WALCHEREN.
An expedition has now to be described, to whose conception and partial
execution justice has not been done by historians. Remembered, if at
all, for its miserable termination, it is not unfrequently classed among
the military operations which an Englishman had better forget. And yet
there was a strategic value in the idea, which was proved even by its
incomplete realisation; and there was a determination, and an
uncomplaining suffering among the English troops, worthy of note in
military story, which have been ill repaid by the nameless graves which
crowd the island of Walcheren, and by the national forgetfulness of the
expedition.
To an Artilleryman the Walcheren Expedition has an interest which well
repays him for turning his eyes and thoughts from the Peninsula to this
strange island in the Northern Sea. Here no less than seventeen troops
and companies of his Corps were present; and so important was their duty
considered, that the Master-General, Lord Chatham, who was also
Commander-in-Chief of the forces employed, requested the
Deputy-Adjutant-General, Brigadier Macleod, himself to accompany the
army in command of the Artillery. And on this island, so baneful to our
troops, and yet so beautiful, a singular historical question connected
with the Regiment was settled, which will receive detailed notice in
this chapter.
Forming the right bank of the West Scheldt at its mouth, the islands of
South Beveland and Walcheren, now united by a railway embankment,
present to the traveller the most singular appearance. Rich and fertile
beyond measure, they are yet only saved from submersion by the sea by
means of costly dykes, kept efficient by incessant labour. In most
places the island of Walcheren, especially, is many feet below the level
of the sea; and even its highest points, the towns of Middleburg and
Flushing, have frequently suffered great injury from the inroads of the
ocean. One such inundation had occurred in 1808, and tended to make the
autumn of 1809 exceptionally unhealthy. Dykes now not merely surround
the island itself, but also the individual villages and farmhouses on
its surface, giving a curious fortified appearance to the whole.
Flushing and Antwerp, in the hands of Napoleon, strongly fortified, and
offering protection and anchorage to his fleets, were a strong and
perpetual menace to England, and gave an appearance of probability to
his threats of invasion, both in the eyes of the English people and
their Government. One of the strongest arguments against the Walcheren
Expedition has always been that it was a dissipation of England’s
military resources, which, if concentrated on the Peninsular campaign,
would have produced infinitely greater results. But it is easy to argue
thus with the wisdom which follows the fact. The danger which was
involved in the fortifications of Antwerp and Flushing was very present
to the English people; and immunity in that respect seemed then more
desirable than victory at a distance, even although that victory might,
in the end, have been a more serious blow at Napoleon’s power. And the
importance of Flushing, armed as it was, may be now better realised by
imagining it in the hands of a powerful Continental dynasty,--not
dismantled and disarmed, as it has been since the siege to be treated of
in this chapter,--but with batteries sufficiently strong to protect the
anchorage in front, and with a fleet riding there, within a few hours of
the English coast. Were such a thing ever to occur again--and it is by
no means impossible--Englishmen would perhaps confess that there was
more wisdom in the Expedition of 1809, which rendered Flushing
harmless, than has generally been allowed.[17]
Much of the unpopularity attending it, and all the incompleteness of
execution, were due to a want of harmony between the naval and military
commanders, which has never yet been satisfactorily explained, but which
undoubtedly was the main cause of the first part of the scheme--the
capture of Flushing--being the only part that was executed. Lord Chatham
would appear to have been much to blame in the matter; but there has
been a mystery connected with it all, which cannot be cleared up. Of
that nobleman’s military incapacity there is, however, no doubt; nor is
the reader surprised to find that his name disappeared, soon after this
Expedition, from the list of the Masters-General of the Ordnance.
The troop of Horse Artillery which accompanied the force was that
commanded by Captain A. Macdonald, and is now D Battery, A Brigade. The
sixteen companies will be found enumerated in the various tables of the
battalions. General Macleod took Captain--afterwards Sir
Robert--Gardiner as his Brigade-Major; and it is from the private
diaries of these officers that the main Regimental incidents connected
[Sidenote: Sir J. T. Jones’s ‘Sieges.’] with this Expedition have been
obtained. Captain Drummond was the General’s Aide-de-camp. The field
officers who accompanied the Artillery were Colonel Terrot,
Lieut.-Colonels Dixon, Franklin, Cookson, and Wood, and Majors
Griffiths, Dixon, and Waller. The immense battering train included 70
guns and 74 mortars; and we learn that not merely was a large supply of
Congreve’s rockets taken for [Sidenote: A.-A.-Gen. to Colonel Neville,
18 July, 1809.] employment as siege weapons, but also that every man in
the Regiment who had been trained to the use of rockets was ordered to
embark with the army.
The name of nearly every Artillery officer with the Expedition will
appear in the course of the narrative. In the meantime the following
numerical return of the force under General Macleod’s command will be
found worthy of perusal. (_See opposite page._)
The Second Division of the army, which General Macleod accompanied,
sailed from the Downs on Saturday, the 29th July, 1809, and anchored the
same evening in the Stein Diep. On the following day they weighed
anchor, and moved into the Room Pot, where they found the First
Division, and where orders were at once given for the troops to land in
light marching order. At 4 P.M. the first six battalions landed, without
opposition, at the Bree Zand, and during the night the remainder of the
troops, under the command of Sir Eyre Coote, continued to disembark,
with the several brigades of Artillery attached to them,--the last named
being under the command of Colonel Terrot. The following detail shows
the Artillery attached to this part of the army:--
Captain Marsh’s Light 6-pr. Brigade, attached to Lieut-Gen. Frazer.
” Webber Smith’s ” ” Major-Gen. Graham.
” Massey’s ” ” Lieut.-Gen. Lord Paget.
There was also a Heavy Brigade under Captain S. Adye.
About 3 P.M. the reserve, under Sir John Hope, proceeded to South
Beveland (immediately adjoining Walcheren), accompanied by Captain
Wilmot’s Light 6-pounder Brigade.
On Monday, the 31st July, Ter Veer, a village at the opposite end of the
island of Walcheren from Flushing, was invested, two guns of Captain
Macdonald’s troop and two 8-inch mortars having been landed to assist;
and it surrendered the following day. Until the fall of Flushing, Ter
Veer was employed as a landing-place and depôt for ordnance stores,--the
Balaclava of the Walcheren Expedition. The army then advanced across the
island, and proceeded to invest Flushing. During the siege, frequent
reinforcements of the French garrison took place, their troops being
transported by sea from Cadsand, and the weather being such as to render
it very difficult for the English fleet to intercept them. The defence
made by the French was very gallant, although the wretched inhabitants
were the main sufferers during the bombardment. By Napoleon’s positive
order, and notwithstanding the remonstrances of the French Commandant,
one of the dykes near Flushing was partly cut, and the sea poured into
the English trenches to a considerable extent, increasing the discomfort
and difficulties which the heavy and almost incessant rains had already
produced.
ARTILLERY EMBARKED for the SCHELDT EXPEDITION, under the EARL OF
CHATHAM, in 1809.
INDEX.
A. Field Officers.
B. Captains.
C. Subalterns.
D. Surgeons.
E. N. C. Officers.
F. Gunners.
G. Drummers.
H. Total.
I. Officers.
J. N. C. Officers.
K. Drivers.
L. Artificers and Trumpeters.
M. Total.
N. General Total.
O. Horses.
+-------------------------------+---+---+---+---+----+------+---+------+------------------------+------+------+
|Number of Troops and Companies,| ROYAL ARTILLERY. |ROYAL ARTILLERY DRIVERS.| | |
| with Drivers attached; +---+---+---+---+----+------+---+------+---+----+----+---+------+------+------+
| also Ports of Embarkation. | A.| B.| C.| D.| E. | F. | G.| H. | I.| J. | K. | L.| M. | N. | O. |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
+-------------------------------+-----------+---+----+------+---+------+---+----+----+---+------+------+------+
|PORTSMOUTH. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|Eight companies | 4| 16| 24| 4| 104| 800| 16| 968| 2| 10| 90| 8| 110| 1,078| 150|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|RIVER THAMES. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|One troop: Royal Horse } | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Artillery (now D Batt., } | | 2| 3| 1| 13| 81| | | | | | | | | |
| A Brigade) } | | | | | | | | 100| | | 54| 8| 62| 162 | 162|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|Eight companies | 4| 16| 24| 4| 104| 800| 16| 968| 7| 41| 308| 37| 393| 1,361| 515|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|With the battering train | | | | | | | | | 7| 54| 500| 42| 603| 603| 1,000|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
+-------------------------------+---+---+---+---+----+------+---+------+---+----+----+---+------+------+------+
| Total | 8| 34| 51| 9| 221| 1,681| 32| 2,036| 16| 105| 952| 95| 1,168| 3,204| 1,827|
+-------------------------------+---+---+---+---+----+------+---+------+---+----+----+---+------+------+------+
N. B. A few casualties occurred prior to the sailing of the Expedition.
About 50 additional horses were embarked, and rather more than 100 men
were left behind sick, and for other causes; but these are the numbers
prepared from the official returns, both in Record Office and United
Service Institution.
The English army was drawn up against Flushing as follows: General
Graham’s division on the right, General Grosvenor’s next; then Lord
Paget’s at West Zouberg, and General Houston’s at Oust Zouberg. Six
batteries were formed, five of which were manned by the Royal Artillery,
and one by seamen. The former were numbered and armed as follows:--
No. 1 Battery.--[18]1200 yards from the town.
13 24-prs. }This was evidently No. 5 Battery, according
2 8-in. howitzers } to the numbering of the Engineers;
6 8-in. mortars } _vide_ Jones’s ‘Sieges.’
No. 3 Battery.--2200 yards from the town.
6 10 in. mortars {This was evidently No. 1 Battery in the Engineers’ catalogue.
No. 4 Battery.--1600 yards from the town.
4 10-in. mortars.
10 24-pounders.
No. 5 Battery.--1600 yards from the town.
2 10-in. howitzers. { This was evidently No. 7 Battery in the
{ Engineers’ catalogue.
No. 6 Battery.--1760 yards from the town.
3 24-pounders.
4 10 in. howitzers.
N.B.--Two additional batteries, Nos. 7 and 8, were afterwards
armed: No. 7 with 2 10-inch mortars, No. 8 with 6 24-pounders.
These batteries were opened on the 13th August, at 1 P.M. At early
morning on the 15th August Flushing surrendered. Including the
ammunition expended by the sailors from No. 2 Battery, which was armed
with six 24-pounders, and opened on Sunday, the 14th August, the
following was the expenditure of ammunition, other than rockets, during
the short siege:--
Rounds.
24-pr. guns 6582
10-in. mortars 1743
8-in. ” 1020
10-in. howitzers 269
8-in. ” 380
----
Total 9994
----
N.B.--Sir R. Gardiner’s MS. agrees exactly in this particular with
Sir J. T. Jones’s ‘Sieges.’
Rockets had been used before the opening of the batteries, and continued
to be employed in great profusion, and with fatal effect. Great part of
the city, including the Hôtel de Ville, was burnt to the ground, and
hundreds of the inhabitants were killed. To this day shot may be seen in
the walls of many of the houses,--handing down from one generation to
another the traditions of the siege.
The chief labour and hardship, however, to the English troops preceded
the opening of the batteries. It was during their construction that the
energies of officers and men were most severely tried. The roads between
Ter Veer and the trenches became almost impassable with constant traffic
and rain; the landing of the guns and stores was attended with great
difficulty; it was impossible to procure cattle in sufficient quantities
for purposes of draught; and many of the horses intended for the later
operations had to be landed at Walcheren to draw the stores from Ter
Veer. As for the trenches themselves, a few extracts from Sir R.
Gardiner’s diary will enable the reader to realise the conditions under
which the Artillerymen worked:--
“August 10th. Ascertained, by the saltness of the water, that the dyke
had been cut.... The water making great progress in the communication
from the right to West Zouberg. The cross-roads very deep and bad;
great difficulty in drawing the guns from the park to the several
batteries.
“August 11th. A violent thunder-storm and incessant rains during the
night precluded all work the greatest part of it. The water rose in the
gun-battery on the left about six inches.
“August 12. The roads much worse, and the water rose very high in the
trenches. The water-gauge showed the rising of the water to be 4 inches.
The magazine of No. 1 Battery on the right was filled with water during
the night from the heavy rains, and it was feared would not be ready to
receive the ammunition. _The exertions of the men, however, overcame
every obstacle._”
Three companies, commanded by Captains Drummond, Campbell, and Fyers,
had landed at Ter Veer on the 8th August, and proved of great service in
the batteries at Oust Zouberg; but the Artillery before Flushing had
been weakened the previous day by the removal of the detachments of
Captains Buckner’s and Brome’s companies, with Captains Adye and Light,
under the command of Colonel Cookson, to join the force in South
Beveland, in consequence of a letter received from Sir John Hope. There
was considerable anxiety in South Beveland. The forts had, certainly,
been occupied by the English; and Captain Wilmot had succeeded in
unspiking and rendering serviceable almost all the guns which they
found; but there were many reasons for disquiet. Provisions were not so
easily obtained as had been expected in such a country; the inhabitants,
without exhibiting actual hostility, were decidedly cool and unfriendly;
rumours were spread, which magnified every hour, announcing large
reinforcements, not merely to Antwerp, but to every Dutch garrison, and
describing swarms of French troops being pushed forward in waggons and
boats to form a large army at Bergen-op-Zoom, or some such place, with a
view to assuming the offensive; the drains made on their resources by
the army in Walcheren alarmed the military chiefs; and the disagreement
between the Admiral and Lord Chatham as to the method of conducting
future operations had already ceased to be secret. It does not,
therefore, surprise the reader to find that when, after the fall of
Flushing, all the troops and horses which had been originally intended
for the second operation, as the design on Antwerp was termed, were
about to return to South Beveland, a decided hesitation manifested
itself among the authorities, which ended in a suspense from further
action. Before the end of August, the whole of the Horse Artillery,
Cavalry, and all the horses of the battering train had returned to
England;--Captains Wilmot’s, Buckner’s, and Brome’s companies were
ordered to follow, after dismantling the forts in South Beveland;--on
the 2nd September, Lord Chatham’s head-quarters were moved to
Middleburg, in Walcheren;--on the 3rd, the embarkation of much of the
ordnance, stores, &c., for England commenced;--on the 10th, Lord Chatham
announced that he had received the King’s commands to return home; and
on the 14th, accompanied by his staff, including General Macleod, he
sailed from Flushing.
The much-vaunted Expedition was therefore at an end; and with the
exception of the garrison of Walcheren, the army returned home by
instalments. But in the successful part of the campaign,--the capture of
Flushing, there is more than a crumb of comfort for the Artilleryman who
is in search of incidents creditable to his corps. The words penned
after the siege by Lord Chatham, who was observant, although incapable,
are worthy of a high place in the Regimental records. “It is
_impossible_,” he wrote, [Sidenote: Lord Chatham’s Despatch announcing
the surrender of Flushing.] “for me to do sufficient justice to the
distinguished conduct of the officers and men of the Royal Artillery,
under the able direction and animating example of Brigadier-General
Macleod.” And in a letter presently to be quoted, the reader will see
that in the duller work of dismantling the works, under circumstances of
great difficulty and sickness, the men of the Royal Artillery earned
noble words of commendation.
Walcheren has been remembered for the sickness which scourged the
English army in 1809, when it has been forgotten as to everything
else;--and the sickness certainly was fearful; although perhaps due more
to exposure, injudicious diet, and inefficient hospital arrangements,
than to any local influences, such as were conceived by superstition and
fear. The former, it is known, _did_ exist; and their results have been
seen in later days, during the first winter of the war in the Crimea,
much as they were in Walcheren. But the latter,--the mysterious local
fevers, which were believed to be indigenous to this island,--seem to
have marvellously disappeared, or to be innocuous, as far as the
healthy, contented, and long-lived inhabitants of its beautiful villages
are concerned. Be that, however, as it may; the sickness among the
English troops in 1809 was very great. On the 30th August there were
5000 sick; on the 3rd September the number increased to 5745; on the 5th
September it rose to 8000; and on the 8th it was no less than 10,948,
with fresh cases occurring every hour. The sickness in the Artillery may
be gathered from a return which is extant. On the 27th September there
had been left in Walcheren a total strength of 1089 officers and men
belonging to the Royal Artillery and Royal Artillery Driver Corps.
Before the 16th October,--in less than three weeks,--255 had been sent
sick to England, 396 were sick at Walcheren, and 109 were in their
graves. From a return of the officers who were invalided to England, we
find the names of many not yet mentioned, including Captains Oliver,
Monro, Parker, Wallace, Greene, and Scott; and Lieutenants J. Evans,
Parker, Dalton, Pringle, Grant, Chapman, and Drawbridge. The names of
others, who remained to the date of the evacuation of the island, will
be mentioned presently.
After Lord Chatham’s departure, it was intended at first to strengthen
the island for defence in the event of a French attack. Napoleon being,
however, as he said, perfectly satisfied that the English should die in
Zealand without any assistance from him, and the continued sickness
appalling the authorities, it was decided to dismantle the newly-armed
batteries with a view to the evacuation of the place. This was done
under the control and supervision of Major William Dixon, R.A., assisted
by the remnants of the twelve companies, left as part of the garrison of
the island. On his arrival in Woolwich, with these companies, he made a
report to the Deputy Adjutant-General, which cannot fail to be
interesting. “It would be of no use now, [Sidenote: Major Dixon to
D.-A.-Gen., 3 Jan. 1810.] sir,” he wrote, “to enter into a detailed
account of the state of defence in which Walcheren was placed at the
moment the order came to withdraw; but, in justice to the officers and
men I had the good fortune to command, you will permit me to state that,
up to the 15th November, every possible exertion was made to withstand
an attack in the field, or a siege in the fortified places. All the
Dutch mortars and many of the guns were exchanged for English; the extra
foreign ammunition sent off to England; Flushing, Veer, and Rammekens
completed; the coast strengthened by batteries mounted with heavy
ordnance; the field brigades distributed to the different corps of the
army; and depôts of ammunition established throughout. These labours
were effected without any assistance from the troops of the Line, and
under circumstances peculiarly trying;--the companies diminished by
sickness to one-third of their original strength, and even then jaded
and worn by an oppression and feeling from climate, which I cannot
describe, but which actually did not amount to disease. Yet, sir,
notwithstanding this, I am happy to say they performed every part of
their duty without a murmur, and obeyed every order with zeal and
alacrity.
“It will be plain to you, sir, that as we had risen to this state of
defence, so in proportion were our labours increased when we came to
dismantle. All that was done had to be undone; and every article of
guns, ammunition, and stores throughout the island, to be embarked in
the least possible time. The same diligence was continued, and within
the given period not a trace remained in the works of the ordnance with
which they had been defended.... Without meaning to take at all from the
general report of the good conduct of the officers and men employed in
the island of Walcheren, but as you are aware that, from various causes,
there are degrees even in excellence itself, I hope I shall not be
considered as acting inconsistently when I recommend the following
officers as more particularly deserving your approbation. To Captains
Maitland and Light I am greatly indebted for their activity and zeal in
completing the defences of Walcheren. To Captain Adye I owe everything
for the assistance he gave in dismantling the works, and embarking the
guns, ammunition, and stores; and to his name, which, in every respect,
deservedly stands first, I beg leave to add those of Captains Rawlinson,
Maitland, and Macartney, in the same undertaking. The whole of the
subalterns went through every part of the duties imposed on them with
zeal and goodwill, even in serving on board the _shutes_ with parties of
gunners to load and unload these vessels. I could place no reliance on
the Dutch who navigated them, but was thus compelled to ensure their
services by guarding against their escape. The navy, I presume, could
not (for they certainly _would_ not) grant us any assistance. Nautical
skill we were not supposed to possess, but necessity, at length, helped
us to find it. I shall conclude, sir, by recommending to your favour
Lieutenant Anderson, the acting Adjutant, whose zeal and activity
neither sickness nor fatigue could arrest, and I cannot hesitate in
pronouncing him one of the finest young men I ever met in my life.”
The amount of ordnance and stores captured in the islands of South
Beveland and Walcheren, and either sent to England or destroyed, was
very considerable. Summarised, according to date of capture, the
following is a list of the guns and mortars which were taken.[19]
_List of Captured Ordnance._
-------------+-----------------+----------------------+-----------------------+------------
Date. | Place. | Guns. | Howitzers. | Mortars.
-------------+-----------------+----------------------+-----------------------+------------
Aug. 1, 1809 |Action on }| 4 6-prs. | |
| landing }| 1 3-pr. | |
| | | |
-------------+-----------------+----------------------+-----------------------+------------
Aug. 1809 |Fort Haak {| 4 24-prs. | }| 3 coehorn.
| {| 3 12-prs. | }|
-------------+-----------------+----------------------+-----------------------+------------
Aug. 1, 1809 |Camp Veere | 5 18-prs (iron) |{ 3 7½-in. howitzers|
| | 2 ” (brass) |{ 1 5½-in. howitzer |
| | 9 24-prs. | |
| | 6 12-prs. | |
| | 14 6-prs. | |
-------------+-----------------+----------------------+-----------------------+------------
Aug. 1809 |Camp Veere | 3 brass wall-pieces| 1 8½-in. howitzer | 8
| Arsenal | 2 swivel guns | |
| | 1 18-pr. ” | |
| | 4 8-pr. ” | |
| | 4 6-pr. ” | |
-------------+-----------------+----------------------+-----------------------+------------
Aug. 4, 1809.|Fort Rammekens | 4 18-pr. ” | | 1
| | 6 12-pr. ” | |
| | 3 6-pr. ” | |
| | 3 2-pr. ” | |
-------------+-----------------+----------------------+-----------------------+------------
Aug. 1, 1809 |Coast Batteries,}| 12 26-prs. ” | | 7
| Walcheren }| | |
-------------+-----------------+----------------------+-----------------------+------------
Aug. 1809 |Fort Bathz, }| 15 24-prs. ” |{ 3 8-inch }| 4
| S. Beveland }| |{ 8 6-inch }|
-------------+----------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+------------
Aug. 1809 |Waarden Battery,}| 12 24-prs. ” | |
| S. Beveland }| | |
| | | |
|West Borselin }| 12 24-prs. ” | |
| Battery }| | |
| | | |
|East Borselin }| 8 24-prs. ” | |
|Battery }| | |
| | | |
|Barland Battery }| 12 24-prs. ” | |
| | | |
|Ounderskirk }| 6 24-prs. ” | |
| Battery }| | |
-------------+----------------+----------------------+-----------------------+--------------
Aug. 16, 1809|Flushing {| 96 brass guns | 22 howrs. (brass) {| 56 mortars
| {| | {| (brass)
| {| 70 iron ” | |
| {|122 ” carronades | |
-------------+-----------------+----------------------+-----------------------+--------------
There were, in addition to the ordnance mentioned above, very large
supplies of ammunition and stores of every description, of which the
islands were denuded on their evacuation by the English.
The embarkation of the troops from Walcheren was conducted under
circumstances of great difficulty. The weather was unfavourable, and for
many days after the men were on board, the wind was so adverse as to
prevent the ships from sailing. A rear-guard had been left on shore to
guard against any attack from the enemy, whose vessels had been
accumulating for some weeks in the neighbourhood; and the troops on
board the English ships were held in readiness for immediate
disembarkation, should the expected attack take place. Some
reinforcements which reached the island from England during the
embarkation, including two companies of Artillery under Lieut.-Colonel
Gold and Major Carncross, were not required to land, but their arrival
had a moral effect in ensuring a peaceable evacuation of the place. From
Colonel Gold, who landed for a few hours, a graphic description of the
state of Walcheren was forwarded to General Macleod in Woolwich. Major
Dixon had previously boasted of the thoroughness of his measures in
destroying [Sidenote: Major Dixon to D.-A.-Gen., 4 Dec. 1809.] the
fortifications. “I am most happy,” he wrote, “to say that not an article
in point of honour or value will be found in the island when the enemy
again takes possession: never was there a clearer sweep (I mean in a
military point of view); and I am satisfied that he will not for years
be enabled to use the Bason for the purposes of the navy. All the
parapets are also thrown down, and not a vestige is to be seen of gun,
ammunition, or store throughout the island.” This picture was confirmed
and completed by [Sidenote: Colonel Gold to D.-A.-Gen., 10 Dec. 1809.]
Colonel Gold, who wrote as follows: “I arrived just in time to witness
the destruction of the Arsenal, which is completely effected; the
entrance to the Bason, in which the French navy were sheltered last
winter, is entirely choked up by blowing up the pieces of the
flood-gates. Never was a scene of greater _public mischief_. On putting
foot on shore I found Macartney in the midst of a wreck of carriages,
and, at Flushing, Pilkington and Dixon surrounded by their own
conflagrations; while Middleburg presented the most pacific appearance,
and even at a church in Flushing, immediately opposite to the scene of
destruction, divine service going on as if nothing unusual had
occurred.... I have been across the island to-day, and although, from
the many good descriptions I had heard, I was fully prepared, I could
not have conceived any country so intolerably bad for military
operations; and that you (General Macleod) made your batteries and got
your guns into them is surprising.”
From these extracts, it will be seen that the first object of this
much-abused Expedition was completely effected, and Walcheren rendered
innocuous, as a means of menacing England. That this was mainly owing to
the energy and perseverance of the troops has, it is hoped, also been
made apparent. Alas! that the story of this Expedition, as of so many
others from England, would be incomplete without the mention of failures
in the supply departments of the army. Three months after the fall of
Flushing, the troops were [Sidenote: Dated Flushing, 14 Nov. 1809.]
still suffering from want of necessary comforts. “It will be doing us a
very great favour,” wrote Major Dixon, “if you can by any means expedite
the arrival of the _bedding_. It is now miserably cold, and I am
convinced that much of our indisposition arises from the want of
necessary accommodation and comfort. By a letter from the Honourable
Board (two packets ago) I expected bedding for the whole of the Ordnance
Department, but nothing of the kind has yet appeared.” From complaints
like these the reader cannot fail to suspect that much of the
exaggerated abuse of the climate of Walcheren was employed to shield
those departments, whose members, in this as in other wars, have evinced
a belief that the army exists for them, not they for the army.
It only remains to tell the singular story, whose conclusion has
affected the regimental privileges of the Royal Artillery from the fall
of Flushing to this day. Mention has been made several times in this
work of a custom, which placed the bells of a captured city, or an
equivalent, at the disposal of the commanding officer of the Artillery
of the besieging force. The privilege--as the reader will remember--had
been exercised so recently as at the siege of Copenhagen. After the
surrender of Flushing, General Macleod preferred [Sidenote: Lieut.-Col.
Mosheim to Lieut.-Colonel Wood, 4/9/1809.] the usual claim. The Mayor
and Corporation replied through the Commandant that they acknowledged
with due respect a right established by custom immemorial that the bells
belonged to the commanding officer of the Royal Artillery, if he
thought proper to enforce his claim, but that they were persuaded he
would grant consideration to their already sufficiently distressed
condition, and not deprive the unfortunate town of its bells, which they
would be as incapable of replacing, as they felt unable to tender any
compensation for them. On the following day, General Macleod replied
that, in consideration of the destruction brought upon the town of
Flushing by the system of defence which the French General had thought
proper to adopt, he had no wish to add to the misery of the inhabitants
by seizing the bells, or by demanding a strict compensation to the full
amount of their value. In consenting, however, to sacrifice to a great
extent his own rights and pretensions, he could not, he said, in any
degree compromise those of the Corps. He must, therefore, demand a
modified sum in order specifically to mark the transaction, and to
enable him at the same time to contribute to the comforts of the
officers and men who had partaken in the artillery duties of the siege.
Valuing the bells at 2000_l._, General Macleod expressed his readiness
to accept 500_l._ This offer was communicated [Sidenote: M. Becker to
Lieut.-Colonel Mosheim, 6 Sept, 1809.] by the French commandant to the
Mayor of Flushing, but was received with indignation:[20] “On nous a
rapporté,” wrote the Mayor, “que Messieurs les officiers de l’Artillerie
Royale persistoient dans leur demande à ce que la ville de Flussingen
leur offrit un compromis en indemnité des cloches, qui--suivant une
ancienne coûtume Anglaise--leur reviendroient, comme une récompense de
leur service contre une place assiégée, qui s’étoit rendue par
capitulation aux troupes de sa Majesté Britannique, et qu’ayant supposé
les dites cloches à 2000_l._ _sterling_ ils avoient fait grâce à la
ville, en considération de son malheur, des trois quarts de cette somme,
et se contentoient par conséquent d’un quart, montant à 500_l._
_sterling_. Vivement pénétré du sentiment de la situation malheureuse à
laquelle la ville de Flussingen et ses pauvres bourgeois sont réduits,
nous ne cessons cependant pas d’être nés descendans des anciens
Hollandais, et tous les désastres que nous avons éprouvés ne nous ont
pas tellement enlevé cet esprit franc et sincère, qui caractérise notre
nation, et qui rivalise en ce point avec la nation Anglaise, que nous ne
sentirions pas l’offense qui nous est faite, et que nous n’oserions
l’exprimer. Oui, Monsieur! malgré tout ce qui puisse nous en arriver,
nous ne pouvons que regretter l’offre qui nous est faite.... Nous avons
de la peine à nous persuader que la demande qu’on nous a faite a été
autorisée par le Commandant en chef. Comment, Monsieur? La ville de
Flussingen, ses malheureux habitans qui excitent la compassion de tout
le monde, qui sont ruinés, sans ressource, qui n’ont pas de quoi pouvoir
dans leur propres besoins; cette ville de Flussingen, ces habitans, qui
à plus d’un titre méritent la considération particulière du Gouvernement
Anglais, et qui, nous n’en doutons pas, deviendroient les objets de sa
moralité! Cette ville, et ces habitans, disons-nous, seroient-ils, après
avoir passé par tous ces malheurs, réduits à cette extrémité de voir
laisser enlevé ses cloches, faute de moyen de représenter la valeur
supposée? Non, Monsieur, il est impossible que le Gouvernement Anglais
autorise une pareille demande envers la ville de Flussingen, et nous
sommes fermement résolus de lui emporter nos plaintes, en cas que
Messieurs les Officiers de l’Artillerie persistent dans leur demande
contraire à l’équité et à la capitulation; et nous ne doutons pas que
l’âme généreuse de sa Majesté Britannique n’y fasse droit. Vous-même,
Monsieur, qui connaissez la situation de Flussingen, qui savez qu’une
somme de 5500f. de Hollande est au-dessus de nos forces, et qui avez
déjà montré compassion à nos maux, ne manquerez pas--nous nous en
flattons--d’employer vos efforts auprès de Messieurs les Officiers de
l’Artillerie pour qu’ils désistent de leurs prétentions. Nous prenons la
liberté de vous adresser un double de notre lettre, vous priant de
l’adresser à son Excellence _My Lord_ Chatham, et d’appuyer auprès de
son Excellence nos réclamations raisonnables.”
[Sidenote: Dated Middleburg, 8 Sept. 1809.]
This appeal was answered by General Macleod to the effect that he could
not, under any consideration, relinquish the rights of his Corps: that
he persisted in his claim, which had received the perfect approbation of
Lord Chatham; but that, in consideration of the representations made by
the magistrates, he again renounced the idea of deriving emolument to
himself at the expense of the distresses of the inhabitants, but would
persist in the right of his Corps, unless the magistrates should consent
to pay the still further reduced sum of one hundred guineas in
establishment of the right;--“to be disposed of in charity to the
soldiers’ wives and widows of the Royal Artillery, as may be thought
proper hereafter.”
As General Macleod was on the eve of leaving Walcheren for England, he
transferred the correspondence to Colonel Terrot, with the intimation
that he himself would have no objection to an appeal to the English
Legislature, should [Sidenote: Dated Middleburg, 9 Sept. 1809.] the
magistrates of Flushing insist on it; but “in that case,” he wrote, “it
is to be understood that the appeal is for the _whole_ of the bells, or
for the full amount of their value. The appeal leaves no room for
generosity on either side.”
The magistrates were obstinate, and the appeal was forwarded to England.
On the 12th November intimation was sent to Major Dixon, in Walcheren,
now in command of the Artillery, that the decision was unfavourable to
the claims [Sidenote: Dated Doctors’ Commons, 26 October, 1809.] of the
Corps. The following extract from the decision, addressed by Sir Charles
Robinson to the Earl of Liverpool, explains the grounds on which it was
based. “With respect to the bells of the church, the demands of the
Artillery are, I conceive, altogether unsustainable. It is apparently
not supported on the part of the Prize Commissioners, since they do not
advert to this claim in their letter of the 4th of October. Anciently,
there prevailed a law of pillage, which assigned to different corps and
to different individuals a privileged claim to particular articles.
Whether this was a privilege of the Artillery under the ancient custom
of England, as described in the Petition, I am not informed; but in the
modern usage of respecting property and public edifices, and more
particularly those set apart for divine worship, such a demand cannot, I
conceive, be sustained. What the custom may be,--whether deserving of
any compensation in the division of what is properly _prize_, or from
any other quarter,--may be a subject of consideration according to
circumstances. But I am of opinion that the demand ought not to be
enforced against the town.”
From subsequent correspondence which is extant, and which passed between
General Macleod and Sir Anthony Farrington, it is evident that the
former felt much regret that an old Regimental privilege should have
disappeared during operations in which he had occupied so prominent a
place; but the reader will admit that no one could have conducted the
cause of the Corps in a more unselfish, chivalrous, and yet resolute
manner.
N.B.--The comments of an officer of the sister corps, on the
conduct of the Artillery at the siege of Flushing, were very
favourable. Two extracts from Sir J. Jones’s work may be given.
“The guns of the batteries on the right of the attack were more
particularly directed to enfilade and take _en écharpe_ the
rampart of the western sea-line, in order to silence the fire of
its artillery on the fleet, now preparing to force the passage of
the Scheldt. This they accomplished very effectually, by disabling
or very severely wounding many of the traversing platforms and
their carriages, and much injuring the guns themselves.”
Again:
“Discharges of carcasses and shells from the mortar batteries,
with powerful flights of rockets intermixed, were kept up
throughout the night on the devoted town, and frequently large
portions of it burned with fury.”--JONES’S ‘Sieges,’ vol. ii. pp.
269-271.