into diverting part of his submarine effort to the United States coast,
or to any other area distant from the critical area surrounding the
coast of France and the United Kingdom, the anti-submarine campaign
would at once be won. The enemy labours under severe difficulties in
carrying out his campaign, even in this restricted area, owing to the
material limitations and the distances they must operate from their
bases, through extremely dangerous localities. The extent of the United
States coastline and the distances between its principal commercial
ports preclude the possibility of any submarine effort in that part of
the world except limited operations of diversion designed to affect
public opinion, and thereby hold our forces from the vital field of
action.
11. The difficulties confronting the convoy system are, of course,
considerable. They are primarily involved in the widely dispersed ports
of origin of merchant shipping; the difficulty of communication by
cable; the time involved by communications by mail; and the difficulties
of obtaining a co-operation and co-ordination between Allied
Governments.
As reported by cable despatch, the British Government has definitely
reached the decision to put the convoy system into operation as far as
its ability goes. Convoys from Hampton Roads, Canada, Mediterranean, and
Scandinavian countries are already in operation. Convoys from New York
will be put in operation as soon as ships are available. The British
navy is already strained beyond its capacity, and I therefore urgently
recommend that we co-operate, at least to the extent of handling convoys
from New York.
12. The dangers to convoys from high sea raiders is remote, but, of
course, must be provided against, and hence the necessity for escorting
cruisers or reserve battleships. The necessity is even greater, however,
for anti-submarine craft in the submarine war zone.
13. As stated in my despatches, the arming of merchantmen is not a
solution of the submarine menace, it serves the single purpose of
forcing the submarine to use torpedoes instead of guns and bombs. The
facts that men-of-war cannot proceed safely at sea without escort, and
that in the Queenstown avenue of approach alone in the past six weeks
there have been thirty armed merchantmen sunk, without having seen the
submarine at all before the attack, seem to be conclusive evidence. A
great mass of other evidence and war experience could be collected in
support of the above.
14. The week ending June 19th has been one of great submarine activity.
Evidence indicates that fifteen to nineteen of the largest and latest
submarines have been operating, of which ten to thirteen were operating
in the critical area to the west and south-west of the British Isles.
The above numbers are exclusive of the smaller and earlier type of
submarines, and submarines carrying mines alone. Two submarines are
working to the westward of the Straits of Gibraltar. A feature of the
week was the sinking of ships as far west as nineteen degrees. Three
merchant ship convoys are en route from Hampton Roads, the last one,
consisting of eighteen ships, having sailed on the 19th of June. One
hundred and sixteen moored mines have been swept up during the week.
Twenty-two reports of encounters with enemy submarines in waters
surrounding the United Kingdom have been reported during the week--three
by destroyers, two by cruisers, two by mystery ships, one by French
gunboat, three by submarines, nine by auxiliary patrol vessels, one by
seaplane, and one by merchant vessel.
There is attached copy of report of operations by anti-submarine craft
based on Queenstown.
(Signed) WM. S. SIMS.
APPENDIX VI
THE NAVY DEPARTMENT'S POLICY
From: Secretary of Navy.
To: Vice-Admiral Sims, U.S.S. _Melville_.
Received: July 10, 1917.
The following letter from the Secretary to the Secretary of State is
quoted for your information and guidance as an index of the policy of
the Department in relation to the co-operation of our naval forces with
those of our Allies. Quote: After careful consideration of the present
naval situation taken in connection with possible future situations
which might arise, the Department is preparing to announce as its
policy, in so far as it relates to the Allies. First, the most hearty
co-operation with the Allies to meet the present submarine situation in
European or other waters compatible with an adequate defence of our own
home waters. Second, the most hearty co-operation with the Allies to
meet any future situation arising during the present war period. Third,
the realization that while a successful termination of the present war
must always be the first Allied aim, and will probably result in
diminished tension throughout the world, the future position of the
United States must in no way be jeopardized by any disintegration of our
main fighting fleet. Fourth, the conception that the present main
military role of the United States naval force lies in its safeguarding
the line of communications of the Allies. In pursuing this aim there
will be generally speaking two classes of vessels engaged: minor craft
and major craft, and two roles of action, first, offensive and, second,
defensive. Fifth, in pursuing the role set forth in paragraph four, the
Department cannot too strongly insist on its opinion that the offensive
must always be the dominant note in any general plans of strategy
prepared. But as the primary role in all offensive preparations must
perforce belong to the Allied powers, the Navy Department announces as
its policy that in general it is willing to accept any joint plan of
action of the Allies deemed necessary to meet immediate need. Sixth,
pursuant to the above general policy, the Navy Department announces as
its general plan of action the following: One, its willingness to send
its minor fighting forces, composed of destroyers, cruisers, submarine
chasers, auxiliaries in any number not incompatible with home needs, and
to any field of action deemed expedient by the joint Allied Admiralties
which would not involve a violation of our present state policy. Two,
its unwillingness as a matter of policy to separate any division from
the main fleet for service abroad, although it is willing to send the
entire battleship fleet abroad to act as a united but co-operating unit
when, after joint consultations of all Admiralties concerned, the
emergency is deemed to warrant it and the extra tension imposed upon the
line of communications due to the increase of fighting ships in European
waters will stand the strain imposed upon it. Three, its willingness to
discuss more fully plans for joint operations. End of Quote 11009.
(Sd) JOSEPHUS DANIELS.
APPENDIX VII
COMMENTS UPON NAVY DEPARTMENT'S POLICY
Office Vice-Admiral, Commanding
U.S. Destroyer Forces
European Waters.
LONDON,
July 16, 1917.
From: Vice-Admiral Sims.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Concerning Policy of U.S. Naval co-operation in war, and
allied subjects.
1. The Department's cablegram of July 10, 1917, quoting a letter which
had been addressed to the Secretary of State concerning naval policy in
relation to the present war, was received on July 10th.
In view of the nature of certain parts of the policy set forth therein,
I wish to indicate the general policy which has heretofore governed my
recommendation.
2. I have assumed that our mission was to promote the maximum
co-operation with the Allies in defeating a common enemy.
All of my despatches and recommendations have been based on the firm
conviction that the above mission could and would be accomplished, and
that hence such questions as the possibility of post war situations, or
of all or part of the Allies being defeated and America being left
alone, were not given consideration--in fact, I cannot see how we could
enter into this war whole-heartedly if such considerations were allowed
to diminish in any way the chances of Allied success.
3. The first course open to us which naturally occurs to mind is that we
should look upon our service as part of the combined Allied service, of
which the British Grand Fleet is the main body, and all other Allied
naval forces disposed throughout the world, as necessary branches
thereof.
This conception views our battleship fleet as a support or reserve of
the Allied main body (the British Grand Fleet) and would lead to
utilizing our other forces to fill in weak spots and to strengthen
Allied lines, both offensively and defensively, wherever necessary.
Such a course might be considered as a disintegration of our fleet, and
it is only natural, therefore, that hesitation and caution should be
felt in its adoption.
4. I have felt, however, that it was possible to accomplish our mission
without in any way involving the so-called disintegration of our fleet
as a whole.
In the first instance I have assumed that our aim would be to project,
or prepare to project, our maximum force against the enemy offensively.
5. An estimate of the situation shows clearly that the enemy is
depending for success upon breaking down the Allies' lines of
communications by virtue of the submarine campaign.
A necessary part of such a plan is to divert strength from the main
fleet and from anti-submarine operations by such means as coastal raids,
threats of landing operations, air raids, and attacks on hospital ships,
which last necessitates destroyer escort for such vessels.
The submarine campaign itself, while it is of necessity concentrated
primarily on the most vital lines of communications, is nevertheless
carried out in such a manner as to lead the Allies to disperse, and not
concentrate, their inadequate anti-submarine Forces.
The Allies are, of course, forced to contemplate at all times, and hence
provide against, the possibility of another main fleet action.
6. A study of the submarine situation, the number of submarines
available to the enemy, and the necessary lines of the Allies'
communications, for both Army and Navy as well as civil needs, shows
clearly that the enemy must direct his main effort in certain restricted
areas.
These areas, as has repeatedly been reported, are included approximately
in a circle drawn from about Ushant to the north of Scotland. The most
effective field for enemy activity is, of course, close into the Irish
Sea and Channel approaches, where all lines must focus.
But, as stated above, the enemy also attacks occasionally well out to
sea and in other dispersed areas with a view of scattering the limited
anti-submarine forces available.
It therefore seems manifest that the war not only is, but must remain,
in European waters, in so far as success or failure is concerned.
7. Speaking generally, but disregarding for the moment the question of
logistics, our course of action, in order to throw our main strength
against the enemy, would be to move all our forces, including the
battleship fleet, into the war area.
8. In view of the nature of the present sea warfare as effected by the
submarine, such a movement by the battleships would necessitate a large
force of light craft--much larger than our peace establishment provided.
In addition to all destroyers, adequate protection of the fleet would
require all other available light craft in the service, or which could
be commandeered and put into service--that is, submarines, armed tugs,
trawlers, yachts, torpedo boats, revenue cutters, mine-layers and
mine-sweepers, and in fact any type of small craft which could be used
as protective or offensive screens.
9. In view of the shipping situation, as affected by the submarine
campaign, it has been impossible to date to see in what way our
battleships could be supplied in case they were sent into the war area.
This refers particularly to oil-burning vessels. It would therefore seem
unwise to recommend such a movement until we could see clearly far
enough ahead to ensure the safety of the lines of communication which
such a force would require.
10. It is to be observed, however, that even in case the decision were
made to move the battleships into the war area, it would unavoidably be
greatly delayed both in getting together the necessary screening forces
and also in getting such craft across the Atlantic.
In the meantime, and while awaiting a decision as to the movements of
the battleship fleet, the submarine campaign has become so intensive,
and the available anti-submarine craft have been so inadequate to meet
it, that the necessity for increasing the anti-submarine forces in the
war area to the maximum possible extent has become imperative.
11. As long, therefore, as the enemy fleet is contained by the stronger
British fleet in a position of readiness, it would not seem a
disintegration of our fleet to advance into the war area all the light
craft of every description which would necessarily have to accompany the
fleet in case it should be needed in this area.
Such movements of the light craft would not in any way separate them
strategically from the battleships, as they would be operating between
the enemy and our own main body and based in a position to fall back as
the main body approached, or to meet it at an appointed place. This
advance of light forces, strategically, would mean no delay whatever to
our heavy forces, should the time come for their entry into the active
war zone.
12. Another very important consideration is the fact that, pending the
movement of the battleships themselves, all of the light forces would be
gaining valuable war experience and would be the better prepared for
operations of any nature in the future, either in connection with the
fleet itself or independently.
It is also considered that it would not constitute a disintegration of
our fleet to advance into the war zone, in co-operation with the British
Grand Fleet or for other duty, certain units of our battleship fleet.
These would merely constitute units advanced for purpose of enemy
defeat, and which would always be in a position to fall back on the main
part of our Fleet, or to join it as it approached the war zone.
It is for this reason that I recommended, on July 7, 1917, that all
coal-burning dreadnoughts be kept in readiness for distant service in
case their juncture with the Grand Fleet might be deemed advisable in
connection with unexpected enemy developments.
It would, of course, be preferable to advance the entire fleet providing
adequate lines of communications could be established to ensure their
efficient operation. At the present time there is a sufficient coal
supply in England to supply our coal-burning dreadnoughts, but the oil
would be a very difficult problem as it must be brought in through the
submarine zone.
When notified that the _Chester_, _Birmingham_, and _Salem_ were
available for duty in the war area, I recommended, after consultation
with the Admiralty, that they join the British Light Cruiser Squadrons
in the North Sea, where there is always a constant demand for more
ships, especially to oppose enemy raiding and other operations aimed at
dispersing the Allied sea forces.
In view of the Department's reference to the Gibraltar situation, and
also in consideration of the sea-keeping qualities of the seven gunboats
of the _Sacramento_ class, it was recommended that they be based on
Gibraltar for duty in assisting to escort convoys clear of the Straits,
and particularly as this would release some British destroyers which are
urgently needed in critical areas to the northward.
13. The Department's policy, as contained in its letter to the Secretary
of State, refers in the first statement to an adequate defence of our
own home waters. It would seem to be sound reasoning that the most
effective defence which can be afforded to our home waters is an
offensive campaign against the enemy which threatens those waters. Or in
other words, that the place for protection of home waters is the place
in which protection is necessary--that is, where the enemy is operating
and must continue to operate in force.
As has been stated in numerous despatches, it is considered that home
waters are threatened solely in the submarine zone--in fact are being
attacked solely in that zone, and must continue to be attacked therein
if the enemy is to succeed against us as well as against the European
Entente.
The number of available enemy submarines is not unlimited, and the
difficulties of obtaining and maintaining bases are fully as difficult
for submarine as for surface craft.
The difficulties experienced by enemy submarines en route and in
operating as far from their bases as they now do are prodigious.
Operations on our coast without a base are impracticable, except by very
limited numbers for brief periods, purely as diversions.
In view of our distance from enemy home bases, the extent of our
coastline, and the distances between our principal ports, it is a safe
assumption that if we could induce the enemy to shift the submarine war
area to our coasts his defeat would be assured, and his present success
would be diminished more than in proportion to the number of submarines
he diverted from the more accessible area where commerce necessarily
focuses.
14. The Department's policy refers to willingness to extend hearty
co-operation to the Allies, and to discuss plans for joint operations,
and also to its readiness to consider any plans which may be submitted
by the joint Allied Admiralties.
15. I submit that it is impossible to carry out this co-operation, to
discuss plans with the various Admiralties, except in one way--and that
is, to establish what might be termed an advance headquarters in the war
zone composed of Department representatives upon whose recommendations
the Department can depend.
I refer to exactly the same procedure as is now carried out in the
army--that is, the General Headquarters in the field being the advance
headquarters of the War Department at home, and the advance headquarters
must of necessity be left a certain area of discretion and freedom of
action as concerns the details of the measures necessitated by the
military situations as they arise.
16. The time element is one of the most vital of all elements which
enter into military warfare, and hence delays in communications by
written reports, together with the necessity for secrecy, render it very
difficult to discuss plans at long range. The enemy secret service has
proved itself to be of extraordinary efficiency.
Moreover, I believe it to be very unsafe to depend upon discussion of
military plans by cable, as well as by letter. The necessary inadequacy
of written or cable communications needs no discussion. The
opportunities for misunderstandings are great. It is difficult to be
sure that one has expressed clearly one's meaning in writing, and hence
phrases in a letter are very liable to misinterpretation. They cannot
explain themselves.
17. One of the greatest military difficulties of this war, and perhaps
of all Allied wars, has been the difficulty of co-ordination and
co-operation in military effort. I am aware of a great mass of
information in this connection which it is practically impossible to
impart except by personal discussion.
It is unquestionable that efficiency would be greatly improved if _any
one_ of the Allies--Italy, France, England, or the United States--were
selected to direct all operations, the others merely keeping the one
selected fully informed of their resources available, and submitting to
complete control and direction in regard to the utilization of these
resources.
18. If the above considerations are granted, it then becomes necessary
to decide as to the best location in which to establish such advanced
headquarters, or what might be called an advance branch war council at
the front--that is, an advanced branch upon whose advice and decisions
the War Council itself largely depends.
I fully realize the pressure and the influences which must have been
brought to bear upon the Department from all of the Allies, and from
various and perhaps conflicting sources.
I also realize that my position here in England renders me open to
suspicion that I may be unduly influenced by the British viewpoint of
the war. It should be unnecessary to state that I have done everything
within my ability to maintain a broad viewpoint with the above stated
mission constantly in mind.
19. From the _naval_ point of view it would seem evident that London is
the best and most central location in the war area for what I have
termed above the Advance Branch of our Naval War Council.
The British navy, on account of its size alone, is bearing the brunt of
the naval war, and hence all naval information concerning the war
therefore reaches and centres in London.
It will be quite possible for all of our advanced headquarters staff, or
parts or divisions thereof, to visit Paris and other Allied Admiralties
at any time.
I wish to make it quite clear that up to date it has been wholly
impossible for me, with one military Aide, to perform all of the
functions of such an advanced branch of the Department.
As stated in my despatches, it has been evident for some time that I
have been approaching a state in which it would be physically impossible
to handle the work without an increase of staff.
The present state of affairs is such that it is quite within range of
possibility for serious errors to occur which may involve disaster to
our ships, due to the physical impossibility of handling the
administrative and other work with the thoroughness which is essential
to safety.
20. I consider that a very minimum staff which would be required is
approximately as follows. More officers could be well employed with
resulting increase of efficiency:
(1) One Chief of Staff, who should be free to carry on a
continuous estimate of the situation, based upon all necessary
information. He would be given the freedom of the Operations Department
of the British and French Admiralties.
(2) An officer, preferably of the rank of commander, for duties in
connection with shipping and convoy to handle all the numerous
communications in relation to the movements of American shipping,
particularly military shipping, and also other shipping carrying
American troops.
(3) An officer, at least a lieutenant-commander, for duties in
connection with Anti-Submarine Division operations in order to
insure perfect co-operation in that field of work between our
service and other Allied Services.
(4) An officer of all-round ability and discretion for duties in
connection with general military intelligence. He should be in
constant touch with the Secret Service Departments of the
Admiralties to insure that all military intelligence, which in any
way affects the Navy Department or our Forces, is properly and
promptly acted upon.
(5) At least two lieutenants or lieutenant-commanders of the line
in my own office in connection with general administrative
questions in addition to the one now available. The necessity for
these additional officers is imperative.
(6) One communication officer to take general charge of codes and
communications both with the Department at home, the Allied
Admiralties, and with the various bases of our Forces in the war
area. (At present Queenstown, Brest, Bordeaux, St. Nazaire, London,
and Paris.)
(7) A paymaster to have complete charge of all financial matters
connected with our naval organization abroad. This officer should
be in addition to Paymaster Tobey, who is performing necessary and
invaluable service on my staff in connection with all logistic
questions.
(Signed) WM. S. SIMS.
APPENDIX VIII
MONTHLY LOSSES SINCE FEBRUARY, 1917, FROM ENEMY ACTION
During the twenty-one months of unrestricted submarine warfare from
February, 1917, to October, 1918, inclusive, 3,843 merchant vessels
(British fishing vessels included) of a total gross tonnage of 8,478,947
have been sunk by enemy action, a monthly average of 183 vessels
totalling 403,760 gross tons. The October tonnage losses show a decrease
from this average of 291,333 gross tons, or 72 per cent.
The following gives the tonnage losses by months from February, 1917, to
October, 1918, inclusive:
=========+===========+==============+==========+==========+=========
| British | Other Allied | Neutral | British |
Period. | Merchant | Merchant | Merchant | Fishing | Total.
| Vessels. | Vessels. | Vessels. | Vessels. |
---------+-----------+--------------+----------+----------+---------
1917 | | | | |
February | 313,486 | 84,820 | 135,090 | 3,478 | 536,334
March | 353,478 | 81,151 | 165,225 | 3,586 | 603,440
April | 545,282 | 134,448 | 189,373 | 5,920 | 875,023
May | 352,289 | 102,960 | 137,957 | 1,448 | 594,654
June | 417,925 | 126,171 | 139,229 | 1,342 | 684,667
July | 364,858 | 111,683 | 70,370 | 2,736 | 549,647
August | 329,810 | 128,489 | 53,018 | 242 | 511,559
September| 196,212 | 119,086 | 29,941 | 245 | 345,484
October | 276,132 | 127,932 | 54,432 | 227 | 458,723
November | 173,560 | 87,646 | 31,476 | 87 | 292,769
December | 253,087 | 86,981 | 54,047 | 413 | 394,528
---------+-----------+--------------+----------+----------+---------
=========+===========+==============+==========+==========+=========
| British | Other Allied | Neutral | British |
Period. | Merchant | Merchant | Merchant | Fishing | Total.
| Vessels. | Vessels. | Vessels. | Vessels. |
---------+-----------+--------------+----------+----------+---------
1918 | | | | |
January | 179,973 | 87,078 | 35,037 | 375 | 302,463
February | 226,896 | 54,904 | 36,374 | 686 | 318,860
March | 199,458 | 94,321 | 51,035 | 293 | 345,107
April | 215,453 | 50,879 | 11,361 | 241 | 277,934
May | 192,436 | 80,826 | 20,757 | 504 | 294,523
June | 162,990 | 51,173 | 38,474 | 639 | 253,276
July | 165,449 | 70,900 | 23,552 | 555 | 260,456
August | 145,721 | 91,209 | 41,946 | 1,455 | 280,331
September| 136,864 | 39,343 | 10,393 | 142 | 186,742
October | 57,607 | 41,308 | 13,512 | -- | 112,427
---------+-----------+--------------+----------+----------+---------
APPENDIX IX
TONNAGE CONSTRUCTED BY ALLIED AND NEUTRAL NATIONS SINCE AUGUST, 1914
Construction of merchant shipping is shown in the following table, which
gives tonnage completed since the beginning of the war for the United
Kingdom, United States, and for other Allied and Neutral Nations.
================+===========+============+============+============
| United | United |Other Allied|
Period. | Kingdom. | States. |and Neutral.|World Total.
|Gross tons.|Gross tons. |Gross tons. |Gross tons.
----------------+-----------+------------+------------+------------
1914 | 675,610 | 120,000[1]| 217,310 | 1,012,920
1915 | 650,919 | 225,122 | 325,959 | 1,202,000
1916 | 541,552 | 325,413 | 821,036 | 1,688,000
1917 | 1,163,474 |1,034,296 | 505,585 | 2,703,355
----------------+-----------+------------+------------+------------
1918 1st quarter| 320,280 | 328,541 | 220,496 | 869,317
2nd quarter| 442,966 | 559,939 | 240,369 | 1,243,274
3rd quarter| 411,395 | 834,250 | 232,127 | 1,477,772
October | 136,100 | 357,532[1]| 50,000 | 543,632
----------------+-----------+------------+------------+------------
1918 (10 months)| 1,310,741 |2,080,262 | 742,992 | 4,133,995
----------------+-----------+------------+------------+------------
[1: Estimated.]
INDEX
_Aboukir_, _Hogue_ and _Cressy_ torpedoed by _U-29_, 84, 174
_Achates_, with convoy, 122
_Active_, flagship of Vice-Adm. Bayly, 58
Adams, Ensign Ashley D., in charge of subchaser units, 191
Aircraft against submarines, 275
_Alcock_, goes to relief of sinking mystery ship _Dunraven_, 163
Allied Naval Council, value of, 218
Amberger, Kapitaen-Leutnant Gustav, of _U-58_, captured, 131;
comment on treatment, 134
American forces in European waters, 204
Anti-submarine craft, use of, 26
Anti-submarine devices, search for, 8
_Arkansas_, on duty with the Grand Fleet, 303
Arming of merchant vessels, 25
_Aroostook_, mine-layer, 254, 264
_Aubrietia_, mystery ship, heading convoy, 118;
sights submarine, 121
_Audacious_, sunk by mine, 174
Aviation, naval, development of, 282;
extent at time of armistice, 286
Babcock, Commr. J. V., sails with Adm. Sims as aide, 2;
at London headquarters, 205, 212, 214
_Badger_ in bombardment of Durazzo, 200
Bagley, Lt.-Commr. D. W., highly commended, 139
Baillargeon, J. C, volunteers services at London headquarters, 206
Baldwin Locomotive Works, constructors of the U.S. mobile railway
batteries, 290
Balfour, Arthur James, discussion of submarine situation with, 9;
with Commission to the United States, 9;
advises Washington of critical submarine situation, 39
_Baltimore_, converted as mine-layer, 252, 261, 264
_Basilisk_, assisted by yacht _Lydonia_, sinks submarine, 136
Bassett, Capt. F. B., commanding the _Utah_, 305
Bastedo, Lt.-Commr. Paul H., in bombardment of Durazzo, 199, 201
Bayly, Vice-Adm. Lewis, letter of welcome to Commr. Taussig, 45;
welcome to Americans at Queenstown, 46;
instructs Americans as to duties, 49;
characteristics, 52;
meets _Fanning_ and congratulates officers and men on capture of
submarine crew, 133;
message commending American forces at Queenstown, 140;
introduces Capt. G. Campbell of the "mystery ship," 142;
has difficulty in identifying one such ship, 151
Beach, Capt. E. L., with the Grand Fleet, 303
Beatty, Adm. Sir David, attitude toward torpedo flags, 217;
farewell speech to American Squadron, 304
Belknap, Capt. Reginald R., commanding mine-laying squadron, 252, 260, 264
_Benham_, highly commended, 139
Berrien, Commr. Frank D., commanding destroyer division, 129;
highly commended, 139
"Big Bertha," American naval guns sent to destroy, 290
Billings, A. W. K., great work in connection with air service, 285
_Birmingham_, at Gibraltar, 134
Blakely, Lt.-Commr. C. A., highly commended, 139
Blakeslee, Lt.-Commr. E. G., at London headquarters, 212
Blue, Capt. Victor, with the Grand Fleet, 303
Boyd, Capt. David F., good work in convoying subchasers, 178
Brest, as destroyer base, 134, 300
Brindisi, rendezvous for attack on Durazzo, 200
Briscoe, Lt.-Commr. Benjamin, work on air service stations, 285
Bristol, Capt. M. L., commanding the _Oklahoma_, 305
British Admiralty, commends work of U.S. aviation pilots, 286
British Fleet, not in control of the seas, 16;
at Scapa Flow, 28
_Broke_, sinks two German destroyers, 61
Browne, Ralph C, new type of submarine mine, 250
Bruges, submarine base, 19
Bullard, Capt. W. H. G., with the Grand Fleet, 303
Bumstead, Prof. H. A., at London headquarters, 213
_Bunker Hill_, converted as mine-layer, 254
Bushnell, David, inventor of submarine, 225
Butler, Capt. H. V., with mine-laying squadron, 264
Callan, Lt.-Commr. J. L., in charge of U.S. air forces in Italy, 284
Campbell, Capt. Gordon, at Queenstown, 58;
exploits with mystery ships, 142;
with "mystery ship" _Pargust_, 147;
technique of operation, 148;
heroism on _Dunraven_, 157;
letter from Adm. Sims on _Dunraven_ exploit, 164
_Canandaigua_, mine-layer, 254, 260, 264
_Canonicus_, mine-layer, 254, 260, 264
Carpender, Lt. A. S., in command of _Fanning_, when submarine crew was
captured, 132;
receives D.S.O., 134
Carson, Sir Edward, discussion of submarine, 9;
of convoy system, 95
Cecil, Lord Robert, on submarine situation with, 9
_Centurion_, in China, commanded by Jellicoe, 43
_Christabel_, encounter with submarine, 127
_Christopher_, goes to relief of sinking mystery ship _Dunraven_, 163
Christy, Capt. H. H., with the Grand Fleet, 303
Churchill, Rt. Hon. W., "digging the rats out of their holes," 246
Clinton-Baker, Rear-Adm., in command of British mine-laying operations,
257
Cluverius, Capt. W. T., with mine-laying squadron, 264
Cole, Capt. W. C., commanding the Nevada, 305
College boys and subchasers, 168
Commerce raiders, guarding against, 94, 112
Cone, Capt. Hutch I., at London headquarters, 212, 214;
organizer American air forces, 284;
severely injured on torpedoed _Leinster_, 285
Conner, Francis G., jumps overboard from _Fanning_ to save drowning
German from crew of submarine, 132
Convoy of shipping to Scandinavia, 22
Convoy system, ancient use of, 86;
merchant captains hostile to, 88, 93;
Gibraltar experiment, 96;
merchant captains won over, 96;
the headquarters and staff, 103;
details of operation, 103, 108;
routing of the convoys, 110, 116;
actual convoys described, 117;
success of system, 136;
relative parts taken by Great Britain and the United States, 138;
most important agency in winning the war, 141
_Conyngham_, in first American destroyer contingent, 42;
with convoy, 122, 124;
destroys submarine, 125
Copeland, D. G., great work in connection with air service, 285
Corfu, subchaser base established at, 182;
detachment performing excellent service, 194
Cork, American destroyer officers make state visit to, 48;
sailors not permitted to visit, 71
Cotten, Capt. Lyman A., with subchasers, arrives at Plymouth, 177;
work in training subchaser crews, 178;
commanding subchaser squadrons, 182
Craven, Capt. T. T., great service in aviation, 283
Crenshaw, Capt. Arthur, good work in convoying subchasers, 178
_Cressy_, _Aboukir_ and _Hogue_ torpedoed by _U-29_, 84, 174
Cronan, Capt. William P., work in training subchaser crews, 178
_Cumberland_, escorting convoy, 119, 123
Cunningham, Major A. A., commanding Marine Corps aviation in Northern
Bombing Group, 285
_Cushing_, at Queenstown, 139;
deceived by "mystery ship," 147
_Danae_, attempt to torpedo, 128
Daniels, Secretary of War, instructs Adm. Sims to sail for England, 1
_Dartmouth_, in attack on Durazzo, 199
_Davis_, in first American destroyer contingent, 42
Davison, Trubee, organizer Yale aviation unit, recommended for
Distinguished Service Medal, 282
De Bon, Vice-Adm., Chief of French Naval Staff, 221
De Steiguer, Capt. L. R., with the Grand Fleet, 303
_Decatur_, at Gibraltar, 135
Defrees, Capt. Joseph H., work on listening devices, 178
_Delaware_, on duty with Grand Fleet, 303
Depth charge, origin of, 78;
effects of on submarines, 79
Destroyers, scarcity of in British navy, 28;
a new type of war vessel, their history, 75;
size and armament, 76;
high efficiency, 76;
how submarines are attacked, 82;
use of in convoying merchant vessels, 95
Destroyers, American, arrive in Queenstown, 40;
copy of sailing orders, 43;
compared with British, 48;
why placed under British Admiral at Queenstown, 61;
number of at Queenstown, 63;
enthusiasm of British public on arrival, 63;
"the return of the _Mayflower_," 64;
in action, 99;
duties of, 101
_Deutschland_, "merchant" submarine, visits Newport News, 266
Di Revel, Vice-Adm., Italian Member Allied Naval Council, 222
Dortch, Lt.-Commr. I. F., highly commended, 139
_Drayton_, highly commended, 139
Duff, Vice-Adm. Sir Alexander L., in charge of convoy system, 103
_Duncan_, American destroyer, at Queenstown, 57
Dunlap, Col. R. H., at London headquarters, 215
_Dunraven_, mystery ship, heroism of captain and crew, 157;
given Victoria Cross, 163, 164
Durazzo, bombardment of, 199
Earle, Rear-Adm., in charge of design of mobile railway batteries for
Western Front, 290
Edwards, Lt.-Commr. W. A., at London headquarters, 212, 214;
commands Yale aviation unit, 283;
succeeds Capt. Cone in charge of aviation section, 285
Evans, Capt. E. R. G. R., British liaison officer with American
destroyers, 44;
exploit as commander of destroyer _Broke_, 61
Evans, Capt. F. T., in command of U.S. aviation centre at Pauillac,
France, 284
Fairfield, Commr. Arthur P., with first American destroyer contingent, 42;
highly commended, 139
_Fanning_, captures crew of submarine, 129
Farquhar, Lt.-Commr., highly commended, 139
_Fenian Ram_, Holland's submarine, 227
Fighting submarines from the air, 275
Fisher, Adm. Sir John, in charge of department for investigating
anti-submarine devices, 8;
tells of American-built submarines, first to cross Atlantic, 266
Fletcher, Rear-Adm. Wm. B., commanding Brest naval base, 300
_Florida_, on duty with Grand Fleet, 303
Foster, Arnold-, on building of submarines, 228
Fullinwider, Commr. S. P., efforts in perfection of new submarine mine,
250
Fulton, Robert, efforts in developing the submarine, 226
Funakoshi, Rear-Adm., Japanese member Allied Naval Council, 222
Furer, Commr. Julius A., work in development of subchasers, 175
Gannon, Capt. Sinclair, with mine-laying squadron, 264
Gates, Lt.-Commr. A. L., exploits at Dunkirk, 288
Geddes, Sir Eric, First Lord of the Admiralty, 219
George, King, meeting with, 9;
popular with American sailors, 67
George, Lloyd, optimistic regarding submarine situation, 10;
on convoy system, 95
German interned ships converted into transports, 301
Gibraltar, co-operation of American navy with British in operations at,
134
Gillmor, R. E., volunteers services at London headquarters, 206
Gleaves, Rear-Adm. Albert, organization for transport fleet, 301
Glinder, Franz, drowned when crew surrendered to _Fanning_, 134;
buried with honours of war, 134
Good, P. F., volunteers services at London headquarters, 206
Goschen, Viscount, deemed submarine useless, 227
Graham, Capt. S. V., good work in convoying subchasers, 178
Grand Fleet, British, protected by destroyers, 73;
immune from torpedo attack, 85
Greenslade, Capt. J. W., with mine-laying squadron, 264
Hammon, Ensign C. H., exploit at Pola, 287
Hanrahan, Commr. David C., highly commended, 139;
commanding American mystery ship _Santee_, 166;
in command of Northern Bombing Group, 285
Harwell, Elxer, jumps overboard from _Fanning_ to save drowning German
from crew of submarine, 134
Helfferich, Dr. Karl, on effectiveness of the submarine, 14
Henry, Lt. Walter S., on _Fanning_, 130
Hepburn, Capt. Arthur J., work in training subchaser crews, 178;
commanding squadron of subchasers, reaches Queenstown, 203
_Hogue_, _Cressy_ and _Aboukir_, torpedoed by _U-29_, 84, 174
Holland, John P., designer of the modern submarine, 227
Hope, Rear-Adm., receives Adm. Sims on arrival, 2
Hospital ships, torpedoing of, 29
_Housatonic_, mine-layer, 254, 260, 264
Howard, Lt.-Commr. D. L., highly commended, 139
Hughes, Capt. C. F., with the Grand Fleet, 303
Inventions, anti-submarine, search for, 8
Inverness and Invergordon, mine-assembly bases at, 256
Ives, Ensign Paul F., drops a "dud" on deck of submarine, 286
_Jacob Jones_, torpedoed by _U-53_, 107;
highly commended, 139
Jacoby, Ensign Maclair, at bombardment of Durazzo, 201
Jellicoe, Adm., character and abilities, 5;
statement of tonnage lost to submarines, 6;
in conference with, 8;
wounded in Boxer Rebellion, 43;
letter of welcome to Commr. Taussig, 44;
difficulty in having convoy system adopted, 89, 95;
presides over Allied Naval Council, 219
Jessop, Capt. E. P., good work in convoying subchasers, 178
Johnson, Commr. Alfred W., with first American destroyer contingent, 42
Johnson, Capt. T. L., with mine-laying squadron, 264
_Justicia_, torpedoing of, 114;
torpedoing announced as that of _Leviathan_ by German Admiralty, 314
Kelly, Commodore, in bombardment of Durazzo, 198;
congratulates subchasers in this action, 203
Kennedy, Ensign S. C., record seaplane flight, 278
Keyes, Ensign K. B., extracts from seaplane flight report, 278
Keys, Adm. Sir Roger, reconstructs submarine barrage, 20
Killingholme, England, U.S. air station at, 278, 284
Kittredge, T. B., volunteers service at London headquarters, 206
Knox, Capt. D. W., at London headquarters, 215
_Kronprinzessin Cecilie_, converted into transport, 301
Lacaze, Adm., French Minister of Marine, 221
Leigh, Capt. Richard H., experiments with listening devices, 172;
sent to Italy to construct subchaser base, 182;
at London headquarters, 212, 214
Libbey, Commr. Miles A., work in perfection of listening devices, 178
Listening devices, development of, 171;
especially advantageous on subchaser, 178;
method of operation on subchasers, 184;
of great value in the Otranto barrage, 196;
tube climbed by submarine survivor, 197
Little, Col. L. McC., at London headquarters, 215
London headquarters, 204, 210;
different departments of, 212;
work of the Planning Section, 215
Long, Capt. A. T., commanding the _Nevada_, 305
Long, Capt. Byron A., at headquarters of convoy system, 103;
at London headquarters, 212, 214;
routing American troops to France, 300
Loomis, Coxswain David D., lookout on _Fanning_ when submarine crew was
captured, 129
Lord Mayor of Cork, welcomes Americans at Queenstown, 45
_Lowestoft_, in attack on Durazzo, 199
_Luckenback_, shelled by submarine, 123
Ludlow, Ensign G. H., wounded, rescued from water, 287
_Lydonia_, assists in sinking submarine, 136
Lyons, Lt.-Commr. D., highly commended, 139
MacDonnell, Lt.-Commr. E. O., in charge of flying Caproni bombers from
Italy to Flanders, 285
MacDougall, Capt. W. D., at London headquarters, 204
McBride, Capt. L. B., at London headquarters, 212, 214
McCalla, Capt., meets Adm. Jellicoe in China, 44
McCormick, E. H., volunteers services at London headquarters, 206
McCullough, Commr. Richard P., recommended for decoration, 136
_McDougal_, in first American destroyer contingent, 42;
highly commended, 139
McDowell, Commr. Clyde S., work on listening devices, 178
McGrann, Commr. W. H., at London headquarters, 212
McNamee, Capt. L., at London headquarters, 215
McVay, Capt. C. B., commanding the _Oklahoma_, 305
Magruder, Rear-Adm. T. P., good work in convoying subchasers, 178
Mannix, Commr. D. Pratt, with mine-laying squadron, 264
Marshall, Capt. A. W., with mine-laying squadron, 264
_Mary Rose_, welcomes American destroyers at Queenstown, 41
_Massachusetts_, converted as mine-layer, 254
_Melville_, "Mother Ship" of the destroyers at Queenstown, 58, 62
Millard, H., volunteers services at London headquarters, 206
Milner, Lord, on convoy system, 95
Mine barrage, at first not effective against submarines, 20, 24
Mine barrage in North Sea, American, 245;
immensity of, 252;
how laid, 257
Mine laying by German submarines, 51, 273, 274
Mines, Americans perfect new type, 250;
immense organization of supply and transport, 252
_Moewe_, commerce raider, 95
Murfin, Capt. Orin G., designer and builder of mine-assembly bases in
Scotland, 256
Mystery ships, greatly aid in combating the submarine, 103;
accompanying convoy, 118;
method of operating, 118;
operations of, 142;
technique, 148;
difficulty of identifying, 151;
number in operation, 152;
heroic fight of the _Dunraven_, 157;
exploit of _Prize_, 165;
American ship _Santee_, 166;
_Stockforce_ destroys submarine, 183
_Nautilus_, submarine of Robert Fulton, 226
Naval guns, German, bombarding Dunkirk and Paris, 290
Naval guns, U.S., used on the Western Front, 289
Nelson, Capt. C. P., good work in convoying subchasers, 178;
commanding subchaser squadrons at Corfu, 194;
in bombardment of Durazzo, 199, 200
_Neptune_ attacked by _U-29_, 84, 85
_Nevada_, guarding transports, 304
_New York_, on duty with Grand Fleet, 303
Niblack, Rear-Adm. Albert P., commanding forces at Gibraltar, 134;
asks that subchasers be sent to Gibraltar, 195
_Nicholson_, in submarine chase, 123;
on convoy duty, 129;
assists _Fanning_ in capture of submarine and crew, 130;
highly commended, 139
_Noma_, goes to relief of sinking mystery ship _Dunraven_, 163
Northern Bombing Group, established, 284, 285
_O'Brien_, highly commended, 163
Oil, scarcity of, for Great Britain's fleet, 34
_Oklahoma_, guarding transports, 305
_Orama_, torpedoed, 125
Ostend, bombing of submarine base at, 285
Otranto barrage, the, 181, 195
Page, Ambassador Walter Hines, asks that high naval representative be
sent to England, 1;
states that England faces defeat by submarines, 8;
on critical submarine situation, 38;
advised of submarine peril, 52;
a tower of strength, 207
_Pargust_, "mystery ship," destroys submarine, 147
_Parker_, in hunt for submarine, 119;
highly commended, 139;
supporting ship for subchasers at Plymouth, 182;
seriously damages the _U-53_, 189
Pauillac, France, U.S. aviation centre at, 284
_Pennsylvania_, transmits mobilization orders to destroyer division, 42
Pershing, Gen., request for naval guns at St. Nazaire, 290;
report of their skilful use, 293
Pescara, Italy, U.S. seaplane station at, 284
_Pisa_, in attack on Durazzo, 199
Pitt, William, early opinion of the submarine, 226
Planning Section at London headquarters, 215
Pleadwell, Capt. F. L., at London headquarters, 212
Plunkett, Adm. Charles P., commanding naval guns on Western Front, 289;
aids in designing mobile railway batteries, 290
Plymouth, subchaser base at, 182
_Pocahontas_, converted from German liner to transport, 302
_Porter_, in first American destroyer contingent, 42
Porto Corsini, Italy, U.S. seaplane station at, 284
Poteet, Lt.-Commr. Fred H., with first American destroyer contingent, 42
Potter, Ensign Stephen, fight with enemy seaplane, 288
Powell, Lt.-Commr. Halsey, of destroyer _Parker_, 119;
highly commended, 139
_Princess Irene_, converted into transport, 302
Pringle, Capt. J. R. P., at Queenstown, 58;
commended by Adm. Bayly, 139
_Prize_, mystery ship, damages submarine and captures captain and two of
crew, 165
Q-ships, _see_ Mystery ships
Queenstown, a destroyer base, 32;
arrival of first American destroyers, 40;
officially welcomes the Americans, 45
_Quinnebaug_, mine-layer, 254, 264
_Rene_, in westbound convoy, 129
Reynolds, Commr. W. H., with mine-laying squadron, 264
_Rhein_, converted into transport, 302
Richardson, R. M. D., volunteers services at London headquarters, 206
_Roanoke_, mine-layer, 254, 260, 264
Roberts, Lady, requests Adm. Sims to call, 66
Robison, Rear-Adm. S. S., work on listening devices, 178
Rodgers, Rear-Adm. Thomas S., commanding Dreadnought division in Bantry
Bay, 305
Rodman, Adm. Hugh, commanding American squadron with the Grand Fleet, 303
Rose, Hans, humane commander of the _U-53_, 106;
Allied forces ambitious to capture, 189;
not on _U-53_ when depth charged, 190;
visits Newport, and sinks merchantmen off Nantucket, 266
Royal Family, interested in American sailors, 67
_Sacramento_, at Gibraltar, 134
_San Diego_, sunk by mine off Fire Island, 274
_San Francisco_, converted as mine-layer, 252, 264
_San Giorgio_, in attack on Durazzo, 199
_San Marco_, in attack on Durazzo, 199
Sanders, Lt. William, commanding mystery ship _Prize_, 165;
awarded Victoria Cross, 165
_Santa Maria_, compared in size to modern destroyer, 76
_Santee_, U.S. mystery ship, 150, 166
_Saranac_, mine-layer, 254, 264
Scales, Capt. A. H., with the Grand Fleet, 303
Schieffelin, Lt. John J., recommended for Distinguished Service Medal, 277
Schofield, Capt. Frank H., work on listening devices, 178;
at London headquarters, 215
Schuyler, Commr. G. L., at London headquarters, 212
Schwab, Charles M., fabricates submarines for the Allies, 266
Seaplane base at Killingholme, England, taken over by U.S., 278
Seaplane stations of U.S. forces in Europe, 284
Sexton, Capt. W. R., at London headquarters, 212
_Shawmut_, mine-layer, 254, 264
Sims, Adm., ordered to England, 1;
notifies Washington that war is being lost, 33;
of the oil scarcity, 34;
favours using U.S. naval forces in conjunction with Allies, 35;
first report of critical submarine situation, 37;
extent of duties in European waters, 62;
significance of the Guildhall speech, 65;
reception accorded by British people, 66;
meets Lady Roberts, 66;
first foreign naval officer to command British forces in war, 68;
works for adoption of convoy system, 93, 95;
congratulates officers and men of _Fanning_ on capture of submarine
and crew, 134;
has difficulty in identifying a "mystery ship," 151;
letter to Capt. Campbell on _Dunraven_ exploit, 164;
warns Navy Department of German submarines visiting U.S. coast, 267
Sinn Fein, controversy with American sailors, 69; in league with Germany,
72
Smith, Capt. S. F., at London headquarters, 212
Sparrow, Capt. H. G., good work in convoying subchasers, 178
Stark, Commr. Harold R., brings small destroyers from Manila to
Gibraltar, 135;
at London headquarters, 212
Stearns, Capt. C. D., with mine-laying squadron. 264
_Sterrett_, highly commended, 139
Stevens, L. S., volunteers services at London headquarters, 206
_Stockforce_, mystery ship, destroys submarine, 183
Stockton, G. B., volunteers services at London headquarters, 206
Strauss, Rear-Adm. Joseph, in command of U.S. mine-laying operations, 257
Subchasers, number built and bases used, 168;
mobilized at New London, Conn., 173;
great numbers ordered by Great Britain and France, 174, 179;
hardships of the new crews, 176;
trip from New London to Corfu, 195;
an influence in the breakdown of Austria, 196;
in attack on Durazzo, 198;
congratulated on exploits of Durazzo by British Commodore and Italian
Naval General Staff, 203
Submarine against submarine, 224;
method of attack, 233
Submarine sinkings, gravity of, concealed by British, 2, 6;
losses of shipping, 51, 141
Submarines, American built, first to cross Atlantic, 267
really submersible surface ships, 229;
how operated, 229;
an American invention, 225
Submarines, American, their part in the war, 224;
attacked by destroyers through error, 236;
the base at Berehaven, 238;
witnesses U-boat destroy itself, 239
Submarines, British, the _H_-, _E_-, and _K_-boats, 224;
destroy a U-boat, 238
Submarines, enemy, winning the war, 4, 7;
number of, destroyed, 7;
officers exaggerate sinkings, 13;
difficulty of blockading the United States, 17;
cruising period dependent upon supply of torpedoes, 19;
mines and nets not effective against, 19;
number operating simultaneously, 20, 21, 31;
erroneous impression as to numbers operating, 20;
every movement charted by Allies, 21, 271, 273;
three different types of, 22;
plans to pen in the bases, 23;
playing hide and seek with destroyers, 33;
on American coast, 36, 266;
amount of shipping destroyed, 51;
how attacked by destroyer, 82;
method of attack on battleships, 84;
operating on American coast impracticable, 91;
individual locations and movements plotted each day, 104;
destroyed by depth charges, 126, 128, 130, 136;
decoying by "mystery ship," 142, 183;
not taken seriously until after Weddingen's exploit, 174;
concentrated in enclosed waters, 180;
the Otranto barrage, 181;
sinkings prevented by subchasers, 183;
how located by listening devices, 184;
_U-53_ seriously damaged by destroyer _Parker_, 189;
suicide of entire crew of a depth charged submarine, 193;
two submarines sunk by subchasers in bombardment of Durazzo, 202;
Germans have difficulty in reaching home after Austrian surrender, 203;
number destroyed by Allies and how, 224;
U-boat destroys itself, 239;
the cruiser submarines, 240;
their various bases, 244;
effectiveness of American North Sea mine barrage, 245;
lay mines on American coast, 273, 274;
aircraft an important factor against, 275;
number sunk about British Isles, 296;
forced to choose between transports and merchantmen, 306
_Surveyor_, yacht, assists in sinking submarine, 136
_Surveyor_, merchantmen torpedoed while being convoyed, 136
_Susquehanna_, converted from German liner to transport, 302
Swasey, A. Loring, services in designing of subchasers, 175
Taussig, Commr. Joseph K., in charge of first American destroyer
contingent, 42;
copy of sailing orders, 42;
previous record, 43;
welcoming letters from Admirals Jellicoe and Bayly, 44, 45;
reports to Vice-Adm. Bayly at Queenstown, 46;
highly commended, 139
Taylor, Capt. M. M., with the Grand Fleet, 303
_Texas_, on duty with Grand Fleet, 303
Thompson, Commr. Edgar, at London headquarters, 212
Thomson, Commr. T. A., at London headquarters, 212
Tobey, Capt. E. C., at London headquarters, 212, 214
Tomb, Capt. J. Harvey, with mine-laying squadron, 264
Tompkins, Capt. John T., work in organization of subchaser fleet, 178
Torpedo, track or wake made by, 81;
effective range of, 83;
duration of submarine's voyage dependent on number carried, 19;
supply limited, 26;
cost of, 77
Torpedo-boat, invention of, 76
Tozer, Capt. C. M., good work in convoying subchasers, 178
Transporting armies to France, 294;
nationality of ships and percentage carried, 302
_Turtle_, first submarine, 225
Twining, Capt. N. C., at London headquarters, 212, 213
_U-29_, torpedoes _Hogue_, _Cressy_ and _Aboukir_, and is later sunk by
_Dreadnought_, 84, 85
_U-53_, operates off American coast, 106;
torpedoes the _Jacob Jones_, 107;
seriously damaged by depth charges, 188;
surrendered after armistice, 190;
after visiting Newport, R.I., sinks several merchantmen, 266
_U-58_ depth charged and crew captured by _Fanning_ and _Nicholson_, 131
_U-151_, lays mines off American coast, 273
_U-156_, lays mines off American coast, 274
_UC-56_, practically destroyed by depth charge from _Christabel_, 128
_Utah_, guarding transports, 305
_Vaterland_, converted into transport, 301
Vauclain, Samuel M., great help in turning out mobile railway batteries,
290
_Venetia_, assists in sinking submarine, 136;
seriously damages another, 136
Voysey, Miss, niece of Vice-Adm. Bayly, and charming hostess, 59
_Wadsworth_, in first American destroyer contingent, 42;
highly commended, 139
_Wainwright_, in first American destroyer contingent, 42
Washington, Capt. Thomas, with the Grand Fleet, 303
Weatherhead, Ensign C. H., makes record seaplane flight, 278
Weddingen, Commr. Otto, torpedoes _Hogue_, _Cressy_ and _Aboukir_, and
is in turn sunk by battleship _Dreadnought_, 84, 174
_Welshman_, narrow escape from being torpedoed, 130, 133
_Weymouth_, in attack on Durazzo, 199
_Wheeling_, depth charges submarine, 136
White, Sir William, on the submarine, 225
Whiting, Commr. Kenneth, great service in aviation, 283
Wiley, Capt. H. A., with the Grand Fleet, 303
Wilhelm, Kaiser, on effectiveness of the submarine, 13
_Wilkes_, on submarine hunt with _Parker_, 189
Williams, Lt.-Commr. Roger, at Queenstown, 57
Wilson, Rear-Adm. Henry B., commander of forces at _Gibraltar_, 134;
at Brest, 134;
commanding Brest naval base, 300
Wireless telegraphy, of the submarines and destroyers, 100;
messages reveal locations of submarines, 105
Wortman, Lieut.-Commr. Ward K., with first American destroyer contingent,
42
_Wyoming_, on duty with Grand Fleet, 303
Y-guns, or howitzers, for hurling depth charges, 79
Yachts, good service on French coast, 301
Yale aviation unit, organization of, 282;
renders great service, 283
Yarnell, Capt. H. E., at London headquarters, 215
Zeebrugge, bombing of submarine base at, 285
Zigzagging, efficacious protection against submarines, 87, 120
Zogbaum, Lt.-Commr. Rufus F., with first American destroyer contingent,
42
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| Transcriber's Note: |
| |
| Inconsistent hyphenation and spelling in the |
| original document have been preserved. |
| |
| Typographical errors corrected in the text: |
| |
| Page 136 Carthagena changed to Cartagena |
| Page 151 out changed to our |
| Page 194 saltest changed to saltiest |
| Page 227 if changed to it |
| Page 264 wift changed to swift |
| Page 271 frm changed to from |
| Page 278 Ensign changed to Ensigns |
| Page 348 de Steigner changed to de Steiguer |
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