 6 | 7 | | 2 | | 9
Major Bull’s ” | | 5 | 6 | 6 | | 5 | 9 | 6 | 9
Captain Whinyates’s ” | | | 1 | 6 | | | 1 | | 12
+------+------+---------+------+------+------+---------+---------+------
| 15 | 15 | 12 | 42 | 21 | 19 | 20 | 6 | 66
-----------------------------+------+------+---------+------+------+------+---------+---------+------
N.B.--Major Beane’s Troop, when it arrived, was armed like Sir H.
Ross’s.
This change of armament proved very beneficial at Waterloo; but the
credit of introducing it seems to have been ascribed, without reason, to
the Duke of Wellington. [Sidenote: Frazer’s Letters, p. 551.] Writing
two days after the battle, Sir A. Frazer said: “I must be allowed to
express my satisfaction, that, _contrary to the opinion of most, I
ventured to change (and under discouraging circumstances of partial
want of means) the ordnance of the Horse Artillery_.” And again: “I
bless my stars that I had obstinacy enough to persist in changing the
guns of the Horse Artillery.” The forethought was certainly more
consistent in one who was an able and enthusiastic Horse-Artilleryman,
than in one who, like the Duke of Wellington, knew little of Artillery
details or tactics.
[Sidenote: Mercer’s Diary, vol. i. p. 160.]
The arrangement and constitution of a troop of Horse Artillery at
Waterloo are given with minuteness by General Mercer in his Diary.
Taking the troop, which he commanded, although only its 2nd Captain,[45]
as a sample of those more heavily armed, it appears that each gun, and
the howitzer, were drawn by 8 horses, and each waggon by 6. Each of the
six mounted detachments required 8 horses; 5 were required for the
staff-sergeants and farriers; 18 for the spare-wheel carriage, forge,
curricle-cart, baggage-waggon, &c.; 17 horses for officers, and 6 mules,
and 30 spare, additional horses. This gave a total of 226 per troop.
There were 23 non-commissioned officers, artificers, and trumpeters; 80
gunners, and 84 drivers. On parade, the 5½-inch howitzer was the right
of the centre division of the troop. It was of this troop that Blücher
said, at the review near [Sidenote: Ibid. p. 217.] Grammont on the 29th
May, that “he had never seen anything so superb in his life;” concluding
by exclaiming, “Mein Gott! dere is not von orse in dies batterie wich is
not goot for Veldt-Marshal!”
There is in the official correspondence of May and June 1815, a
collection of quaintly amusing letters from various 2nd Captains of
Artillery in Belgium, who, prior to the war, had been left in
undisturbed command of their batteries,--their 1st Captains being
specially employed--and who now wrote begging that the latter should not
be allowed to join, and thus rob them of their chances of distinction
and preferment. One of these--Captain Napier--wrote direct to the
Master-General, protesting against the appointment of Captain Bolton to
command his battery; which, he wrote, “hurt him much.” Little did he
think as he wrote that a mightier hand than the Master-General’s was in
a very few days to cancel the appointment, and that ere the first battle
should be over, he should resume the command, vacant by his senior’s
death! Pages might be filled with instances of this resentment at the
presence of a 1st Captain; nor were they confined to attempts to prevent
the seniors from joining. One 2nd Captain, whose commanding officer was
wounded at Quatre Bras, wrote off immediately, begging the
Master-General to appoint no one in his place, but to leave the command
in his hands.
When the Allies were ready, as far as equipment was concerned, Brussels
remained the head-quarters of the Duke of Wellington, and the army was
scattered through the country, in a way which has excited much criticism
among continental writers. Napoleon, when he fought the battles of Ligny
and Quatre Bras, had hoped to find the English army still in its
cantonments; but he was disappointed, for it had quitted them, and
commenced to concentrate on the 13th and 14th June. His intention had
been to defeat the Prussians, and compel them to retire on the base of
their communications and supplies, and to compel the advanced part of
the Anglo-allied army to retire from Quatre Bras on Brussels. In neither
particular were his hopes fulfilled. He certainly compelled the
Prussians, after their defeat at Ligny on the 16th June, to retire; but
they quitted the main road to Namur, along which Napoleon expected that
they would continue their retreat, and marched to Wavre by a road
parallel to that occupied by Wellington between Quatre Bras and
Brussels. This brilliant movement was unsuspected by Napoleon, whose
remissness after Ligny and during the early part of the 17th was
unaccountable. Disappointed in his [Sidenote: Sir G. Wood to D.-A.-G.
24/6/15.] plans with regard to the Prussians, he failed also in his
purpose against the English. Marshal Ney with two corps attacked part of
the Allied force at Quatre Bras, a place in front of the village of
Genappe, where two main roads--from Genappe to Charleroi, and Namur to
Nivelle--cross one another. The endurance of the Allies was tried to the
utmost by having to wait the arrival of reinforcements, and to fight
against superior numbers, but it was rewarded by a [Sidenote: Cust.]
complete, although costly, victory. The first attack was received by the
Belgians; but Picton’s English division, over 7000 strong, soon came up,
followed by over 6,500 Brunswickers and Germans. The battle commenced at
2 P.M. on the 16th; and at 4 o’clock the Duke of Wellington came on the
field with a brigade of foreign cavalry, and assumed the command. Later
in the evening, the 1st British division, under Generals Cook and
Maitland, with its artillery, arrived from Enghien, having marched for a
period of fifteen hours;[46] and with the approaching darkness came the
retreat of the French on Frasnes. This defeat ruined the French
Emperor’s plans, and paved the way for the greater defeat of the 18th.
[Sidenote: Sir G. Wood to D.-A.-G. 24/6/15.]
The following field-officers, troops, and brigades of Artillery were
present at the battle of Quatre Bras:--
Lieut.-Colonel S. G. Adye, commanding the Artillery of the 1st Division.
” Sir A. Frazer, commanding Royal Horse Artillery.
” Sir J. Hartmann, commanding King’s German Artillery.
” Sir J. May, Assist. Adjutant-General.
” Sir A. Dickson.
Captain Sandham’s Brigade, R.A. }
Major Kuhlmann’s Troop, K. G. L. } Attached to the 1st Division.
Major Lloyd’s Brigade, R.A. } ” 3rd Division.
Capt. Cleeve’s ” K. G. L. }
Major Roger’s ” R.A. ” 5th Division.
Major Heise, with Captain Rettberg’s brigade of Hanoverian Artillery,
was also engaged.
The Horse Artillery and British Cavalry did not come up until after the
battle; and the want of the latter was severely felt during the day, the
French being very strong in that arm.
[Sidenote: Sir A. Frazer’s Letters, p. 541.]
Major Lloyd’s and Major Rogers’ batteries were warmly engaged at Quatre
Bras. Two guns belonging to the former were lost, but were afterwards
recovered. The troop of [Sidenote: Ibid. p. 540.] German Horse Artillery
was of great service, sustaining the reputation which that corps had
earned in the Peninsula. But the losses among the Artillerymen were
small in proportion to those among the regiments of Infantry. Of 3750
British killed and wounded at Quatre Bras, only 28 belonged to the Royal
Artillery. The losses were, however, very severe among the horses, and
crippled the batteries very much. In Sir George Wood’s despatch
announcing the [Sidenote: To D.-A.-G. 24 June, 1815.] battle, he wrote:
“I beg you will be pleased to mention to his Lordship, the
Master-General, the good conduct of that part of the Artillery which was
engaged on the 16th. They were warmly engaged, being several times
charged by the French Cavalry,--and tended much to the success of the
day.” The merits of Quatre Bras, as a scene on which English courage and
endurance were nobly displayed, are too often forgotten in the
recollections of the greater battle, by which it was so speedily
followed.
In consequence of the Prussians moving on Wavre, it became necessary for
the Duke of Wellington to fall back also; and orders were given on the
17th for the army to retire to Mont St. Jean, not far from the village
of Waterloo. This position had been carefully selected and examined by
the Duke, with a view to the event which was now at hand. The retreat
through Genappe was effected with the greatest order, and was covered by
the Horse Artillery and Cavalry. [Sidenote: Mercer’s Diary, vol. i. p.
270.] Captain Mercer’s and Captain Whinyates’s troops were the last to
retire, the former officer having been detailed for that duty--the
latter having exceeded his orders, and remained behind, hoping to come
in for some fighting. For the Horse Artillery and Cavalry, the retreat
was no bed of roses. The heavy rains had made the roads and fields
almost impassable. Genappe is in a hollow; and as the Horse Artillery
mounted the slopes towards La Belle Alliance, pursued by the French
Cavalry, they had to move at a gallop through fields, which would have
tried them even at a walk. Sir Robert Gardiner’s troop was especially
taxed in this way; and he used frequently to say that it was fortunate
that his 6-pounder armament had not been exchanged for the heavier
nature; for his guns would certainly have been captured had this been
done. The nature of the ground which was traversed may be gathered from
the fact that not a horse in Sir Robert’s troop reached Mont St. Jean
without losing at least [Sidenote: Communicated by Colonel L. Gardiner,
R.-H.-A.] one shoe. The whole night of the 17th was spent in shoeing the
horses, and getting the troop ready for the work of the following day.
On the morning of the 18th June, the French army was drawn up on the
south side, and the Allies on the Brussels side, of a long hollow, which
common _parlance_ has inaccurately named the “field of Waterloo.” The
strength of the French army, according to the industrious
Siborne--checked by later writers--was, in round numbers, 72,000; that
of the Allies, about 68,000. The French had, in addition, Marshal
Grouchy’s force of 33,000 men, fourteen miles away, on a blind chase
after the Prussians, who were already six miles nearer Waterloo than
their pursuers; and Wellington had a division of 18,000 men on
detachment to his right, towards Hal, at a distance of ten miles. This
extra precaution--this strange nervousness about his right--has been
much and justly condemned by critics. When one reflects of what value
that force would have been at different times during the 18th, one
cannot but feel that if the Allied information to the right had been as
carefully procured, as it had been to the left of the army, the whole of
these 18,000 men might have been drawn in to the main body. However,
even admitting this to be a blunder, the French were nevertheless
utterly outmanœuvred. Napoleon’s remissness on the night of the 16th,
and his idleness on the morning of the 17th, were now to receive the
punishment which such qualities in the face of an enemy always deserve,
and generally get.
[Sidenote: Sir George Wood to D.-A.-G. 24 June, 1815.]
The Artillery engaged on the side of the Allies was as follows:--
Sir G. A. Wood commanding.
Lieut.-Colonel Sir A. Frazer, commanding R. H. A.
” S. G. Adye, ” Artillery of 1st Division.
” Gold, ” ” 2nd Division.
” Williamson, ” ” 3rd Division.
” Sir J. Hartmann, ” King’s German Artillery.
” A. Macdonald, ” {Six troops of H. A. attached
{to Cavalry.
Major Drummond, ” Reserve Artillery.
Lieut.-Colonel Sir A. Dickson.
The troops of Horse Artillery attached to the Cavalry were those
commanded by--
Lieut.-Colonel Webber Smith,
Lieut.-Colonel Sir R. Gardiner,
Major R. Bull,
Major N. Ramsay,
Captain Mercer, and
Captain Whinyates.
The divisional Artillery was as follows:--
Captain Sandham’s Brigade, R.A.}
Major Kuhlmann’s Troop, K.G.A. }1st Division.
Captain Bolton’s Brigade, R.A. }
Major Sympher’s Troop, K.G.A. }2nd Division.
Major Lloyd’s Brigade, R.A. }
Captain Cleve’s Brigade, R.A. }3rd Division.
Major Rogers’ Brigade, R.A. 5th Division.
The reserve Artillery--the whole of which came into action early in the
day--consisted of--
Lieut.-Colonel Sir H. D. Ross’s Troop, R.H.A.
Major Beane’s ” ”
Captain Sinclair’s Brigade, R.A.
Major Heise, and two brigades of Hanoverian Artillery, were also
engaged.
It will thus be seen that the number of troops and brigades of the Royal
Artillery engaged at the battle of Waterloo was thirteen, or a force of
78 guns, exclusive of the German and Hanoverian Artillery. Some
companies of the regiment were also present with the small-arm
ammunition for the army.
Captain Baynes acted as Brigade-Major to the Artillery; and Captain
Pakenham, Lieutenants Coles, J. Bloomfield, and W. Bell, acted as staff
officers.
[Sidenote: _Vide_ vol. ii. Appendix A.]
The description of the battle which will now be given will be brief; as
it will be necessary subsequently to enter with more detail into the
services and conduct of the Artillery during the day.
The battle of Waterloo was--as Sir James Shaw Kennedy expresses it--a
drama in five acts. The first was the attack on Hougomont at 11.30 A.M.,
many precious hours having been wasted by Napoleon; the second was the
attack by the French on La Haye Sainte, at half-past 1; the third was
the celebrated succession of cavalry attacks on the Allied line between
Hougomont and La Haye Sainte, commencing at 4 o’clock; the fourth was
the successful attack by Marshal Ney on La Haye Sainte, at 6
o’clock,--an event which if properly used by Napoleon might have had a
very grave effect on the result of the battle, for it caused a great gap
in the very centre of the Allied line; and the fifth was the celebrated
attack on the Allied centre made by 12 battalions of the Imperial Guard,
strengthened by the co-operation of [Sidenote: Kennedy.] other
divisions, and supported “by a powerful Artillery, and what remained of
the Cavalry.”
In the attack on Hougomont, the battery which most distinguished itself
was the famous old I Troop--now D Battery, B Brigade, R.H.A.--under
Major R. Bull, whose Peninsular history rivals that of the Chestnut
Troop. It was armed with howitzers; and cleared the wood in front of
Hougomont of the French troops,--firing shell with wonderful accuracy
over the heads of the English Infantry; an operation [Sidenote: Frazer’s
Letters, p. 556.] so delicate, as to make the Duke remark to Sir
Augustus Frazer, who ordered it, that he hoped he was not undertaking
too much. But Sir Augustus said that he could depend on the troop; and
the event proved that he was right: for after ten minutes’ firing, the
French were driven out of the wood. Webber Smith’s troop was also hotly
engaged during this first attack, and suffered during the day very
severely, not merely--as all did--from the French skirmishers, but also
from having been on one occasion enfiladed by one of Prince Jerome’s
batteries. Captain Bolton’s field brigade, which was to have so great
glory at a critical period in the day, was in action at the first attack
on Hougomont; and when subsequently moved more to the centre of the
Allied line, its place to the left of Hougomont was taken by Norman
Ramsay’s troop. It has already been mentioned that the first shot fired
by the Allied Artillery at Waterloo was fired by Captain Sandham’s
brigade. This was in reply to the first attack on Hougomont; and during
the day no fewer than 1100 rounds of ammunition were fired by this
single brigade.[47] Although beyond the province of this work to enter
into the Infantry details of the battle, it must yet be said that, even
in a day when the British Infantry showed a valour and endurance which
have never been surpassed, their defence of Hougomont shines with
especial lustre. Knowing its value, as strengthening the right of his
line, the Duke had taken precautions on the previous night by loopholing
the walls to render its defence more practicable. Although set on fire,
and attacked repeatedly by superior numbers, it was never lost; its
defenders showing a tenacity and courage, unexampled almost in the
annals of war.
In the second act of the drama--the first attack on La Haye
Sainte--Captain Whinyates’s troop and Major Rogers’ field brigade were
first engaged; and it is important to [Sidenote: _Vide_ Appendix A.]
remember, with a view to the argument, which is to come, that it was
during this act that the Artillery of the reserve was brought up. Sir
Hew Ross’s and Major Beane’s troops suffered at this time great loss.
Among the officers alone, Major Beane was killed, and both 2nd captains
and two subalterns wounded.
The third act, the charges of the French cavalry, will be fully
discussed in the argument, which will be found in the Appendix. Suffice
it to say, at present, that they were preceded by clouds of skirmishers,
and by a tremendous artillery fire; and that at no period of the day
were the losses among the Artillery more severe. Among those who fell
then was Norman Ramsay; and it was the lot of his [Sidenote: Frazer’s
Letters, p. 548.] dearest friend to witness and to tell the
circumstances. “In a momentary lull of the fire,” wrote Sir Augustus
Frazer, “I buried my friend Ramsay, from whose body I took the portrait
of his wife, which he always carried next his heart. Not a man assisted
at the funeral who did not shed tears. Hardly had I cut from his head
the hair which I enclose, and laid his yet warm body in the grave, when
our convulsive sobs were stifled by the necessity of [Sidenote: Nivelle,
20 June, 1815.] returning to renew the struggle.” Two days later, the
same hand wrote: “Now that the stern feelings of the day have given way
to the return of better ones, I feel with the bitterness of anguish not
to be described, the loss of my friend Ramsay. Nor for this friend
alone, but for [Sidenote: Dated 6 July, 1815.] many others, though less
dear than poor Norman.” And yet again, writing from Paris, Sir A. Frazer
said: “I cannot get Ramsay out of my head; such generosity, such
romantic self-devotion as his, are not common.” It was written of
Ramsay, “Sibi satis vixit,--non patriæ;” and it is difficult to conceive
a nobler eulogy. A man who never tampered with temptation, but trampled
on it instead,--he left behind him the story of a life, which is a model
for his successors in the Corps to imitate. There is a Waterloo going on
daily in a soldier’s life: his enemies are more skilled than
Napoleon--they are as relentless as death: they come dressed in many
garbs, but their names are sloth, ignorance, and vice; and the weapon by
which alone they can be overcome is an earnest and conscientious
performance of duty. This weapon must be grasped most firmly, and
wielded most mercilessly, when the duties to be performed are monotonous
or uninviting; but its unfailing use, even through a life of
uninteresting routine, will earn for the soldier, when the night comes,
the same words as were spoken of Norman Ramsay, “Satis sibi vixit,--non
patriæ.”
The fourth act of the drama witnessed, at 6 o’clock, the capture of La
Haye Sainte by the French, after a magnificent defence by Major Baring
and part of the King’s German Legion, which only failed from want of
ammunition. There seems little doubt that the Duke of Wellington had
underrated the importance of this position; indeed, he is said in later
years to have admitted it. Fortunately, Napoleon did not sufficiently
note the advantage he had gained; and contented himself with using its
now friendly cover in preparation for his great final effort.
The Prussians had by this time arrived, and were in force on the French
right. At the village of Planchenoit, they were already in such numbers
that the French General, Loban, required 16,000 men to keep them in
check. On the extreme left of the English, at Papillote, the advanced
parties of another Prussian column had also arrived; and, all fear for
his left being now at an end, the Duke of Wellington was enabled to
strengthen his centre, and his right centre, by moving Vivian’s and
Vaudeleur’s Cavalry Brigades from the left, accompanied by Sir Robert
Gardiner’s troop of Horse Artillery.
The necessity of a great final effort was now apparent to Napoleon; and
the curtain rose on the fifth act of the drama at half-past 7 o’clock.
It is a point which the Artilleryman should never forget, that, in this
majestic advance of the Imperial Guard, its head was broken and thrown
into confusion by the fire of Captain Bolton’s guns, before the 52nd
Regiment, and the Guards, did their celebrated work. It was at this time
that Captain Bolton was killed, and that the Duke personally gave his
orders to Captain Napier,--the 2nd Captain,--as the French approached,
to load with canister.
While the advancing columns of the enemy were in the hollow, their
artillery carried on a cannonade over their heads, more terrible than
had been witnessed during the day. The following description of Mercer’s
battery at the end of the day will give the reader an idea of the
murderous [Sidenote: Mercer’s Journal, vol. i. p. 331.] fire to which
the Allies were exposed. “Of 200 fine horses,” he wrote, “with which we
had entered the battle, upwards of 140 lay dead, dying, or severely
wounded. Of the men, scarcely two-thirds of those necessary for _four_
guns remained; and those so completely exhausted, as to be totally
incapable of further exertion. Lieutenant Breton had had three horses
killed under him; Lieutenant Hincks was wounded in the breast by a spent
ball; Lieutenant Leathes on the hip by a splinter; and although
untouched myself, my horse had no less than eight wounds. Our guns and
carriages were all together in a confused heap, intermingled with dead
and wounded horses, which it had not been possible to disengage from
them.” And this was but typical of most of the batteries engaged.
As for the Infantry, words cannot paint too highly their endurance on
that long day. One regiment had 400 men killed or wounded, before they
were allowed to fire a trigger; and all suffered heavily. Yet there was
not a word of distrust as regarded their great commander. They pined
with all their hearts for permission to attack, instead of lying where
they often were--being shot by scores; but discipline was stronger than
desire. Even at the worst times, a word from the Duke, or a report that
he was coming, sufficed to produce a silence and a steadiness, as
perfect as if on parade in a barrack-square. For those who were present,
Waterloo was thus a double victory,--over their enemies, and over
themselves. True discipline is a succession of such victories.
With the noble charge of the 52nd, followed by the general advance of
the whole line, the French retreat became a rout,--the most disastrous,
as has been said, on record: but the record referred to did not include
the Titanic battles of the last few years. The Prussians took up the
pursuit, and the Allied Army bivouacked on the field of battle.
So much detail connected with the services of the Artillery at Waterloo
must of necessity be given in the Appendix, that it has not been thought
advisable to anticipate it here. But there are several interesting
Regimental matters connected with the battle, for the insertion of which
this seems the most suitable place.
In the first place, the names of the officers belonging to the troops
and brigades, which were present, may be given.
TOTAL NUMBER OF ALL RANKS of the following TROOPS and BRIGADES
present at WATERLOO, according to MS. RETURNS TO BOARD OF
ORDNANCE, dated Paris, 18th September, 1815.
R.H.A.
Major R. Bull’s Troop, now “D” Battery, B Brigade.
No.
2nd Captain Brevet-Major R. M. Cairnes }
Lieutenant Louis } 168
” Smith }
” Townsend }
Lieutenant Colonel Webber Smith’s Troop, now “B” Battery, B Brigade.
2nd Captain E. T. Walcott }
Lieutenant Edwards } 167
” Forster }
” Crawford }
Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Robert Gardiner’s Troop, now “A” Battery, B Brigade.
2nd Captain T. Dyneley }
Lieutenant Harding } 174
” Swabey }
” Ingilby }
Captain Whinyates’s Troop (reduced in 1816).
2nd Captain Dansey }
Lieutenant Strangways }
” Wright } 194
” Ward }
” Ord }
2nd Captain Mercer’s Troop, now “C” Battery, B Brigade.
2nd Captain Newland }
Lieutenant Leathes } 164
” Hincks }
” Breton }
Major Ramsay’s Troop, now “D” Battery, A Brigade.
2nd Captain A. Macdonald }
Lieutenant Brereton }
” Sandilands } 173
” Robe }
Lieutenant-Colonel Sir H. D. Ross’s Troop, now “A” Battery, A Brigade.
2nd Captain and Brevet-Major Parker }
Lieutenant Hardinge }
” Day } 159
” Warde }
” Onslow }
R.H.A.
Major Beane’s Troop (reduced in 1816).
2nd Captain Webber }
Lieutenant Maunsell } 169
” Bruce }
” Cromie }
R.A.
Captain C. F. Sandham’s Brigade (reduced in 1819).
2nd Captain Stopford }
Lieutenant Foot } 105
” Baynes }
” Jago }
This and all the other Field Brigades were armed, each with five
9-pounders and one 5½-inch howitzer.
[Sidenote: MS. Returns, dated 30 May, 1815.]
Captain Bolton’s Brigade, now “E” Battery, 8th Brigade.
2nd Captain Napier }
Lieutenant Pringle }
” Anderson } 101
” Spearman }
” Sharpin }
” B. Cuppage }
Major Lloyd’s Brigade (reduced in April, 1817).
2nd Captain S. Rudyerd }
Lieutenant Phelps } 97
” Harvey }
Captain Sinclair’s Brigade, now “4” Battery, 3rd Brigade (Captain Gordon being absent).
2nd Captain F. Macbean }
Lieutenant Wilson }
” Poole } 104
” Burnaby }
Major Roger’s Brigade, now “7” Battery, 13th Brigade.
Lieutenant R. Manners }
(_Other officers’ names not given._) } 94
These were the only troops and brigades which were engaged. There were
others, which were in the vicinity, but not present at the battle; and
there were also detachments of other brigades present with small-arm
ammunition. Lieutenants E. Trevor, W. Lemoine, J. Bloomfield, and others
already named, were present on staff or unattached duty.
Of the officers named above, the following were killed or wounded at the
battle of Waterloo:--
[Sidenote: Sir George A. Wood to Master-General, 24 June, 1815.]
Major W. N. Ramsay, R.H.A., Killed.
” R. M. Cairnes ” ”
” G. Beane ” ”
” J. B. Parker ” Severely wounded: leg amputated.
” R. Bull ” Slightly wounded.
Captain Whinyates ” ”
” Dansey ” ”
” Macdonald ” ”
” Webber ” ”
Lieutenant Strangways ” ”
” Brereton ” Severely, not dangerously.
” Robe ” ” (since dead).
” Smith ” Slightly wounded.
” Cromie ” Severely: both legs amputated.
” Forster ” ” not dangerously.
” Crawford ” Slightly wounded.
” Day ” ”
Major H. Baynes R.A. Slightly wounded.
Captain Bolton ” Killed.
Major Lloyd ” Severely wounded (died).
Captain Napier ” Severely wounded.
Lieutenant Spearman ” ”
” R. Manners ” Severely (since dead).
” Harvey ” ” right arm amputated.
” Poole ” ” not dangerously.
[Sidenote: Dated 24 June, 1815.]
The numerical losses, as shown by Sir George Wood in his official return
to the Ordnance, were as follows:--
Rank
Officers. Sergeants. and Horses.
File.
Royal Horse Artillery--
Killed 3 1 31 229
Wounded 14 8 107 59
Missing 0 0 7 21
-- -- --- ---
Total 17 9 145 309
-- -- --- ---
Royal Artillery--
Killed 1 0 19 80
Wounded 7 4 61 34
Missing 0 0 2 12
-- -- --- ---
Total 8 4 82 126
-- -- --- ---
King’s German Legion Artillery--
Killed 1 1 10 47
Wounded 6 1 47 44
Missing 0 0 1 3
-- -- --- ---
Total 7 2 58 94
-- -- --- ---
General Total 32 15 285 529
-- -- --- ---
There were two field brigades, which formed part of the Duke of
Wellington’s army, but which were not brought up in time for the battle,
although they were of great importance during the subsequent siege
operations against the fortresses. Their armament was the same as that
of the [Sidenote: _Vide_ ‘Hist. R.A.’ vol. i. p. 221.] others; and one
of them, Captain Brome’s, would appear to have been in position,
although not engaged;--possibly detached at Hal. The officers with
these, and their numbers, were as follows:-
Total
of all
Ranks.
Captain Brome’s Brigade, now 2 Battery, 13th Brigade, R.A.
2nd Captain J. E. G. Parker }
Lieutenant Saunders } 106
” Cater }
” Molesworth }
Major G. W. Unett, now 3 Battery, 7th Brigade, R.A.
2nd Captain Browne }
Lieutenant Lawson } 106
” Montagu }
These brigades received the boon service granted for the battle of
Waterloo under a Horse Guards’ decision, which was promulgated in Paris
on the 5th September, 1815, including among Waterloo men all troops,
which had on the 18th June been employed either in the village of
Waterloo, or had been detached to the right to prevent the advance of
the enemy towards Brussels by Hal.
The companies which were present with small-arm ammunition, or which
furnished detachments for that service, will be found in the chapters on
the various battalions.
The commendations passed on the corps generally for its services at
Waterloo will be found in Appendix A, in support of the argument therein
contained. But it may be interesting to the friends or descendants of
individual officers, who were present, and who specially distinguished
themselves, to read extracts from the reports sent to the Ordnance.
These [Sidenote: Dated Le Cateau, 24 June, 1815.] will be given without
comment. “I feel,” wrote Sir George Wood, “that I should particularly
mention that I wish Lieutenant-Colonel Sir John May may succeed to one
of the vacant troops; and I do assure you the conduct of Major Lloyd was
conspicuous to the whole army. This officer and Captain Mercer[48] are
candidates for the other vacant troop. Captain Mercer was the senior
second captain in the field, and behaved nobly. I must also mention that
Lieutenant Louis commanded Major Bull’s troop for some time. Lieutenant
Sandilands was the only officer left with the command of poor Major
Ramsay’s troop, the rest of the officers being wounded. I beg to mention
him to your protection, as well as Lieutenants Coles and Wells, whom I
have appointed to do duty with the Horse Artillery, and I beg you will
use your interest with the Master-General that they may be confirmed....
I shall certainly give in the name of Captain Macdonald for brevet
promotion; it was with great difficulty that he could be made quit the
field when severely wounded,--as well as Lieutenant Brereton, who
remained in the field of battle until Lieutenant-Colonel Macdonald
ordered him to the rear, to have his wounds dressed.... Although
Lieutenant-Colonel Gold was in command of a Division of Artillery in the
field, I beg you will mention to the Master-General that I have received
great benefit from his advice and zeal, during the time I have commanded
the Artillery in the Pays-Bas.... I beg leave to mention that Lieutenant
Bloomfield was both days in the field with me; and should he wish at
some future time to be posted to the Horse Brigade, I hope he will not
be forgot.” In another despatch to General Macleod, Sir George Wood
wrote as follows: “I must call your particular attention to the officers
who attended me personally in the field, whose merits I beg to recommend
to the consideration of His Lordship the Master-General.” These officers
were Lieutenant-Colonel Sir A. Frazer, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir J.
Hartmann, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir A. Dickson, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir J.
May, Captain Baynes, Brigade Major, Lieutenants Coles, Bloomfield, Bell,
and Meëlmann--all of whom were mentioned by name.
[Sidenote: To Sir G. A. Wood, 24 June, 1815.]
Lieutenant-Colonel Macdonald thus described the services of his
Adjutant: “In justice to the conduct of Captain Pakenham, who acted as
my Adjutant in the battle of the 18th, I feel it a duty I owe this most
promising officer to state to you that he made himself equally
conspicuous by his coolness and bravery, and the precision with which he
conveyed my orders to the troops of Horse Artillery I had the honour to
command on that occasion.” Sir Augustus Frazer spoke in equally
favourable terms of his Adjutant: [Sidenote: Ibid. 23 June, 1815.] “I
beg to submit my hope that, in the promotion which may be expected, the
Horse Artillery may not lose the services of Lieutenant Bell, who, both
here and in the Peninsula, has acted as Adjutant of Horse Artillery, and
is an officer of much professional merit, whose judgment, intelligence,
and unceasing application to the duties of his office, have rendered him
very valuable.”
Major Bull thus described the conduct of his gallant troop, now D
Battery, B Brigade, Royal Horse Artillery: [Sidenote: Major Bull to Sir
A. Frazer, 19 June, 1873.] “I consider it a duty I owe equally to the
officers, non-commissioned officers, gunners, and drivers, to say that,
throughout the day, and in every situation, nothing could exceed their
coolness, intrepidity, and strict attention to orders; and as a proof of
their zeal in the service, at one period of the evening when we were
short of ammunition, and H Troop” (Major Ramsay’s) “on our left rather
short of gunners, on an application for assistance, several of my men
volunteered joining their guns, until our ammunition came up; and as
far as was prudent or necessary, I granted their request. I must also
beg leave to say that, from Major Cairnes having unfortunately fallen
very early in the action, I received the greatest assistance throughout
the day from Lieutenant Louis’s activity; and it is but justice to this
officer to add, that, when I was under the necessity of quitting the
field for half an hour, in consequence of my being wounded, he commanded
the troop during my absence in a manner that did himself great credit,
and gave me perfect satisfaction at a very arduous period of the
action.”
[Sidenote: To Sir G. A. Wood, dated 15 July, 1815.]
General Colquhoun Grant, in writing of Captain Walcott, said: “I beg to
recommend this gallant and meritorious officer to your attention.” He
added: “I have great pleasure in embracing this opportunity to mention
my entire and full approbation of the conduct of Lieut.-Colonel Webber
Smith, and the officers and men of his troop” (now B Battery, B Brigade,
Royal Horse Artillery), “during the whole of the period they have been
attached to the brigade under my command.”
Lieutenant-Colonel Macdonald,--an enthusiastic Horse Artilleryman--in
addition to the letter quoted above, wrote [Sidenote: Ibid. dated 16
July, 1815.] as follows: “In addition to the names of the various
officers belonging to the six troops of Royal Horse Artillery, attached
to the Cavalry, whose lot it was to command troops on the memorable day
of the 18th June, it has occurred to me to be no less my duty to express
to you my admiration of the cool and determined conduct of Captain
Walcott, who was some time detached from his troop on that day; and who,
in the handsomest manner, after the whole of his ammunition was
expended, volunteered to take charge of some of the guns of Major
Ramsay’s troop, after it had suffered much by the loss of officers. It
is also highly satisfactory to me to report to you the equally gallant
conduct of Captain Dansey, of Captain Whinyates’s Rocket Troop, which I
also had an opportunity of witnessing; and who was wounded when detached
with rockets in the _chaussée_, which crossed the centre of the
position. You are already aware, from your own observation, how much all
the officers of these troops distinguished themselves on the occasion,
and what a noble example they set to the non-commissioned officers and
men by whom it was so gallantly initiated. Words are indeed inadequate
to express my sense of the conduct of all, where the reputation, which
the Horse Artillery had before obtained, was so nobly sustained, if not
even surpassed; and which I must plead as my excuse for extending the
limits of this communication beyond my original intention, viz., that of
drawing your attention to the merits of Captains Walcott and Dansey.”
In reporting the death of Major Lloyd, from his wounds, [Sidenote: Dated
Paris, 3 Aug. 1815.] Sir George Wood wrote: “I can, without hesitation,
affirm that a braver, or more zealous officer, never entered a field of
battle; and who did his duty on the 16th and 18th to the satisfaction of
every General officer.” A few days later, in enclosing a letter from
Lieutenant Brereton, Sir [Sidenote: Ibid. 17 Aug. 1815.] George said: “I
have received from every commanding officer the handsomest testimony of
the conduct of Lieutenant Brereton, both in the Peninsula, and at the
battle of Waterloo; and I have it from General Byng to say that, on the
battle of the 16th (the Horse Artillery not being engaged on that day),
he proffered his service to act as aide-de-camp, which service he
performed to the great satisfaction of the General.” At a subsequent
date, in forwarding an application from Major Percy Drummond, [Sidenote:
Ibid. 8 Oct. 1815.] Sir George Wood said: “I have ever found Major
Drummond a most active, zealous, and attentive officer, having been
under my command on several occasions, particularly in the battle of
Waterloo.” In acknowledging a letter from [Sidenote: Ibid. 28 Jan.
1816.] Major Rogers, Sir George said: “Your company at all times did you
every justice, and proved it under your command at the battle of
Waterloo, in which your brigade bore a distinguished feature.” Almost
every officer who served in the Artillery at Waterloo, received from his
gallant commander some official commendation; and, by this means, many
Regimental incidents connected with the battle have been handed down.
In writing, for example, about an officer who lived to be a revered
General in the Corps, Sir George Wood said: [Sidenote: Dated
Valenciennes, 29 Feb, 1816.] “Lieutenant William Anderson has conducted
himself in every situation as a good and zealous officer. On the 18th
June,--on many occasions during that day,--he carried my orders, and
brought off some disabled guns under a severe fire. Having my horses
shot, I was forced to dismount him.”
[Sidenote: Sir George Wood to Gen. Macleod, dated 3 July, 1815.]
At the battle of Waterloo, the Artillery expended 10,400 rounds of
ammunition. The amount fired by one battery, Captain Sandham’s, has
already been stated; and it may be mentioned here that Captain
Whinyates’s troop fired 309 shot, 236 spherical case, 15 common case,
and 52 rockets.
[Sidenote: Memoir of Sir E. C. Whinyates, p. 3.]
The subsequent operations of the English army during the year, in which
this history comes, for the present, to an end, will merely be glanced
at. The main body of the army marched at once towards Paris; and the
damage suffered by the Artillery during the battle was so quickly
repaired, that [Sidenote: Sir George Wood to D.-A.-Gen., dated 3 July,
1815.] Sir George Wood was able to take every gun with him that had been
on the field, with four 18-pounders in addition; making a total of 123
pieces of ordnance, and over 20,000 rounds of ammunition, with which the
army marched on Paris. The collapse of any opposition, and the ultimate
occupation of that city by the Allies, are facts well known to the
reader. There were, however, some Artillery operations against the
French fortresses, in which some brigades of Artillery, under Sir
Alexander Dickson, were engaged. Maubeuge surrendered on the 12th July,
and was taken possession of on the 14th, after three days’ open
trenches, and firing. Landrecy surrendered on the 21st, and was taken
possession of on the 23rd July, after two day’s open trenches,
[Sidenote: Sir A. Dickson, to D.-A.-G., dated 12 Aug. 1815.] and about
two hours’ firing. Marienbourg surrendered on the 28th, and was taken
possession of on the 30th July, after one day’s open trenches and heavy
bombardment. Philippeville was taken possession of on the 10th August,
having surrendered on the 8th, after one day’s open trenches and heavy
bombardment. Sir Alexander Dickson spoke in the highest terms of the
officers and men under his command; he attributed to their energy the
fact that at every place he was able to collect, previous to commencing
operations, sufficient ordnance and ammunition to have reduced it, as he
said, by main force. At Maubeuge, he had 60 guns--30 of which were
24-pounders,--20,000 round shot, and 26,000 shells. At Landrecy he had
60 guns, 24,000 round shot, and 22,000 shells. At Marienbourg, he had 15
mortars, with 3000 shells; and 6 24-pounders arrived, just as the place
surrendered. At Philippeville, he had 66 pieces of ordnance, with 17,000
round shot, and 23,000 shells. During these operations, the Artillery
was attached to a corps of the Prussian army, by which the sieges of the
fortresses were conducted. The terms on which the duties were performed
were somewhat peculiar. “Our line of duty,” wrote Sir [Sidenote: Sir A.
Dickson to D.-A.-G., dated 12 Aug. 1815.] A. Dickson, “is to move the
battering-train, keep it in order, fix the shells, fill the cartridges,
and, in short, do every individual thing except fighting the guns: which
my instructions neither authorize me to do, nor would it be pleasant to
do, if they did; for we should not get the credit we ought, when working
in competition with the Prussian Artillery: whereas, as the duty is
conducted now, every fair and just credit is allowed for our exertions,
and the service goes on with the utmost cordiality. Prince Augustus of
Prussia is chief of the Artillery of that kingdom, and he takes into his
own hand very much the application of the artillery; which is very
pleasant for me, as I receive all the arrangements and instructions,
direct from his Royal Highness. An application is given in every morning
at the park during a siege, expressing the ordnance and ammunition
required for the next day; and in the evening the Prussian Artillery
come to receive their demands. I have, however, a few officers and men
of the Royal Artillery in the trenches, to afford any assistance when
required; and also to watch the practice, report about the fuzes, &c.”
[Sidenote: Ibid. dated 22 Aug. 1815.]
After the fall of Philippeville, Major Carmichael’s company, with the
advanced division of the battering-train, consisting of thirty-three
mortars and howitzers, reached a point near Rocroy, on the 15th
August:--followed by Major Michell’s and Major Wall’s companies with
ten 24-pounders, and a large supply of ammunition. The Prussians opened
the trenches on the night of the 15th, and batteries were prepared for
twenty-one mortars and howitzers. With such effect were these opened on
the morning of the 16th, that before 9 A.M. Rocroy capitulated. After
this event, Prince Augustus expressed himself highly satisfied with the
exertions of the British Artillery attached to the battering-train; and
orders reached Sir Alexander Dickson from the Duke of Wellington to
bring the second battering-train, which was at Antwerp, to Brussels, and
to land it forthwith. The next operation of any importance was against
the town of Givet, against which no fewer than one hundred guns were
collected. Before the bombardment commenced, however, the Governor
consented to give up the place, and retire into Charlemont; which he did
on the 11th September.
A force under Sir Charles Colville had been sent against Cambray,
immediately after Waterloo, and the place--after a short siege--was
carried on the 25th June. Of the conduct [Sidenote: To the Duke of
Wellington, 26 June, 1815.] of the Artillery on this occasion, Sir
Charles wrote: “The three brigades of Artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel
Webber Smith, and Majors Unett and Brome, under the direction of
Lieutenant-Colonel Hawker, made particularly [Sidenote: Sir George Wood
to D.-A.-G., Paris, 4 Sept. 1815.] good practice.” The services of Major
Unett’s brigade (now 3 Battery, 7th Brigade) received special mention in
a report from Sir Charles Colville to Sir George Wood; and the following
extract from a letter written by its gallant commander may interest the
officers and men now serving in [Sidenote: Major Unett to Sir G. Wood,
dated 3 Aug. 1815.] the battery. “My brigade, being in reserve, had not
an opportunity of witnessing the late glorious battle of Waterloo, but
it afterwards proceeded with the 4th Division of the army for the
purpose of reducing the fortress of Cambray; and, in justice to my
officers, I must be permitted to say that my three subalterns, never
having been under fire before, deserve much praise for their cool and
steady behaviour at their guns (within four hundred yards of the curtain
of the citadel, in an open field), and which was clearly evinced by the
uncommon good practice made, which so completely silenced the enemy as
to cause (by driving them from their guns and ramparts) a most trifling
loss to our Infantry when they stormed the place.” The French king
entered Cambray on the day after it was taken: and on the same day,
Peronne was taken by General Maitland and the Guards.
Arrangements for concluding hostilities, and entering upon a treaty,
were soon made in Paris. One of the conditions inflicted on the French
people was that an army of occupation should be left in France for
five--afterwards reduced to three--years; and considerable difficulty
was found in apportioning the various arms in the English contingent of
that army.
The Duke of Wellington decided on reducing the Artillery share to a
point far below what Sir George Wood thought desirable; and the latter
urged his views very strongly, but, as he said, “What can a
Lieut.-Colonel do against a Field-Marshal?”[49] However, his importunity
succeeded in obtaining an addition of two companies to the Artillery
force which was at first intended to remain in France.
[Sidenote: MS. Return to B. of Ordnance, dated Paris, 10 Dec. 1815.]
The following was the number ultimately decided upon:--
1 Colonel } for duty as the Regimental Staff of the Royal
1 Assistant Adjutant-Gen. } Artillery in the Army of Occupation.
1 Brigade Major }
Three troops of Royal Horse Artillery to be attached to the
Cavalry, and to amount to 542 of all ranks, with 516 horses.
Seven brigades of Foot Artillery, having a company of Artillery to
each; six of which were to be attached to the three divisions of
the army, and one to be in reserve. The total of all ranks, with
these brigades, amounted to 790; and there were in addition 599
officers and men of the Royal Artillery Drivers, and 770 horses.
For duty with the small-arm ammunition brigades for the three
divisions of the army, there were three officers of Royal
Artillery; 150 non-commissioned officers and men of the Royal
Artillery Drivers; and 210 horses.
There was also a company of Royal Artillery in reserve, numbering
111 of all ranks.
One Lieut.-Colonel and one Major were attached to the Royal Horse
Artillery.
Two Lieut.-Colonels and one Major were attached to the Royal
Artillery.
And one Lieut.-Colonel was attached to the Royal Artillery
Drivers.
The following were the five troops of Horse Artillery selected to return
to England, when the above establishment was decided upon:--
[Sidenote: MS. Return to B. of Ord. dated Paris, 10 Dec. 1815.]
R. A.
Strength. Horses. Drivers
attached.
Lieut.-Colonel Sir R. Gardiner’s troop 179 of all ranks. 198 22
” Webber Smith’s ” 176 ” 197 20
” Sir H. D. Ross’s ” 189 ” 219 30
Major Whinyates’s ” 223 ” 219 nil.
Captain Mercer’s (late Beane’s) ” 176 ” 196 26
Detachment R. H. A. 59 ” 156 83
Orders for the shipment of the battering-train also arrived in the end
of 1815, with a view to its return to England; and, as Sir Alexander
Dickson’s active duties on the continent then ceased, it seems but
justice to the memory of one whose name has occupied so prominent a
place in these pages, to quote a passage from a letter written by Sir
George Wood, proving that his exceptional Peninsular honours had
[Sidenote: To D.-A.-G., R.A., dated Cambray, 2 April, 1816.] not
unfitted him for serving, when required, in a subordinate
position:--“You may expect Sir A. Dickson in the course of the next week
at Woolwich. I have found him the same good officer and man, as you well
know him.”
The reductions, which followed the battle of Waterloo have been
frequently alluded to in these volumes. They would furnish but a gloomy
topic for the historian, for the pruning-knife was used without regard
to sentiment, and some of the best companies in the regiment were the
victims.
It is more pleasant to close this story in 1815, when the Corps was at
the greatest strength attained since its birth,--a hundred years before.
Suffice it to say that from 114 [Sidenote: Kane’s List.] troops and
companies in that year, it fell to 79 before 1819, and even these were
mere ghosts or skeletons of their former selves. For nearly thirty
years, after 1819, the history of the Regiment was almost a blank page,
and hopelessness and depression weighed heavily on its members.
But 1815 is the year in which this narrative ends; nor is it meant to
close it with any gloomy foreshadowing of the years of inaction and
despondency, which rolled on with dismal monotony, until the Regimental
firmament was lit by the lurid fires of the Crimean struggle. In 1815
the military reputation of England was at a maximum. She possessed an
army which had graduated with honours in the sternest school, and a
General to whose words the Sovereigns of Europe listened with deference.
Determination, single-mindedness, and an exalted sense of duty were the
qualities which had animated the Duke of Wellington through his whole
career. Their reward was found in his successes; and his successes were
crowned in Paris. Imperfections exist in the most able, and even in the
most conscientious; and England’s greatest General was certainly no
exception to this rule. But, if we allow for the irritation caused by
frequent and injudicious interference,--and for occasional hastiness,
which led him to speak without always testing the accuracy of his
information,--we must admit the Duke of Wellington to have been the most
perfect type of an English soldier ever presented in the pages of our
history. When, however, the Artilleryman seeks for something that is
genial and lovable in the soldiers of that victorious age,--he turns
from the cold and undemonstrative Chief, and dwells fondly on the men
who had by their exertions raised Artillery, as a science, to an
unprecedented point, and had elevated with it the Corps [Sidenote:
Hime.] they loved. The researches of a recent writer have brought to
light words spoken by a chivalrous enemy, which should be emblazoned in
the records of every battery, and impressed [Sidenote: General Foy.] on
the mind of every Artilleryman:--“Les canonniers Anglais se distinguent
entre les autres soldats par le bon esprit qui les anime. En bataille
leur activité est judicieuse, leur coup d’œil parfait, et leur bravoure
stoïque.” Of the latter three qualities, two may be ensured by diligence
in peace, and the third is tested by the difficulties and dangers of
war: but the history of the great and the good in the Corps must indeed
have been feebly written, if it do not strengthen among its living
members that which exists now, as of old, “le bon esprit qui les
anime.”
APPENDICES.
APPENDIX A.
THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON, AND THE ARTILLERY AT WATERLOO.
[Sidenote: Jones’s Sieges, vol. i., p. 222.]
In the first volume of Sir J. T. Jones’s ‘Sieges in Spain,’ edited by
Lieutenant-Colonel H. D. Jones, the following passage occurs: “It
becomes the duty of the Editor to remove the very injurious and
unmerited censure cast upon the officers of Engineers who were employed
at the Siege of Badajoz, and which is contained in a letter from the
Earl of Wellington to Major-General G. Murray, a copy of which is
published in the collection of the Despatches of the Duke of
Wellington.”
The Editor then proceeds to prove, most clearly and successfully, that
the hasty language used with reference to the Engineers was not only
injurious, but also unmerited.
The same great General is also convicted by his admirer, Napier, of
hasty inconsistency in his private correspondence. It was of the very
same troops, and referring to precisely the same time, that the Duke of
Wellington wrote in one [Sidenote: Napier’s ‘Peninsular War,’ vol. vi.,
p. 166.] letter: “The soldiers are detestable for everything but
fighting; and the officers are as culpable as the men:” and in another,
“that he thought he could go anywhere, and do anything with the army
that fought on the Pyrenees.”
Well might Napier say that the vehemence of the censure in the former of
the quotations is inconsistent with the latter, and now celebrated,
observation.
It now becomes the painful, and yet necessary, task of the chronicler of
the services of the Royal Artillery, as of the member of the sister
corps already quoted, “to remove a very injurious and unmerited censure”
cast upon the Regiment, in a private letter, written by the Duke of
Wellington, with reference to its conduct at the battle of Waterloo. Of
this letter’s existence the world was ignorant until the year 1872, when
it made its appearance in a volume of ‘Supplementary Letters and
Despatches of the Duke of Wellington,’ published by his son. The
sensation which it was certain [Sidenote: ‘Athenæum.’] to produce was
foretold by one of the reviews, and was anticipated by the noble Editor.
As, however, his object was to tell the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth, the present Duke did not feel justified in
withholding from publication any letter, which was found among his
father’s papers, merely because it might wound the feelings of its
readers, or give a new interpretation of historical events. And although
the indiscriminate publication of a man’s private correspondence is a
doubtful tribute to his memory, and a severe test of his reputation, it
is, on the whole, fortunate for the Royal Artillery that this letter
made its appearance, while officers were yet alive, who had taken a part
in the battle referred to in its pages, and clearly remembered its
details.
The original letter was written by the Duke of Wellington to Lord
Mulgrave, then Master-General of the Ordnance, on the 21st December,
1815. The published letter was from a copy, or draft, of the original,
which was found among the Duke’s papers. The hope that perhaps there may
have been modifications in the original, which did not exist in the
draft or copy, disappears before the fact that Lord Mulgrave’s answer
was also found among the Duke’s papers, expressing his amazement at the
letter he had just received. The harsh statements in the published
draft, or copy, were doubtless, therefore, left in the original when
forwarded. The circumstances under which the letter were written were as
follows. The field officers of the Royal Artillery, who had been present
at Waterloo, applied to the Master-General [Sidenote: ‘Hist. R. A.,’
vol. ii. p. 356.] of the Ordnance for the same pensions for service as
had been given after Vittoria. The indignation with which the Duke of
Wellington had heard of the Vittoria pensions was well known in the
Regiment: nor can one avoid sympathising with him. Discipline must
suffer if the power of rewarding, or recommending for reward, be
independent of the commander of the forces as a channel. The special
interference of the Ordnance on behalf of the Corps, which was their
_protégé_, was not merely a breach of discipline, to which a man like
the Duke of Wellington was not likely tamely to submit, but must have
had an irritating effect on the rest of the army. When, therefore, the
field officers of Artillery present at Waterloo resolved to apply for
the same reward as had been given after Vittoria, they had the
alternative before them of making their request through the Duke, basing
it upon a precedent which was detestable in his eyes, or of availing
themselves of the dual government, under which they served, by making a
direct application to the Ordnance. Of these alternatives, the former
would have been the more soldierlike, but was not likely to succeed: the
latter, therefore, was unfortunately adopted.
The application was not couched in a very official form, nor was it
officially pressed by Sir George Wood. The only reference to it which
can be traced in that officer’s correspondence is in a letter announcing
Major Lloyd’s death, [Sidenote: Dated Paris, 3 Aug, 1815.] in which he
writes:--“Should Lord Mulgrave, in his goodness, be inclined to grant
pensions to field officers and captains commanding brigades, similar to
the battle of Vittoria, I hope and trust that the late Major Lloyd’s
family may receive the benefit his service deserved.” The precedent of
Vittoria was not quite a parallel case to that of Waterloo: in the
former every brigade with the army had been in action; while, in the
latter, some had been detached. It seems to have been on this
distinction, mainly, that Lord Mulgrave based his refusal to grant the
reward. To justify himself, he referred the matter to the Duke of
Wellington, who approved of the refusal, as might have been expected,
but did so in terms which reveal an inaccuracy, and a hastiness,
unparalleled in his Grace’s correspondence. He wrote as follows:--
“TO THE EARL OF MULGRAVE.
“Paris, _21st December, 1815_.
“MY DEAR LORD,
“I received yesterday your Lordship’s letter of the 10th,
regarding the claim of the field officers of the Artillery,
present in the battle of Waterloo, to the same measure of favour
granted to those in the battle of Vittoria.
“In my opinion you have done quite right to refuse to grant this
favour, and that you have founded your refusal on the best
grounds. I cannot recommend that you should depart from the ground
you have taken. To tell you the truth, I was not very well pleased
with the Artillery in the battle of Waterloo.
“The army was formed in squares immediately on the slope of the
rising ground, on the summit of which the Artillery was placed,
with orders not to engage with artillery, but to fire only when
bodies of troops came under their fire. It was very difficult to
get them to obey this order. The French cavalry charged, and were
formed on the same ground with our Artillery in general, within a
few yards of our guns. In some instances they were in actual
possession of our guns. We could not expect the artillerymen to
remain at their guns in such a case. But I had a right to expect
that the officers and men of the Artillery would do as I did, and
as all the staff did, that is, to take shelter in the squares of
the Infantry till the French cavalry should be driven off the
ground, either by our Cavalry or Infantry. But they did no such
thing; they ran off the field entirely, taking with them limbers,
ammunition, and everything: and when, in a few minutes, we had
driven off the French cavalry, and had regained our ground and our
guns, and could have made good use of our artillery, we had no
artillerymen to fire them; and, in point of fact, I should have
had no Artillery during the whole of the latter part of the
action, if I had not kept a reserve in the commencement.
“Mind, my dear Lord, I do not mean to complain; but what I have
above mentioned is a fact known to many; and it would not do to
reward a corps under such circumstances. The Artillery, like
others, behaved most gallantly; but when a misfortune of this kind
has occurred, a corps must not be rewarded. It is on account of
these little stories, which must come out, that I object to all
the propositions to write what is called a history of the battle
of Waterloo.
“If it is to be a history, it must be the truth, and the whole
truth, or it will do more harm than good, and will give as many
false notions of what a battle is, as other romances of the same
description have. But if a true history is written, what will
become of the reputation of half of those who have acquired
reputation, and who deserve it for their gallantry, but who, if
their mistakes and casual misconduct were made public, would not
be so well thought of? I am certain that if I were to enter into a
critical discussion of everything that occurred from the 14th to
the 19th June, I could show ample reasons for not entering deeply
into these subjects.
“The fact is, that the army that gained the battle of Waterloo was
an entirely new one, with the exception of some of the old Spanish
troops. Their inexperience occasioned the mistakes they committed,
the rumours they circulated that all was destroyed, because they
themselves ran away, and the mischief which ensued; but they
behaved gallantly, and I am convinced, if the thing was to be done
again, they would show what it was to have the experience of even
one battle.
“Believe me, &c.,
(Signed) “WELLINGTON.
“P.S.--I am very well pleased with the field officers for not
liking to have their application referred to me. They know the
reason I have not to recommend them for a favour.”
In discussing this letter, it is proposed to examine what may be termed
the internal and external evidences of its inaccuracy, commencing with
the former.
In his despatch of the 19th June, 1815, announcing the victory, the
Duke wrote: “The Artillery and Engineer departments were conducted _much
to my satisfaction_ by Colonel Sir George Wood and Colonel Smyth.”
Evidently, then, the fact “known to many” of the Artillerymen running
off the ground had not been known to him when he wrote his despatch, or
he could hardly have described the Artillery department as having been
conducted much to his satisfaction. Nor does the fact, even when made
known to him, seem to have produced the effect upon his Grace’s mind,
which misconduct among the troops under his command, in the face of an
enemy, would at any other time have instantly created. Were not the
genuineness of the letter beyond all question, some of the
contradictions and inconsistencies in it would have justified the reader
in pronouncing it a forgery, invented to throw discredit on the
reputation of England’s greatest General. Was it the Duke of Wellington
who, after writing the words, “They ran off the field entirely, taking
with them limbers, ammunition, and everything,” proceeded to say, “The
Artillery, like others, behaved most gallantly”? Was it the Iron Duke
who, after saying, “In point of fact, I should have had no Artillery
during the whole of the latter part of the action, if I had not kept a
reserve in the commencement,” went on, with the resignation of a martyr,
to say, “Mind, my dear Lord, I do not mean to complain”? The
inconsistency with his known character is astounding.
After describing the disappearance of his Artillerymen, and the straits
to which he was consequently reduced, he proceeds in this letter to say:
“It would not do to reward a corps under such circumstances.” If he were
correctly informed as to these circumstances, there would not have been
a single individual in the whole of his army who would have differed
from him as to his conclusion. But, unfortunately for him, he
endeavoured to prove too much. Not content with giving, as a reason for
withholding rewards, an assertion which, if accurate, would have more
than justified him, he must needs strengthen an already overwhelming
case by a mysterious insinuation in the postscript of the letter,
respecting some other unexpressed ground of his displeasure, with which
the field officers must be familiar as a cause for his refusing to
recommend them for reward. Was there not, in this piling of Pelion upon
Ossa, some consciousness of the necessity of self-justification?
But these are merely striking self-contradictions and inconsistencies in
style. It is when the truth of the statements made by the Duke in this
letter is inquired into, that one stands astounded at the inaccuracy of
his informants, and the hasty assumptions of the writer himself. The
letter is so involved,--so confusing in its mixed references to the
Artillery and to the army generally,--so laden with marvellous didactic
sentences as to the propriety of writing a history of the battle of
Waterloo,--that it is not always easy to ascertain the connection
between argument and conclusion. So slovenly, indeed, is the style at
the end of the letter, that it reads as if the whole army ran away! Let
two sentences be reproduced: “The fact is, that the army that gained the
battle of Waterloo was an entirely new one, with the exception of some
of the old Spanish troops. Their inexperience occasioned the mistakes
they committed, the rumours they circulated that all was destroyed,
because they themselves ran away, and the mischiefs which ensued; but
they behaved gallantly.” ... One rises from a perusal of these words
with a bewildered feeling that gallant behaviour among troops is
identical with running away;--and that the whole army, with the
exception of some of the old Spanish troops, exhibited their gallantry
in this singular manner. But, as the statement, that the army was
entirely a new one, is used apparently in the first instance to account
for the Artillery running off the field, it may be interesting to glance
at the troops and brigades, whose inexperience seemed--in the Duke’s
mind as he wrote--to have made their flight almost natural.
Of the eight troops of Horse Artillery present at the battle of
Waterloo, five were the old tried troops of the Peninsula, whose gallant
services had been recorded year after year by the Duke’s own hand: Sir
Hew Ross’s, Sir Robert Gardiner’s, Colonel Webber Smith’s, Major
Beane’s, and Major Bull’s. A sixth, Captain Whinyates’s, was the famous
Rocket Troop of Leipsic; and of the other two, one had fought at Buenos
Ayres, and the other in Walcheren. It was to one of these latter and
more inexperienced troops, Captain Mercer’s, that the victory at one
period of the day [Sidenote: Battalion Records of the Royal Artillery.]
was due. With regard to the field brigades of this new army, it would
seem that Major Rogers’s company had been engaged for two years past in
the operations in Holland, and had been in the Walcheren Expedition
previously; that Captain Sinclair’s brigade had been at Copenhagen,
Corunna, and Walcheren; Captain Sandham’s at Copenhagen and Walcheren;
Major Lloyd’s at Walcheren; and that Captain Bolton’s, the only brigade
without war service, happened to be the one whose effect in breaking the
head of the columns of the Imperial Guard has become historical,--and
whose inexperience would therefore hardly appear to have been very
detrimental. From this statement it is evident that the Artillery
element in the Duke’s army at Waterloo was veteran, rather than
new;--for, if the troops and brigades possessed such records as are
given above, much more did the majority of the field and staff officers
present deserve the title of veterans.
But the next inaccuracy is more unpardonable; and the informants of the
Duke on the subject were guilty of errors for which there was no excuse.
“In point of fact,” wrote the Duke, “I should have had no Artillery
during the whole of the latter part of the action, if I had not kept a
reserve at the commencement.” Fortunately for the exposure of this grave
inaccuracy, there is no point on which there is more full and official
information both in Sir George Wood’s and other despatches, and more
detailed notice in private correspondence, than on the subject of the
Artillery reserves at Waterloo. As stated in the last chapter of this
volume, it was composed of Sir Hew Ross’s and Major Beane’s troops of
Horse Artillery, and Captain Sinclair’s Field Brigade. So far was this
force from being kept in reserve, and being brought forward
providentially at the end of the action to replace the runaways, that
it was actually in action--every gun--almost at the _commencement of the
day_, and suffered the heaviest losses before half-past one. By a happy
coincidence, the Artillery, which must have been represented to the Duke
as his reserve, is mentioned by [Sidenote: Frazer’s Letters, p. 559.]
Sir Augustus Frazer: “Some time before this--i.e., the massing of the
second line _during the cavalry attacks_--the Duke ordered me to bring
up all the reserve Horse Artillery, which at that moment were _Mercer’s_
and _Bull’s troops_.” But, instead of these troops being a reserve kept,
as the Duke’s letter says, “from the commencement,”--they also had both
been in action from the beginning of the day, and Bull’s troop had
actually been sent to the [Sidenote: Ibid. p. 557.] centre of the second
line “to refit and repair disabled carriages!”
The importance of this inaccuracy in the letter cannot be overrated. If
the Artillery, which the Duke admits having had at the end of the day,
was not the reserve, which he had kept in hand,--and it certainly was
not,--what was it? The asserted flight of the gunners with their limbers
and ammunition hangs upon the truth, or otherwise, of there having been
reserves in hand to replace them. But the fact of these reserves having
been in action from the beginning of the day is incontestable; and is
proved by the correspondence of Sir Hew Ross, who commanded one of the
reserve troops, as well as by the official and semi-official
correspondence of others. It is possible that the arrival of Sir Robert
Gardiner’s troop, with Vivian’s and Vandeleur’s brigades, from the left
of the line, at the end of the day, may have deceived the Duke’s
informant, and led him to imagine that it was fresh Artillery from the
reserve. That it was not so, however, but merely moved with the division
to which it was attached, is a matter of fact; and at no time in the day
was this troop ever in reserve. Therefore, in a vital point, the Duke’s
letter is unquestionably inaccurate.
The next statement in the letter, which demands scrutiny is the
following: “The Artillery was placed with orders not to engage with
artillery, but to fire only when bodies of troops came under their
fire. It was very difficult to get them to obey this order.” Sir John
Bloomfield, who was on Sir George Wood’s staff, carried this order to
all the troops and brigades, and is confident that, with one exception,
it was rigidly obeyed. He remembers that the Duke saw a French gun
struck by a shot from one of the English batteries,--and, under the
impression that it came from Captain Sandham’s brigade, he sent orders
to have that officer placed in arrest. This was not done, some
satisfactory explanation having been given,--relieving Captain Sandham
of the disobedience. Singularly enough, the offender was never
discovered, until, in 1870, with the publication of General Mercer’s
Diary, came the confession of the crime. [Sidenote: ‘Mercer’s Diary,’
vol. i. p. 301.] “About this time, being impatient of standing idle, and
annoyed by the batteries on the Nivelle road, I ventured to commit a
folly, for which I should have paid dearly had our Duke chanced to be in
our part of the field. I ventured to disobey orders, and open a slow,
deliberate fire at the battery, thinking, with my 9-pounders, soon to
silence his 4-pounders.” As Captain Mercer’s troop was placed near
Sandham’s brigade at this time, it is evident that this occurrence, and
that mentioned by Sir John Bloomfield, are identical. Sir John, whose
duties carried him to all parts of the field, and whose recollection of
the day is as clear as possible, asserts positively, that in no other
instance was the order disobeyed; and it will be seen from accounts,
both French and English, to be quoted hereafter, that the order to fire
upon bodies of troops approaching was literally obeyed with the most
marked results. Was it, then, quite worthy of the Duke of Wellington to
reason from the particular to the general, and to visit the disobedience
of one officer [Sidenote: Colonel Gardiner, R.H.A.] upon a whole corps?
As has been well said by the son of one of the bravest Artillery
officers on the field, Sir Robert Gardiner: “If a Regiment of Infantry
had run away, and all the others had behaved splendidly,--would the
whole arm have been similarly condemned? Would it not have been more
just to reward those who deserved it?”
The mention of reward suggests the next amazing inconsistency in the
Duke’s letter,--and makes it almost certain that it was written on
receiving some subsequent information from another source,--not from his
personal observation. In this letter, dated six months after the battle,
he wrote: “It would not do to reward a corps under such circumstances;”
and again: “The field officers know the reason I have not to recommend
them for a favour.” How are these sentences to be reconciled with the
following extract from the ‘London Gazette,’ which immediately followed
the battle, and was issued while all its details must have been fresh in
the Duke’s recollection?
[Sidenote: Dated Whitehall, 22 June, 1815.]
“His Royal Highness the Prince Regent has further been pleased to
nominate and appoint the undermentioned officers to be Companions of the
said most Honourable Military Order of the Bath, _upon the
recommendation of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, for their
services in the battles fought upon the 16th and 18th of June last_:”
Lieut.-Colonel S. G. Adye, Royal Artillery.
Lieut.-Colonel R. Bull, ”
Lieut.-Colonel C. Gold, ”
Lieut.-Colonel A. Macdonald, ”
Lieut.-Colonel J. Parker, ”
Major T. Rogers, ”
Lieut.-Colonel J. W. Smith, ”
Lieut.-Colonel J. S. Williamson, ”
Colonel Sir G. A. Wood, Kt., ”
_This list includes the very field officers of whom the Duke wrote
afterwards, “They know the reason I have not to recommend them for a
favour._” Was it no favour to be recommended for the Order of the Bath?
Again: “It would not do,” wrote the Duke in December, 1815, “to
recommend a corps under such circumstances.” Let the reader glance at
the following picture of an unrewarded corps.
Out of thirteen troops and brigades, with the requisite staff, the
following officers obtained rewards, in addition to the nine
appointments to the Order of the Bath, quoted above. It must be
remembered that the number eligible excluded subalterns, and was further
reduced by the death of Majors Beane, Lloyd, Ramsay, Cairnes, and
Captain Bolton.
_Brevet promotion_, for service at Waterloo:
Major R. Bull to be Lieut.-Colonel, dated 18th June, 1815.
Major J. Parker ” ” ”
Captain E. Whinyates to be Major ”
Captain T. Dynely ” ”
Captain A. Macdonald ” ”
Brevet promotion for services at Waterloo was also conferred in January
1819 on
Captain C. Napier,
Captain W. Webber,
Captain W. Brereton, }
Captain R. H. Ord, } Subalterns at Waterloo.
[Sidenote: Dated Paris, 2 Aug. 1815.]
[Sidenote: Ibid. 21 Aug. 1815.]
At the request, also, of the Duke of Wellington, Sir George Wood
obtained permission to accept a knighthood of the Order of Maria
Theresa, from the Emperor of Austria; and, a few days later, the Order
of St. Wladimir, from the Emperor of Russia.
[Sidenote: Ibid. 8 Oct. 1815.]
Yet again, at the request of the Duke of Wellington, the following
officers obtained permission to accept from the Emperor of Russia the
Order of St. Anne, “in testimony of His Majesty’s approbation of their
services and conduct, particularly in the late battles fought in the
Netherlands:”
Lieut.-Colonel Sir J. May, K.C.B., R.H.A.
Lieut.-Colonel Sir H. Ross, ” ”
Lieut.-Colonel Sir R. Gardiner, ” ”
Lieut.-Colonel R. Bull, ” ”
Major A. Macdonald, ” ”
It is unnecessary to add that the boon service granted for the battle of
Waterloo, and the Waterloo medals, were given to the Artillery present,
without exception. It would, therefore, appear that for a corps which
did not deserve to be rewarded, it did not fare badly; and that its
merits were only called in question when pensions based on an unpopular
precedent were asked for. It is also impossible that the Duke could have
been so generous in his original recommendations, had he known of his
own personal observation, that which he stated in his letter of the 21st
December, and which must now receive grave consideration; the asserted
flight from the field of battle of many of the Artillerymen with their
limbers, &c.
In ascertaining the unmistakable inaccuracy of this cruel and hasty
assertion, which must have been made by the Duke of Wellington on the
most worthless evidence, the advantage of the late publication of the
letter has become apparent. Much of the evidence, which will be adduced
to rebut it, was not written with the view of meeting such an
accusation, but is merely extracted from the simple narrative of a
battle, in which the facts are stated without any idea of their being
questioned. Had the Duke’s letter been published while the writers of
many of the letters to be quoted were alive, their answers would not
have had half the historical value they now possess, for they would have
been regarded as the pleadings of interested defendants. The statements
of disinterested historians will conclude this brief argument.
When the celebrated charges of the French cavalry at Waterloo took
place, the English guns lined the crest of the position, and the
Infantry was formed in squares in their rear. The order given by the
Duke was that the Artillerymen should stand to their guns as long as
possible, and then take refuge in the Infantry squares; and that _the
limbers should be sent behind the squares_. This order was carried to
the various batteries by Sir John Bloomfield, and was obeyed to the
letter. “The idea of six limbers,” writes Colonel Gardiner, “with six
horses in each limber, going into a [Sidenote: Communicated by Sir J.
Bloomfield.] square of Infantry, was of course an impossibility, and
never contemplated.” The gunners had cartouche-bags slung round them,
containing ammunition, and invariably, with the exception of those of
Captain Mercer’s troop, took refuge in the adjacent squares, or under
the bayonets of the kneeling ranks. When the cavalry retired, on each
occasion the gunners ran out, and, as a rule, the guns were in action
against the retreating cavalry before they had gone sixty yards. The
delay of a few moments occurred once or twice, while shot were being
brought from the limbers; and Sir John Bloomfield remembers an
expression of impatience escaping the Duke on one of these occasions.
Nor was it unnatural. “To lose,” writes Colonel Gardiner, “an
opportunity of inflicting destruction on the French cavalry, directly
they turned their backs, and before they could get out of the range of
canister, must have been very tantalizing.” But that the delay ever
exceeded a few moments, or that a single limber ever left the ground,
Sir John Bloomfield is confident is an utter delusion. Such an
occurrence as is described in the Duke’s letter could not have happened
without being well known. The Duke himself said, “It is known to many;”
and yet Sir John lived for three years with the headquarter staff in
Paris, and never heard even an insinuation on the subject. Another
Waterloo survivor writes on this point: [Sidenote: General B. Cuppage,
R.A., to the Author.] “I never did hear, nor any one else, of the
artillery misbehaving at Waterloo. Sir Alexander Dickson took me with
him into Brussels after the battle. We saw every officer who came in,
and the action was in every part the constant theme of conversation,
both in our private, as well as more general moments. Had anything
bearing such a term taken place, it would certainly have been canvassed.
I was in daily conversation with our wounded in the town. Surely I may
say, but that the Duke of Wellington says it, it is as cruel as it is
unjust.”
If known to many, it could hardly have escaped the commanding officer of
the corps most interested. The fact that Sir George Wood did not write
his despatches to the Ordnance until the 24th June,--that during the six
days’ interval since the battle he had been constantly with the
Duke,--and yet that he could write as follows, proves most clearly that
the Duke himself cannot have been aware of what he afterwards wrote to
Lord Mulgrave, and that his letter must have been based on subsequent
malicious and worthless testimony. The wording of Sir George Wood’s
letters have an almost providential bearing on the point at issue; and
could not have been used, had there been even a doubt as to the conduct
of the Corps.
[Sidenote: Dated Le Cateau, 24 June, 1815.]
“I beg leave,” he wrote, “to call the attention of His Lordship the
Master-General to the skill and intrepidity so eminently displayed by
the British and German Artillery. The accompanying return of their loss
will show how much they participated in the action, and I can assure His
Lordship the Master-General, that, notwithstanding their being
outnumbered by the Artillery of the enemy, _their merits never shone
more conspicuous_ than on this occasion. It now remains for me to
express with much pleasure and satisfaction that _every officer and man
in the field of battle did their duty_.”
With his despatch, Sir George wrote a private letter to General Macleod,
in which the following passage occurs: [Sidenote: Ibid.] “I do assure
you, I have not words to express the extreme good conduct of the Corps.
All exerted themselves, both officers and men, and such a conflict of
guns never was in the memory of man.”
But there are recorded, also, the opinions of the Generals of other
arms, under whose immediate command various troops and brigades served:
and who would have known had any misconduct occurred among them, better
than the Duke himself, on account of the more limited field of their
observation. General Colquhoun Grant’s complimentary [Sidenote: _Vide_
p. 436.] order with reference to Colonel Webber Smith’s Troop has
already been quoted. The following order was issued by [Sidenote: Dated
Nivelle, 20 June, 1815.] Lord Hill: “The highly distinguished conduct of
the 2nd Division, and Colonel Mitchell’s Brigade of the 4th Division,
who had the good fortune to be employed in the memorable action, merit
His Lordship’s highest approbation; and he begs that ... Colonel Gold,
commanding Royal Artillery of the 2nd Corps, ... Major Sympher,
commanding a troop of Horse Artillery, King’s German Legion, Captain
Napier (to whose lot it fell to command the 9-pounder Brigade, 2nd
Division, on the death of Captain Bolton), will accept his best thanks
for their exemplary conduct, and will be pleased to convey his
sentiments to the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men under
their command.”
The following extract from the 5th Division orders, by Sir James Kempt,
speaks equally favourably of another [Sidenote: Dated 19 June, 1815.]
brigade: “The British Brigade of Artillery commanded by Major Rogers,
and the Hanoverian Brigade commanded by Major Heisse, were most nobly
served, and judiciously placed; and these officers and men will be
pleased to accept of his--i.e. the Major-General’s--particular thanks
for their service.”
References to the services of other brigades, and of the Horse
Artillery, by the officers of the Corps under whom they served, have
already been quoted; and in every case commendation of the warmest
description was passed upon them. The following quotation from Sir
Augustus Frazer’s correspondence is interesting here, as asserting what
was denied by the Duke in his letter to Lord Mulgrave, that the
[Sidenote: Frazer’s Letters, p. 559.] men took shelter in the squares.
“The repeated charges of the enemy’s noble cavalry were similar to the
first: each was fruitless. Not an infantry soldier moved; and, on each
charge, abandoning their guns, our men sheltered themselves between the
flanks of the squares. Twice, however, the enemy tried to charge in
front; these attempts were entirely frustrated by the fire of the guns,
wisely reserved till the hostile squadrons were within twenty yards of
the muzzles. In this, the cool and quiet steadiness of the troops of
Horse Artillery was very creditable.” This was written two days after
the battle; and no man had better opportunity of seeing the conduct of
his Corps than the writer. Every historian of the battle endorses this
version: and the testimony of an impartial historian always represents
the carefully sifted testimony of many. Sir Edward Cust, the laborious
military annalist, writes thus: “Suddenly some bugles were heard to
sound, and all the Artillerymen, abandoning their guns and tumbrils,
ran back into the infantry squares.... In a moment, the Artillery
gunners quitted the protection of the squares, and running up to their
guns, which were most of them ready loaded, opened heavily with grape
and with every species of projectile.... The cavaliers again mounted the
plateau; again the gunners abandoned their guns, and took refuge within
the squares.” Creasy writes: “As the French receded from each attack,
the British Artillerymen rushed forward from the centre of the squares,
where they had taken refuge, and plied their guns on the retiring
horsemen.” The same is the account given by every historian of the
battle. Were they all dreaming? or were they in some conspiracy to
conceal the truth? And if so, did the Duke himself join it? In the
thirty-seven years of his life after Waterloo, he never contradicted the
numerous accounts of the battle, all of which agreed in their statement
of the eminent services of the Artillery. Was it consistent in one, who
professed belief in an occurrence “known to many,” and who gave that
belief as a ground for the refusal of favours,--to allow such passages
as the following to be published without contradiction, unless indeed he
had subsequently ascertained the worthlessness of his information?[50]
“There,” wrote [Sidenote: ‘Battle of Waterloo,’ by G. R. Gleig,
Chaplain-General.] Gleig, “every arm did its duty; the Artillery from
the beginning to the close of the day.” Again: “In the course of the day
every battery was brought into action; and not even the records of that
noble Corps can point to [Sidenote: Ibid.] an occasion in which they
better did their work.” Sir James Shaw Kennedy, in summing up his
description of the [Sidenote: Sir J. S. Kennedy’s ‘Waterloo,’ p. 179.]
battle, says: “Full scope was thus given for the British Cavalry and
Artillery to display their surpassing gallantry and excellence; and they
did not fail to display these qualities in an eminent degree.”
But it has been admitted that Captain Mercer’s troop was an exception to
the others; that his men did not take [Sidenote: Mercer’s ‘Diary,’ p.
312.] shelter within the Infantry squares. Let him tell his own story.
“Sir Augustus, pointing out our position between two squares of
Brunswick Infantry, left us with injunctions to remember the Duke’s
orders (to retire within the squares) and to economise our ammunition.
The Brunswickers were falling fast ... these were the very boys whom I
had but yesterday seen throwing away their arms and fleeing,
panic-stricken, from the very sound of our horses’ feet.... Every moment
I feared they would again throw down their arms and flee.... To have
sought refuge amongst men in such a state were madness; the very moment
our men ran from their guns, I was convinced, would be the signal for
their disbanding. We had better, then, fall at our posts than in such a
situation.” He accordingly made his men stand to the guns, until the
cavalry were within a few feet of them; and on each occasion the havoc
he wrought among them--as he drove them back--was frightful. The immense
heap of dead, lying in front of Mercer’s guns, was such that Sir
Augustus Frazer said that, [Sidenote: Ibid. p. 343.] in riding over the
field next day, he “could plainly distinguish the position of C Troop
from the opposite height by the dark mass, which, even from that
distance, formed a remarkable feature in the field.”
Captain Mercer’s men, therefore, were those who did not obey the Duke’s
order. It was a fortunate act of disobedience, [Sidenote: Ibid. p. 313.]
and it saved the Brunswickers; but Captain Mercer was severely punished
for it. He was not recommended for brevet rank; and, on his appointment
by Lord Mulgrave to a vacant Troop, he was deprived of it by the Duke of
Wellington, who got it summarily reduced in 1816. Did, however, the
limbers of Captain Mercer’s battery ever leave the ground? That they did
not, can be shown most clearly. In his diary, he describes the state of
his Troop after a heavy fire, to which it was exposed _after_ the
charges of the French [Sidenote: Ibid. p. 326.] cavalry. In the
description, he says: “The guns came together in a confused heap, the
trails crossing each other, and the whole _dangerously near the limbers_
and ammunition waggons.” The same description also proves that the
frightful losses suffered by the troop took place during the very time
when, according to the Duke’s letter, the men and limbers would have
been off the field. In going to take up the position, they moved at a
gallop, and in so compact a body, that the Duke cried out: “Ah! that’s
the way I like to see Horse Artillery move!” In a short time, such was
the havoc committed among men and horses, that Captain Mercer wrote: “I
sighed for my poor troop; it was already a wreck.”
With regard to the insinuation as to the lack of artillery at the end of
the battle, it is shown clearly by Siborne, in his model of the battle
as it was at a quarter before 8 P.M., that thirteen Troops and Brigades
of the Royal Artillery were in action, when the final attack took place;
_this being the entire number with the army_. Of these, some were so
crippled by losses--as Mercer’s was--that they were unable to join in
the pursuit; and possibly some recollection of this fact may have been
in the Duke’s mind when he wrote. That the artillery fire, however, at
the end of the day was slack from the cause stated in the Duke’s letter
is an utter mistake; nor do the French seem to have found it very slack,
as will be seen presently.
One word before appealing to a few other historians. If such conduct had
taken place, as is described in the letter under consideration, it would
have been bruited over the whole army. Concealment, or collusion, would
have been impossible; enquiries would have been officially instituted.
To believe that such an occurrence could have been kept quiet, requires
a considerably greater stretch of credulity, than to believe that the
Duke of Wellington was misinformed. In fact, that such unanimity of
testimony to one version, and such a general agreement to be silent to
another, should be possible, unless the former were true, and the latter
imaginary, would be nothing short of a miracle. One or two miracles of
this description would demolish all belief in history.
In the earliest and most detailed account of the Battle of Waterloo, the
tenth edition of which was published in 1817, and which is called ‘The
Battle of Waterloo, also of Ligny, and Quatre Bras, described by the
series of accounts published by authority, by a near observer;’ edited
by Captain G. Jones, the following passage occurs: “No account yet
published of the battle, seen by the Editor, has mentioned in adequate
terms the effect of our artillery at Waterloo--no _English_ account at
least. _The enemy felt_ it, and in their manner of expressing themselves
have passed the greatest compliments. A French account, given in our
preceding pages, says: ‘The English artillery made _dreadful_ havoc in
our ranks.’... ‘The Imperial Guard made several charges, but was
constantly repulsed, _crushed by a terrible artillery, that each minute
seemed to multiply_.’[51] These invincible grenadiers _beheld the
grape-shot make day through their ranks_; they closed promptly and
coolly their shattered ranks.”... “In proportion as they ranged up the
eminence, and darted forward on the squares, which occupied its summit,
_the Artillery vomited death upon them, and killed them in masses_....
In an account given by an officer of the ‘Northumberland,’ of Napoleon’s
conversation on board that ship, he says: ‘Bonaparte gives great credit
to our Infantry and Artillery.’” Again: “The artillery on both sides was
well served, but Bonaparte had upwards of 250 pieces in the field.
Notwithstanding our inferiority in this arm, which was still more
apparent from the size of the enemy’s guns (being 12-pounders, ours only
9 and 6), than from their numbers, ours were so well fought, that I
believe it is allowed by all they did equal execution.... See also the
account of Captain Bolton and Napier’s Brigade of Foot Artillery, from
which it appears the Artillery had turned the enemy, previous to the
advance of the Guards. The French displayed the greatest rage and fury;
they cursed the English while they were fighting, and cursed the
precision with which the English grape-shot was fired, which ‘was
neither too high nor too low, but struck right in the middle.’”
From the many writers who have done credit to the exertions and courage
of the Artillery at Waterloo, three more extracts will be made.
In proof of the activity of the Corps at the end of the day, the
following quotation, from an author already mentioned, [Sidenote:
Gleig.] is given. In describing the reception given to the French
Imperial Guard, he says: “The English gunners once more plied their
trade. It was positively frightful to witness [Sidenote: Kennedy, p.
142.] the havoc that was occasioned in that mass.” Sir James Shaw
Kennedy also describes the strength of the British artillery fire at the
end of the day.
In a Paper on ‘The Campaign of Waterloo,’ which appeared in the ‘United
Service Journal,’ in 1834, the following passage occurs: “If we admit
that, during this arduous and terrible day, the British Infantry acted
up to the right standard of soldiership, which their long career of
victory had established, it must be added that _the Artillery actually
surpassed all expectation_, high as, from their previous conduct, that
expectation naturally was. In point of zeal and courage, the officers
and men of the three arms were of course fully upon a par; but the
circumstances of the battle were favourable to the Artillery; and
certainly the skill, spirit, gallantry, and indefatigable exertion which
they displayed, almost surpasses belief.”
Only one more witness will be called from the ranks of historians.
Hooper, in his work on Waterloo, to which he devoted eight years, and in
the compilation of which he used every known authority on both sides,
made use of words which appropriately close this argument: “The
Artillery, so devoted and effective, gathered another branch from the
tree of honour.”
APPENDIX B.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AND THE MAGNETIC SURVEY OF THE GLOBE.
After the peace of 1815 officers of Royal Artillery had little
opportunity for active employment or staff duty. Among other officers
who turned their attention to employments out of the ordinary routine
were General Sir Edward Sabine and the late Colonel Colquhoun. The
latter officer made a voyage to the Arctic Seas as an amateur whaler,
took employment in connection with a South American Mining Company, and,
before his appointment to the Carriage Department, in which he did most
excellent service for many years--till nearly the date of the Crimean
war--commanded the Artillery of Sir de Lacy Evans’s Spanish Legion, and
was employed with the naval expeditions sent to Spain and to the coast
of Syria.
Sir Edward Sabine began a long scientific career by accompanying the
late Sir Edward Parry to the North Polar Seas in 1819-20, as the
scientific observer of his expedition. His interest in scientific
pursuits, and especially in the determination of the figure of the Earth
and in the science of terrestrial magnetism, has continued to the
present date. He filled the office of Secretary of the Royal Society
from 1828 to 1829, that of Foreign Secretary from 1845 to 1850, and that
of Treasurer from 1850 to 1861; and he was President from 1861 to 1871,
when he retired from office. In 1839, the Royal Society and British
Association procured the sanction of the Government for a naval
expedition to the Antarctic Seas, and for the establishment of four
fixed magnetic and meteorological observatories at four stations widely
apart, namely, Hobarton, in Van Diemen’s Land, Cape Town, St. Helena,
and Toronto. The station at Hobarton was undertaken by the Admiralty,
and given to officers of the late Sir James Ross’s Antarctic expedition.
The establishment of the other observatories was, under the authority of
the Master-General and Board of Ordnance, entrusted to Royal Artillery
officers, with non-commissioned officers as assistants, who were
employed under the orders of the Deputy Adjutant-General and of Sir
Edward (then Major) Sabine, as an ordinary staff duty. The officers
successively employed were Lieutenants (now Major-Generals) F.
Eardley-Wilmot, W. J. Smythe, J. H. Lefroy, C. J. B. Riddell, and H.
Clerk; Lieutenant (now Colonel) Younghusband and the late Colonel H. J.
Strange.
The magnetic instruments employed, of singular elegance and precision,
were designed by the Rev. Humphrey Lloyd (now Provost) of Trinity
College, Dublin, by whom the officers were instructed in their
manipulation at the Magnetic Observatory in the College grounds, the
only one then existing in the United Kingdom. The discovery which had
been made of the simultaneous manifestation of magnetical disturbance
over a wide extent of the globe rendered it desirable that the
observations at all the stations should be taken at the same moment of
absolute time; and, in compliment to Professor Gauss, to whom magnetic
science was so deeply indebted, Goettingen time was universally adopted.
Observations of the three elements--Declination, Horizontal Force, and
Vertical Force--were made every two hours, day and night, and with such
strictness that, if by any accident the right moment was lost, the
observation was entered in red ink, with a note of the number of seconds
elapsed. Once a month, on what was called “Term Day,” the observations
were prosecuted at intervals of a few minutes for twenty-four hours
uninterruptedly, and a similar course was adopted whenever a magnetic
storm declared itself, and persevered in until the storm passed away, a
period, occasionally, of as much as thirty hours.
The observatories were established originally for three years, but were
continued, in the case of the Cape and St. Helena, for a second term of
the same length, and in that of Toronto for three terms. At the
conclusion of these terms the St. Helena observatory was discontinued,
and the remaining observatories were taken over by the local
governments.
Lieutenant Clerk commenced his magnetic employment by a cruise in the
Antarctic Seas for a magnetic survey. Lieutenant Lefroy carried out a
magnetic survey of a considerable portion of the Hudson’s Bay
territories, and Lieutenant Eardley-Wilmot a survey of the Cape Colony.
The observations made at the Ordnance and Naval Observatories have been
published under the direction of Sir Edward Sabine, who has had an
office for the purpose at [Sidenote: In November, 1871.] Woolwich, which
has been subsequently removed to the Kew Observatory.
The brief summary given above of the operations which earned for so many
Artillery officers the blue riband of Science,--Fellowship of the Royal
Society,--would establish to a great extent that which its most
distinguished officers have always sought to secure for the Regiment,--a
scientific reputation. But in the career of Sir Edward Sabine, so
briefly alluded to, there has been one continued proof of the
possibility of a soldier attaining the highest eminence in the world of
science. Although personally unknown to many of his brother officers,
his fame has been the pride of all; and has been felt to reflect a
lustre, unprecedented in the profession, upon the Corps of which he is a
member. Many readers of these pages will remember the reception given to
him when, with the other Colonels-Commandant, he was persuaded during
the present year to revisit the head-quarters of the Regiment. In the
enthusiasm with which he was greeted by old and young, there was an
unmistakable evidence of an _esprit de corps_, which, while admitting
the claims of the scientific world at large upon their distinguished
comrade, yet determined that it should be known to him that his honours
were doubly dear to them because he was one of themselves.
In the sketch of the Magnetic Survey of the Globe given above, there
would be a great omission if it were not stated how much the employment
of Artillery officers in these operations was due to the previous
labours and successes of Sir Edward Sabine. It was in 1817, two years
after the conclusion of the war, that the first Polar Expedition was
prepared. The Admiralty, to whom the preparations were entrusted,
applied to the President and Council of the Royal Society to recommend a
person who should be competent to conduct the researches in Physics and
Natural History. General Mudge--already mentioned in this work--was then
at the head of the British Trigonometrical Survey, and was a member of
the Council of the Royal Society. It may be here mentioned, in passing,
that in those days the Artillery and Engineers had the alternate
direction of the Trigonometrical Survey, now apparently vested
exclusively in the latter. Sir Edward Sabine was already favourably
known, not merely to General Mudge, but also to other leading members of
the Council of the Royal Society, such as Young, Kater, Wollaston, and
Davy,--on account of some works which he had written, one being on the
Birds of North America, in which country he had served during the war of
1812-14. After passing a severe examination, with great credit, Sir
Edward Sabine’s appointment to the Polar Expedition was sanctioned by
Lord Mulgrave, then Master-General of the Ordnance: and early in 1818 he
sailed in the ‘Isabella,’ making his first Pendulum station at Hare
Island, in Baffin’s Bay, in the spring of 1818. The results of his
experiments, then and subsequently, appeared in the ‘Philosophical
Transactions,’ and in a work entitled ‘Pendulum and other Experiments,’
published in 1825, at the cost of Government, on the recommendation of
the Duke of Wellington, who had succeeded Lord Mulgrave as
Master-General of the Ordnance.
It was Sir Edward’s hope--in which, however, he was disappointed--that a
series of Pendulum experiments on the continental surface comprised
between the high Canadian latitudes and the shores of the Mexican Sea,
should also be undertaken. He has lived, however, to see the same object
admirably accomplished on the continent of British India between Cape
Comorin and the Higher Himalaya, under the able direction of Colonel
Walker of the Royal (Indian) Engineers,--and to take himself a final
part in the completion of the series, at the Kew Physical Observatory,
by Captain Heaviside, R.E., and the men of the Indian Engineers,
employed on that service by Colonel Walker. It may be said without
exaggeration that the support given by Sir Edward--as President of the
Royal Society--to Colonel Walker’s propositions, and the earlier
experiments made by himself in the same field, have been among the
highest services rendered by any man to science. Among the many
Artillery officers who, since the peace of 1815, have sought to make a
return to their country by their devotion to physical science, Sir
Edward Sabine stands _facile princeps_:--and he has had the satisfaction
of living to see, not merely his experiments carried to maturity, but
also the inferences, which he did not hesitate to draw with confidence
from his own earlier experiments, confirmed by the results of the
labours of others. The results of his experiments, which claimed to be
sufficiently extensive to justify the conclusion which they [Sidenote:
Transactions of Royal Astronomical Society.] were held to establish of
the measure of the ellipticity in the northern portion of the globe,
have received an increased value since the published results of a
similar series in the southern hemisphere by Captain Henry Foster, from
the fact of their mutual agreement.
These earlier services of Sir Edward Sabine supplied the ground on which
the then Master-General (Lord Vivian) justified,--and on which Sir
Robert Peel, as head of the Government, approved,--his nomination to the
superintendence of the Magnetic Observatories in 1839, fourteen years
after the publication by him of the work mentioned above, ‘Pendulum and
other Experiments.’ It was while he held this appointment, that he
directed the Magnetic Survey of the Globe, in which so many Artillery
officers had the good fortune to take a leading part.
APPENDIX C.
TABULAR STATEMENT SHOWING THE DATE OF FORMATION, AND FORMER
DESIGNATION, OF EVERY BATTERY OF THE REGIMENT NOW IN THE SERVICE.
N.B.--The reader should look at the explanatory notes before using the
Tables.
--------+--------+-------------------------------------------------+-------
Battery.|Brigade.|Designation, previous to Introduction of the | When
| | Brigade System. |formed.
--------+--------+-------------------------------------------------+-------
A | A |A Troop, Royal Horse Artillery | 1793
B | ” |B ” ” ” ” | 1793
C | ” |C ” ” ” ” | 1793
D | ” |G ” ” ” ” | 1804
E | ” |K ” ” ” ” | 1857
--------+--------+-------------------------------------------------+-------
A | B |D Troop, Royal Horse Artillery | 1794
B | ” |E ” ” ” ” | 1794
C | ” |F ” ” ” ” | 1801
D | ” |H ” ” ” ” | 1805
E | ” |I ” ” ” ” | 1805
F | ” |C Troop, Madras Horse Artillery | 1816
G | ” |D ” ” ” ” | 1825
H | ” |--------- Royal Horse Artillery | 1871
--------+--------+-------------------------------------------------+------
A | C |*1st Troop, 1st B^{de}., Bengal Horse Artillery | 1800
B | ” | 1st ” 3rd ” ” ” ” | 1809
C | ” | 2nd ” 1st ” ” ” ” | 1825
D | ” | 2nd ” 3rd ” ” ” ” | 1825
E | ” | 3rd ” 1st ” ” ” ” | 1826
--------+--------+-------------------------------------------------+-------
A | D |A Troop, Madras Horse Artillery | 1805
B | ” |B ” ” ” ” | 1809
C | ” |(a)Leslie’s Troop, Bombay Horse Artillery | 1811
D | ” | 3rd Troop, 3rd B^{de}., Bengal Horse Artillery| 1826
E | ” | 2nd Troop, Bombay Horse Artillery | 1820
F | ” | 5th Troop, 1st B^{de}., Bengal Horse Artillery| 1858
G | ” | 3rd Troop, Bombay Horse Artillery | 1824
H | ” | 4th ” ” ” ” | 1824
--------+--------+-------------------------------------------------+-------
A | F |1st Troop, 2nd B^{de}., Bengal Horse Artillery | 1809
B | ” |2nd ” 2nd ” ” ” ” | 1816
C | ” |3rd ” 2nd ” ” ” ” | 1825
E | ” |4th ” 2nd ” ” ” ” | 1857
F | ” |4th ” 3rd ” ” ” ” | 1858
--------+--------+-------------------------------------------------+-------
A | 1st |{4th Company, 7th Battalion, Royal Artillery,} | 1758
| |{formerly Royal Irish Artillery} |
B | ” |2nd Company, 1st Battalion, Royal Artillery | ×
C | ” |1st ” 7th ” ” ” | 1756
D | ” |4th ” 2nd ” ” ” | ×
E | ” |8th ” 4th ” ” ” | 1771
F | ” |1st ” 5th ” ” ” | 1794
G | ” |5th ” 8th ” ” ” | 1803
H | ” |1st ” 8th ” ” ” | 1803
I | ” |------------------------ ” ” | 1871
K | ” |------------------------ ” ” | 1871
--------+--------+-------------------------------------------------+-------
2 | 2nd |3rd Company, 5th Battalion, Royal Artillery | 1794
3 | ” |4th ” 5th ” ” ” | 1794
4 | ” |3rd ” 6th ” ” ” | 1799
5 | ” |7th ” 2nd ” ” ” | ×
6 | ” |6th ” 1st ” ” ” | ×
7 | ” |3rd ” 1st ” ” ” | ×
9 | ” |------------------------- ” ” | 1859
--------+--------+-------------------------------------------------+-------
2 | 3rd |5th Company, 9th Battalion, Royal Artillery | 1806
3 | ” |6th ” 5th ” ” ” | 1795
4 | ” |4th ” 3rd ” ” ” | ×
5 | ” |8th ” 6th ” ” ” | 1800
6 | ” |2nd ” 4th ” ” ” | ×
7 | ” |6th ” 3rd ” ” ” | ×
8 | ” |5th ” 2nd ” ” ” | ×
--------+--------+-------------------------------------------------+-------
A | 4th |1st Company, 3rd Battalion, Royal Artillery | ×
B | ” |1st ” 11th ” ” ” | 1848
C | ” |-------------------------- ” ” | 1871
D | ” |8th ” 3rd ” ” ” | ×
E | ” |3rd ” 11th ” ” ” | 1848
F | ” |5th ” 11th ” ” ” | 1848
G | ” |4th ” 12th ” ” ” | 1848
H | 4th | 4th Company, 11th Battalion, Royal Artillery | 1779
I | ” | --------------------------- ” ” | 1871
K | ” | 8th Company, 7th Battalion, ” ” | 1794
--------+--------+-------------------------------------------------+-------
1 | 5th | 5th Company, 5th Battalion, Royal Artillery | 1794
2 | ” | 7th ” 7th ” ” ” | 1794
3 | ” | 4th ” 1st ” ” ” | ×
4 | ” | 7th ” 1st ” ” ” | ×
5 | ” | 8th ” 5th ” ” ” | 1795
6 | ” | 2nd ” 6th ” ” ” | 1791
7 | ” | (Formerly 1 Battery, 20th Brigade.) ” |
--------+--------+-------------------------------------------------+-------
1 | 6th | 6th Company, 4th Battalion, Royal Artillery | ×
2 | ” | 8th ” 12th ” ” ” | 1848
3 | ” | 5th ” 7th ” ” ” | 1778
4 | ” | 3rd ” 13th ” ” ” | 1854
5 | ” | 7th ” 13th ” ” ” | 1854
6 | ” | 8th ” 13th ” ” ” | 1854
7 | ” | B ” 4th ” Madras Artillery | 1845
--------+--------+-------------------------------------------------+-------
1 | 7th | 8th Company, 8th Battalion, Royal Artillery | 1803
2 | ” | 4th ” 13th ” ” ” | 1854
3 | ” | 7th ” 3rd ” ” ” | ×
4 | ” | 1st ” 4th ” ” ” | ×
5 | ” | 1st ” 14th ” ” ” | 1855
6 | ” | 2nd ” 14th ” ” ” | 1855
7 | ” | 2nd ” 12th ” ” ” | 1848
--------+--------+-------------------------------------------------+-------
A | 8th | 2nd Company, 3rd Battalion, Bengal Artillery | 1786
B | ” | 4th ” 6th ” Royal Artillery | 1799
C | ” | 5th ” 6th ” ” ” | 1799
D | ” | 2nd ” 5th ” ” ” | 1794
E | ” | 2nd ” 9th ” ” ” | 1806
F | ” | 6th ” 6th ” ” ” | 1799
G | ” | 6th ” 2nd ” ” ” | ×
H | ” | 7th ” 8th ” ” ” | 1803
--------+--------+-------------------------------------------------+-------
A | 9th | 7th Company, 5th Battalion, Royal Artillery | 1795
B | ” | 5th ” 4th ” ” ” | ×
C | 9th | 7th Company, 6th Battalion, Royal Artillery | 1800
D | ” | 6th ” 8th ” ” ” | 1803
E | ” | 8th ” 9th ” ” ” | 1806
F | ” | 1st ” 1st ” ” ” | ×
G | ” | 1st ” 9th ” ” ” | 1806
--------+--------+-------------------------------------------------+-------
1 | 10th | 1st Company, 10th Battalion, Royal Artillery | 1846
2 | ” | 2nd ” 10th ” ” ” | 1846
3 | ” | 3rd ” 10th ” ” ” | 1846
4 | ” | 4th ” 10th ” ” ” | 1846
5 | ” | 5th ” 10th ” ” ” | 1846
6 | ” | 7th ” 4th ” ” ” | 1771
7 | ” | 3rd ” 2nd ” ” ” | ×
--------+--------+-------------------------------------------------+-------
A | 11th | 8th Company, 1st Battalion, Royal Artillery | ×
B | ” | 5th ” 3rd ” ” ” | ×
C | ” | 1st ” 6th ” ” ” | 1791
D | ” | 6th ” 7th ” ” ” | 1778
E | ” | 5th ” 13th ” ” ” | 1854
F | ” | 6th ” 13th ” ” ” | 1854
G | ” | 5th ” 14th ” ” ” | 1855
H | ” | 2nd ” 8th ” ” ” | 1803
I | ” | -------------------------- ” ” | 1871
K | ” | -------------------------- ” ” | 1871
--------+--------+-------------------------------------------------+-------
1 | 12th | 8th Company, 10th Battalion, Royal Artillery | 1846
2 | ” | 2nd ” 2nd ” ” ” | ×
3 | ” | 3rd ” 7th ” ” ” | 1758
4 | ” | 6th ” 10th ” ” ” | 1846
5 | ” | 1st ” 12th ” ” ” | 1848
6 | ” | 4th ” 9th ” ” ” | 1806
7 | ” | 4th ” 8th ” ” ” | 1803
--------+--------+-------------------------------------------------+-------
1 | 13th | 2nd Company, 13th Battalion, Royal Artillery | 1854
2 | ” | 5th ” 14th ” ” ” | 1855
3 | ” | 8th ” 14th ” ” ” | 1855
4 | ” | 5th ” 1st ” ” ” | ×
5 | ” | 2nd ” 11th ” ” ” | 1848
6 | ” | 7th ” 11th ” ” ” | 1818
7 | ” | 2nd ” 3rd ” ” ” | ×
--------+--------+-------------------------------------------------+-------
A | 14th |8th Company, 2nd Battalion, Royal Artillery | ×
B | ” |3rd ” 9th ” ” ” | 1806
C | ” |6th ” 9th ” ” ” | 1806
D | ” |6th ” 11th ” ” ” | 1848
E | ” |5th ” 12th ” ” ” | 1848
F | ” |4th ” 14th ” ” ” | 1855
G | ” |6th ” 14th ” ” ” | 1855
H | ” |7th ” 10th ” ” ” | 1846
I | ” |-------------------------- ” ” | 1871
K | ” |-------------------------- ” ” | 1871
--------+--------+-------------------------------------------------+-------
1 to 7 | 15th |-------------------------- Royal Artillery | 1860
--------+--------+-------------------------------------------------+-------
A | 16th |2nd Company, 4th Battalion, Bengal Artillery | 1770
B | ” |1st ” 1st ” ” ” | 1786
C | ” |4th ” 1st ” ” ” | 1786
D | ” |4th ” 3rd ” ” ” | 1802
E | ” |3rd ” 1st ” ” ” | 1818
F | ” |--------------------------- Royal Artillery | 1862
G | ” |--------------------------- ” ” | 1862
--------+--------+-------------------------------------------------+-------
1 | 17th |A Company, 1st Battalion, Madras Artillery | +
2 | ” |B ” 1st ” ” ” | +
3 | ” |------------------------- Royal Artillery | 1862
4 | ” |------------------------- ” ” | 1862
5 | ” |A ” 4th ” Madras Artillery | 1845
6 | ” |------------------------- Royal Artillery | 1862
| ” |9th ” 8th} |
7 | ” | then } ” ” ” | 1803
| |8th ” 11th} |
--------+--------+-------------------------------------------------+-------
A | 18th |2nd Company, 1st Battalion, Bombay Artillery | 1765
B | ” |3rd ” 1st ” ” ” | 1796
C | ” |3rd ” 2nd ” ” ” | 1798
D | ” |4th ” 2nd ” ” ” | 1820
E | ” |1st ” 3rd ” ” ” | 1857
F | ” |2nd ” 3rd ” ” ” | 1857
G | ” |D ” 3rd ” Madras Artillery | 1806
--------+--------+-------------------------------------------------+-------
A | 19th |2nd Company, 1st Battalion, Bengal Artillery | 1758
B | ” |1st ” 2nd ” ” ” | 1802
C | 19th |4th Company, 2nd Battalion, Bengal Artillery | 1802
D | ” |4th ” 5th ” ” ” | 1818
E | ” |2nd ” 6th ” ” ” | 1842
F | ” |3rd ” 6th ” ” ” | 1842
G | ” |7th ” 14th ” Royal Artillery | 1855
--------+--------+-------------------------------------------------+-------
A | 20th |A Company, 3rd Battalion, Madras Artillery | +
B | ” |B ” 2nd ” ” ” | 1812
C | ” |C ” 2nd ” ” ” | 1812
D | ” |D ” 2nd ” ” ” | 1809
E | ” |C ” 1st ” ” ” | 1786
F | ” |B ” 3rd ” ” ” | 1806
G | ” |C ” 3rd ” ” ” | 1811
--------+--------+-------------------------------------------------+-------
1 | 21st |1st Company, 1st Battalion, Bombay Artillery | 1748
2 | ” |--------------------------- Royal Artillery | 1862
3 | ” |2nd ” 2nd ” Bombay Artillery | 1768
4 | ” |4th ” 1st ” ” ” | 1802
5 | ” |4th ” 3rd ” ” ” | 1857
6 | ” |--------------------------- Royal Artillery | 1862
7 | ” |1st ” 2nd ” ” ” | ×
--------+--------+-------------------------------------------------+-------
1 | 22nd |2nd Company, 5th Battalion, Bengal Artillery | 1760
2 | ” |--------------------------- Royal Artillery | 1862
3 | ” |1st ” 5th ” Bengal Artillery | 1786
4 | ” |3rd ” 2nd ” ” ” | 1802
5 | ” |3rd ” 3rd ” ” ” | 1802
6 | ” |--------------------------- Royal Artillery | 1862
7 | ” |--------------------------- ” ” | 1862
--------+--------+-------------------------------------------------+-------
1 | 23rd |1st Company, 4th Battalion, Bengal Artillery | 1749
2 | ” |4th ” 4th ” ” ” | 1763
3 | ” |1st ” 3rd ” ” ” | 1778
4 | ” |2nd ” 2nd ” ” ” | 1802
5 | ” |1st ” 6th ” ” ” | 1842
6 | ” |--------------------------- Royal Artillery | 1862
7 | ” |3rd ” 4th ” Bengal Artillery | 1786
--------+--------+-------------------------------------------------+-------
NOTES TO APPENDIX C.
* Formed from the Horse Artillery galloper guns raised at different
periods between 1760 and 1800, and attached to Regiments of Cavalry. It
first served as a distinct troop with Sir David Baird’s Division of the
Army that fought in Egypt under Sir Ralph Abercrombie in 1801.
(a) Extract from G. O. by G. G. of India, dated Agra, 11/4/43:--“The 1st
Troop of the Bombay Horse Artillery shall hereafter, _for ever_, be
denominated Leslie’s Troop of Horse Artillery.”
× Two Companies of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions of Royal Artillery
were formed in 1771. The remaining Companies of these three Battalions
and the first six Companies of the 4th Battalion were formed at
different periods from 1716 to 1757. Their identity with those Batteries
now in the Service cannot be traced.
+ Date of formation unknown, but these Batteries are mentioned in G. O.
dated 19/3/1800.
G. E. WYNDHAM MALET, CAPTAIN R.A.
PRESENT DESIGNATION OF THE OLD FIELD BATTERIES.
+-----------------------------------------+
| 4th Brigade. |
+-----------------------------------------+
| E = 1 Co. 3 Batt. became 1 By. 4 Brig. |
| now A ” 4 ” |
| |
| W = 1 ” 11 ” became 2 ” 4 ” |
| now B ” 4 ” |
| |
| A = 2 ” 8 ” became 3 ” 4 ” |
| now C ” 4 ” |
| |
| B = 8 ” 3 ” became 4 ” 4 ” |
| now D ” 4 ” |
| |
| F = 3 ” 11 ” became 5 ” 4 ” |
| now E ” 4 ” |
| |
| H = 5 ” 11 ” became 6 ” 4 ” |
| now F ” 4 ” |
| |
| P = 4 ” 12 ” became 7 ” 4 ” |
| now G ” 4 ” |
| |
| | |
| |
+-----------------------------------------+
| 8th Brigade. |
+-----------------------------------------+
| N = 3 Co. 7 Batt. became 1 By. 8 B.|
| now R ” 4 ” |
| |
| No. 5 = 4 ” 6 ” became 2 ” 8 ” |
| now B ” 8 ” |
| |
| R = 5 ” 6 ” became 3 ” 8 ” |
| now C ” 8 ” |
| |
| No. 2 = 2 ” 5 ” became 4 ” 8 ” |
| now D ” 8 ” |
| |
| No. 12 = 2 ” 9 ” became 5 ” 8 ” |
| now E ” 8 ” |
| |
| No. 11 = 6 ” 6 ” became 6 ” 8 ” |
| now F ” 8 ” |
| |
| U = 6 ” 2 ” became 7 ” 8 ” |
| now G ” 8 ” |
| |
| G = 7 ” 8 ” became 8 ” 8 ” |
| |
+-----------------------------------------+
| 9th Brigade. |
+-----------------------------------------+
| M = 7 Co. 5 Batt. became 1 By. 9 B.|
| now A ” 9 ” |
| |
| Z = 5 ” 4 ” became 2 ” 9 ” |
| now B ” 9 ” |
| |
| I = 7 ” 6 ” became 3 ” 9 ” |
| now C ” 9 ” |
| |
| O = 6 ” 8 ” became 4 ” 9 ” |
| now D ” 9 ” |
| |
| S = 8 ” 9 ” became 5 ” 9 ” |
| now E ” 9 ” |
| |
| L = 1 ” 1 ” became 6 ” 9 ” |
| now F ” 9 ” |
| |
|No. 16 = 1 ” 9 ” became 7 ” 9 ” |
| now G ” 9 ” |
| |
| |
| |
+-----------------------------------------+
N.B.--Prior to the introduction of the Brigade system, whenever a
Company of Artillery was made a Field Battery, it received a _Letter_
designation during its continuance in that condition.--F. D.
INDEX TO VOL. I.
“A” Battery, A Brigade (A Troop), 396.
“A” ” B ” (E, afterwards D, Troop), 399.
“A” Battery, 1st Brigade (4 Company, 7th Battalion), 422.
“A” Battery, 4th Brigade (1 Company, 3rd Battalion), 220.
“A” Battery, 9th Brigade (9 Company, afterwards 7, 5th Battalion), 409.
“A” Battery, 11th Brigade (8 Company, 1st Battalion), 177, 208.
“A” Battery, 14th Brigade (10 Company, afterwards 8, 2nd Battalion), 183.
Abbott, Charles, 179.
----, Edward, 173, 176.
Abson, George, 259.
Academy, Royal Military, 13, 19, 108 to 121, 243.
Adair, R. B., 409.
Addams, James, 257.
Adye, Mortimer, 222.
----, R. W., 180, 411.
----, S. G., 408.
----, P., 172, 176, 326.
Alms, Chas. G., 421, 423.
America--Braddock’s Expedition (1755), 158.
American War of Independence, 164, 297 to 381.
Anderson, George, 188.
----, J. R., 400.
----, W. C., 174.
Andrews, R., 421.
Annapolis (Port Royal, Nova Scotia), 71 to 78, 105.
Anson, A. E. H., 179.
Appendices, 426 to 443.
Arabin, Frederick, 254.
Arbuckle, B. H. Vaughan, 417.
Arbuthnot, C. G., 181, 403, 414.
----, John, 177.
----, Hon. W., 401, 422.
Armstrong, James, 174.
----, R. S., 254.
Arsenal, Royal, 16.
Artificers and Engineers, 38-9.
Artillery, earliest records of the use of, 36-7.
----, field, 37-8.
----, horse, 37.
---- in England, infancy of, 35 to 44.
---- officers, precedence of, 105, 137-8-9, 155.
Askwith, W. H., 407.
A Troop, _Vide_ “A” Battery, A Brigade.
Aylmer, Henry, 176.
Band, Royal Artillery regimental, 209.
Barker, Sir George R., 416.
Barnes, John, 411.
----, Joseph, 225.
Barnett, W. T., 262.
Barry, W. W., 256.
Bastard, J. S., 182.
Bates, Henry, 225, 409.
Battery _esprit_, 4, 170, 206.
Battle-Axe Company (2 Battery, 5th Brigade), 418-19.
Bayly, Z. C., 180, 414.
Baynes, C., 414.
“B” Battery, A Brigade (B Troop), 398.
“B” Battery, B Brigade (F, afterward E, Troop), 400.
“B” Battery, 1st Brigade (2 Company, 1st Battalion), 173.
“B” Battery, 8th Brigade (4 Company, 6th Battalion), 414.
“B” Battery, 9th Brigade (5 Company, 4th Battalion), 259.
“B” Battery, 11th Brigade (5 Company, 3rd Battalion), 223.
Beane, George, 223, 399.
Beckman, Sir Martin, 45, 57, 92.
Beevor, R., 223.
Belford, General Wm., 115, 125, 127-8, 132-3, 152.
Bell, Sir William, 223, 396.
Belleisle, siege of, 227 to 240.
----, list of Artillery officers at, 229.
Belson, George, 172.
Benezet, W. H. C., 417.
Benn, Anthony, 181.
Benn, Piercy, 222.
Bennett, Lieut. Henry, 125, 127.
Bent, Henry, 220, 422.
----, W. H., 175.
Bentham, Wm., 179, 223, 413.
Beresford, D. W. Pack, 177.
----, G. J., 176.
Bergen-op-Zoom, siege of (1747), 134.
Bettesworth, J., 421.
Biddulph, M. A. S., 179.
Bingham, Charles Cox, 226, 256, 413, 416.
Birch, R. H., 180, 181.
Bissett, Daniel, 180, 414.
Blachley, Charles, 220, 398, 399.
----, Henry, 423.
Blackheath, reviews of Artillery on, 266.
Blomefield, Sir Thomas, 174, 177, 188, 315, 379.
Bloomfield, Benjamin Lord, 398, 411, 415.
----, Sir John, 223, 400, 406.
Boag, James, 179, 274.
Board of Ordnance, 1, 9, 10, 19, 23 to 28, 137.
Boddy, Bombardier, R.A., 366.
Boger, T., 175.
Bogue, R., 394, 404.
Bonnell, Andrew, 432.
Boothby, J. G., 416.
Borgard, Lieut.-General Albert, 22, 61, 79, 104, 157, 431.
----, Memoir of, 83 to 100.
----, Regimental Orders by, 141.
----, Withers, 124.
Borthwick, William, 225.
----, William, 175, 263, 400.
Bourchier, Daniel, 221.
Bousfield, William, 61, 104, 431.
Bowater, George, 176, 416.
Bradbridge, J., 260, 292.
Braddock’s Expedition in America (1755), 158.
Brady, Chas. J., 262.
----, Thomas, 175-176.
Brandling, J. J., 399, 404, 415.
Brandreth, T. A., 177, 400.
Brandywine, battle of, 319.
Bredin, Andrew, 261.
Brereton, Sir William, 223.
Brettingham, R. W., 423.
Bridge, Cyprian, 222, 261.
Brietzche, Lieut., 229.
Brigade system established (1859), 3.
Briscoe, John, 220, 410, 423.
Brittenstein, George, 432.
Broadbridge, Thomas, 124.
Brooklyn (Long Island), battle of, 308.
Broome or Brome, Lieut.-General Joseph, 124, 127, 130, 182, 221, 266.
Brome, Lieut.-Colonel Joseph, 263.
Brough, R. S., 177, 421.
Broughton, S. D., 180.
Browne, Lieut.-Colonel George, 431.
----, St. John T., 257.
----, T. G., 409.
Brownrigg, Major, 162.
B Troop, _Vide_ “B” Battery, A Brigade.
Buchanan, J. F., 188.
----, G. J. L., 175.
Buckner, Richard, 408, 409.
Bull, Robert, 401.
Bullock, Lieut. Edward, 124.
Bunker’s Hill, battle of, 302.
Burn, R., 223.
Burnaby, C. H., 422.
----, R. B., 416.
Burrows, A. G., 258.
Burton, John, 254.
Butler, James, 180, 244, 400.
Butts, William, 254, 258.
Byfleet, camp at (1756), 150-1-2.
Caddy, William, 261.
Cadet Company, 15, 110.
Cadets, 13, 106-7, 110 to 121.
Cadiz, Expedition to (1702), 93.
Calcutta, 178.
Campbell, Alex., 127, 220.
----, Dugald, 180.
----, F. A., 173, 177.
----, Fredk., 406.
----, H. A. B., 406.
Camden, battle of, 367.
Cameron, A., 416.
Canada, 18, 303-4-5.
Cannon, early construction of, 35-6.
---- first used in the field, 35.
----, tables, of in the reign of Charles II., 46.
Carey, W. R., 257.
Carlisle, 128.
----, Robert, 244.
Carmichael, Lewis, 226, 417.
Carncross, Sir Joseph, 406.
Carter, John, 176, 244, 420.
Carthagena, attack on (1741), 123.
Carthew, R., 134, 407.
Cater, T. O., 180, 256.
Cator, John F., 421.
----, Sir William, 396.
“C” Battery, A Brigade (C Troop), 398.
----, B Brigade (G, afterwards F, Troop), 400.
“C” Battery, 1st Brigade (1 Company, 7th Battalion), 421.
“C” Battery, 8th Brigade (6 Company, afterwards 5, 6th Battalion), 415.
“C” Battery, 9th Brigade (9 Company, afterwards 7, 6th Battalion), 416.
“C” Battery, 11th Brigade (1 Company, 6th Battalion), 413.
Chalmers, J. A., 256.
Chalmers, John, 158.
Chamberlain, Sir Henry, 414.
Chamberlayne, J., 406.
Changes in the designation of troops and companies, 439.
Chapman, Richard, 175, 223.
Charles II., royal warrant of, 426.
Charlestown, siege of, 361.
Charleton, Thomas, 179, 182.
Charlton, George, 125, 127, 175.
----, George, 173.
Chesney, F. R., 261.
Chestnut Troop. _Vide_ “A” Battery, A Brigade.
Chester, John, 173, 226, 398.
Chevenix, Major, 162.
Christie, H. P., 422.
Clarke, Christopher, 176.
Clason, A. J., 409.
Cleaveland, R. F., 6, 261, 422.
----, Lieut.-General Samuel, 124, 127, 188, 189, 207, 301-2-3, 319, 378.
Cleeve, William, 176, 224, 425.
Clement, J. A., 424.
Clerk, Henry, 410.
---- of the Deliveries, 17, 18.
---- of the Ordnance, 17.
Clifford, Miller, 174.
Coast Brigade (invalid companies), 40, 167, 268, 349.
Cobbe, George, 172, 177, 222, 400.
Cockburn, John, 356.
----, J. P., 177, 415, 422, 424.
Cocks, P. R., 414.
Coffin, G. C., 259.
Colebrooke, J. R., 182.
----, P. W., 416.
----, Sir William, 174.
Colburne, Roger, 432.
Colclough, George, 172, 407.
Collier, William, 179, 256.
Collington, J. W., 172.
Collins, Captain, 364.
Colquhoun, J. W., 416.
Commons, House of, 2, 69, 381.
Company of Artillery, strength and pay of (1741), 104. (1716), 434.
----, loss of, in the Doddington (1755), 158.
Compton, Sir William, 44, 45.
Congreve, Sir William, 307.
Connell, A. F., 177.
Conrade, George, 432.
Cookson, C. N., 181.
----, George, 400, 409.
Cornelius, R. L., 258.
Courts-martial, 133.
Cox, William, 182.
Craufurd, R. E. F., 221.
Crawford, A. F., 406.
----, George, 413.
Crawford, W. J., 417.
Crofton, E. W., 423.
----, R. H., 180, 423.
Cruttenden, C., 183, 261, 423.
C Troop. _Vide_ “C” Battery, A Brigade.
Cubitt, Thomas, 254, 258.
Culloden, battle of (1746), 128.
Cumberland, Duke of, 132-3, 152.
Cuppage, William, 172, 274, 399.
Curry, Sir Edmund, 263, 421.
Dacres, Sir Richard J., 406.
D’Aguilar, C. L., 400, 417.
Dalton, Charles, 173, 175.
----, Charles J., 174.
Dansey, C. C., 404, 416.
Darby, Joseph, 423.
D’Arcy, Joseph, 179.
Dartmouth, Lord, 11, 12, 13, 14, 31, 44, 47.
Davies, Thomas, 379.
Davis, Thomas, 183.
“D” Battery, A Brigade (H, afterwards G, Troop), 401.
“D” Battery, B Brigade, (I, afterwards H, Troop), 401.
“D” Battery, 1st Brigade (4 Company, 2nd Battalion), 180.
“D” Battery, 4th Brigade (8 Company, 3rd Battalion), 225.
“D” Battery, 8th Brigade (2 Company, 5th Battalion), 406.
“D” Battery, 11th Brigade (6 Company, 7th Battalion), 423.
Deacon, Henry, 174.
Deal, James, 124.
Dennis, J. B., 421.
De Rinzy, G. A. F., 224.
Deruvijnes, F. L., 224.
Desaguliers, Lieut.-General T., 125, 127, 134, 152, 185, 228.
----, Lieut., 313.
Desborough, J., 175.
Desbrisay, George, 183.
----, Thomas, 183.
----, Theo., 221.
Des Etans, L. P., 432.
Designation of troops and companies, changes in the, 439.
Dettingen, battle of, 125.
Devereux, Hon. G. T., 407.
Dexter, Lieut., 133.
Dick, F., 176.
Dickens, C. R., 414.
Dickenson, E., 263.
Dickson, A., 174, 175.
----, Sir Alexander, 400, 415.
Distribution of Royal Artillery (1727), 105, (1782), 389.
Dixon, F. M., 183, 223, 292.
Dixon, G. W., 224, 399.
----, William, 180.
----, W. H. M., 222.
Dodd, Thomas, 182, 424.
Domville, J. R., 173.
----, J. W., 221.
Douglas, Sir Howard, 421.
----, Robert, 223, 225, 338, 354, 380, 405, 406.
----, Robert, 413.
----, R. S., 179.
Dovers, John, 226, 244.
Downman, F., 175, 176, 398.
----, Sir Thomas, 174, 398, 399.
Downing, J., 223.
Dowse, John, 258.
Dress of Gunners, &c., in the reign of William III., 59.
Dress of Royal Artillery (1741), 140, 154. (1768-70), 242. (1772), 265. (1799), 412.
Dress of Royal Irish Artillery, 167.
Drivers, 38, 128-9.
Drosier, E. W., 223.
Drummond, Duncan, 207, 221, 244, 405.
----, Percy, 176, 222.
D Troop, 399.
Dumaresq, W. L., 410.
Dunbar, James, 181, 220.
Duncan, Alexander, 400, 423.
----, John, 226.
Dundas, W. B., 261.
Dunlop, F., 424.
Dunn, Wm., 396, 400, 407.
Du Plat, Chas. T., 254.
Dupuis, Sir John E., 399.
Durdero, Joseph, 432.
Durham, Lieut. Richard, 127.
Durnford, P., 256, 413.
----, G., 261.
Du Vernet, A., 221.
Dyas, Richard, 415, 424.
Dyer, Sir John, 175, 183.
Dyneley, Thomas, 257, 398, 399.
Dysart, R., 222.
Dyson, John, 421.
Earliest records of the use of Artillery, 36, 37.
Early construction of cannon, 35, 36.
East Indies, 136.
East India detachment, 157-8. 411.
“E” Battery, A Brigade (K Troop), 403.
---- B Brigade (1st Rocket, afterwards I Troop), 404.
---- 1st Brigade (8 Company, 4th Battalion), 261.
Edwards, Sam. D., 226.
Egan, Chas., 177, 222, 414, 416.
Elgee, C. W., 414.
Elgee, J. L., 416.
----, W., 257.
Elliott, W. G., 394, 404, 408.