CHAPTER XIII

TRANSPORTING TWO MILLION AMERICAN SOLDIERS TO FRANCE

I

In March, 1918, it became apparent that the German submarine campaign

had failed. The prospect that confronted the Allied forces at that time,

when compared with the conditions which had faced them in April, 1917,

forms one of the most impressive contrasts in history. In the first part

of the earlier year the cause of the Allied Powers, and consequently the

cause of liberty throughout the world, had reached the point almost of

desperation. On both land and sea the Germans seemed to hold the future

in their hands. In Europe the armies of the Central Powers were

everywhere in the ascendant. The French and British were holding their

own in France, and in the Somme campaign they had apparently inflicted

great damage upon the German forces, yet the disintegration of the

Russian army, the unmistakable signs of which had already appeared, was

bringing nearer the day when they would have to meet the undivided

strength of their enemy. At the time in question, Rumania, Serbia, and

Montenegro were conquered countries, and Italy seemed unable to make any

progress against the Austrians. Bulgaria and Turkey had become

practically German provinces, and the dream of a great Germanic eastern

empire was rapidly approaching realization. So strong was Germany in a

military sense, so little did she apprehend that the United States could

ever assemble her resources and her men in time to make them a decisive

element in the struggle, that the German war lords, in their effort to

bring the European conflict to a quick conclusion, did not hesitate to

take the step which was destined to make our country their enemy.

Probably no nation ever adopted a war measure with more confidence in

its success. The results which the German submarines could accomplish

seemed at that time to be simply a matter of mathematical calculation.

The Germans estimated that they could sink at least 1,000,000 tons a

month, completely cut off Great Britain's supplies of food and war

materials, and thus end the war by October or November of 1917. Even

though the United States should declare war, what could an unprepared

nation like our own accomplish in such a brief period? Millions of

troops we might indeed raise, but we could not train them in three or

four months, and, even though we could perform such a miracle, it was

ridiculous to suppose that we could transport them to Europe through the

submarine danger zone. I have already shown that the Germans were not

alone in thus predicting the course of events. In the month of April,

1917, I had found the Allied officials just about as distressed as the

Germans were jubilant. Already the latter, in sinking merchant ships,

had had successes which almost equalled their own predictions; no

adequate means of defence against the submarine had been devised; and

the chiefs of the British navy made no attempts to disguise their

apprehension for the future.

Such was the atmosphere of gloom which prevailed in Allied councils in

April, 1917; yet one year later the naval situation had completely

changed. The reasons for that change have been set forth in the

preceding pages. In that brief twelve months the relative position of

the submarine had undergone a marked transformation. Instead of being

usually the pursuer it was now often the pursued. Instead of sailing

jauntily upon the high seas, sinking helpless merchantmen almost at

will, it was half-heartedly lying in wait along the coasts, seeking its

victims in the vessels of dispersed convoys. If it attempted to push out

to sea, and attack a convoy, escorting destroyers were likely to deliver

one of their dangerous attacks; if it sought the shallower coastal

waters, a fleet of yachts, sloops, and subchasers was constantly ready

to assail it with dozens of depth charges. An attempt to pass through

the Straits of Dover meant almost inevitable destruction by mines; an

attempt to escape into the ocean by the northern passage involved the

momentary dread of a similar end or the hazard of navigating the

difficult Pentland Firth. In most of the narrow passages Allied

submarines lay constantly in wait with their torpedoes; a great fleet of

airplanes and dirigibles was always circling above ready to rain a

shower of bombs upon the under-water foe. Already the ocean floor about

the British Isles held not far from 200 sunken submarines, with most of

their crews, amounting to at least 4,000 men, whose deaths involved

perhaps the most hideous tragedies of the war. Bad as was this

situation, it was nothing compared with what it would become a few

months or a year later. American and British shipyards were turning out

anti-submarine craft with great rapidity; the industries of America,

with their enormous output of steel, had been enlisted in the

anti-submarine campaign. The American and British shipbuilding

facilities were neutralizing the German campaign in two ways: they were

not only constructing war vessels on a scale which would soon drive all

the German submarines from the sea, but they were building merchant

tonnage so rapidly that, in March, 1918, more new tonnage was launched

than was being destroyed. Thus by this time the Teutonic hopes of ending

the war by the submarine had utterly collapsed; if the Germans were to

win the war at all, or even to obtain a peace which would not be

disastrous, some other programme must be adopted and adopted quickly.

Disheartened by their failure at sea, the enemy therefore turned their

eyes once more toward the land. The destruction of Russian military

power had given the German armies a great numerical superiority over

those of the Allies. There seemed little likelihood that the French or

the British, after three years of frightfully gruelling war, could add

materially to their forces. Thus, with the grouping of the Powers, such

as existed in 1917, the Germans had a tremendous advantage on their

side, for Russia, which German statesmen for fifty years had feared as a

source of inexhaustible man-supply to her enemies, had disappeared as a

military power. But a new element in the situation now counterbalanced

this temporary gain; that was the daily increasing importance of the

United States in the war. The Germans, who in 1917 had despised us as an

enemy, immediate or prospective, now despised us no longer. The army

which they declared could never be raised and trained was actually being

raised and trained by the millions. The nation which their publicists

had denounced as lacking cohesion and public spirit had adopted

conscription simultaneously with their declaration of war, and the

people whom the Germans had affected to regard as devoted only to the

pursuit of gain and pleasure had manifested a unity of purpose which

they had never before displayed, and had offered their lives, their

labours, and their wealth without limit to the cause of the Allies. Up

to March, 1918, only a comparatively small part of this American army

had reached Europe, but the Germans had already tested its fighting

quality and had learned to respect it. Yet all these manifestations

would not have disturbed the Germanic calculations except for one

depressing fact. Even a nation of 100,000,000 brave and energetic

people, fully trained and equipped for war, is not a formidable foe so

long as an impassable watery gulf of three thousand miles separates them

from the field of battle.

For the greater part of 1917 the German people believed that their

submarines could bar the progress of the American armies. By March,

1918, they had awakened from this delusion. Not only was an American

army millions strong in process of formation, but the alarming truth now

dawned upon the Germans that it could be transported to Europe. The

great industries of America could provide munitions and food to supply

any number of soldiers indefinitely, and these, too, could be brought to

the Western Front. Outwardly, the German chiefs might still affect to

despise this new foe, but in their hearts they knew that it spelt their

doom. They were not now dealing with a corrupt Czardom and hordes of

ignorant and passionless Slavs, who could be eliminated by propaganda

and sedition; they were dealing with millions of intelligent and

energetic freemen, all animated by a mighty and almost religious

purpose. Yet the situation, desperate as it seemed, held forth one more

hope. If the German armies, which still greatly outnumbered the French

and British, could strike and win a decisive victory before the

Americans could arrive, then they might still force a satisfactory

peace. "It is a race between Ludendorff and Wilson" is the terse and

accurate way in which Lloyd George summed up the situation. The great

blow fell on March 21, 1918; the British and the French met it with

heroism, but it was quite evident that they were fighting against

terrible odds. At this time the American army in France numbered about

300,000 men; it now became the business of the American navy, assisted

by the British, to transport the American troops who could increase

these forces sufficiently to turn the balance in the Allies' favour.

The supreme hour, to which all the anti-submarine labours of the

preceding year were merely preliminary, had now arrived. Since the close

of the war there has been much discussion of the part which the American

navy played in bringing it to a successful end. Even during the war

there was some criticism on this point. There were two more or less

definite opinions in the public mind upon this question. One was that

the main business of our war vessels was to convoy the American soldiers

to France; the other emphasized the anti-submarine warfare as its most

important duty. Anyone would suppose, from the detached way in which

these two subjects have been discussed, that the anti-submarine warfare

and the successful transportation of troops were separate matters. An

impression apparently prevails that, at the beginning of the war, the

American navy could have quietly decided whether it would devote its

energies to making warfare on the submarine or to convoying American

armies; yet the absurdity of such a conception must be apparent to

anyone who has read the foregoing pages. The several operations in which

the Allied navies engaged were all part of a comprehensive programme;

they were all interdependent. According to my idea, the business of the

American navy was to join its forces whole-heartedly with those of the

Allies in the effort _to win the war_. Anything which helped to

accomplish this great purpose became automatically our duty. Germany was

basing her chances of success upon the submarine; our business was

therefore to assist in defeating the submarine. The cause of the Allies

was our cause; our cause was the cause of the Allies; anything which

benefited the Allies benefited the United States; and anything which

benefited the United States benefited the Allies. Neither we nor France

nor England were conducting a separate campaign; we were separate units

of an harmonious whole. At the beginning the one pressing duty was to

put an end to the sinking of merchantmen, not because these merchantmen

were for the larger part British, but because the failure to do so would

have meant the elimination of Great Britain from the war, with results

which would have meant defeat for the other Allies. Let us imagine, for

a moment, what the sequence of events would have been had the submarine

campaign against merchant shipping succeeded; in that case Britain and

France would have been compelled to surrender unconditionally and the

United States would therefore have been forced to fight the Central

Empires alone. Germany's terms of peace would have included the

surrender of all the Allied fleets; this would eventually have left the

United States navy to fight the German navy reinforced by the ships of

Great Britain, Austria, France, and Italy. In such a contest we should

have been outnumbered about three or four to one. I have such confidence

in the power and purpose of America as to believe that, even in a

single-handed conflict with Germany, we should have won in the end; but

it is evident that the problem would have been quite a different one

from that of fighting in co-operation with the Allies against the

Germanic foe.

Simply as a matter of self-interest and strategy it was certainly wisdom

to throw the last ounce of our strength into the scale of the Allied

navies; and it was therefore inevitable that we should first of all use

our anti-submarine craft to protect all shipping sailing to Europe and

to clear the sea of submarines. In doing this we were protecting the

food supply not only of Great Britain, but of France and our other

Allies, for most of the materials which we sent to our European friends

were transported first to England and thence were shipped across the

Channel. Moreover, our twelve months' campaign against the submarine was

an invaluable preliminary to transporting the troops. Does any sane

person believe that we could have put two million Americans into France

had the German submarines maintained until the spring and summer of 1918

the striking power which had been theirs in the spring of 1917? Merely

to state the question is to answer it. In that same twelve months we had

gained much experience which was exceedingly valuable when we began

transporting troops in great numbers. The most efficacious protection to

merchant shipping, the convoy, was similarly the greatest safeguard to

our military transports. Those methods which had been so successfully

used in shipping food, munitions, and materials were now used in

shipping soldiers. The section of the great headquarters which we had

developed in London for routing convoys was used for routing

transports, and the American naval officer, Captain Byron A. Long, who

had demonstrated such great ability in this respect, was likewise the

master mind in directing the course of the American soldiers to France.

In other ways we had laid the foundations for this, the greatest troop

movement in history. In the preceding twelve months we had increased the

oil tankage at Brest more than fourfold, sent over repair ships, and

augmented its repair facilities. This port and all of our naval

activities in France were under the command first of Rear-Admiral Wm. B.

Fletcher, and later Rear-Admiral Henry B. Wilson. It was a matter of

regret that we could not earlier have made Brest the main naval base for

the American naval forces in France, for it was in some respects

strategically better located for that purpose than was any other port in

Europe. Even for escorting certain merchant convoys into the Channel

Brest would have provided a better base than either Plymouth or

Queenstown. A glance at the map explains why. To send destroyers from

Queenstown to pick up convoys and escort them into the Channel or to

French ports and thence return to their base involved a long triangular

trip; to send such destroyers from Brest to escort these involved a

smaller amount of steaming and a direct east and west voyage. Similarly,

Queenstown was a much better location for destroyers sent to meet

convoys bound for ports in the Irish Sea over the northern "trunk line."

But unfortunately it was utterly impossible to use the great natural

advantages of Brest in the early days of war; the mere fact that this

French harbour possessed most inadequate tankage facilities put it out

of the question, and it was also very deficient in docks, repair

facilities, and other indispensable features of a naval base. At this

time Brest was hardly more than able to provide for the requirements of

the French, and it would have embarrassed our French allies greatly had

we attempted to establish a large American force there, before we had

supplied the essential oil fuel and repair facilities. The ships which

we did send in the first part of the war were mostly yachts, of the

"dollar-a-year" variety, which their owners had generously given to the

national service; their crews were largely of that type of young

business man and college undergraduate to whose skill and devotion I

have already paid tribute. This little flotilla acquitted itself

splendidly up and down the coast of France. Meanwhile, we were

constructing fuel-oil tanks; and as soon as these were ready and repair

ships were available, we began building up a large force at Brest--a

force which was ultimately larger than the one we maintained at

Queenstown; at the height of the troop movements it comprised about 36

destroyers, 12 yachts, 3 tenders, and several mine-sweepers and tugs.

The fine work which this detachment accomplished in escorting troop and

supply convoys is sufficient evidence of the skill acquired by the

destroyers and other vessels in carrying out their duties in this

peculiar warfare.

Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, a great organization had

been created under the able direction of Rear-Admiral Albert Gleaves for

maintaining and administering the fleet of transports and their ocean

escorts. Also, as soon as war was declared the work was begun of

converting into transports those German merchant ships which had been

interned in American ports. The successful completion of this work was,

in itself, a great triumph for the American navy. Of the vessels which

the Germans had left in our hands, seventeen at New York, Boston,

Norfolk, and Philadelphia, seemed to be adapted for transport purposes,

but the Germans had not intended that we should make any such use of

them. The condition of these ships, after their German custodians had

left, was something indescribable; they reflected great discredit upon

German seamanship, for it would have been impossible for any people

which really loved ships to permit them to deteriorate as had these

vessels and to become such cesspools of filth. For three years the

Germans had evidently made no attempt to clean them; the sanitary

conditions were so bad that our workmen could not sleep on board, but

had to have sleeping quarters near the docks; they spent weeks

scrubbing, scraping, and disinfecting, in a finally successful effort to

make the ships suitable habitations for human beings. Not only had the

Germans permitted such liners as the _Vaterland_ and the _Kronprinzessin

Cecilie_ to go neglected, but, on their departure, they had attempted to

injure them in all conceivable ways. The cylinders had been broken,

engines had been smashed, vital parts of the machinery had been removed

and thrown into the sea, ground glass had been placed in the oil cups,

gunpowder had been placed in the coal--evidently in the hope of causing

explosions when the vessels were at sea--and other damage of a more

subtle nature had been done, it evidently being the expectation that the

ships would break down when on the ocean and beyond the possibility of

repair. Although our navy yards had no copies of the plans of these

vessels or their machinery--the Germans having destroyed them all--and

although the missing parts were of peculiarly German design, they

succeeded, in an incredibly short time, in making them even better and

speedier vessels than they had ever been before.

The national sense of humour did not fail the transport service when it

came to rechristening these ships; the _Princess Irene_ became the

_Pocahontas_, the _Rhein_ the _Susquehanna_; and there was also an

ironic justice in the fact that the _Vaterland_, which had been built by

the Germans partly for the purpose of transporting troops in war,

actually fulfilled this mission, though not quite in the way which the

Germans had anticipated. Meanwhile, both the American and the British

mercantile marines were supplementing this German tonnage. The first

troops which we sent to France, in June, 1917, were transported in ships

of the United Fruit Company; and when the German blow was struck, in

March, 1918, both the United States and Great Britain began collecting

from all parts of the world vessels which could be used as troop

transports. We called in all available vessels from the Atlantic and

Pacific coasts and the Great Lakes; England stripped her trade routes to

South America, Australia, and the East, and France and Italy also made

their contributions. Of all the American troops sent to France from the

beginning of the war, the United States provided transports for 46.25

per cent., Great Britain for 51.25, the remainder being provided by

France and Italy. Of those sent between March, 1918, and the armistice,

American vessels carried 42.15 per cent., British 55.40 per cent.[8]

Yet there was one element in the safe transportation of troops which was

even more fundamental than those which I have named. The basis of all

our naval operations was the dreadnoughts and the battle-cruisers of the

Grand Fleet. It was this aggregation, as I have already indicated,

which made possible the operation of all the surface ships that

destroyed the effectiveness of the submarines. Had the Grand Fleet

suddenly disappeared beneath the waves, all these offensive craft would

have been driven from the seas, the Allies' sea lines of communication

would have been cut, and the war would have ended in Germany's favour.

From the time the transportation of troops began the United States had a

squadron of five dreadnought battleships constantly with the Grand

Fleet. The following vessels performed this important duty: the _New

York_, Captain C. F. Hughes, afterward Captain E. L. Beach; the

_Wyoming_, Captain H. A. Wiley, afterward Captain H. H. Christy; the

_Florida_, Captain Thomas Washington, afterward Captain M. M. Taylor;

the _Delaware_, Captain A. H. Scales; the _Arkansas_, Captain W. H. G.

Bullard, afterward Captain L. R. de Steiguer; and the _Texas_, Captain

Victor Blue. These vessels gave this great force an unquestioned

preponderance, and made it practically certain that Germany would not

attempt another general sea battle. Under Rear-Admiral Hugh Rodman, the

American squadron performed excellent service and made the most

favourable impression upon the chiefs of the Allied navies. Under the

general policy of co-operation established throughout our European naval

forces these vessels were quickly made a part of the Grand Fleet in so

far as concerned their military operations. This was, of course, wholly

essential to efficiency--a point the layman does not always

understand--so essential, in fact, that it may be said that, if the

Grand Fleet had gone into battle the day after our vessels joined, the

latter might have decreased rather than increased the fighting

efficiency of the whole; for, though our people and the British spoke

the same language, the languages of the ships, that is, their methods of

communication by signals, were wholly different. It was therefore our

duty to stow our signal flags and books down below, and learn the

British signal language. This they did so well that four days after

their arrival they went out and manoeuvred successfully with the Grand

Fleet. In the same way they adopted the British systems of tactics and

fire control, and in every other way conformed to the established

practices of the British. Too great praise cannot be given the officers

and men of our squadron, not only for their efficiency and the

cordiality of their co-operation, but for the patience with which they

bore the almost continuous restriction to their ships, and the long

vigil without the opportunity of a contact with the enemy forces. Just

how well our ships succeeded in this essential co-operation was

expressed by Admiral Sir David Beatty in the farewell speech which he

made to them upon the day of their departure for home. He said in part:

"I want, first of all, to thank you, Admiral Rodman, the captains,

officers, and ships' companies of the magnificent squadron, for the

wonderful co-operation and the loyalty you have given to me and to

my admirals; and the assistance that you have given us in every

duty you had to undertake. The support which you have shown is that

of true comradeship; and in time of stress, that is worth a very

great deal.

"You will return to your own shores; and I hope in the sunshine,

which Admiral Rodman tells me always shines there, you won't forget

your 'comrades of the mist' and your pleasant associations of the

North Sea....

"I thank you again and again for the great part the Sixth Battle

Squadron played in bringing about the greatest naval victory in

history. I hope you will give this message to your comrades: 'Come

back soon. Good-bye and good luck!'"

But these were not the only large battleships which the United States

had sent to European waters. Despite all the precautions which I have

described, there was still one danger which constantly confronted

American troop transports. By June and July, 1918, our troops were

crossing the Atlantic in enormous numbers, about 300,000 a month, and

were accomplishing most decisive results upon the battlefield. A

successful attack upon a convoy, involving the sinking of one or more

transports, would have had no important effect upon the war, but it

would probably have improved German _moral_ and possibly have injured

that of the Americans. There was practically only one way in which such

an attack could be made; one or more German battle-cruisers might slip

out to sea and assail one of our troop convoys. In order to prepare for

such a possibility, the Department sent three of our most powerful

dreadnoughts to Berehaven, Ireland--the _Nevada_, Captain A. T. Long,

afterward Captain W. C. Cole; the _Oklahoma_, Captain M. L. Bristol,

afterward Captain C. B. McVay; and the _Utah_, Captain F. B. Bassett,

the whole division under the command of Rear-Admiral Thomas S. Rodgers.

This port is located in Bantry Bay, on the extreme southwestern coast.

For several months our dreadnoughts lay here, momentarily awaiting the

news that a German raider had escaped, ready to start to sea and give

battle. But the expected did not happen. The fact that this powerful

squadron was ready for the emergency is perhaps the reason why the

Germans never attempted the adventure.

II

A reference to the map which accompanies this chapter will help the

reader to understand why our transports were able to carry American

troops to France so successfully that not a single ingoing ship was ever

struck by a torpedo. This diagram makes it evident that there were two

areas of the Atlantic through which American shipping could reach its

European destination. The line of division was about the forty-ninth

parallel of latitude, the French city of Brest representing its most

familiar landmark. From this point extending southward, as far as the

forty-fifth parallel, which corresponds to the location of the city of

Bordeaux, is a great stretch of ocean, about 200 miles wide. It includes

the larger part of the Bay of Biscay, which forms that huge indentation

with which our school geographies have made us Americans so familiar,

and which has always enjoyed a particular fame for its storms, the

dangers of its coast, and the sturdy and independent character of the

people on its shores. The other distinct area to which the map calls

attention extends northerly from the forty-ninth parallel to the

fifty-second; it comprises the English Channel, and includes both the

French channel ports, the British ports, the southern coast of Ireland,

and the entrance to the Irish Sea. The width of this second section is

very nearly the same as that of the one to the south, or about 200

miles.

[Illustration: THE OPTION OFFERED TO THE GERMAN SUBMARINES

This diagram explains why the American navy succeeded in transporting

more than 2,000,000 American soldiers to France without loss because of

submarines. The Atlantic was divided into two broad areas--shown by the

shaded parts of the diagram. Through the northern area were sent

practically all the merchant ships with supplies of food and materials

for Europe. The southern area, extending roughly from the forty-fifth to

the forty-ninth parallel, was used almost exclusively for troopships.

The Germans could keep only eight or ten U-boats at the same time in the

eastern Atlantic; they thus were forced to choose whether they should

devote these boats to attacking mercantile or troop convoys. The text

explains why, under these circumstances, they were compelled to use

nearly all their forces against merchant ships and leave troop

transports practically alone.

Emery Walker Ltd. sc]

Up to the present moment this narrative has been concerned chiefly with

the northernmost of these two great sea pathways. Through this one to

the north passed practically all the merchant shipping which was

destined for the Allies. Consequently, as I have described, it was the

great hunting ground of the German submarines. I have thus far had

little to say of the Bay of Biscay section because, until 1918, there

was comparatively little activity in that part of the ocean. For every

ship which sailed through this bay I suppose that there were at least

100 which came through the Irish Sea and the English Channel. In my

first report to the Department I described the principal scene of

submarine activity as the area of the Atlantic reaching from the French

island of Ushant--which lies just westward of Brest--to the tip of

Scotland, and that remained the chief scene of hostilities to the end.

Along much of the coastline south of Brest the waters were so shallow

that the submarines could operate only with difficulty; it was a long

distance from the German bases; the shipping consisted largely of

coastal convoys; much of this was the coal trade from England; it is

therefore not surprising that the Germans contented themselves with now

and then planting mines off the most important harbours. Since our enemy

was able to maintain only eight or ten U-boats in the Atlantic at one

time it would have been sheer waste of energy to have stationed them off

the western coast of France. They would have put in their time to little

purpose, and meanwhile the ships and cargoes which they were above all

ambitious to destroy would have been safely finding their way into

British ports.

The fact that we had these two separate areas and that these areas were

so different in character was what made it possible to send our

2,000,000 soldiers to France without losing a single man. From March,

1918, to the conclusion of the war, the American and British navies were

engaged in two distinct transportation operations. The shipment of food

and munitions continued in 1918 as in 1917, and on an even larger scale.

With the passing of time the mechanism of these mercantile convoys

increased in efficiency, and by March, 1918, the management of this

great transportation system had become almost automatic. Shipping from

America came into British ports, it will be remembered, in two great

"trunk lines," one of which ran through the English Channel and the

other up the Irish Sea. But when the time came to bring over the

American troops, we naturally selected the area to the south, both

because it was necessary to send the troops to France and because we had

here a great expanse of ocean which was relatively free of submarines.

Our earliest troop shipments disembarked at St. Nazaire; later, when the

great trans-Atlantic liners, both German and British, were pressed into

service, we landed many tens of thousands at Brest; and all the largest

French ports from Brest to Bordeaux took a share. A smaller number we

sent to England, from which country they were transported across the

Channel into France; when the demands became pressing, indeed, hardly a

ship of any kind was sent to Europe without its quota of American

soldiers; but, on the whole, the business of transportation in 1918

followed simple and well-defined lines. We sent mercantile convoys in

what I may call the northern "lane" and troop convoys in the southern

"lane." We kept both lines of traffic for the most part distinct; and

this simple procedure offered to our German enemies a pretty problem.

For, I must repeat, the German navy could maintain in the open Atlantic

an average of only about eight or ten of her efficient U-boats at one

time. The German Admiralty thus had to answer this difficult question:

Shall we use these submarines to attack mercantile convoys or to attack

troop convoys? The submarine flotilla which was actively engaged was so

small that it was absurd to think of sending half into each lane; the

Germans must send most of their submarines against cargo ships or most

of them against troopships. Which should it be? If it were decided to

concentrate on mercantile vessels then the American armies, which the

German chiefs had declared to their people could never get to the

Western Front, would reach France and furnish General Foch the reserves

with which he might crush the German armies before winter. If, on the

other hand, the Germans should decide to concentrate on troopships, then

the food and supplies which were essential to the Allied cause would

flow at an even greater rate into Great Britain and thence to the

European nations. Whether it were more important, in a military sense,

to cut the Allies' commercial lines of communication or to sink troop

transports is an interesting question. It is almost impossible for the

Anglo-Saxon mind to consider this as a purely military matter, apart

from the human factors involved. The sinking of a great transport, with

4,000 or 5,000 American boys on board, would have been a dreadful

calamity and would have struck horror to the American people; it was

something which the Navy was determined to prevent, and which we did

prevent. Considered as a strictly military question, however--and that

was the only consideration which influenced the Germans--it is hard to

see how the loss of one transport, or even the loss of several, would

have materially affected the course of the war. In judging the purely

military results of such a tragedy, we must remember that the Allied

armies were losing from 3,000 to 5,000 men a day; thus the sinking of an

American transport once a week would not have particularly affected the

course of the war. The destruction of merchant shipping in large

quantities, however, represented the one way in which the Germans could

win. There were at least a hundred merchant ships to every one of our

troopships; if a considerable number of the former could be sunk,

Germany would have scored a decisive advantage. From the declaration of

submarine warfare, the objective of the German Admiralty had been for

"tonnage"; by March, 1918, as already said, the chances of destroying

sufficient tonnage to win had become extremely slight; yet it still

represented the one logical mission of the submarine.

The two alternatives, however, that of attacking mercantile convoys or

troop convoys, hardly existed in fact. Let us suppose for a moment that

the Germans had changed their programme, had taken their group of

operating submarines from the northern trade routes, and had stationed

them to the south, in the track of the troop transports. What would the

results have been? "Lane," though a convenient word for descriptive

purposes, is hardly an accurate one; for this ocean passage-way was

really about 200 miles wide. Imagine eight or ten submarines, stretched

across that expanse and hunting for troopships. At this rate the Germans

would have had about one submarine for every twenty miles. Instead of

finding themselves sailing amid a swarm of surface ships, as they were

when they were stationed in the busy trade routes of the Irish Sea or

the English Channel, the submarines would have found themselves drifting

on a great waste of waters. Our troop convoys averaged not more than

three a week even in the busiest period; in all probability the

submarines would therefore have hung around for a month without catching

a glimpse of one. Even if by some chance the patient vigil should

finally have been rewarded, it is extremely unlikely that the submarine

would ever have found a favourable opportunity to attack. We must keep

in mind that the convoy room at the Admiralty knew, within certain

limits, the location of submarines from day to day; any time one was

located in the track of a troop convoy, therefore, a wireless to the

convoy would have conveyed this information and directed it to reach the

coast of France by another route.

At the beginning the speediest vessels only were used for transporting

troops. Ships which made less than twelve knots an hour were not deemed

safe for such precious cargoes; when the need for troops became more

and more pressing and when our transport service had demonstrated great

skill in the work, a few slower vessels were used; but the great

majority of our troop transports were those which made twelve knots or

more. Now one of the greatest protections which a ship possesses against

submarine attack is unquestionably high speed. A submarine makes only

eight knots when submerged--and it must submerge immediately if its

attack is to be successful. It must be within at least a mile of its

quarry when it discharges its torpedo; and most successful attacks were

made within three hundred yards. Now take a pencil and a piece of paper

and figure out what must be the location of a submarine, having a speed

of eight knots, when it sights a convoy, which makes twelve knots and

more, if it hopes to approach near enough to launch a torpedo. A little

diagramming will prove that the U-boat must be almost directly in line

of its hoped-for victim if it is to score a hit. But even though the god

of Chance should favour the enemy in this way, the likelihood of sinking

its prey would still be very remote. Like all convoys, the troopships

began zigzagging as soon as they entered the danger zone; and this in

itself made it almost impossible for a submarine to get its bearings and

take good aim. I believe that these circumstances in themselves--the

comparative scarcity of troop transports, the width of the "lane" in

which they travelled, the high speed which they maintained, and their

constant zigzagging, would have defeated most of the attempts which the

Germans could have made to torpedo them. Though I think that most of

them would have reached their destinations unharmed without any other

protection, still this risk, small as it was, could not be taken; and we

therefore gave them one other protection greater than any of those which

I have yet mentioned--the destroyer escort. A convoy of four or five

large troopships would be surrounded by as many as ten or a dozen

destroyers. Very properly, since they were carrying human cargoes, we

gave them an escort at least three times as large per vessel as that

given to large mercantile convoys of twenty or more vessels; and this

fact made them very uninviting baits for the most venturesome U-boat

commanders.

When the engineers build a Brooklyn bridge they introduce an element

which they call the factor of safety. It is their usual procedure to

estimate the greatest weight which their structure may be called upon to

bear under any conceivable circumstances and then they make it strong

enough to stand a number of times that weight. This additional strength

is the "factor of safety"; it is never called into use, of course, but

the consciousness that it exists gives the public a sense of security

which it could obtain in no other way. We adopted a similar policy in

transporting these millions of American boys to Europe. We also had a

large margin of safety. We did not depend upon one precaution to assure

the lives of our soldiers; we heaped one precautionary measure on

another. From the embarking of the troops at New York or at Hampton

Roads to the disembarkation at Brest, St. Nazaire, La Pallice, Bordeaux,

or at one of their other destinations, not the minutest safeguard was

omitted. We necessarily thus somewhat diminished the protection of some

of the mercantile convoys--and properly so. This was done whenever the

arrival of a troop convoy conflicted with the arrival of a merchant

convoy. Also, until they reached the submarine zone, they were attended

by a cruiser or a battleship whose business it was to protect them

against a German raider which might possibly have made its escape into

the ocean; the work performed by these ocean escorts, practically all of

which were American, was for the most part unobtrusive and

unspectacular, but it constitutes a particularly fine example of

efficiency and seamanlike devotion. At Berehaven, Ireland, as described

above, we had stationed three powerful American dreadnoughts,

momentarily prepared to rush to the scene in case one of the great

German battle-cruisers succeeded in breaking into the open sea. Even the

most minute precautions were taken by the transports.

The soldiers and crews were not permitted to throw anything overboard

which might betray the course of a convoy; the cook's refuse was dropped

at a particular time and in a way that would furnish no clue to a

lurking submarine; even a tin can, if thrown into the sea, was first

pierced with holes to make sure that it would sink. Anyone who struck a

match at night in the danger zone committed a punishable offence. It is

thus apparent why the Germans never "landed" a single one of our

transports. The records show only three or four cases in which even

attempts were made to do this; and those few efforts were feeble and

ineffectual. Of course, the boys all had exciting experiences with

phantom submarines; indeed I don't suppose that there is a single one of

our more than 2,000,000 troops who has not entertained his friends and

relatives with accounts of torpedo streaks and schools of U-boats.

But the Germans made no concerted campaign against our transports;

fundamental conditions, already described, rendered such an offensive

hopeless; and the skill with which our transport service was organized

and conducted likewise dissuaded them. I have always believed that the

German Admiralty ordered their U-boat captains to let the American

transports alone; or at least not to attack except under very favourable

circumstances, and this belief is rather confirmed by a passage in

General Ludendorff's memoirs. "From our previous experience of the

submarine war," General Ludendorff writes, "I expected strong forces of

Americans to come, but the rapidity with which they actually did arrive

proved surprising. General von Cramon, the German military

representative at the Austro-Hungarian Headquarters, often called me up

and asked me to insist on the sinking of American troopships; public

opinion in Austria-Hungary demanded it. Admiral von Holtzendorff could

only reply that everything was being done to reduce enemy tonnage and to

sink troopships. It was not possible to direct the submarines against

troopships exclusively. They could approach the coasts of Europe

anywhere between the north of England and Gibraltar, a front of some

fourteen hundred nautical miles. It was impossible effectively to close

this area by means of submarines. One could have concentrated them only

on certain routes; but whether the troopships would choose the same

routes at the same time was the question. As soon as the enemy heard of

submarines anywhere he could always send the ships new orders by

wireless and unload at another port. It was, therefore, not certain that

by this method we should meet with a sufficient number of troopships.

The destruction of the enemy's freight tonnage would then have been

undertaken only spasmodically, and would have been set back in an

undesirable manner; and in that way the submarine war would have become

diverted from its original object. The submarine war against commerce

was therefore continued with all the vigour possible."

Apparently it became the policy of the German Admiralty, as I have

said, to concentrate their U-boats on merchant shipping and leave the

American troopships practically alone--at least those bound to Europe.

Unfortunately, however, at no time did we have enough destroyers to

provide escorts for all of these transports as fast as they were

unloaded and ready to return to America, but as time in the "turn

around" was the all-important consideration in getting the troops over,

the transports were sent back through the submarine zone under the

escort of armed yachts, and occasionally not escorted at all. Under

these conditions the transports could be attacked with much less risk,

as was shown by the fact that five were torpedoed, though of these

happily only three were sunk.

III

The position of the German naval chiefs, as is shown by the quotation

from General Ludendorff's book, was an extremely unhappy one. They had

blatantly promised the German people that their submarines would prevent

the transportation of American troops to Europe. At first they had

ridiculed the idea that undisciplined, unmilitary America could ever

organize an army; after we adopted conscription and began to train our

young men by the millions, they just as vehemently proclaimed that this

army could never be landed in Europe. In this opinion the German

military chieftains were not alone. No such army movement had ever

before been attempted. The discouraging forecast made by a brilliant

British naval authority in July, 1917, reflected the ideas of too many

military people on both sides of the ocean. "I am distressed," he said,

"at the fact that it appears to me to be impossible to provide enough

shipping to bring the American army over in hundreds of thousands to

France, and, after they are brought over, to supply the enormous amount

of shipping which will be required to keep them full up with munitions,

food, and equipment."

It is thus not surprising that the German people accepted as gospel the

promises of their Admiralty; therefore their anger was unbounded when

American troops began to arrive. The German newspapers began to ask the

most embarrassing questions. What had become of their submarines? Had

the German people not been promised that their U-boats would sink any

American troopships that attempted to cross the ocean? As the shipments

increased, and as the effect of these vigorous fresh young troops began

to be manifest upon the Western Front, the outcries in Germany waxed

even more fierce and abusive. Von Capelle and other German naval chiefs

made rambling speeches in the Reichstag, once more promising their

people that the submarines would certainly win the war--speeches that

were followed by ever-increasing arrivals of American soldiers in

France. The success of our transports led directly to the fall of Von

Capelle as Minister of Marine; his successor, Admiral von Mann, who was

evidently driven to desperation by the popular outburst, decided to make

one frantic attempt to attack our men. The new minister, of course, knew

that he could accomplish no definite results; but the sinking of even

one transport with several thousand troops on board would have had a

tremendous effect upon German _moral_. When the great British liner

_Justicia_ was torpedoed, the German Admiralty officially announced that

it was the _Leviathan_, filled with American soldiers; and the

jubilation which followed in the German press, and the subsequent

dejection when it was learned that this was a practically empty

transport, sailing westward, showed that an actual achievement of this

kind would have raised their drooping spirits. Admiral von Mann,

therefore, took several submarines away from the trade routes and sent

them into the transport zone. But they did not succeed even in attacking

a single east-bound troopship. The only result accomplished was the one

which, from what I have already said, would have been expected; the

removal of the submarines from the commercial lane caused a great fall

in the sinking of merchant ships. In August, 1918, these sinkings

amounted to 280,000 tons; in September and October, when this futile

drive was made at American transports, the sinkings fell to 190,000 and

110,000 tons.

Too much praise cannot be given to the commanders of our troop convoys

and the commanding officers of the troop transports, as well as the

commanders of the cruisers and battleships that escorted them from

America to the western edge of the submarine zone. The success of their

valuable services is evidence of a high degree not only of nautical

skill, judgment, and experience, but of the admirable seamanship

displayed under the very unusual conditions of steaming without lights

while continuously manoeuvring in close formation. Moreover, their

cordial co-operation with the escorts sent to meet them was everything

that could be desired. In this invaluable service these commanding

officers had the loyal and enthusiastic support of the admirable petty

officers and men whose initiative, energy, and devotion throughout the

war enabled us to accomplish results which were not only beyond our

expectations but which demonstrated that they are second to none in the

world in the qualities which make for success in war on the sea.

On the whole, the safeguarding of American soldiers on the ocean was an

achievement of the American navy. Great Britain provided a slightly

larger amount of tonnage for this purpose than the United States; but

about 82 per cent. of the escorting was done by our own forces. The

cruiser escorts across the ocean to France were almost entirely

American; and the destroyer escorts through the danger zone were

likewise nearly all our own work. And in performing this great feat the

American navy fulfilled its ultimate duty in the war. The transportation

of these American troops brought the great struggle to an end. On the

battlefield they acquitted themselves in a way that aroused the

admiration of their brothers in the naval service. When we were reading,

day by day, the story of their achievements, when we saw the German

battle lines draw nearer and nearer to the Rhine, and, finally, when the

German Government raised its hands in abject surrender, the eighteen

months' warfare against the German submarines, in which the American

navy had been privileged to play its part, appeared in its true

light--as one of the greatest victories against the organized forces of

evil in all history.

FOOTNOTE:

[8] These figures are taken from the Annual Report of the Secretary of

the Navy for 1919, page 207.

THE END

APPENDIX I

OFFICIAL AUTHORIZATION TO PUBLISH "THE VICTORY AT SEA"

U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

14 June 1919.

From: Rear-Admiral Wm. S. Sims, U.S. Navy.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Requests Permission to Publish a Book on the Activities of

the U.S. Navy during The Great War.

Reference (a): Paragraph 1534 of the Articles for the Government of

the Navy of the United States.

1. In accordance with the provisions of reference (a) I request

authority to publish in my name a book descriptive of the activities of

the U.S. Naval Forces operating in European waters during The Great War.

2. My object in preparing this book is to familiarize the American

people with the great work accomplished by the Navy during the war. It

will be a popular presentation written in a nontechnical style,

illustrated with photographs taken in Europe and various diagrams

indicating the nature of our activities.

[s] WM. S. SIMS.

9 July 1919.

APPROVED.

[s] Josephus Daniels.

HWS-MEF

2nd Indorsement.

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE,

Washington, D.C.

11 July 1919.

From: Director of Naval Intelligence.

To: President Naval War College.

1. Forwarded.

[s] A. P. NIBLACK.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, WASHINGTON

June 26, 1919.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL:

I am sending you in the regular official course my approval of your

plan to print and publish a book relative to the operations of the naval

forces under your command during the great war. I am happy that you are

going to undertake this, because I am sure it will be of great value to

the Navy and of interest to the world.

With sentiments of esteem and high regard,

Sincerely yours,

[s] JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

P.S.

Of course any facilities or assistance that the Navy Department can

render you will be at your disposal.

Rear-Admiral W. S. Sims, U.S.N.,

President Naval War College,

Newport, Rhode Island.

_Extract from Navy Regulations, 1913, Article 1534_

"(2) No person belonging to the Navy or employed under the Navy

Department shall publish or cause or permit to be published, directly or

indirectly, or communicate by interviews, private letters, or otherwise,

except as required by his official duties, any information in regard to

the foreign policy of the United States, or concerning the acts or

measures of any department of the Government or of any officer acting

thereunder, or any comments or criticisms thereon; or the text of any

official instructions, reports, or letters upon any subject whatever, or

furnish copies thereof to any person, without the express permission of

the Navy Department.

"(4) Nothing in this article shall be construed as prohibiting officers

from forwarding to the department, through official channels,

well-considered comment and suggestions with a view to promoting the

efficiency of the service and the public interests; on the contrary,

such suggestions are invited, but they should be in regard to things or

methods and not a criticism of persons, and should in all cases be

accompanied by a well-digested plan for improvement. Such suggestions,

if approved by the department, will be entered on the officer's record

and he will be duly notified to that effect."

APPENDIX II

FIRST CABLE MESSAGE TO WASHINGTON

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Sent April 14, 1917.

Through: State Department.

File No. 25-9-2.

The situation is as follows:

The submarine issue is very much more serious than the people realize in

America. The recent success of operations and the rapidity of

construction constitute the real crisis of the war. The _moral_ of the

enemy submarines is not broken, only about fifty-four are known to have

been captured or sunk and no voluntary surrenders have been recorded.

The reports of our press are greatly in error. Recent reports circulated

concerning surrenders are simply to depreciate enemy _moral_ and results

are [not] very satisfactory.

Supplies and communications of forces all fronts, including the

Russians, are threatened and control of the sea actually imperilled.

German submarines are constantly extending their operations into the

Atlantic, increasing areas and the difficulty of patrolling. Russian

situation critical. Baltic fleet mutiny, eighty-five admirals, captains,

and commanders murdered, and in some armies there is insubordination.

The amount of British, neutral and Allied shipping lost in February was

536,000 tons, in March, 517,000 tons, and in the first ten days of April

205,000 tons. With short nights and better weather these losses are

increasing.

The British forces could not effectively prevent the escape of some

raiders during the long nights, but the chances are better now.

The Allies were notified that hospital ships will continue to be sunk,

this in order to draw destroyers away from operations against submarines

to convoy hospital ships; in this way causing a large demand for large

convoy forces in all areas not before necessary, and also partially

immobilizing the main fleet.

On account of the immense theatre and the length and number of lines of

communication, and the material deterioration resulting from three

years' continuous operation in distant fields with inadequate base

facilities, the strength of the naval forces is dangerously strained.

This applies to all of the sea forces outside of the Grand Fleet. The

enemy has six large and sixty-four small submarine mine-layers; the

latter carry eighteen mines and the former thirty-four, also torpedoes

and guns. All classes submarines for actual commission completed at a

rate approaching three per week. To accelerate and insure defeat of the

submarine campaign immediate active co-operation absolutely necessary.

The issue is and must inevitably be decided at the focus of all lines of

communications in the Eastern Atlantic, therefore I very urgently

recommend the following immediate naval co-operation.

Maximum number of destroyers to be sent, accompanied by small

anti-submarine craft; the former to patrol designated high seas area

westward to Ireland, based on Queenstown, with an advance base at Bantry

Bay, latter to be an inshore patrol for destroyers: small craft should

be of light draft with as high speed as possible but low speed also

useful. Also repair ships and staff for base. Oil and docks are

available but I advise sending continuous supply of fuel. German main

fleet must be contained, demanding maximum conservation of the British

main fleet. South of Scotland no base is so far available for this

force.

At present our battleships can serve no useful purpose in this area,

except that two divisions of dreadnoughts might be based on Brest for

moral effect against anticipated raids by heavy enemy ships in the

channel out of reach of the British main fleet.

The chief other and urgent practical co-operation is merchant tonnage

and a continuous augmentation of anti-submarine craft to reinforce our

advanced forces. There is a serious shortage of the latter craft. For

towing the present large amount of sailing tonnage through dangerous

areas sea-going tugs would be of great use.

The co-operation outlined above should be expedited with the utmost

despatch in order to break the enemy submarine _moral_ and accelerate

the accomplishment of the chief American objective.

It is very likely the enemy will make submarine mine-laying raids on our

coast or in the Caribbean to divert attention and to keep our forces

from the critical areas in the Eastern Atlantic through effect upon

public opinion. The difficulty of maintaining submarine bases and the

focussing of shipping on this side will restrict such operations to

minor importance, although they should be effectively opposed,

principally by keeping the Channel swept on soundings. Enemy submarine

mines have been anchored as deep as ninety fathoms but majority at not

more than fifty fathoms. Mines do not rise from the bottom to set depth

until from twenty-four to forty-eight hours after they have been laid.

So far all experience shows that submarines never lay mines out of sight

of landmarks or lights on account of danger to themselves if location is

not known. Maximum augmentation merchant tonnage and anti-submarine work

where most effective constitute the paramount immediate necessity.

Mr. Hoover informs that there is only sufficient grain supply in this

country for three weeks. This does not include the supply in retail

stores. In a few days Mr. Hoover will sail for the United States.

SIMS.

APPENDIX III

FIRST DETAILED REPORT ON THE ALLIED NAVAL SITUATION

LONDON, ENGLAND.

April 19, 1917.

From: Rear-Admiral Wm. S. Sims, U.S.N.

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Confirmation and elaboration of recent cablegrams

concerning War situation and recommendations for U.S. Naval

co-operation.

1. _Reception_:

My reception in this country has been exceptionally cordial and

significant of the seriousness of present situation and the importance

to be attached to the United States' entry into the war.

I was met at Liverpool by Rear-Admiral Hope, R.N., a member of Admiral

Jellicoe's staff, and the Admiral of the Port, the former having been

sent by the Admiralty to escort me to London. A special train was

provided which made a record run, and within a few hours after arrival

in London I was received by the First Sea Lord and his principal

assistants in a special conference.

2. _Conferences_:

More or less hesitancy was noted at first in presenting a full statement

of the true situation, particularly (as it developed later) on account

of its seriousness, combined with a natural reluctance against appearing

to seek assistance, and a hesitancy in taking chances of allowing

information indirectly to reach the enemy, and thereby improve enemy

_moral_.

I therefore positively took the position that I must be considered a

part of the Admiralty organization, and that it was essential to safe

and efficient co-operation that I be trusted with a full knowledge of

the exact situation.

They finally consented, only after reference to the Imperial War

Council, to my exposing the true state of affairs both as regards the

military situation and rate of destruction of merchant shipping.

I have had daily conferences with the First Sea Lord, both at his office

and residence, and also have been given entire freedom of the Admiralty

and access to all Government Officials. I have freely consulted with

such officials as the following:

Prime Minister.

First Lord of Admiralty (Sir Edward Carson).

Ministers of Munitions, Shipping, Trade, and other Cabinet officials.

First Sea Lord, and his assistants.

Chief of Naval Staff.

Directors (corresponding to our Chiefs of Bureaus) of Intelligence,

Anti-submarine operations, Torpedoes, Mines, Mining, etc.

3. _General Statement of the Situation_:

Since the last declaration of the enemy Government, which from

intelligence information was anticipated, the submarine campaign against

merchant shipping of all Nations has resolved itself into the real issue

of the war and, stated briefly, the Allied Governments have not been

able to, and are not now, effectively meeting the situation presented.

4. As stated in my first despatch, the communications and supplies to

all forces on all fronts, including Russian, are threatened, and the

"Command of the Sea" is actually at stake.

5. My own views of the seriousness of the situation and the submarine

menace have been greatly altered. My convictions and opinions, as

probably those of the Department also, had been largely based upon Press

reports and reports of our Attaches and other professional Americans who

have been abroad during the War. All of this information has been either

rigidly censored or else has been given out in such form that it would

be of minimum assistance to enemy _moral_.

6. The necessity for secrecy, which the British Government has

experienced, and which I repeatedly encounter in London, and even in the

Admiralty itself, is impressive. There have been remarkable and

unexpected leakages of information throughout the war. Certain neutral

legations of smaller countries are now under strong suspicion.

7. The extent to which the submarine campaign is being waged is in

itself excellent evidence of the importance attached to it by the enemy,

and of the degree to which they counted, and still are counting, upon

it.

The Intelligence Department has reliable information (as reliable as can

be) that the enemy really reckoned that the Allies would be defeated in

_two_ months through shortage of supplies.

8. With improved weather and the shorter nights now coming on we may

expect even more enemy submarine success.

9. The Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet was yesterday in conference

in the Admiralty as to what greater extent destroyers and auxiliaries of

the Fleet may be utilized without endangering its power in the remote

possibility of another fleet engagement.

The consensus of opinion seems to be that the latter will not occur, but

there is not complete unanimity in this belief, and of course, in any

case, the possibility must be adequately and continuously provided

against.

_General discussion of situation_:

10. I delayed [four days] forwarding my first report of the situation

with a view of obtaining the maximum information consistent with the

importance of the time element. I was also somewhat deterred by a

natural reluctance to alter so radically my preconceived views and

opinions as to the situation.

11. The evidence is conclusive that, regardless of any enemy diversions

such as raids on our coasts or elsewhere, the critical area in which the

war's decision will be made is in the eastern Atlantic at the focus of

all lines of communications.

The known number of enemy submarines and their rate of construction,

allowing liberal factors for errors of information, renders it

inevitable that the main submarine effort must continue to be

concentrated in the above critical area.

12. Even in this critical area, it is manifest that the field is

relatively large for the maximum number of submarines which the enemy

can maintain in it. For example, with the present Admiralty policy

(explained below) they are forced to cover all the possible trade routes

of approach between the north of Scotland and Ushant.

13. From consideration of the above and all other essential information

available, it is apparent that the enemy could not disperse his main

submarine campaign into other quarters of the Globe without diminishing

results in this and all areas to a degree which would mean failure to

accomplish the Mission of the submarine campaign, which can be nothing

else than a final decision of the war.

14. Considerable criticism has been, and still is, concentrated upon the

Admiralty for not taking more effective steps and for failing to produce

more substantial and visible results. One of the principal demands is

for convoys of merchant shipping, and more definite and real protection

within the war zone.

The answer, which manifestly is not publicly known, is simply that the

necessary vessels are not available, and further that those which are

available are suffering from the effects of three years of arduous

service.

15. It is insistently asked (was asked by myself) why shipping is not

directed to and concentrated at various rendezvous and from these

convoyed through the dangerous areas. The answer is the same--the area

is too large; the necessary vessels are not available.

16. However, I am now consulting with the Director of Shipping as to the

practicability and advisability of attempting some approach to such a

plan in case the United States is able to put in operation sufficient

tonnage to warrant it.

17. After trying various methods of controlling shipping, the Admiralty

now believes the best policy to be one of dispersion. They use about six

relatively large avenues or arcs of approach to the United Kingdom and

Channel, changing their limits or area periodically if necessity

demands.

Generally speaking, one is to the north of Scotland, another to the

north of Ireland, and three or four others covering the Irish Sea and

Channel. Individual ships coming into any of these areas of approach are

instructed, generally before sailing, to cross the twentieth meridian at

certain and different latitudes and thence steer certain courses to

port.

At times in the past they have found one of these avenues of approach

free of submarines under such conditions as to lead them to concentrate

shipping therein, but invariably the enemy has become aware of the

course pursued.

18. The great difficulty in any method of shipping control is

communication with the shipping itself and full co-operation by the

merchant personnel. The moment a ship is captured the code either

becomes dangerous or useless. The merchant code is being continually

changed, and at all times it cannot be counted upon for more than a

fortnight. The immense difficulty of changing the code and keeping

shipping all over the world in touch with changes is apparent.

19. Continual trouble is experienced with some merchant Captains taking

the law into their own hands and exhibiting contempt, or at least

indifference, for Admiralty instructions. The American Liner _New York_

upon which I took passage furnishes a typical example. She was

instructed to make Fastnet Light at daylight but she passed it about

nine P.M., thus passing in daylight through the most dangerous

area.

20. The Admiralty has had frequent conferences with Merchant masters and

sought their advice. Their most unanimous demand is "Give us a gun and

let us look out for ourselves." They are also insistent that it is

impracticable for merchant vessels to proceed in formation, at least in

any considerable numbers, due principally to difficulty in controlling

their speed and to the inexperience of their subordinate officers. With

this view I do not personally agree but believe that with a little

experience merchant vessels could safely and sufficiently well steam in

open formations.

21. The best protection against the submarine menace for all classes of

ships, merchant as well as Naval, is SPEED and ZIGZAGGING, not more than

fifteen minutes on a course. Upon this point no one disagrees, but on

the contrary there is absolutely unanimity of opinion.

22. In the absence of adequate patrol craft, _particularly destroyers_,

and until the enemy submarine _moral_ is broken, there is but one sure

method of meeting the submarine issue upon which there is also complete

unanimity--increased number of merchant bottoms, preferably small.

"More Ships! More Ships! More Ships!" is heard on every hand.

23. It is also significant that until very recently the Admiralty have

been unable completely to convince some members of the Cabinet that the

submarine issue is the deciding factor in the War. The civilian mind,

here as at home, is loath to believe in unseen dangers, particularly

until the pinch is felt in real physical ways.

24. The Prime Minister only two days ago expressed to me the opinion

that it ought to be possible to find physical means of absolutely

sealing up all escape for submarines from their own ports. The fact that

all such methods (nets, mines, obstructions, etc.) inherently involve

the added necessity of continuous protection and maintenance by our own

Naval forces is seldom understood and appreciated. I finally convinced

the Prime Minister of the fallacy of such propositions by describing the

situations into which we would be led: namely, that in order to maintain

our obstructions we would have to match the forces the enemy brought

against them, until finally the majority if not all of our forces would

be forced into dangerous areas where they would be subject to continual

torpedo and other attack, in fact in a position most favourable to the

enemy.

25. Entirely outside of the fact that the enemy does, and always can,

force exits, and thereby nullify the close blockade, the weather is a

serious added difficulty. The heaviest anchors obtainable have been used

for nets, mines, and obstructions, only to have the arduous work of

weeks swept away in a few hours of heavy weather. Moorings will not

hold. They chafe through. In this respect we could be of great

assistance, i.e. in supply of moorings and buoys.

26. The Channel is not now, and never has been, completely sealed

against submarine egress, let alone the vaster areas of escape to the

north. Submarines have gone under mine-fields, and have succeeded in

unknown ways in evading and cutting through nets and obstructions.

27. In addition to submarines, heavy forces are free to raid, and in

fact escape through, the Channel at any time when the enemy decides that

the necessity or return will justify the risk. Hence the suggestion that

two divisions of our fast Dreadnoughts might be based upon Brest,

primarily for the resulting moral effect against such possible raids.

I was told yesterday by an important Admiralty official that while he

thought the chances of raids in, or escape through, the Channel by heavy

enemy forces out of reach of the Grand Fleet (North of Scotland) were

very remote, nevertheless the possibility existed and was principally

thwarted on moral grounds, that is, the uncertainty in his mind of the

opposition which would be encountered. He agreed with others, including

the First Sea Lord, that the addition of some of our heavy forces to

those maintained in southern Channel approaches by the French and

British would undoubtedly entirely preclude the possibility of such

raids.

28. _Submarine Losses_:

It has been found necessary to accept _no_ reports of submarine losses

as authentic and certain unless survivors are captured or the submarine

itself is definitely located by dragging. No dependence even is placed

upon evidence of oil on the surface after a submarine has been attacked

and forced down, as there is reason to believe that when an enemy

submarine dives to escape gunfire she is fitted to expel oil for the

particular purpose of conveying the impression that she has been sunk

and thereby avoid further pursuit. It has been shown that the amount of

damage a submarine can stand is surprising and much more than was

anticipated before the experience of the war. Upon a recent occasion a

British submarine was mistaken for an enemy and though struck by several

shells, dived and escaped to port.

The submarine losses which are certain since outbreak of war are as

given in attached cablegram.

It is estimated that between thirty and forty submarines operate at a

time in the waters surrounding the British Islands and French Coast. At

least one is now known to be on White Sea trade lanes.

29. _Best anti-submarine weapons_:

One of the most efficient weapons now used by all destroyers and patrol

craft against submarines is the so-called "Depth Charge," sample and

drawings of which have been forwarded by our Naval Attache. These are

merely explosive charges designed to explode at a certain depth,

formerly eighty feet, now about one hundred feet. They are dropped

overboard where a submarine that has submerged is assumed to be and are

counted upon to badly shake up and demoralize if they do not actually

cause serious damage.

Howitzers and Bomb-throwers of large calibre are under construction,

designed to throw similar depth charges to distances of about 2,000

yards. Details will be forwarded.

30. _Torpedo Protection_:

This subject may be summed up by the statement of the Captain of a

British Dreadnought who said in effect that after a year's experience he

did not fear being sunk by a torpedo. Unless struck by several the worst

to be anticipated is damage to shafts or rudder, thus necessitating

towing. Cruisers have often been struck and been able to reach port.

Vital water-tight doors are kept continuously closed at sea.

Destroyer officers have been heard to express the curious opinion that

the enemy ships were more or less unsinkable. This is probably to be

explained by the fact that they carry very few supplies; that they have

their storage spaces compartmented or filled with wood or other

water-excluding material; and that when in port, they quarter their

crews in barracks, and when leaving for a cruise carry the minimum

amount of berthing and supply facilities. These points, however, are not

positively known.

On the contrary, all vessels of the British Fleet must be kept fully

supplied and fuelled at all times for extended cruising. This is

particularly true of Battle-cruisers and Cruisers.

31. All officers of rank and actual experience consulted are convinced

that the enemy have no unusual methods of protection, or in fact any

"surprises" in ordnance or other fighting equipment.

32. All are agreed that the best protection against torpedoes is SPEED

and ZIGZAGGING.

33. It is a common experience of the Naval as well as Merchant service

that torpedo wakes are reported where none exist. Many reports are

received of torpedoes barely missing ships. This was true in the Jutland

Battle. The Captain on one Battleship said that he received numerous

reports of torpedoes passing just ahead and just astern, nearly all of

which he had reason to believe did not exist.

Streaks of suds, slicks, etc., are very deceiving and are easily

mistaken for torpedo wakes, particularly when the danger of torpedoes is

present. This accounts for many reports by passengers on liners and

other merchant craft of seeing many torpedoes just miss their mark.

34. _Submarine versus Submarine_:

There has always been opposition to using submarines against submarines,

principally on the grounds that the possibilities of their

accomplishments would not be sufficiently great to justify the risk

involved of mistaken identity and resulting damage to friends.

The Director of Anti-Submarine Warfare believes, however, that such

operations promise well, and the experiment is now being tried with as

many submarines as can be spared from the Grand Fleet. Some enemy

submarines have been destroyed by this method, usually torpedoed. One

valuable feature of this method lies in the fact that as long as our

submarines are not so used, the enemy submarine is always perfectly safe

in assuming that all submarines sighted are friends. If this certainty

is removed the enemy will be forced to keep down more, and to take much

greater precautions against detection. This is an advantage of no small

account.

In addition to the possible offensive work that may be accomplished by

our submarines on such duty, the plan furnishes us with more reliable

information as to the limitations and capabilities of enemy vessels

under the actual conditions existing in the areas in which they operate.

Without this knowledge based on actual experience too much is left to

conjecture which is liable to lead to a great deal of misdirected

effort.

(Signed) WM. S. SIMS.

APPENDIX IV

THE QUESTION OF ARMING MERCHANT SHIPS

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Through Admiralty. From Queenstown.

Sent: June 28, 1917.

Admiralty for Secretary Navy Washington, providing it meets

Admiralty's full approval.

From Admiral Sims.

Referring to Department's opinion, reported in last two cables, to the

effect that adequate armament and trained crews constitute one of the

most effective defensive anti-submarine measures, I again submit with

all possible stress the following based on extended [Allied] war

experience. The measures demanded, if enemy defeat in time is to be

assured, are not defensive but offensive defensive. The merchantman's

inherent weakness is lack of speed and protection. Guns are no defence

against torpedo attack without warning, which is necessarily the enemy

method of attack against armed ships. In this area alone during the last

six weeks thirty armed ships were sunk by torpedoes without submarine

being seen, although three of these were escorted each by a single

destroyer. The result would of course have been the same no matter how

many guns these ships carried or what their calibre. Three mystery

ships, heavily manned by expert naval crews with much previous

experience with submarine attack, have recently been torpedoed without

warning. Another case within the month of mystery ship engaging

submarine with gunfire at six thousand yards but submarine submerged and

approached unseen and torpedoed ship at close range. The ineffectiveness

of heaviest batteries against submarine attack is conclusively shown by

Admiralty's practice always sending destroyers to escort their

men-of-war. The comparative immunity of the relatively small number

American ships, especially liners, is believed here to be due to the

enemy's hopes that the pacifist movement will succeed. Cases are on

record of submarines making successful gun attacks from advantageous sun

position against armed ships without ship being able to see submarine.

I submit that if submarine campaign is to be defeated it must be by

offensive measures. The enemy submarine mission must be destruction of

shipping and avoidance of anti-submarine craft. Enemy submarines are now

using for their final approach an auxiliary periscope less than two

inches in diameter. This information just acquired. All of the

experience in this submarine campaign to date demonstrates that it would

be a seriously dangerous misapprehension to base our action on the

assumption that any armament on merchantmen is any protection against

submarines which are willing to use their torpedoes. The British have

now definitely decided the adoption, to the maximum practicable extent,

convoys from sixteen to twenty ships. This is an offensive measure

against submarines, as the latter will be subject to the attack of our

anti-submarine craft whenever they come within torpedoing distance of

convoyed merchantmen. Moreover it permits of concentrated attack by our

forces and obliges the enemy to disperse his forces to cover the various

routes of approach.

Concerning Department's reference to a scheme for protection of merchant

shipping which will not interfere with present escort duties, I submit

that the time element alone prevents utilization of any new

anti-submarine invention. The campaign may easily be lost before any

such schemes can come into effective operation. The enemy is certainly

counting on maximum effort being exerted before long nights and bad

weather of autumn, that is, in next three months. Heaviest effort may be

anticipated in July and August. I again submit that protection of our

coastlines and of Allied shipping must necessarily be carried out in

field of enemy activity if it is to be effective. The mission of the

Allies must be to force submarines to give battle. Hence no operations

in home waters should take precedence over, or be allowed to diminish,

the maximum effort we can exert in area in which enemy is operating, and

must continue to operate in order to succeed.

SIMS.

APPENDIX V

THE ADVANTAGES OF THE CONVOY SYSTEM

LONDON,

June 29, 1917.

From: Commander U.S. Naval Forces operating in European Waters.

To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).

Subject: General report concerning military situation.

1. I feel that there is little to add to my recent cable despatches

which, in view of the importance of the time element, have been made

full and detailed.

2. To sum up my despatches briefly, I would repeat that I consider that

the military situation is very grave indeed on account of the success of

the enemy submarine campaign.

If the shipping losses continue as they have during the past four

months, it is submitted that the Allies will be forced to dire straits

indeed, if they will not actually be forced into an unsatisfactory

peace.

The present rate of destruction is very much greater than the rate of

building, and the shortage of tonnage is already so great that the

efficiency of the naval forces is already reduced by lack of oil. Orders

have just been given to use three-fifths speed, except in cases of

emergency. This simply means that the enemy is winning the war.

3. My reasons for being so insistent in my cable despatches have been

because of my conviction that measures of co-operation which we may take

will be inefficient if they are not put into operation immediately, that

is, within a month.

There is every reason to believe that the maximum enemy submarine effort

will occur between now and the first of November, reaching its height

probably during the latter part of July, if not earlier.

4. There is certainly no sovereign solution for the submarine menace

except through well-established methods of warfare based upon

fundamental military principles.

5. It is submitted that the cardinal military principle of

concentration of effort is at present being pursued by the enemy and

not by the Allies.

6. We are dispersing our forces while the enemy is concentrating his.

The enemy's submarine mission is and must continue to be the destruction

of merchant shipping. The limitations of submarines and the distances

over which they must operate prevent them from attacking our naval

forces, that is, anti-submarine craft. They cannot afford to engage

anti-submarine craft with guns; they must use torpedoes. If they should

do so to any considerable extent their limited supply would greatly

reduce their period of operation away from base, and the number of

merchantmen they could destroy. Their object is to avoid contact with

anti-submarine craft. This they can almost always do, as the submarine

can see the surface craft at many times the distance the surface craft

can see a periscope, particularly one less than two inches in diameter.

Moreover, the submarine greatly fears the anti-submarine craft because

of the great danger of the depth charges. Our tactics should therefore

be such as to force the submarine to incur this danger in order to get

within range of merchantmen.

7. It therefore seems to go without question that the only course for us

to pursue is to revert to the ancient practice of convoy. This will be

purely an offensive measure, because if we concentrate our shipping into

convoys and protect it with our naval forces we will thereby force the

enemy, in order to carry out his mission, to encounter naval forces

which are not embarrassed with valuable cargoes, and which are a great

danger to the submarine. At present our naval forces are wearing down

their personnel and material in an attempted combination of escorting

single ships, when they can be picked up, and also of attempting to seek

and offensively engage an enemy whose object is to avoid such

encounters. With the convoy system the conditions will be reversed.

Although the enemy may easily know when our convoys sail, he can never

know the course they will pursue or the route of approach to their

destinations. Our escorting forces will thus be able to work on a

deliberate prearranged plan, preserving their oil supplies and energy,

while the enemy will be forced to disperse his forces and seek us. In a

word, the handicap we now labour under will be shifted to the enemy; we

will have adopted the essential principal of concentration while the

enemy will lose it.

8. The most careful and thorough study of the convoy system made by the

British Admiralty shows clearly that while we may have some losses under

this system, owing to lack of adequate number of anti-submarine craft,

they nevertheless will not be critical as they are at present.

9. I again submit that if the Allied campaign is to be viewed as a

whole, there is no necessity for any high sea protection on our own

coast. The submarine as a type of war vessel possesses no unusual

characteristics different from those of other naval craft, with the

single exception of its ability to submerge for a limited time. The

difficulty of maintaining distant bases is the same for the submarine as

it is for other craft. As long as we maintain control of the sea as far

as surface craft are concerned, there can be no fear of the enemy

establishing submarine bases in the Western Hemisphere.