PENINSULAR WAR--ROLIÇA, VIMIERA, CORUNNA.
“Saw
Time, like a pulse, beat fierce
Through all the worlds.”
_Rossetti._
The history of the Regiment between 1808 and 1814 is concentrated in the
Peninsular campaigns,--with the one exception of the Expedition to
Walcheren. As the war in Spain drew to a close, the Second American War,
which had in the meantime arisen, increased in importance, reaching its
culminating point in 1814.
It is proposed in this chapter to treat of that section of the wars in
the Peninsula, which terminated in the sad but glorious victory of
Corunna. After a diversion on the subject of the Walcheren Expedition,
the Peninsular narrative will be resumed, and be continued
uninterruptedly to its close.
The reader will doubtless remember that in the spring of 1808 the
Spaniards rose as one man to resist the schemes of Napoleon, who had
placed his brother Joseph on the throne of Spain. The English
Government, always ready to assist any country which defied the French
emperor, placed a force of 9000 men under the command of Sir Arthur
Wellesley, who sailed for Portugal on the 12th July, to co-operate with
the Spanish forces. This force was subsequently increased to nearly
30,000; but the conflicting instructions given by Government, and the
utter ignorance of the real state of affairs in Spain, prevented the
possibility of harmony of action among the English forces, and had
ultimately much to do with the abrupt and mistaken Convention of Cintra.
Portugal had recently suffered dismemberment at the hands of Napoleon as
a penalty for its friendship with England; the English expedition had
therefore a double motive,--the delivery of Portugal, and co-operation
with the Spaniards. How terrible the errors of the English Government
were in organizing this Expedition can only be [Sidenote: Napier, vol.
i., book i., chapter iii.] realised by a study of the celebrated and
standard history of the war; and such a study is necessary to enable one
fully to realise the marvellous genius of Wellington, and his determined
vigour. It is sufficient for the purpose of this work to show that, if
the Royal Artillery shared the glories of Wellington, they also from the
very first shared his difficulties--which were certainly not lessened in
their treatment by the Ordnance. The conflicting instructions given by
Government to Sir Arthur Wellesley were matched by the total absence of
any information from the Board to Colonel Robe, who had been appointed
to command the Artillery of the Expedition. A man full of zeal--one of
the best practical Artillerymen whom the Regiment has ever produced--he
naturally sought by every means in his power to ensure the completeness
in every respect of the equipment of the force under his control. How
completely he was foiled by the masterly silence of the Board will be
seen by the following letters written by him after his arrival in
Portugal. That, in spite of all his difficulties, he succeeded in
earning the warm commendations of a chief, who was rarely guilty of many
words of praise, is merely another instance of the truth [Sidenote:
‘Times,’ 13 Jan. 1873.] of the saying of a recent writer: “The student
who reads the history of the Royal Artillery can hardly fail to be
struck by proof after proof that the progress of the Regiment has been
due to the energy and manly courage of individual officers within its
ranks in spite of the withering cold of officialism.... So it must be,
and ever will be. Boards and clerks will bind chains in peace round the
men of talent, who will either break them when a crisis comes, or die in
the effort to do so.”
The correspondence was as follows.
“‘Kingston’ Transport,
Mondego Bay,
July 30, 1808.
[Sidenote: Lieut.-Col. Robe to Brig.-Gen. Macleod.]
“... I shall therefore take the liberty of mentioning to you some
points which it may be essential should on future occasions be put
right on the embarkation of Artillery.... It appears to me
necessary that the officer appointed to command Artillery on any
expedition should know something more of the nature of the service
intended than I did, and that he should not be made to take upon
trust that everything necessary for his service will be found on
board his ships. Our equipment is not yet arrived at the state of
perfection to render such a mode efficient; and if it is
practised, the commanding officer of Artillery will find, as I
have, that his brigades will be wanting in articles extremely
necessary, and be very short indeed in stores intended for repair
or for keeping them in good order. He will perhaps find also, as I
have, that intrenching tools, and even platforms, are sent with
the Engineer’s department for a species of service for which he
has not a gun, nor a mortar, nor a round of ammunition. I do not
make this a matter of complaint to you. I complain not of
anything, because I can go no further than use to the best of my
ability the means put into my power; but I confess it would have
been much more satisfactory to me had I been permitted an
opportunity of stating before I embarked what might have been sent
with me for the real benefit of the service, and I don’t think it
would have occasioned an hour’s delay to the embarkation, or have
added a shilling of expense to the country, because the essential
articles, if not supplied, _must_ be purchased. I have so often
mentioned _horses_ that I ought perhaps to apologise for again
recurring to that subject; and perhaps it may be said that I have
no reason to mention them, having the horses of the Irish
Commissariat ordered to be turned over to me on landing.
Fortunate, indeed, I think myself to have even _them_. I know not
what figure we should have cut without them; but when you learn
that they are acknowledged to be _cast horses from the Cavalry_
turned over to the Commissariat, you will readily think that we
are not likely to make a very capital figure with them. I have
been also fortunate enough to obtain with them a promise of shoes
from that branch, sufficient, with the _one hundred sets_ supplied
to me, to shoe them on first going off. Future service must be
supplied as it can, and I shall not let it go unsupplied.” ...
This letter was written by Colonel Robe before he had realised the whole
of his wants, and how admirably the Honourable Board had succeeded in
proving their ability “How not to do it.” The truth dawned on him very
soon, and his language of remonstrance became stronger. His next letter
is dated the 7th August, 1808, from the camp above Lavos, Mondego Bay,
and contains the following passages:--
[Sidenote: Lieut.-Col. Robe to Brig.-Gen. Macleod.]
“I now deem it my duty (which were I to neglect I should be highly
culpable) to point out to you in the strongest manner the impolicy
of sending Artillery to a foreign country without horses. Even the
horses we have now, old, blind, and casts from the Cavalry as they
are, we find superior to what we can obtain from the country. The
latter are good of their kind, but small, and not of sufficient
weight for our carriages. Three hundred good horses would have
cost the country no more for transport than as many bad ones, and
what we shall do for the brigade now to be landed remains to be
decided.... I must also mention the proportion of general stores
which you, sir, know Artillery cannot do without, and which ought
to be sent out with every embarkation. Had I been made acquainted
with what was to have been embarked, I should not have gone on
board ship till the proper proportion had been furnished. _I did
everything in my power to obtain the information from the Board,
and was referred to Mr. ----, who himself at the time was not
furnished with any information._ I did at hazard request Mr.
Spencer to put on board one hundred sets of horse-shoes and some
nails, thinking them an addition to what would be provided for us.
_These are all I have had for the horses of three brigades_; and
had I not obtained some more from the Commissary-General,
belonging to the horses delivered to us, the horses must have
taken the field _barefoot_. I have made demands for some, and for
such things as are most immediately required, and what may be
wanted in the meantime must be purchased here.
“I write this to you officially, and must not be considered as
individually complaining or making difficulties. My people of all
classes exert themselves, and I am determined to get on; but I
know that, engaged in a department where much is expected, I am
doing my country greater service by pointing out what may render
that department as complete as it is supposed to be, than if I
were to remain for ever silent on the subject.”
Then followed the battles of Roliça and Vimiera, to be alluded to
hereafter, and merely mentioned here to show that before the date of his
next letter Colonel Robe had been able to form a very practical opinion
of the Board’s shortcomings. Writing after Vimiera, on the night of the
[Sidenote: Lieut.-Col. Robe to Brigadier Macleod.] 21st August, 1808, he
says: “My men are staunch, and the admiration of the army; and had they
been properly supplied with horses and with stores, as artillery _should
have_ embarked from England, Europe would not have produced a more
efficient artillery. I shall have occasion to write to you and to the
Board on the latter subjects, as soon as I can obtain time; but give me
leave to say now that never more will I leave England taking my
provision of Artillery upon trust, and coming upon an army burthened
with cast horses, or no horses at all, or with brigades unsupplied with
any one store to make repair, and scarce a shoe to put on horses when I
could beg them. This may be strong; but I have reason to use the
expressions after suffering the inconveniences occasioned by the want of
these supplies.”
[Sidenote: Lieut.-Col. Robe to Colonel Harding.]
On the 1st September, 1808, Colonel Robe pointed out to Colonel Harding,
who had arrived to take command of the Artillery in Portugal, that “not
less than two hundred and fifty horses would be required to render that
Artillery efficient for taking the field for a length of service. Those
received originally from the Irish Commissariat were old cast horses of
Cavalry, and many of them blind. They now fall off very fast.”
* * * * *
The reader will be eager to see how the Board explained its
shortcomings, and what reparation it proposed to make to the brave
officer, who had gained honour for his Corps in spite of official
blunders. For calm, cool assumption, perhaps, [Sidenote: Board of
Ordnance to Lieut.-Col. Robe.] the reply sent by the Board is
unsurpassed. It bears date the 6th October, 1808, after the news of the
English successes, and the gallantry of the Artillery under Colonel
Robe, had reached England, and after Colonel Robe had been twice
specially mentioned by Sir A. Wellesley in his despatches. It was
written, let the reader remember, on behalf of a Board whose errors were
not confined to those quoted above; which had actually sent guns without
their ammunition, and ammunition which would have been useless, had not
Colonel Robe succeeded in borrowing suitable guns from the navy. It was
addressed to an officer who had been straining every nerve, night and
day, to remedy the defects due to official ignorance, or to what is much
the same, official affectation of omniscience;--to an officer who, in
spite of the remonstrances which had been extorted from him by his
discovery of the Board’s incapacity, had never attempted to shelter
himself behind the faults of others, but had, instead, toiled to remedy
them. Let the reader bear these facts in mind, as he attempts to realise
the feelings with which Colonel Robe must have perused the following
lines:--“In reply to the parts of your public correspondence in which
you have so very warmly complained of some omissions and deficiencies,
particularly in the Light Brigade of Artillery shipped at Plymouth, I am
to say that his Lordship has, upon inquiry, ascertained that there
_were_ _some irregularities_ in the embarkation, and that he has, in
consequence, expressed his displeasure through the Board to the parties
concerned, in a manner to make a lasting impression. His Lordship has,
besides, issued such orders, and made such regulations, as must
effectually preclude every plea or excuse for irregularity or omission
in future.
“The Master-General, in desiring me to give you the above information,
has directed me to add that, although he is willing to ascribe much of
the style and many of the expressions in the letters to your known zeal
for the service, and the anxiety attending an officer during the moments
of preparation for the field, yet his Lordship cannot but regret that,
instead of forwarding a complaint, which it would be the wish and the
interest of the Ordnance to attend to, you should have allowed yourself
to arraign, with such improper and unmerited asperity, the conduct of
the Ordnance Department in general.”
The old, old story! Officialism, on being detected in error, hurriedly,
and with attempts at dignity, assumes an air of injured innocence, and
neither forgives nor forgets the unhappy soldier who is the means of
revealing its shortcomings. What a contrast does Colonel Robe’s
dignified and soldierlike acknowledgment of this reprimand present!
Having first acknowledged the congratulations of the Master-General on
the conduct of the Artillery at Roliça and Vimiera, which he had caused
to be read to the men on parade, and entered in all the order-books,
thereby, as he wrote, “awakening every joyful feeling that could arise
in the breasts of [Sidenote: Lisbon, 7 Jan. 1809.] soldiers,” he
proceeded as follows:--“The latter part of your letter is indeed a great
source of grief to me, and has hurt me more than I can express. I had
hoped to have obtained for my whole conduct the approbation of his
Lordship the Master-General and the Board of Ordnance. I set out with
the most earnest desire to fulfil, to the extent of my abilities, every
duty I might be honoured with, and to abide in the strictest manner by
their orders, for which purpose I applied for instructions and such
information as the very limited time prior to my departure would admit.
The shortness of that time, our expected destination (which, as you
know, we had reason to believe was far more distant than it proved
afterwards to be[14]) certainly produced in me an anxiety that the
branch of service entrusted to me should be supplied in the manner most
conducive to the end for which it was sent out. This anxiety may have
caused a warmth of expression not deemed advisable in public
correspondence, however good the intention. And that an unfavourable
impression has been received in His Lordship’s mind I, with pain,
perceive, and submit in the most respectful manner to the animadversion
you have received His Lordship’s commands to make.... Whatever the
warmth of my feelings might have been which impelled me to the remarks
that have caused His Lordship’s displeasure, I entreat that they may be
ascribed to the peculiar situation in which I was placed. My letter to
you was written on the ground of, and almost during, the action, and,
consequently, that degree of coolness was not attended to which ought to
have been manifested.”
The difficulties of the campaign of August 1808 were increased by the
insincerity and disunion of the Spaniards, the feebleness of the
Portuguese support, and the extraordinary conduct of the English
Government in sending General after General with conflicting
instructions. The supersession of Sir Arthur Wellesley at a critical
moment, uncalled for and undeserved, would have paralysed a less
determined commander. To his resolution, his singleness of purpose, and
his tact in dealing with the Portuguese authorities, is the fact due
that, brief as the campaign was, it was marked by two brilliant
engagements, and established already the military reputation of the
English troops. The British army in Portugal, in 1808, was gathered from
the four winds of heaven, without harmony either in instructions or
management, and destitute of adequate equipment or supplies. The main
body, which sailed from Cork, had been intended for South America; the
contingent brought by Sir John Moore had been sent in the first instance
to Sweden, on an errand rendered fruitless by the obstinacy of the
Swedish monarch; and the rest of the army was gathered in instalments
from Gibraltar, Madeira, and various parts of England. The annexed
table, prepared from the embarkation returns, shows the method in which
the Artillery portion of the army was collected:--at first destitute of
horses, and, later, embarked with so much precipitation, that in many
instances the horses died from long confinement on board ship; and in
others it was found that animals had been hurriedly purchased, and
embarked afflicted with fatal and infectious diseases, which spread
rapidly among those which were healthy. The horses which were purchased
in the country were small, and unfitted for Artillery work. The roads
round Lisbon, and in the district traversed by Sir A. Wellesley’s force,
were of the worst description; and Colonel Robe and his successor,
Colonel Harding, wrote to the Board, expressing their thankfulness that,
for the three brigades engaged at Roliça and Vimiera they had been able
to procure _oxen_ to draw the guns, with horses as leaders! The
remonstrances of Colonel Robe and his successors succeeded in procuring
from England, as the annexed table will show, a suitable supply of
horses as the year advanced; but the honours gained by the Corps had
been earned before these arrived (_see_ p. 204).
[Sidenote: Now 3 Battery, 2 Brigade, and 7 Battery, 17 Brigade.]
In addition to the companies (Captain Geary’s and Captain Raynsford’s)
which embarked with Colonel Robe to form part of Sir A. Wellesley’s
force, 161 of the King’s German Artillery were also detailed. The
services of this Corps during the Peninsular and Waterloo campaigns were
of the highest order. The head-quarters of the Corps were at this time
at Porchester, and the strength in 1808 was as follows:--
[Sidenote: Muster-Rolls of K. G. Artillery, 1808.]
Field officers, 4; staff officers, 6; staff sergeants, 3. Two troops of
Horse Artillery, consisting in all of 372 officers and men, and 186
horses.
RETURN of the OFFICERS and MEN of the ROYAL ARTILLERY, and of Officers’
or Draught Horses, or others under the Ordnance, which were sent from
various Stations to Spain or Portugal during the Year 1808, with the
Dates of their respective Embarkations.
INDEX.
A. Officers.
B. N. C. Officers.
C. Gunners.
D. Drummers.
E .Total.
F. Officers.
G. N. C. Officers.
H. Drivers.
I. Trumpeters.
J. Artificers.
K. Total.
L. General Total.
M. Horses.
+-------------------------------------------+--------------+--------------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| | Date of | ROYAL ARTILLERY. | R. A. DRIVER CORPS. |
| | Embarkation. |---------+-----+----+-----+----+----+-----+----+----+-----+-----+-----+
| | | A. | B. | C. | D. | E. | F. | G. | H. | I. | J. | K. | L. | M. |
+-------------------------------------------+--------------+----+----+-----+----+-----+----+----+-----+----+----+-----+-----+-----+
|Embarked with Sir A. Wellesley |June, 1808 | 10| 27| 204| 4| 245| 2| 18| 143| 2| 10| 175| 420| |
|Embarked with General Spencer from } |June 13, 1808 | 3| 6| 53| 1| 63| | 1| 13| | | 14| 77| 360|
| Gibraltar for Cadiz } | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|Embarked with Sir J. Moore for Sweden, } |April 30, 1808| 24| 62| 406| 8| 500| 3| 18| 276| 2| 30| 329| 829| 309|
| and then for Spain } | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|Embarked with Generals Ackland and } |July 23, 1808 | 10| 29| 187| 4| 230| 3| 13| 178| 2| 14| 210| 440| |
| Anstruther } | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|Embarked from Gibraltar by order of Sir } |Aug. 13, 1808 | 8| 27| 186| 3| 224| | | | | | | 224| |
| H. Dalrymple } | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|Embarked from Madeira for Portugal } |Aug. 17, 1808 | 3| 14| 94| 2| 113| | | | | | | 113| 300|
| with General Beresford } | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 300|
|Embarked with Sir D. Baird from Cork |Sept. 23, 1808| 8| 26| 205| 3| 242| 2| 20| 181| 2| 16| 221| 463| 296|
|Embarked with Sir D. Baird from Woolwich |Sept. 22, 1808| 10| 26| 200| 2| 238| 2| 20| 181| 1| 15| 219| 457| 304|
|Embarked from Woolwich: Horse Artillery |Oct. 5, 1808 | 12| 28| 100| | 200| | | 109| 2| 14| 125| 325| 600|
|Embarked from Portsmouth: Horse Artillery |Nov. 18, 1808 | 10| 26| 161| | 197| | | 108| 2| 14| 124| 321| |
|Embarked from Portsmouth |Dec. 8, 1808 | 2| | 1| | 3| 4| 28| 213| 3| 19| 267| 270| |
+-------------------------------------------+--------------+---------+-----+----+-----+----+----+-----+----+----+-----+-----+-----+
| Total embarked for Portugal or } | | 100| 271| 1857| 27| 2255| 16| 118| 1402| 16| 132| 1684| 3939| 2469|
| Spain in the year 1808 } | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
+-------------------------------------------+--------------+----+----+-----+----+-----+----+----+-----+----+----+-----+-----+-----+
N.B. The return given by Napier in vol. 1. p. 590, of his ‘History,’
neither includes the R. A. drivers, nor the officers and N. C. officers
of the R. A. of several of the detachments mentioned above, but merely
the gunners. It, however, does include the King’s German Artillery,
which is not shown in this purely regimental return.
Four marching companies, in all 714 officers and men--with 67 horses.
One of these companies was stationed in the Mediterranean.
An addition to Colonel Robe’s force of a doubtful value was received
from Gibraltar. Lieut.-Colonel George Ramsey was ordered from Gibraltar
with three companies to meet the Artillery expected from England, and a
_car brigade_ of guns, as it was termed, was issued from the Ordnance
stores, for the service. Two of the companies, and Colonel Ramsey, were
sent back to Gibraltar immediately on their arrival in Cadiz:--only one,
Captain Morison’s[15] being allowed to proceed in charge of the guns.
Colonel Ramsey, however, had time to inspect the car brigade which had
been issued to him, and his official report on it was not complimentary
to [Sidenote: To D. A. G. from Cadiz, 21 July, 1808.] the store-keepers.
A similar brigade, it would appear, had been sent to Sicily, a few weeks
before; and the clerk of stores had hopelessly confused the two. The
shafts for the howitzers had been sent with the 6-pounders; seven
gun-wheels had been put on board for use with the waggons,--although not
interchangeable,--and one waggon was entirely useless. The stores were
inadequate and unsuitable; and there was neither a commissary, nor an
artificer, with the detachment. A little further vacillation on the part
of the authorities led to two companies leaving Gibraltar for Portugal
immediately after the return of those under Colonel [Sidenote: Now 1
Battery, 6 Brigade.] Ramsey; and one of these, Captain Skyring’s, had
the good fortune to join Colonel Robe in time for the battle of Vimiera.
Colonel Robe’s force anchored in Mondego Bay on 28th July; and on the
following day Sir Arthur Wellesley, who had preceded the army, and had
been engaged in diplomatic as well as military duties, arrived, and gave
orders for the disembarkation. The French withdrew from the coast, and
the inhabitants showed symptoms of co-operation with the English, which
were, however, sadly neutralised by the conduct of their rulers; while
Sir A. Wellesley pressed forward, on the 9th August, to Leiria, hoping
to cover the disembarkation of the additional troops which he now knew
were on their way from England, and perhaps at the same time to strike
an effective blow, as near to Lisbon as possible, with the force under
his command. This would have the effect of inspiring the Portuguese with
courage; of asserting the right of the English to control the military
operations of the Allies; and of disarranging the plans of the French.
The English army was augmented at Lavos on the 6th August by General
Spencer’s contingent; and was divided into six brigades, under Generals
Hill, Nightingale, Crawford, [Sidenote: G. O. dated Lavos, 7 Aug. 1808.]
Bowes, Ferguson, and Fane. A demi-battery of Artillery was attached to
each brigade; howitzers being attached to the 1st, 2nd, 5th, and 6th
Brigades, and the 9-pounders being kept in reserve. On the line of
march, the Artillery always moved in front of the brigades to which they
were attached, and the Artillery of the reserve followed the Infantry.
The advance of Sir Arthur Wellesley was perfectly successful; he
succeeded in cutting the line of communication between Generals Loison
and Laborde, and in inducing the French Commander-in-Chief, Junot, to
quit Lisbon, and take the field with the reserve. The cowardice and
self-interest of the Portuguese leaders robbed him, however, at a
critical moment, of several thousand troops; so that in his first
engagement with the enemy he had the assistance of no more than 1650
Portuguese. That engagement was the one known as the combat of
Roliça--fought on the 17th August, with superior numbers on the side of
the English, but against a General, Laborde, who was not only very able,
but also occupied a position of great natural strength.
The attack of the English, who, with the Portuguese, numbered 14,000,
was made in three columns, the left commanded by General Ferguson,--the
right composed of the Portuguese,--and the centre, consisting of three
brigades, commanded by Sir Arthur in person. The Royal Artillery had 18
guns, one half of which came into action to cover the advance of the
Infantry. So determined was that advance, and so critical did General
Laborde’s position become, as the left column, under General Ferguson,
closed in upon his right, that he fell back to a new and parallel
position, on the heights of Zambugeira. The steep heights, and dense
brushwood, which had to be traversed in the advance of the English,
rendered the attack of this new position a more difficult and costly
one, and the losses of the 9th, 29th, and 82nd Regiments were especially
heavy. The ardour of the troops was, however, irresistible; and Laborde
again fell back, handling his troops with the utmost skill. In a very
short time, after one or two attempts to make a stand, the [Sidenote:
Napier.] French were in full retreat--“leaving three guns on the field
of battle, and the road to Torres Vedras open to the victors.”
The loss of the French was admitted by themselves to be [Sidenote:
Wellington Supplementary Despatches, vol. vi. p. 116.] 600 killed and
wounded; but it was probably much greater. Sir Arthur Wellesley, writing
on the following day, said the loss had been reported to be 1500; and
Colonel Robe, in his despatch to the Ordnance, said that the loss of the
French far exceeded that of the English, which amounted to 479 killed
and wounded. The loss of the Royal Artillery on this occasion was, as
Colonel Robe wrote, irreparable. Captain Henry Geary, an officer of
great promise and experience, [Sidenote: Col. Robe to D. A. Gen., R.A.
18 August, 1808.] was killed. “He was, by his own desire, and as senior
Captain, in charge of guns with the Light Brigade, and was killed while
pointing his gun within one or two hundred yards of the enemy. I regret
him as an officer, for he was invaluable; and as a friend and old
fellow-campaigner, by no means less. His loss to his family cannot be
appreciated; but it will always be a comfort that he died as he had
lived, in the very act of doing his [Sidenote: Napier, vol i. p. 591.]
duty to his country, and a true Christian.” The force of Artillery under
Colonel Robe’s command at Roliça numbered 660 of all ranks.
The next engagement between the French and English forces took place
under singular circumstances. Sir Arthur Wellesley had been reinforced
by the brigades under Generals Ackland and Anstruther,--thus bringing
his force up to 16,000 men, besides 660 Artillery, and 240
Cavalry,--exclusive of the Portuguese under Colonel Trant. The greatest
number which Junot could bring against this army could--it was
known--hardly exceed 14,000. Further English reinforcements being known
to be on the way, Sir A. Wellesley decided on assuming the offensive.
Unfortunately, Sir H. Burrard, one of the three Generals sent out by the
English Government to assume the command, arrived on the night of the
20th August, and Sir A. Wellesley was obliged to wait on him for orders.
No arguments that he could employ could persuade Sir H. Burrard to
attack before the arrival of the expected reinforcements; and Sir Arthur
parted from him with feelings of the most bitter disappointment.
Fortunately for him, and for the army, Junot, who by this time had
reached Torres Vedras, resolved himself to assume the offensive; and to
attack the English in their position near the village of Vimiera. The
battle commenced at seven o’clock on the morning of the 21st August, and
deserves a special mention in this work. For at Vimiera, for the first
time, as Napier and Oust show, did the French realise the difference
between the English forces and those with whom they had hitherto been
contending;--for the first time did they appreciate those qualities with
which they were so soon to be familiar: “the stolid firmness and
resolute thrust of the Infantry, and the wonderful skill and precision
of the Artillery.” No chronicler of this battle fails to speak of the
“murderous fire of Robe’s Artillery;”--a fire which told with admirable
effect at the most critical periods of the engagement. The number of
guns present was small,--only 18, as at Roliça; but on this occasion all
were engaged,--the reserve as well as the divisional Artillery being
brought into play.
The right wing of the English army consisted of the 1st Brigade, under
General Hill; the centre, of the 6th and 7th, under Generals Fane and
Anstruther; the left, of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 8th, under Generals
Ferguson, Nightingale, Bowes, and Ackland; and the reserve was composed
of the 5th Brigade, under General Crawford.
The attack of the French was made with great gallantry, in spite of many
difficulties caused by the broken and wooded nature of the ground, and
was directed against the English centre in the first instance, and
mainly against General Fane’s brigade. That officer, wisely availing
himself of a discretionary power granted him, and seeing that the
position was a favourable one for the employment of his Artillery
against the advancing columns, brought up the guns of the reserve at
once, and with those of his own division formed [Sidenote: Cust.] a
battery, which played on the advancing foe with “such a shower of shell
and grape as might have been sufficient to stop any troops;” and
although the French troops _did_ reach the summit of the hill on which
the English stood, they were, as Napier writes, so “shattered by the
terrible fire of Robe’s Artillery,” that they fell an easy prey to the
gallant charges of the 50th Regiment. At another part of the line, where
skirmishing between Anstruther’s brigade and the French was going on,
the Artillery played an equally important part. A column of Grenadiers
had been sent forward by Kellermann to share in this part of the battle,
[Sidenote: Napier.] and “coming at a brisk pace, these choice soldiers
beat back the advanced companies of the 43rd Regiment; but to avoid
Robe’s artillery, which ransacked their left, they dipped a little into
the ravine on the right, and were immediately taken on the other flank
by the guns of the 4th and 8th Brigades; then, when the narrowness of
the way, and the sweep of the round shot, were crushing and disordering
their ranks, the 43rd, rallying in one mass, went down upon the very
head of the column, and with a short but fierce struggle, drove it back
in confusion.” Yet again: in the attack upon General Ferguson’s brigade
made by Solignac, who expected to find a weak force on the left to
oppose him,--but found it strengthened with the same forethought and
skill as marked, in days coming on, the tactics of Wellington at
Waterloo,--we read of the “powerful artillery which swept away their
foremost ranks.” As the reader finishes the account of this battle, and
reads of the French retreating in confusion, leaving thirteen of their
guns on the field, he can scarcely realise that the whole Artillery
force of Sir A. Wellesley was little more than the captured guns
represented. How much of the effect of this force, small as it was, was
due to the individual exertions of all ranks may be gathered from the
following extract from Colonel Robe’s despatch to the Ordnance:--“Never
[Sidenote: Col. Robe to D. A. Gen. Vimiera, 21 Aug. 1808.] was man
better supported by his officers and soldiers than I have been. I would
not change one of them, from the Major to the youngest subaltern, for
anything in the world; and only regret my son was not with me. My men
are staunch and the admiration of the army.” It may interest the
professional reader to know that great part of Colonel Robe’s report
after Vimiera was occupied with praises of Shrapnel’s spherical case, of
which he begged large additional supplies. He concludes with a sentence
which proves the _entente cordiale_ which existed between himself and
his superiors. “Nothing but the unexampled assistance and attention of
Sir A. Wellesley, and the general officers, could have brought this
artillery into the field in an efficient manner; and I am proud to say
they have never yet stopped an hour for us.”
Sir H. Burrard, with the chivalrous courtesy which has so often been
repeated in the annals of the English army, did not interfere with Sir
A. Wellesley’s command during the battle, but at its termination he
declined to accede to the proposal of the latter to undertake an
energetic pursuit, which would doubtless have ended in an unconditional
surrender of the French troops. Of Sir Arthur’s bitter
disappointment,--of the further complication caused by the arrival of
yet another General to supersede Sir H. Burrard--Sir Hew Dalrymple,--of
the singular Convention of Cintra, which while it certainly succeeded in
procuring the evacuation of Portugal by the French, did so on terms
which were very disproportionate to the success of the English
arms,--and of the indignation in England which followed the news of this
marvellous treaty,--it is beyond the province of this work to treat. The
state of affairs in Portugal--the absence of [Sidenote: Wellington
Supplementary Despatches, &c., vol. vi. p. 129.] all harmony of plan or
action, was such as to call from Sir Arthur Wellesley the expression,
“Considering the way in which things are likely to be carried on here, I
shall not be sorry to go away.”
The recall of Sir Hew Dalrymple, Sir H. Burrard, and Sir A. Wellesley to
England, on account of the Court of Enquiry ordered to investigate the
circumstances under which the Convention had been agreed to, left the
command of the English forces in Portugal with Sir John Moore. An army
of 28,000 men was concentrated at Lisbon under that General. The command
of the Artillery, which had been considerably reinforced, had been given
to Colonel Harding, who endorsed every complaint which had been made by
Colonel Robe, but who seems to have been somewhat more of an optimist
than that officer; for in one of his letters, describing his field
artillery, he wrote that “four oxen and two horses bring along a gun
famously.” On his arrival at Lisbon, he found that he had to arrange for
the proper equipment not merely of his own batteries, but also of the
artillery of a force of 4000 Spaniards at Lisbon, whom the Convention
had set free, and who, when armed and equipped, marched for Catalonia.
Sir John Moore decided on taking the field in October 1808, but being
misinformed as to the state of the roads, he decided on breaking up his
army, so as to march by different roads, and to unite at Salamanca with
another army under Sir David Baird, which had landed at Corunna. The
Artillery was ordered to march through the Alemtejo and by Badajos to
Talavera, [Sidenote: Colonel Harding to D.-A.-Gen.] and was arranged by
Colonel Harding as follows. He himself, Lieut.-Colonel Wood, Major
Viney, with the following companies, Thornhill’s, Drummond’s, Wilmot’s,
Raynsford’s, Crawford’s, Carthew’s, and Skyring’s, went with the army;
the guns being four brigades of light 6-pounders, and one of 9-pounders.
He was unable to take a brigade for each company, for lack of horses.
Colonel Robe was left in command at Lisbon, with Major Hartmann and
three companies of the King’s German Artillery, Captain Bredin’s company
of the Royal Artillery, and half a company of the same under Captain
Lawson. The guns to which these were attached consisted of a 12-pounder
brigade, three brigades of light 6-pounders, a few howitzers, and the
car brigade of 3-pounders from Gibraltar, mentioned above. The force of
Artillery with Sir David Baird’s army, which had landed at Corunna, was
commanded by Colonel Sheldrake, and consisted of four companies and a
proportion of drivers. The guns used by this force, and by the Horse
Artillery under Colonel George Cookson, which arrived--also at
Corunna--on the 8th November, 1808, were as follows:--One 9-pounder
brigade and three brigades of light 6-pounders, which moved on to
Betanjos: one 9-pounder brigade, and one of light 6-pounders, which
remained at [Sidenote: Colonel Cookson to D.-A.-Gen. Corunna, 9 Nov.
1808.] Corunna; and one light 6-pounder brigade, and a brigade of
mountain artillery, for service with the Cavalry, as soon as horses and
mules could be obtained.
Of all the difficulties encountered in the winter campaign of 1808 by
the Royal Artillery, the scarcity of horses was the greatest. The table
given in a former part of this chapter shows that after the first gross
omission in the case of Colonel Robe’s force, the Ordnance Department
endeavoured, as far as numbers were concerned, to send an adequate
supply of horses to ensure that mobility without which field artillery
is a sham. But that the simplest precautions as to quality and soundness
were overlooked is too evident from the monotonous protests of all the
officers who found themselves in a position of responsibility. Colonel
Harding, writing from Lisbon, reported that he had obtained permission
to sell the Artillery horses he had received from England, as useless
and worn out, and to purchase those of the French army, which was then
embarking under the provisions of the Convention of Cintra. Colonel
Cookson had not reached the Downs ere he had to report the appearance of
glanders among the horses entrusted to him; and Colonel Robe had to
report the death, immediately after landing, of 75 out of 300
horses--more than half occasioned by the same complaint. The officer in
charge of the drivers attached to the Artillery under the command of
Colonel Sheldrake, reported that “all his horses were in dreadful order
when they embarked, that he had lost many, and that he attributed it in
a great measure to the horses being a great many very old.” Mules were
difficult to obtain--the horses of the country were few and of small
size; and in spite of the plaintive appeals from successive officers
that “it cost no more to the country to keep a good horse than a bad
one,” shipload of cripples from England followed shipload, and nothing
but superhuman exertions on the part of all on the spot enabled the
Artillery to move at all. The desperate state of affairs may be gathered
from a report of Colonel Robe’s, in which he described the means left to
him for horsing the brigades in his charge, after Colonel Harding’s
force had left Lisbon with Sir John Moore. With 52 field guns, liable to
be demanded at any moment by Colonel Harding, he had only 500 men; but
this number was lavish compared with that [Sidenote: Col. Robe to
D.-A.-Gen. 1 Nov. 1808.] of his horses. “The following,” he wrote, “is a
state of the horses left with me on the departure of the army for
Spain:--
Horses. Mules.
Effective 15 3
Sick or lame 49 4
-- --
64 7
Since died of general decay, or } 7 1
destroyed for glanders }
-- --
Remaining 57 6
-- --
The sick of these are reported to be in a very bad condition; and nearly
the whole of them to be at present unserviceable, from lameness, age,
and sore backs.”
So great was the scarcity of horses, that when the Horse Artillery
landed at Corunna, the officers’ horses were taken on repayment--without
their consent, and they were left to purchase any animals they could
find in the country. That Colonel Robe had good reason to fear a demand
being made on his small depôt may be seen from the following account of
the number of horses, which the state of the roads between Lisbon and
Spain had rendered absolutely necessary [Sidenote: Official Return to
Sir H. Burrard, Nov. 1, 1808.] for the brigades which had marched with
Colonel Harding. Every artillery carriage, of whatever description, had
6 horses; the long 6-pounder gun had 8, and the 12-pounder had 10.
Besides this, horses were required for the officers, non-commissioned
officers, and for park duties; and the ammunition waggons, for
conveyance of such as could not be carried on the limbers, were drawn by
a motley collection of horses, mules, and oxen. Six days after this
return was [Sidenote: Colonel Robe to D.-A.-Gen. 6 Nov. 1808.] prepared,
Colonel Robe’s supply had decreased to 40, and the demands from the
front were such that he declared no less than a reserve of 600 horses
would be required to meet them.
There is a danger, in perusing the noble story of the Peninsular War,
lest all the reader’s admiration should be given to the courage and
endurance of the men, or the skill of the leaders. But there were men
who would infinitely rather have endured bodily suffering, than the
charge which neglect or ignorance at home had thrust upon them. To feel
in all its terrible reality the starvation of equipment, without which
no adequate results can be expected either from skill or courage;--to
know that if that equipment is not in some way forthcoming, the disgrace
of failure or consequent disaster will be transferred from those to whom
it is due, and will be visited on themselves;--and at the same time to
be certain that any responsibility which they may assume is at their own
peril, and can only be exercised with a halter round their neck of
possible disallowances, reprimands, and suspicion,--all these produce in
men a state of mind, beside which danger or bodily hardship seems almost
repose. And it was in such a condition that many of England’s best
soldiers had to live during the war in Spain--enduring more than has
formed the theme of song and story--and yet bearing it without sympathy,
without acknowledgment.
No one can thoroughly understand Sir John Moore’s campaign in Spain
without bearing in mind the boasting and lying of the Spanish Generals,
with whom it was intended that he should co-operate, and the yet more
extravagant falsehoods of the Spanish Government. Deluded by these, Sir
John Moore, even after he had heard of the surrender of Madrid to
Napoleon, pressed on to Majorga in the hope of effecting a junction with
the Marquis Romana, and of receiving Sir David Baird’s reinforcement
from Corunna. With an English army of 25,000 men he pressed still
farther on to Sahagan, where for the first time he heard the whole
truth, and realised the strength of the French armies which were being
directed against him, under Napoleon himself. With every Spanish General
already beaten in detail, Madrid in the hands of the enemy, and greatly
superior forces hurrying to meet him, he commenced a retreat which has
become famous,--the first step of which is thus described [Sidenote:
Colonel Harding to D.-A.-Gen. Majorga, 25/12/1808.] by Colonel
Harding:--“We fully expected to have engaged the enemy on the 23rd,
about five leagues from Sahagan; the army was in full march at 8 o’clock
on the night of the 23rd, and hoped to have fallen in with them early in
the morning of the 24th. An intense hard frost, and the whole of the
roads one sheet of ice from the snow thawing during the day, was much
against the march of Artillery, as we had not time to rough all the
horses. The march of the troops was stopped an hour after they marched
off; some of the troops, particularly Downman’s troop, were out till 2
in the morning. The General received some information immediately after
the troops marched off, which caused their sudden return. We now seem to
be pointing towards Corunna, and forming depôts that way. Our movements
have lately been so intricate and unexpected, that if I had had time to
write to you, I could give you little information.... Lieutenant-Colonel
Cookson has the command of the three brigades on the right of the line,
Evelegh’s, Bean’s, and Wilmot’s. Lieutenant-Colonel Wood has charge of
those on the left of the line, Downman’s, Drummond’s, and Carthew’s.
Four reserve brigades with the park are Raynsford’s (9-pounders),
Crawford’s, Brandreth’s, and Wall’s (light 6-pounders) brigades. The
park, stores, and ammunition are under Major Thornhill. The depôts
advanced are under Captain Skyring. There is a brigade of mountain guns
somewhere, which I hope will not join us, but return to Corunna. We have
lately received 59 prize horses, which, although not good, are a great
help to us, from our great loss.”
English troops are apt to become demoralized during a retreat; and in
the retreat to Corunna, irregularity was increased by the intense cold,
suffering, and hardship which the men had to endure. The conduct of the
rear-guard and of the Cavalry was, however, beyond all praise; and was
due in a great degree to the constant presence of Sir John Moore
himself, whose skill, firmness, and powers of persuasion never shone
more clearly than at this time. But, even when irregularity was
greatest, it vanished when an engagement appeared probable: it was at
such times as these, that perfect discipline prevailed. The Artilleryman
reads with pleasure that while 2627 men strayed from the English army
during the retreat, not one belonged to his corps; and [Sidenote:
Cadell.] that Sir John Moore himself was so struck by this fact and by
their general conduct, that he wrote, “The Artillery consists of
particularly well-behaved men.” These words are the more gratifying as
the strength of the Artillery was considerable--eleven brigades of
guns,--and the duties of the men were very arduous.
Several affairs of small importance took place between the two armies,
but the English came in sight of Corunna without any general engagement.
The dismay which seized every one on learning that the transports had
not yet arrived may be imagined; fortunately it was short-lived, as they
soon made their appearance.
The story of the Artillery at the end of the retreat, and during the
battle of Corunna, may be summarised from Colonel Harding’s reports. On
the 11th January the army took up a position about five miles from
Corunna; but on the 14th, being unable, with their reduced numbers,
sufficiently to occupy this ground without danger of being outflanked,
they withdrew to a position about three miles nearer the town, leaving
their original ground to be occupied by Soult, before the battle. On the
12th all the Artillery, except the brigades required for outpost and
rearguard duties, was ordered by Sir John Moore to be embarked; and at
the same time a magazine containing 12,000 barrels of powder, situated
about four miles from Corunna, was blown up with great skill, under the
supervision of Colonel Cookson. This was not done, however, until some
400 barrels had been carried for the use of the Artillery, along
dreadful roads, for a distance of four miles, on the shoulders of the
Artillerymen; while at the same time serviceable arms were issued from
the stores to all the troops, in exchange for those which had become
useless during the retreat. A supply of ammunition at the rate of 70
rounds per man was also given out. These measures had the double effect
of destroying valuable stores which must have inevitably fallen into the
hands of the enemy, and of giving an advantage to the English army in
the battle which ensued, which was denied to their opponents, whose arms
and ammunition had suffered greatly during the harassing marches of the
preceding days.
All the Artillerymen, who could be spared from the embarkation of guns
and stores on the 14th and 15th, were employed in the destruction of the
guns and mortars on the sea front of Corunna (which would otherwise have
been used against the English fleet, on the occupation of the town by
the French), and also of those mounted on a small island in the bay.
Upwards of 50 heavy guns and 20 mortars were dismounted, spiked, and
thrown over the precipice, and their carriages and beds destroyed. In
this the men were assisted cheerfully by the inhabitants, although, as
Napier points out, they were aware that the English army would
ultimately embark, and that they would incur the enemy’s anger for
having taken part in any military operations. This conduct, so
inconsistent with the insufficient defence made by the Spaniards as a
nation, drew forth from the historian a remark, which the events of 1873
have strangely justified: “Of proverbially vivid imagination and quick
resentments, the Spaniards feel and act individually, rather than
nationally.”
[Sidenote: Official MS. Return, signed by Colonel Harding.]
The Artillery of the outposts, on which the brunt of the action of the
16th fell, was commanded by Major Viney, and consisted of 145 officers
and men of the Royal Artillery, and 94 officers and men of the Royal
Artillery Drivers. The guns employed were seven light 6-pounders, one
5½-inch howitzer, and four Spanish 8-pounders.
The names of the officers serving under Major Viney’s command were as
follows: Captains Truscott, Wilmot,[16] Godby, and Greatley; Lieutenants
Sinclair and King; and Assistant-Surgeons Price and Hutchison. The
officers of the Royal Artillery Drivers were Lieutenants Abercromby and
Read.
A slight affair of picquets took place on the 15th; but even as late as
noon on the 16th, Sir John Moore told Colonel Harding that he did not
think the enemy meant to attack, and therefore he continued the
embarkation. Most of the horses and appointments belonging to Downman’s
and Evelegh’s troops of Horse Artillery had been lost during the
retreat; and their guns, and those of several of the other brigades, had
been placed on board ship; so that many of the Artillerymen, who had
been present during the retreat, and were under fire on the 16th, were
without their guns on that day, and were employed in bringing up
ammunition for the army. The Artillery of the outposts, although lightly
armed, did good service; but the ground was not calculated for the
manœuvring of guns, either on the side of the French or of the English.
On Monday the 16th, at 3 P.M., Soult advanced with all his army in three
columns, his cavalry and artillery remaining on the heights to cover his
formations. Two divisions of the English army, under General Hope and
Sir David Baird, occupied the most advanced ground on their side, with
their left to the Bay of Corunna; a third division, under General
Frazer, was posted on some heights to the right--more
retired--commanding the approaches to Corunna from the [Sidenote: To
D.-A.-G. 23 June, 1809. N.B. Capt. Gardiner was Brigade-Major to the R.
A.] Vigo Road. Captain Gardiner wrote: “The action became general about
3 o’clock, and an uninterrupted fire of cannon and musketry was kept up
till one hour after dark. They evidently pushed for our right, which was
our weakest point, but the firmness of our line was in no way to be
shaken. At one time I feared they would outflank us from their numbers;
but this was prevented by the movements of the reserve under General
Paget. At a little after 6 o’clock Soult retired, leaving us masters of
the field, and in possession of a village he occupied in the morning.”
This village, Elvina, had been to the battle of Corunna what Hougomont
and La Haye Sainte were afterwards to that of Waterloo. The battle, at
various periods of the day, raged fiercely round it. Here Sir David
Baird received the wound which compelled him to leave the field; and it
was when watching the attack by the English reserve on the French troops
in possession of this village late in the day, that Sir John Moore
received the wound which proved fatal. Its retention by the English at
the close of the day was therefore a distinct proof of victory.
[Sidenote: Despatch to Sir D. Baird.]
But it was not a victory, as General Hope well said, which could be
attended by any very brilliant consequences to Great Britain. The utmost
that could be hoped for was the embarkation of the army without
molestation. Thanks to the defeat of the French, their want of
ammunition, and the friendly courage of the inhabitants of Corunna, the
whole army, with the exception of the rear-guard, was embarked with
perfect order during the night of the 16th. The incessant rumble of
wheels over the field denoted the gathering of the wounded, and their
conveyance in the artillery carts and waggons to the beach. The guns
which had been engaged during the day were taken for embarkation to a
sandy bay, south-west of Corunna, but, as Colonel Harding wrote, “The
weather would not permit it: the guns were spiked; the carriages
destroyed; and the whole thrown over a precipice into deep water.”
The rear-guard had been detailed by Sir John Moore himself, to assist
the Spaniards in manning the guns on the land front of Corunna,--to keep
possession of the small island in the bay,--and to cover the embarkation
of the troops from the citadel. The Artillery attached to it was
commanded by Major Beevor, assisted by Major Thornhill, Captains
Truscott, Beane, Brandreth, and Greatley, and Lieutenants Maling,
Wright, and Darby. There were 36 non-commissioned officers and 253 men.
The whole of the rear-guard was embarked, but with difficulty, on the
evening of the 18th and morning of the 19th. The voyage to England was
tempestuous in the extreme. Many officers and men died on the passage;
many others, including Colonel Harding himself, only survived their
hardships a few months. The whole army landed in England at various
ports in such a state of destitution, that the whole nation was shocked,
and could not believe it possible that the story of the final success
was true. These skeleton regiments, starved and half-clothed, had not
the appearance of an army fresh from victory; and for many years the
skill displayed in the retreat upon Corunna, and the subsequent success,
received little, if any, credit from the people.
So ended Sir John Moore’s campaign in Spain;--and with it--his life. A
type of the same individuality of which the Duke of Wellington was the
perfection,--in which a sense of duty rises above every other
feeling,--he yet possessed charms of character, denied to his great
comrade, which won for him the love, as well as the confidence, of his
troops. A disciplinarian, indeed, he was--what leader can be great who
is not?--but, with all his strictness, there was something so winning in
his disposition, that even after a lapse of fifty years, the writer of
these pages has seen tears in the eyes of a man who had served under
him, at the mere mention of his name.
The many letters from the various officers, whose correspondence with
the Ordnance is extant, tell in simple [Sidenote: Colonel Harding to D.
A. Gen.] words the worth of the leader who fell at Corunna. “You have
heard,” writes one, “of our terrible loss: we could [Sidenote: Captain
(afterwards Sir R.) Gardiner to D. A. Gen.] not believe he was dead.”
Another writes: “General Hope’s despatches will acquaint you with our
affecting loss. You will imagine how severely I felt it. I saw him after
he received the wound, but he was talking with such firmness, that I did
not apprehend the danger he was in.” General Hope’s words cannot be too
frequently read. “The [Sidenote: Despatch to Sir D. Baird, 18 Jan.
1809.] fall of Sir John Moore has deprived me of a valuable friend, to
whom long experience of his worth had sincerely attached me. But it is
chiefly on public grounds that I must lament the blow. It will be the
consolation of every one who loved or respected his manly character,
that after conducting the army through an arduous retreat with
consummate firmness, he has terminated a career of distinguished honour
by a death that has given the enemy additional reason to respect the
name of a British soldier. Like the immortal Wolfe, he is snatched from
his country at an early period of a life spent in her service: like
Wolfe, his last moments were gilded by the prospect of success, and
cheered by the acclamation of victory: like Wolfe, also, his memory will
for ever remain sacred in that country which he sincerely loved, and
which he had so faithfully served.”
There is a pathos about these words, which is not surpassed even in the
lines which have given an eternal place in English verse to the battle
which has just been described. But all the regret of friends, all the
eloquence of admirers, all the hymns of poets, fade into nothing beside
the simple words of the dying chief,--who uttered with his last breath
no appeals for praise, no boastings of difficulties overcome, no
chidings against those who had disappointed or deceived him, but the
quiet, confident expression of a soldier whose duty is done: “I hope
that my country will do me justice.”
The following return shows the strength of the Royal Artillery left in
Portugal, after the evacuation of Spain by Sir John Moore’s army. It
also shows the number who had returned at various times from the
Peninsula, prior to 27th February, 1809, having proceeded thither with
the various contingents detailed in the preceding table. (_See next
page._)
TABLE showing the NUMBER of OFFICERS, NON-COMMMISSIONED OFFICERS,
GUNNERS, and DRUMMERS of the ROYAL ARTILLERY; and also of the OFFICERS,
NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, DRIVERS, TRUMPETERS, ARTIFICERS, and HORSES
belonging to the Royal Artillery Drivers, relanded from Spain or
Portugal before the 27th February, 1809.
INDEX.
A. Officers.
B. N. C. Officers.
C. Gunners.
D. Drummers.
E. Total.
F. Officers.
G. N. C. Officers.
H. Drivers.
I. Trumpeters.
J. Artificers.
K. General Total.
L. Total.
M. Horses.
+-------------------------------+------------------------------+---------------------------------------+
| | ROYAL ARTILLERY. | ROYAL ARTILLERY DRIVERS. |
| +---+----+------+---+------+---+---------------------------------------+
| | A.| B.| C. | D.| E. | F.| G.| H. | I.| J.| K. | L. | M.|
+-------------------------------+--------+------+---+---------+-----+------+---------------+------+----+
|Relanded in Great Britain and }| 64| 178| 1,215| 16| 1,473| 14| 105| 1,116| 14| 97| 1,346| 2,819| 764|
| Ireland, fit for service }| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|In Portugal, per return of | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1st January | 31| 84| 556| 11| 682| 2| 7| 219| 2| 28| 258| 940| |
+-------------------------------+---+----+------+---+------+---+---------------+----+------+-----------+
| Total | 95| 262| 1,771| 27| 2,155| 16| 112| 1,335| 16| 125| 1,604| 3,759| 764|
+-------------------------------+---+----+------+---+------+---+----+------+---+----+------+------+----+
N.B. There had been purchased, or otherwise obtained, in Portugal, and
still remained effective, 146 horses and 78 mules; but as they had not
been sent from England they are not included in the above table.