[32] "Sir Henry Loch (with whom I had two long private interviews alone)

asked me some very pointed questions, such as what arms we had in

Johannesburg, whether the population could hold the place for six days

until help could arrive, etc., etc., and stated plainly that if there

had been three thousand rifles and ammunition here he would certainly

have come over."

And so on in the same strain. Sir Henry Loch endorsed the truth of these

statements two years later by boasting openly in the House of Lords

about his plans for organising a raid into the South African Republic.

And all this happened while he (Sir Henry Loch) was the guest of our

Government, and engaged in friendly negotiations about the interests of

British subjects. To what a depth had British Policy in South Africa

already degenerated. Within two years, however, a deeper abyss was to

open.

[Sidenote: The conspiracy.]

The secret conspiracy of the Capitalists and Jingoes to overthrow the

South African Republic began now to gain ground with great rapidity, for

just at this critical period Mr. Chamberlain became Secretary of State

for the Colonies. In the secret correspondence of the conspirators,

reference is continually made to the Colonial Office in a manner which,

taken in connection with later revelations and with a successful

suppression of the truth, has deepened the impression over the whole

world that the Colonial Office was privy to, if not an accomplice in,

the villainous attack on the South African Republic.

[Sidenote: The Jameson Raid]

It is unnecessary to dwell at length on the Jameson Raid; the world has

not yet forgotten how the Administrators of a British province, carrying

out a conspiracy headed by the Prime Minister of the Cape Colony,

attacked the South African Republic with an armed band in order to

assist the Capitalist revolution of Johannesburg in overthrowing the

Boer Government; how this raid and this revolution were upset by the

vigilance of the Boers; how Jameson and his filibusters were handed over

to England to stand their trial--although the Boers had the power and

the right to shoot them down as robbers; how the whole gang of

Johannesburg Capitalists pleaded guilty to treason and sedition; how,

instead of confiscating all their property, and thus dealing a death

blow to Capitalistic influence in South Africa, the Government dealt

most leniently with them (an act of magnanimity which was rewarded by

their aiding and abetting a still more dangerous agitation three years

later).

[Sidenote: The Parliamentary Commission.]

Nor has the world forgotten how, at the urgent instance of the

Africander party in the Cape Colony, an investigation into the causes of

the conflict was held in Westminster; how that investigation degenerated

into a low attack upon the Government of the sorely maligned and deeply

injured South African Republic, and how at the last moment, when the

truth was on the point of being revealed, and the conspiracy traced to

its fountain head in the British Cabinet, the Commission decided all of

a sudden not to make certain compromising documents public.

[Sidenote: "Constitutional means."]

Here we see to what a depth the old great traditions of British

Constitutionalism had sunk under the influence of the ever-increasing

and all-absorbing lust of gold, and in the hands of a sharp-witted

wholesale dealer, who, like Cleon of old, has constituted himself a

statesman. Treachery and violence not having been able to attain their

objects, "Constitutional means" were to be invoked (as Mr. Rhodes openly

boasted before the aforesaid Commission), so as to make Capitalistic

Jingoism master of the situation in South Africa.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 29: Olive Schreiner, _Words in Season_, page 62.]

[Footnote 30: Transvaal Green Book No. 1 of 1896.]

[Footnote 31: Transvaal Green Book No. 1 of 1896.]

[Footnote 32: Transvaal Green Book No. 1 of 1896.]

CAPITALISTIC JINGOISM.

SECOND PERIOD.

[Sidenote: National sentiment in South Africa kindled by the Jameson

Raid.]

The foregoing sketch has shown how deeply our people felt and resented

the wrong that was done to them. It was to be expected that such a

treacherous attack on the Republics, emanating from their own leader,

would awaken the Africanders even in the remotest districts, and would

bring fresh energy into the arena of politics. To give an instance of

the measure of the feeling which had been quickened by the raid, a short

extract is given below from an article published in the organ of the

Africander party, _Our Land_, a few months after the Raid, an article

which undoubtedly expressed the feeling of Africanders:--

"Has not Providence over-ruled and guided the painful course of events

in South Africa since the beginning of this year (1896)? Who can doubt

it?

"The stab which was intended to paralyse Africanderdom once and for all

in the Republics has sent an electric thrill direct to the national

heart. Africanderdom has awakened to a sense of earnestness and

consciousness which we have not observed since the heroic war for

Liberty in 1881. From the Limpopo as far as Cape Town the Second Majuba

has given birth to a new inspiration and a new movement amongst our

people in South Africa. A new feeling has rushed in huge billows over

South Africa. The flaccid and cowardly Imperialism, that had already

begun to dilute and weaken our national blood, gradually turned aside

before the new current which permeated our people. Many who, tired of

the slow development of the national idea, had resigned themselves to

Imperialism now paused and asked themselves what Imperialism had

produced in South Africa? Bitterness and race hatred it is true! Since

the days of Sir Harry Smith and Theophilus Shepstone and Bartle Frere to

the days of Leander Jameson and Cecil Rhodes, Imperialism in South

Africa has gone hand in hand with bloodshed and fraud. However wholesome

the effects of Imperialism may be elsewhere, its continual tendency in

this country during all these years has been nothing else but an attempt

to force our national life and national character into foreign grooves;

and to seal this pressure with blood and tears.... This is truly a

critical moment in the existence of Africanderdom all over South Africa.

Now or never! Now or never the foundation of a wide-embracing

nationalism must be laid. The Iron is red hot, and the time for forging

is at hand....

... The partition wall has disappeared. Let us stand manfully by one

another. The danger has not yet disappeared; on the contrary, never has

the necessity for a policy of a Colonial and Republican Union been

greater; now the psychological moment has arrived; now our people have

awakened all over South Africa; a new glow illuminates our hearts; let

us now lay the foundation stone of a real United South Africa on the

soil of a pure and _all-comprehensive national sentiment_."

Such language caused the Jingoes to shudder--not because it was

disloyal, because that it certainly was _not_, but because it proved

that the Jameson Raid had suddenly awakened the Africanders, and that

owing to this defeat of the Jingoes a vista of further and greater

defeats widened out in the future. The Colonial Africanders would

certainly have to be reckoned with, in case an annexation policy were

followed with regard to the Republics.

[Sidenote: Victory of the Africander Party in the Cape Parliament.]

For some time the Jingoes cherished the hope that they would gain the

majority in the Cape Parliament under an amended Redistribution Act. The

General Election of 1898 took place, with the result that the Africander

party obtained a small majority, and later, under a Redistribution Act

forced upon them by the Jingoes, the majority of the former was

considerably increased.

[Sidenote: The cry of disloyalty]

Instead of honestly admitting that the Africander victory was the

natural result of the Jameson Raid, the Jingoes began, not only in South

Africa, but also in England, to shout that the rule and supremacy of

England in South Africa was menaced.

[Sidenote: The Transvaal must be humiliated.]

They contended that South Africa would be lost to England unless

energetic intervention took place without delay, and that this menace to

English rule was due to the Republican propaganda which the South

African Republic had set in motion. That as long as the South African

Republic refused to humiliate itself before British authority, but on

the contrary kept its youthful head on high with national pride, other

parts of South Africa would be inclined to follow its example, and there

would thus be no certainty for British supremacy in this quarter of the

globe. The South African Republic would have to be humiliated and to be

crushed into the dust; the Africanders in other parts of South Africa

would then abandon their alleged hope of a more extensive Republican

South Africa.

[Sidenote: The necessity for constitutional means.]

But how was this humiliation to be brought about, and how, above all,

was it to be brought about by those "Constitutional means," which, since

the failure of the conspiracy, had become a _sine qua non_?

The new Governor of the Cape Colony and High Commissioner of South

Africa, who had enjoyed the distinction of a brilliant university

career, who had learnt humility and moderation at the feet of Mr. W.T.

Stead, and who had learnt by his experience with the fellaheen in Egypt

how to govern the descendants of the Huguenots and the "Beggars of the

Sea," would know very well how to evolve "Constitutional means" in order

to humiliate the South African Republic, and to crush it into the dust.

[Sidenote: The suzerainty.]

There was at any rate the burning question of suzerainty, which the

South African Republic had unconsciously and innocently raised in the

following way:--

After the Jameson Raid the Volksraad had passed certain laws with a view

of removing some of the causes of that movement, as, for example, the

law by which dangerous individuals could be expelled from the State, and

the law by which paupers and people suffering from contagious diseases

could be prevented from entering the Republic.[33] These laws were

declared to be in conflict with Article XIV. of the London Convention.

Violations of Article IV. were also said to have taken place in regard

to certain extradition and other treaties, which had been concluded

between the South African Republic and Foreign Powers.[34] On the 7th

May, 1897, the Government of the South African Republic dispatched a

very important reply to these accusations, in which, after fully stating

the reasons why the Government differed from Her Majesty's Government,

an appeal was made for arbitration as being the most suitable method of

settling the dispute.

This appeal was couched in the following language:

[Sidenote: The appeal for Arbitration.]

[35] "While it respects the opinion of Her British Majesty's Government,

it takes the liberty, with full confidence in the correctness of its own

views, to propose to Her British Majesty's Government the principle of

Arbitration, with which the honourable the First Volksraad agreed, in

the hope that it will be taken in the conciliatory spirit in which it is

made. It considers that it has every reason for this proposal, the more

so because the principle of Arbitration is already laid down in that

Convention in the only case in which, according to its opinion at the

time, a difference could be foreseen, to wit, with regard to Article I.;

because it has already been proposed by Her British Majesty's

Government, and accepted by this Government with regard to the

difference in respect of Article 14 of the Convention arising in the

matter of the so-called Coolie question, which was settled by

Arbitration; because the Right Honourable the Secretary of State, Mr.

Chamberlain, himself, in his letter of the 4th September, 1895, to His

Excellency the High Commissioner at Cape Town, favours this principle in

the same question, where he says: 'After 1886, as time went on, the

manner in which the law was interpreted and was worked, or was proposed

to be worked, gave rise to complaints on the part of the British

Government, and as it seemed impossible to come to an agreement by means

of correspondence, the Marquis of Ripon took what is the approved course

in such cases, of proposing to the South African Republic that the

dispute should be referred to Arbitration. This was agreed to ...,'

because the principle of Arbitration in matters such as this appears to

the Government to be the most impartial, just, and most satisfactory way

out of the existing difficulty, and, lastly, because one of the parties

to a Convention, according to all principles of reasonableness, cannot

expect that his interpretation will be respected by the other party as

the only valid and correct one. And although this Government is firmly

convinced that a just and impartial decision might be obtained even

better in South Africa than anywhere else, it wishes, in view of the

conflicting elements, interests, and aspirations which are now apparent

in South Africa, and in order to avoid even the appearance that it would

be able or desire to exercise influence in order to obtain a decision

favourable to it, to propose that the President of the Swiss Bondstate,

who may be reckoned upon as standing altogether outside the question,

and to feel sympathy or antipathy neither for the one party nor for the

other, be requested to point out a competent jurist, as has already

often been done in respect of international disputes. The Government

would have no objection that the Arbitration be subject to a limitation

of time, and gives the assurance now already that it will willingly

subject itself to any decision if such should, contrary to its

expectation, be given against it. The Government repeats the well-meant

wish that this proposal may find favour with Her British Majesty's

Government; and inasmuch as the allegations of breaches of the

Convention find entrance now even in South Africa, and bring and keep

the feelings more and more in a state of suspense, this Government will

be pleased if it can learn the decision of Her British Majesty's

Government as soon as possible."

[Sidenote: England refuses to arbitrate on ground of suzerainty.]

To this the British Government replied that according to the Convention

of 1884, taken in conjunction with the preamble of the Convention of

1881, the South African Republic was under the suzerainty of Her

Majesty, and that it was incompatible with the subordinate position of

the South African Republic to submit to Arbitration any matters in

dispute as to the construction of the Convention between it and the

suzerain Power.

In order to avoid any misunderstanding as to this very remarkable

document, the exact wording of the British dispatch is

given:--[36] "Finally, the Government of the South African Republic

propose that all points in dispute between Her Majesty's Government and

themselves relating to the Convention should be referred to Arbitration,

the Arbitrator to be nominated by the President of the Swiss Republic.

In making this proposal the Government of the South African Republic

appear to have overlooked the distinction between the Conventions of

1881 and 1884 and an ordinary treaty between two independent Powers,

questions arising upon which may properly be the subject of Arbitration.

By the Pretoria Convention of 1881 Her Majesty, as Sovereign of the

Transvaal Territory, accorded to the inhabitants of that territory

complete self-government, subject to the suzerainty of Her Majesty, her

heirs, and successors, upon certain terms and conditions, and subject to

certain reservations and limitations set forth in 33 articles; and by

the London Convention of 1884, Her Majesty, while maintaining the

preamble of the earlier instrument, directed and declared that certain

other articles embodied therein should be substituted for the articles

embodied in the Convention of 1881. The articles of the Convention of

1881 were accepted by the Volksraad of the Transvaal State, and those of

the Convention of 1884 by the Volksraad of the South African Republic.

Under these Conventions, therefore, Her Majesty holds towards the South

African Republic the relation of a _suzerain_ who has accorded to the

people of that Republic self-government upon certain conditions, _and it

would be incompatible with that position to submit to Arbitration the

construction of the conditions on which she accorded self-government to

the Republic_."

[Sidenote: Reply of the Transvaal Government.]

[37] In its celebrated reply of the 16th April, 1898, the Government of

the South African Republic proved with unanswerable force that the

preamble of the Convention of 1881 had been abolished, that Lord Derby

had himself in 1884 proposed a draft Convention, in which the preamble

was erased (see Appendix B.), and that by the ultimate acceptance of

that proposal, the suzerainty had ceased to exist.

On this account, as well as for other reasons, it contended that as no

suzerainty existed between the two countries, the objection to

Arbitration as a means of settling disputes would disappear, and the

Government reiterated their appeal to have such differences or disputes

disposed of by Arbitration.

[Sidenote: The object of the suzerainty dispute.]

Naturally this was exactly what Mr. Chamberlain did not want. He was

opposed to Arbitration dispute, because it would have probably led to

the humiliation of the British and not of the Boer Government. The

suzerainty question was introduced in the meanwhile as a "Constitutional

Proposal," which might be used for the purpose of humiliating the South

African Republic.

In his answer to the arguments put forward by the South African

Republic,[38] Mr. Chamberlain could only persist in repeating his

contention that suzerainty still existed, and did not even attempt to

refute the statement that Lord Derby had himself erased the preamble of

the Convention of 1881. It was clearly his opinion that Lord Derby had,

through stupidity and thoughtlessness, abandoned the suzerainty in

1884, just as Lord Russell had abandoned the idea of obtaining the

South African Republic in 1852, so that he would now, just as Shepstone

in 1877, have to try and disconcert the Republic by a display of force

and inflexible determination, so as not to be deprived of these

eminently "Constitutional means."

[Sidenote: The Transvaal a sovereign international state.]

[39] His arguments in this dispatch, that both the suzerainty of Her

Majesty and the right of the South African Republic to self-government

were dependent upon the preamble of the Pretoria Convention, and that if

the preamble were null and void, not only would the suzerainty but also

the right to self-government disappear, were clearly designed to

intimidate the South African Republic; but in other respects the

argument was perfectly correct. Accordingly the Government of the South

African Republic replied that it did not base its claim to

self-government on the preamble of the Convention of 1881, nor on the

Convention of 1884 (for no mention is made of self-government in that

document), but simply on the ground of its being a sovereign

international state.

In other words, it contended that the Convention of London implied that

the South African Republic was a sovereign international state, and that

it was therefore superfluous in that Convention to specify or define its

rights. Into this answer, which is not only juridically and historically

correct, but which rests on the basis of common sense, the astute High

Commissioner was able to read a menace to Her Majesty's Government,

although the Government of the Republic distinctly stated in that reply

that it adhered to the Convention of London, an assurance which it had

already made hundreds of times.

[Sidenote: Justice of the Transvaal contention.]

This is the whole history of the suzerainty dispute between the two

Governments. The South African Republic had asked for arbitration on

certain questions, and England, with Mr. Chamberlain as spokesman, had

refused, because a suzerain Power could not be expected to settle

disputes with its vassal by means of arbitration. So that according to

the new principles of International Law, based on the "screw" ethics of

Birmingham, it was to be judge and jury in its own disputes with other

people.

The position taken up by our Government in this remarkable controversy

is substantiated by the actions of Lord Derby during the negotiations

about the Conventions, as well as by the following telegram, which he

sent to the High Commissioner for communication to the two Republics:--

HIGH COMMISSIONER, CAPE TOWN.

_To_ BRITISH RESIDENT, PRETORIA.

Please inform Transvaal Government that I have received the

following from the Secretary of State:--27th February. Convention

signed to-day. New south-western boundary as proposed, following

trade road. British Protectorate country outside Transvaal

established with delegates' consent. They promise to appoint

Border Commissioner inside Transvaal, co-operate with ours

outside; Mackenzie--British Resident. Debt reduced to quarter

million. Same complete internal independence in Transvaal as in

Orange Free State. Conduct and control diplomatic intercourse

Foreign Governments conceded. Queen's final approval treaties

reserved. Delegates appear well satisfied and cordial feeling two

Governments. You may make the above known.

This Convention is also substantiated by the express declarations of

Lord Rosmead and the Rev. D.P. Faure to the effect that it was clearly

understood, at the time the London Convention was concluded, that the

suzerainty was abolished. It is unnecessary to add anything about the

evidence of the Members of the Transvaal Deputation. The suzerainty has

thus not the slightest shadow of existence; and yet, as will be proved,

Mr. Chamberlain is prepared to go to war with the South African Republic

over this question, a war which will, according to his intentions,

result in Annexation.

[Sidenote: Uitlander grievances and Capitalistic agitation.]

While the two Governments were occupied with this question the

Capitalists were not idle. They were busy fanning the flame in another

direction. It was not only a fact that Rhodesia was an unexpected

failure, but it had proved far richer in native wars than in payable

gold mines. The Capitalist groups possessing the greatest interests in

the Witwatersrand gold mines were also the most deeply interested in

Rhodesia, and it naturally occurred to them that their Transvaal mines

ought also to bear the burden of their unprofitable investments in

Rhodesia--an adjustment which would, however, necessitate the

amalgamation of the two countries, especially when the interests of the

shareholders were considered.

In order to attain this object a continual agitation was kept up at

Johannesburg, so that English shareholders living far away should be

prepared for the day when the Annexation would take place on

Constitutional lines.

The argument which was calculated to impress these European shareholders

was that the administration of the South African Republic had created a

situation which was most prejudicial to the financial interests of the

mining industry. Viewed from this standpoint the Uitlander grievances

were an inexhaustibly rich and payable mine.

[Sidenote: The industrial Commission.]

This agitation first of all emanated directly from the Capitalists, and

had assumed such proportions in 1897 that the Government decided to

appoint a Commission of officials and mining magnates in order to

enquire searchingly into the alleged financial grievances. As far as the

Government was concerned, the chief findings of the Commission were:--

A Century of Wrong · 第 4 / 12 段