GENERAL PERSHING'S OWN STORY OF THE VICTORIOUS AMERICAN ARMY
ORGANIZATION OF HIS GENERAL STAFF--TRAINING IN FRANCE--IN THE AISNE
OFFENSIVE--AT CHATEAU THIERRY--THE ST. MIHIEL SALIENT--MEUSE-ARGONNE,
FIRST PHASE--THE BATTLE IN THE FOREST--SUMMARY.
This is a brief summary of the organization and operations of the
American Expeditionary Force from May 26, 1917, until the signing of the
armistice, November 11, 1918. Immediately upon receiving my orders I
selected a small staff and proceeded to Europe in order to become
familiar with conditions at the earliest possible moment.
The warmth of our reception in England and France was only equaled by
the readiness of the commanders in chief of the veteran armies of the
Allies and their staffs to place their experience at our disposal. In
consultation with them the most effective means of co-operation of
effort was considered. With French and British armies at their maximum
strength, and all efforts to dispossess the enemy from his firmly
intrenched positions in Belgium and France failed, it was necessary to
plan for an American force adequate to turn the scale in favor of the
Allies. Taking account of the strength of the Central Powers at that
time, the immensity of the problem which confronted us could hardly be
over-estimated. The first requisite being an organization that could
give intelligent direction to effort, the formation of a General Staff
occupied my early attention.
ORGANIZATION OF GENERAL STAFF.
A well organized General Staff through which the commander exercises his
functions is essential to a successful modern army. However capable our
division, our battalion, and our companies as such, success would be
impossible without thoroughly co-ordinated endeavor. A General Staff
broadly organized and trained for war had not hitherto existed in our
army. Under the Commander-in-Chief, this staff must carry out the policy
and direct the details of administration, supply, preparation, and
operations of the army as a whole, with all special branches and bureaus
subject to its control. As models to aid us we had the veteran French
General Staff and the experience of the British who had similarly formed
an organization to meet the demands of a great army. By selecting from
each the features best adapted to our basic organization, and fortified
by our own early experience in the war, the development of our great
General Staff system was completed.
The General Staff is naturally divided into five groups, each with its
chief who is an assistant to the Chief of the General Staff. G.1 is in
charge of organization and equipment of troops, replacements, tonnage,
priority of overseas shipment, the auxiliary welfare association and
cognate subjects; G.2 has censorship, enemy intelligence, gathering and
disseminating information, preparation of maps, and all similar
subjects; G.3 is charged with all strategic studies and plans, movement
of troops, and the supervision of combat operations; G.4 co-ordinates
important questions of supply, construction, transport arrangements for
combat, and of the operations of the service of supply, and of
hospitalization and the evacuation of the sick and wounded; G.5
supervises the various schools and has general direction and
co-ordination of education and training.
The first Chief of Staff was Colonel (now Major-General) James G.
Harbord, who was succeeded in May, 1918, by Major-General James W.
McAndrew. To these officers, to the deputy Chief of Staff, and to the
assistant Chiefs of Staff, who, as heads of sections, aided them, great
credit is due for the results obtained not only in perfecting the
General Staff organization but in applying correct principles to the
multiplicity of problems that have arisen.
ORGANIZATION OF THE FORCES.
After a thorough consideration of Allied organizations it was decided
that our combat division should consist of four regiments of infantry of
3,000 men, with three battalions to a regiment and four companies of 250
men each to a battalion, and of an artillery brigade of three regiments,
a machine gun battalion, an engineer regiment, a trench-mortar battery,
a signal battalion, wagon trains, and the headquarters staffs and
military police. These, with medical and other units, made a total of
over 28,000 men, or practically double the size of a French or German
division. Each corps would normally consist of six divisions--four
combat and one depot and one replacement division--and also two
regiments of cavalry, and each army of from three to five corps. With
four divisions fully trained, a corps could take over an American sector
with two divisions in line and two in reserve, with the depot and
replacement divisions prepared to fill the gaps in the ranks.
Our purpose was to prepare an integral American force which should be
able to take the offensive in every respect. Accordingly, the
development of a self-reliant infantry by thorough drill in the use of
the rifle and in the tactics of open warfare was always uppermost. The
plan of training after arrival in France allowed a division one month
for acclimatization and instruction in small units from battalions down,
a second month in quiet trench sectors by battalions, and a third month
after it came out of the trenches when it should be trained as a
complete division in war of movement.
SCHOOLS OF INSTRUCTION.
Very early a system of schools was outlined and started, which should
have the advantage of instruction by officers direct from the front. At
the great school center at Langres, one of the first to be organized,
was the staff school, where the principles of general staff work, as
laid down in our own organization, were taught to carefully selected
officers. Men in the ranks, who had shown qualities of leadership, were
sent to the school of candidates for commissions. A school of the line
taught younger officers the principles of leadership, tactics, and the
use of the different weapons. In the artillery school, at Saumur, young
officers were taught the fundamental principles of modern artillery;
while at Issoudun an immense plant was built for training cadets in
aviation. These and other schools, with their well-considered
curriculums for training in every branch of our organization, were
co-ordinated in a manner best to develop an efficient army out of
willing and industrious young men, many of whom had not before known
even the rudiments of military technique. Both Marshal Haig and General
Petain placed officers and men at our disposal for instructional
purposes, and we are deeply indebted for the opportunities given to
profit by their veteran experience.
AMERICAN ZONE.
The eventual place the American army should take on the western front
was to a large extent influenced by the vital question of communication
and supply. The northern ports of France were crowded by the British
armies' shipping and supplies while the southern ports, though
otherwise at our service, had not adequate port facilities for our
purposes and these we should have to build. The already overtaxed
railway system behind the active front in northern France would not be
available for us as lines of supply and those leading from the southern
ports of northeastern France would be unequal to our needs without much
new construction. Practically all warehouses, supply depots and
regulating stations must be provided by fresh constructions. While
France offered us such material as she had to spare after a drain of
three years, enormous quantities of material had to be brought across
the Atlantic.
VAST PREPARATIONS NECESSARY.
With such a problem any temporization or lack of definiteness in making
plans might cause failure even with victory within our grasp. Moreover,
broad plans commensurate with our national purpose and resources would
bring conviction of our power to every soldier in the front line, to the
nations associated with us in the war, and to the enemy. The tonnage for
material for necessary construction for the supply of an army of three
and perhaps four million men would require a mammoth program of
shipbuilding at home, and miles of dock construction in France, with a
corresponding large project for additional railways and for storage
depots.
All these considerations led to the inevitable conclusion that if we
were to handle and supply the great forces deemed essential to win the
war we must utilize the southern ports of France--Bordeaux, La Pallice,
St. Nazaire, and Brest--and the comparatively unused railway systems
leading therefrom to the northeast. Generally speaking, then, this would
contemplate the use of our forces against the enemy somewhere in that
direction, but the great depots of supply must be centrally located,
preferably in the area included by Tours, Bourges, and Chateauroux, so
that our armies could be supplied with equal facility wherever they
might be serving on the western front.
SKILLED HELP.
To build up such a system there were talented men in the Regular Army,
but more experts were necessary than the army could furnish. Thanks to
the patriotic spirit of our people at home, there came from civil life
men trained for every sort of work involved in building and managing the
organization necessary to handle and transport such an army and keep it
supplied. With such assistance the construction and general development
of our plans have kept pace with the growth of the forces, and the
Service of Supply is now able to discharge from ships and move 45,000
tons daily, besides transporting troops and material in the conduct of
active operations.
WORK OF THE DEPARTMENTS.
As to organization, all the administrative and supply services, except
the Adjutant General's, Inspector General's, and Judge Advocates
General's Departments which remain at general headquarters, have been
transferred to the headquarters of the services of supplies at Tours
under a commanding general responsible to the commander-in-chief for
supply of the armies. The Chief Quartermaster, Chief Surgeon, Chief
Signal Officer, Chief of Ordnance, Chief of Air Service, Chief of
Chemical Warfare, the general purchasing agent in all that pertains to
questions of procurement and supply, the Provost Marshal General in the
maintenance of order in general, the Director General of Transportation
in all that affects such matters, and the Chief Engineer in all matters
of administration and supply, are subordinate to the Commanding General
of the Service of Supply, who, assisted by a staff especially organized
for the purpose, is charged with the administrative co-ordination of all
these services.
TRANSPORTATION AND ENGINEER'S DEPARTMENT.
The transportation department under the Service of Supply directs the
operation, maintenance, and construction of railways, the operation of
terminals, the unloading of ships, and transportation of material to
warehouses or to the front. Its functions make necessary the most
intimate relationship between our organization and that of the French,
with the practical result that our transportation department has been
able to improve materially the operations of railways generally.
Constantly laboring under a shortage of rolling stock, the
transportation department has nevertheless been able by efficient
management to meet every emergency.
The Engineer Corps is charged with all construction, including light
railways and roads. It has planned and constructed the many projects
required, the most important of which are the new wharves at Bordeaux
and Nantes, and the immense storage depots at La Pallice, Montoir, and
Gievres, besides innumerable hospitals and barracks in various ports of
France. These projects have all been carried on by phases keeping pace
with our needs. The Forestry Service under the Engineer Corps has cut
the greater part of the timber and railway ties required.
PURCHASES IN EUROPE.
To meet the shortage of supplies from America, due to lack of shipping,
the representatives of the different supply departments were constantly
in search of available material and supplies in Europe. In order to
co-ordinate these purchases and to prevent competition between our
departments, a general purchasing agency was created early in our
experience to co-ordinate our purchases and, if possible, induce our
Allies to apply the principle among the Allied armies. While there was
no authority for the general use of appropriations, this was met by
grouping the purchasing representatives of the different departments
under one control, charged with the duty of consolidating requisitions
and purchases. Our efforts to extend the principle have been signally
successful, and all purchases for the Allied armies are now on an
equitable and co-operative basis. Indeed, it may be said that the work
of this bureau has been thoroughly efficient and business-like.
ARTILLERY, AIRPLANES AND TANKS.
Our entry into the war found us with few of the auxiliaries necessary
for its conduct in the modern sense. Among our most important
deficiencies in material were artillery, aviation, and tanks. In order
to meet our requirements as rapidly as possible, we accepted the offer
of the French Government to provide us with the necessary artillery
equipment of seventy-fives, one fifty-five millimeter howitzers, and
one-fifty-five GPF guns from their own factories for thirty divisions.
The wisdom of this course is fully demonstrated by the fact that,
although we soon began the manufacture of these classes of guns at home,
there were no guns of the calibers mentioned manufactured in America on
our front at the date the armistice was signed. The only guns of these
types produced at home thus far received in France are 109 seventy-five
millimeter guns.
In aviation we were in the same situation, and here again the French
Government came to our aid until our own aviation program should be
under way. We obtained from the French the necessary planes for
training our personnel, and they have provided us with a total of 2,676
pursuit, observation, and bombing planes. The first airplanes received
from home arrived in May, and altogether we have received 1,379. The
first American squadron completely equipped by American production,
including airplanes, crossed the German lines on August 7, 1918. As to
tanks, we were also compelled to rely upon the French. Here, however, we
were less fortunate, for the reason that the French production could
barely meet the requirements of their own armies.
OUR OBLIGATIONS TO FRANCE.
It should be fully realized that the French Government has always taken
a most liberal attitude and has been most anxious to give us every
possible assistance in meeting our deficiencies in these as well as in
other respects. Our dependence upon France for artillery, aviation, and
tanks was, of course, due to the fact that our industries had not been
exclusively devoted to military production. All credit is due our own
manufacturers for their efforts to meet our requirements, as at the time
the armistice was signed we were able to look forward to the early
supply of practically all our necessities from our own factories.
CAMP WELFARE WORK.
The welfare of the troops touches my responsibility as
Commander-in-Chief to the mothers and fathers and kindred of the men who
came to France in the impressionable period of youth. They could not
have the privilege accorded European soldiers during their periods of
leave of visiting their families and renewing their home ties. Fully
realizing that the standard of conduct that should be established for
them must have a permanent influence in their lives and on the
character of their future citizenship, the Red Cross, the Young Men's
Christian Association, Knights of Columbus, the Salvation Army, and the
Jewish Welfare Board, as auxiliaries in this work, were encouraged in
every possible way. The fact that our soldiers, in a land of different
customs and language, have borne themselves in a manner in keeping with
the cause for which they fought, is due not only to the efforts in their
behalf but much more to other high ideals, their discipline, and their
innate sense of self-respect. It should be recorded, however, that the
members of these welfare societies have been untiring in their desire to
be of real service to our officers and men. The patriotic devotion of
these representative men and women has given a new significance to the
Golden Rule, and we owe to them a debt of gratitude that can never be
repaid.
COMBAT OPERATIONS.
During our periods of training in the trenches some of our divisions had
engaged the enemy in local combats, the most important of which was
Seicheprey by the Twenty-sixth on April 20, in the Toul sector, but none
had participated in action as a unit. The First Division, which had
passed through the preliminary stages of training, had gone to the
trenches for its first period of instruction at the end of October and
by March 21, when the German offensive in Picardy began, we had four
divisions with experience in the trenches, all of which were equal to
any demands of battle action. The crisis which this offensive developed
was such that our occupation of an American sector must be postponed.
TROOPS PLACED UNDER MARSHAL FOCH.
On March 28 I placed at the disposal of Marshal Foch who had been agreed
upon as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies, all of our forces to
be used as he might decide. At his request the First Division was
transferred from the Toul sector to a position in reserve at Chaumont en
Vexin. As German superiority in numbers required prompt action, an
agreement was reached at the Abbeville conference of the Allied premiers
and commanders and myself on May 2 by which British shipping was to
transport ten American divisions to the British army area, where they
were to be trained and equipped, and additional British shipping was to
be provided for as many divisions as possible for use elsewhere.
THE CANTIGNY OPERATIONS.
On April 26 the First Division had gone into the line in the Montdidier
salient on the Picardy battlefront. Tactics had been suddenly
revolutionized to those of open warfare, and our men, confident of the
results of their training, were eager for the test. On the morning of
May 28 this division attacked the commanding German position in its
front, taking with splendid dash the town of Cantigny and all other
objectives, which were organized and held steadfastly against vicious
counter-attacks and galling artillery fire. Although local, this
brilliant action had an electrical effect, as it demonstrated our
fighting qualities under extreme battle conditions, and also that the
enemy's troops were not altogether invincible.
THE GERMAN AISNE OFFENSIVE.
The Germans' Aisne offensive, which began on May 27, had advanced
rapidly toward the River Marne and Paris, and the Allies faced a crisis
equally as grave as that of the Picardy offensive in March. Again every
available man was placed at Marshal Foch's disposal, and the Third
Division, which had just come from its preliminary training in the
trenches, was hurried to the Marne. Its motorized machine gun battalion
preceded the other units and successfully held the bridgehead at the
Marne, opposite Chateau-Thierry. The Second Division, in reserve near
Montdidier, was sent by motor trucks and other available transport to
check the progress of the enemy toward Paris. The Division attacked and
retook the town and railroad station at Bouresches and sturdily held its
ground against the enemy's best guard divisions. In the battle of
Belleau Wood, which followed, our men proved their superiority and
gained a strong tactical position, with far greater loss to the enemy
than to ourselves. On July 1, before the Second was relieved, it
captured the village of Vaux with most splendid precision.
Meanwhile our Second Corps, under Maj. Gen. George W. Read, had been
organized for the command of our divisions with the British, which were
held back in training areas or assigned to second-line defenses. Five of
the ten divisions were withdrawn from the British area in June, three to
relieve divisions in Lorraine and the Vosges and two to the Paris area
to join the group of American divisions which stood between the city and
any farther advance of the enemy in that direction.
OPERATIONS NEAR RHEIMS.
The great June-July troop movement from the States was well under way,
and, although these troops were to be given some preliminary training
before being put into action, their very presence warranted the use of
all the older divisions in the confidence that we did not lack reserves.
Elements of the Forty-second Division were in the line east of Rheims
against the German offensive of July 15, and held their ground
unflinchingly. On the right flank of this offensive four companies of
the Twenty-eighth Division were in position in face of the advancing
waves of the German infantry. The Third Division was holding the bank of
the Marne from the bend east of the mouth of the Surmelin to the west of
Mezy, opposite Chateau-Thierry, where a large force of German infantry
sought to force a passage under support of powerful artillery
concentrations and under cover of smoke screens. A single regiment of
the Third wrote one of the most brilliant pages in our military annals
on this occasion. It prevented the crossing at certain points on its
front while, on either flank, the Germans, who had gained a footing,
pressed forward. Our men, firing in three directions, met the German
attacks with counter-attacks at critical points and succeeded in
throwing two German divisions into complete confusion, capturing 600
prisoners.
BEGINNING OF THE COUNTER ATTACK.
The great force of the German Chateau-Thierry offensive established the
deep Marne salient, but the enemy was taking chances, and the
vulnerability of this pocket to attack might be turned to his
disadvantage. Seizing this opportunity to support my conviction, every
division with any sort of training was made available for use in a
counter offensive. The place of honor in the thrust toward Soissons on
July 18 was given to our First and Second Divisions in company with
chosen French divisions. Without the usual brief warning of a
preliminary bombardment, the massed French and American artillery,
firing by the map, laid down its rolling barrage at dawn while the
infantry began its charge. The tactical handling of our troops under
these trying conditions was excellent throughout the action. The enemy
brought up large numbers of reserves and made a stubborn defense both
with machine guns and artillery, but through five days' fighting the
First Division continued to advance until it had gained the heights
above Soissons and captured the village of Berzy-le-sec. The Second
Division took Beau Repaire farm and Vierzy in a very rapid advance and
reached a position in front of Tigny at the end of its second day. These
two divisions captured 7,000 prisoners and over 100 pieces of artillery.
THE SOISSONS ATTACK.
The Twenty-sixth Division, which, with a French division, was under
command of our First Corps, acted as a pivot of the movement toward
Soissons. On the 18th it took the village of Torcy, while the Third
Division was crossing the Marne in pursuit of the retiring enemy. The
Twenty-sixth attacked again on the 21st, and the enemy withdrew past the
Chateau-Thierry-Soissons road. The Third Division, continuing its
progress, took the heights of Mont St. Pere and the villages of
Charteves and Jaulgonne in the face of both machine gun and artillery
fire.
On the 24th, after the Germans had fallen back from Trugny and Epieds,
our Forty-second Division, which had been brought over from the
Champagne, relieved the Twenty-sixth and, fighting its way through the
Foret de Fere, overwhelmed the nest of machine guns in its path. By the
27th it had reached the Ourcq, whence the Third and Fourth Divisions
were already advancing, while the French divisions with which we were
co-operating were moving forward at other points.
The Third Division had made its advance into Roncheres Wood on the 29th
and was relieved for rest by a brigade of the Thirty-second. The
Forty-second and Thirty-second undertook the task of conquering the
heights beyond Cierges, the Forty-second capturing Sergy and the
Thirty-second capturing Hill 230, both American divisions joining in
the pursuit of the enemy to the Vesle, and thus the operation of
reducing the salient was finished. Meanwhile the Forty-second was
relieved by the Fourth at Chery-Chartreuve, and the Thirty-second by the
Twenty-eighth, while the Seventy-seventh Division took up a position on
the Vesle. The operations of these divisions on the Vesle were under the
Third Corps, Maj. Gen. Robert L. Bullard, commanding.
BATTLE OF ST. MIHIEL.
With the reduction of the Marne salient we could look forward to the
concentration of our divisions in our own zone. In view of the
forthcoming operation against the St. Mihiel salient, which had long
been planned as our first offensive action on a large scale, the First
Army was organized on August 10 under my personal command. While
American units had held different divisional and corps sectors along the
western front, there had not been up to this time, for obvious reasons,
a distinct American sector; but, in view of the important parts the
American forces were now to play, it was necessary to take over a
permanent portion of the line. Accordingly, on August 30, the line
beginning at Port sur Seille, east of the Moselle and extending to the
west through St. Mihiel, thence north to a point opposite Verdun, was
placed under my command. The American sector was afterwards extended
across the Meuse to the western edge of the Argonne Forest, and included
the Second Colonial French, which held the point of the salient, and the
Seventeenth French Corps, which occupied the heights above Verdun.
PREPARATION FOR THE ATTACK.
The preparation for a complicated operation against the formidable
defenses in front of us included the assembling of divisions and of
corps and army artillery, transport, aircraft, tanks, ambulances, the
location of hospitals, and the molding together of all of the elements
of a great modern army with its own railheads, supplied directly by our
own Service of Supply. The concentration for this operation, which was
to be a surprise, involved the movement, mostly at night, of
approximately 600,000 troops, and required for its success the most
careful attention to every detail.
The French were generous in giving us assistance in corps and army
artillery, with its personnel, and we were confident from the start of
our superiority over the enemy in guns of all calibers. Our heavy guns
were able to reach Metz and to interfere seriously with German rail
movements. The French Independent Air Force was placed under my command
which, together with the British bombing squadrons and our air forces,
gave us the largest assembly of aviation that had ever been engaged in
one operation on the western front.
LOCATION OF THE TROOPS.
From Les Eparges around the nose of the salient at St. Mihiel to the
Moselle River the line was roughly forty miles long and situated on
commanding ground greatly strengthened by artificial defenses. Our First
Corps (Eighty-second, Ninetieth, Fifth, and Second Divisions), under
command of Maj. Gen. Hunter Liggett, restrung its right on
Pont-a-Mouson, with its left joining our Third Corps (the Eighty-ninth,
Forty-second, and First Divisions), under Maj. Gen. Joseph T. Dickman,
in line to Xivray, were to swing in toward Vigneulles on the pivot of
the Moselle River for the initial assault. From Xivray to Mouilly the
Second Colonial French Corps was in line in the center and our Fifth
Corps, under command of Maj. Gen. George H. Cameron, with our
Twenty-sixth Division and a French division at the western base of the
salient, were to attack three difficult hills--Les Eparges, Combres, and
Amaramthe. Our First Corps had in reserve the Seventy-eighth Division,
our Fourth Corps the Third Division, and our First Army the Thirty-fifth
and Ninety-first Divisions, with the Eightieth and Thirty-third
available. It should be understood that our corps organizations are very
elastic, and that we have at no time had permanent assignments of
divisions to corps.
MOVEMENT OF THE TROOPS.
After four hours' artillery preparation, the seven American divisions in
the front line advanced at 5 A.M. on September 12, assisted by a limited
number of tanks manned partly by Americans and partly by the French.
These divisions, accompanied by groups of wire cutters and others armed
with bangalore torpedoes, went through the successive bands of barbed
wire that protected the enemy's front line and support trenches, in
irresistible waves on schedule time, breaking down all defense of an
enemy demoralized by the great volume of our artillery fire and our
sudden approach out of the fog.
Our First Corps advanced to Thiaucourt, while our Fourth Corps curved
back to the southwest through Nonsard. The Second Colonial French Corps
made the slight advance required of it on very difficult ground, and the
Fifth Corps took its three ridges and repulsed a counter-attack. A rapid
march brought reserve regiments of a division of the Fifth Corps into
Vigneulles in the early morning, where it linked up with patrols of our
Fourth Corps, closing the salient and forming a new line west of
Thiaucourt to Vigneulles and beyond Fresnes-en-Woevre. At the cost of
only 7,000 casualties, mostly light, we had taken 16,000 prisoners and
443 guns, a great quantity of material, released the inhabitants of many
villages from enemy domination, and established our lines in a position
to threaten Metz. This signal success of the American First Army in its
first offensive was of prime importance. The Allies found they had a
formidable army to aid them, and the enemy learned finally that he had
one to reckon with.
PREPARATION FOR THE ARGONNE OFFENSIVE.
On the day after we had taken the St. Mihiel salient, much of our corps
and army artillery which had operated at St. Mihiel and our divisions in
reserve at other points, were already on the move toward the area back
of the line between the Meuse River and the western edge of the forest
of Argonne. With the exception of St. Mihiel, the old German front line
from Switzerland to the east of Rheims was still intact. In the general
attack all along the line, the operation assigned the American army as
the hinge of this Allied offensive was directed toward the important
railroad communications of the German armies through Mezieres and Sedan.
The enemy must hold fast to this part of his lines or the withdrawal of
his forces with four years' accumulation of plants and material would be
dangerously imperiled.
The German army had as yet shown no demoralization and, while the mass
of its troops had suffered in morale, its first-class divisions and
notably its machine gun defense were exhibiting remarkable tactical
efficiency as well as courage. The German General Staff was fully aware
of the consequences of a success on the Meuse-Argonne line. Certain that
he would do everything in his power to oppose us, the action was planned
with as much secrecy as possible and was undertaken with the
determination to use all our divisions in forcing a decision. We
expected to draw the best German divisions to our front and to consume
them while the enemy was held under grave apprehension lest our attack
should break his line, which it was our firm purpose to do.
LINE OF BATTLE.
Our right flank was protected by the Meuse, while our left embraced the
Argonne Forest, whose ravines, hills, and elaborate defense screened by
dense thickets had been generally considered impregnable. Our order of
battle from right to left was the Third Corps from the Meuse to
Malancourt, with the Thirty-third, Eightieth, and Fourth Divisions in
line, and the Third Division as corps reserve; the Fifth Corps from
Malancourt to Vauquois, with Seventy-ninth, Eighty-seventh, and
Ninety-first Divisions in line, and the Thirty-second in corps reserve;
and the First Corps, from Vauquois to Vienne le Chateau, with
Thirty-fifth, Twenty-eighth, and Seventy-seventh Divisions in line, and
the Ninety-second in corps reserve. The army reserve consisted of the
First, Twenty-ninth, and Eighty-second Divisions.
BATTLE OPERATIONS.
On the night of September 25 our troops quietly took the place of the
French who thinly held the line in this sector which had long been
inactive. In the attack, which began on the 26th, we drove through the
barbed wire entanglements and the sea of shell craters across No Man's
Land, mastering all the first line defenses. Continuing on the 27th and
28th, against machine guns and artillery of an increasing number of
enemy reserve divisions, we penetrated to a depth of from three to seven
miles, and took the village of Montfaucon and its commanding hill and
Exermont, Gercourt, Cuisy, Septsarges, Malancourt, Ivoiry, Epinionville,
Charpentry, Very, and other villages. East of the Meuse one of our
divisions, which was with the Second Colonial French Corps, captured
Marcheville and Rieville, giving further protection to the flank of our
main body. We had taken 10,000 prisoners, we had gained our point of
forcing the battle into the open and were prepared for the enemy's
reaction, which was bound to come, as he had good roads and ample
railroad facilities for bringing up his artillery and reserves.
GREAT DIFFICULTIES OVERCOME.
In the chill rain of dark nights our engineers had to build new roads
across spongy, shell-torn areas, repair broken roads beyond No Man's
Land, and build bridges. Our gunners, with no thought of sleep, put
their shoulders to wheels and dragropes to bring their guns through the
mire in support of the infantry, now under the increasing fire of the
enemy's artillery. Our attack had taken the enemy by surprise, but,
quickly recovering himself, he began to fire counter-attacks in strong
force, supported by heavy bombardments, with large quantities of gas.
From September 28 until October 4 we maintained the offensive against
patches of woods defended by snipers and continuous lines of machine
guns, and pushed forward our guns and transports, seizing strategical
points in preparation for further attacks.
OTHER UNITS WITH ALLIES.
Other divisions attached to the Allied armies were doing their part. It
was the fortune of our Second Corps, composed of the Twenty-seventh and
Thirtieth Divisions, which had remained with the British, to have a
place of honor in co-operation with the Australian Corps on September
29 and October 1 in the assault on the Hindenburg Line where the St.
Quentin Canal passes through a tunnel under a ridge. The Thirtieth
Division speedily broke through the main line of defense for all its
objectives, while the Twenty-seventh pushed on impetuously through the
main line until some of its elements reached Gouy. In the midst of the
maze of trenches and shell craters and under cross-fire from machine
guns the other elements fought desperately against odds. In this and in
later actions, from October 6 to October 19, our Second Corps captured
over 6,000 prisoners and advanced over 13 miles. The spirit and
aggressiveness of these divisions have been highly praised by the
British army commander under whom they served.
OPERATIONS NEAR RHEIMS.
On October 2-9 our Second and Thirty-sixth Divisions were sent to assist
the French in an important attack against the old German positions
before Rheims. The Second conquered the complicated defense works on
their front against a persistent defense worthy of the grimmest period
of trench warfare and attacked the strongly held wooded hill of Blanc
Mont, which they captured in a second assault, sweeping over it with
consummate dash and skill. This division then repulsed strong
counter-attacks before the village and cemetery of Ste. Etienne and took
the town, forcing the Germans to fall back from before Rheims and yield
positions they had held since September, 1914. On October 9 the
Thirty-sixth Division relieved the Second and, in its first experience
under fire, withstood very severe artillery bombardment and rapidly took
up the pursuit of the enemy, now retiring behind the Aisne.
RESULTS OF AMERICAN OPERATIONS.
The Allied progress elsewhere cheered the efforts of our men in this
crucial contest as the German command threw in more and more
first-class troops to stop our advance. We made steady headway in the
almost impenetrable and strongly held Argonne Forest, for, despite this
reinforcement, it was our army that was doing the driving. Our aircraft
was increasing in skill and numbers and forcing the issue, and our
infantry and artillery were improving rapidly with each new experience.
The replacements fresh from home were put into exhausted divisions with
little time for training, but they had the advantage of serving beside
men who knew their business and who had almost become veterans
overnight. The enemy had taken every advantage of the terrain, which
especially favored the defense by a prodigal use of machine guns manned
by highly trained veterans and by using his artillery at short ranges.
In the face of such strong frontal positions we should have been unable
to accomplish any progress according to previously accepted standards,
but I had every confidence in our aggressive tactics and the courage of
our troops.
PROGRESS UNDER DIFFICULTIES.
On October 4 the attack was renewed all along our front. The Third Corps
tilting to the left followed the Brieulles-Cunel road; our Fifth Corps
took Gesnes, while the First Corps advanced for over two miles along the
irregular valley of the Aire River and in the wooded hills of the
Argonne that bordered the river, used by the enemy with all his art and
weapons of defense. This sort of fighting continued against an enemy
striving to hold every foot of ground and whose very strong
counter-attacks challenged us at every point. On the 7th the First Corps
captured Chatel-Chehery and continued along the river to Cornay. On the
east of Meuse sector one of the two divisions co-operating with the
French captured Consenvoye and the Haumont Woods. On the 9th the Fifth
Corps, in its progress up the Aire, took Fleville, and the Third Corps,
which had continuous fighting against odds, was working its way through
Brieulles and Cunel. On the 10th we had cleared the Argonne Forest of
the enemy.
FORMATION OF SECOND ARMY.
It was now necessary to constitute a second army, and on October 9 the
immediate command of the First Army was turned over to Lieut. Gen.
Hunter Liggett. The command of the Second Army, whose divisions occupied
a sector in the Woevre, was given to Lieut. Gen. Robert L. Bullard, who
had been commander of the First Division and then of the Third Corps.
Major General Dickman was transferred to the command of the First Corps,
while the Fifth Corps was placed under Maj. Gen. Charles P. Summerall,
who had recently commanded the First Division. Maj. Gen. John L. Hines,
who had gone rapidly up from regimental to division commander, was
assigned to the Third Corps. These four officers had been in France from
the early days of the expedition and had learned their lessons in the
school of practical warfare.
Our constant pressure against the enemy brought day by day more
prisoners, mostly survivors from machine gun nests captured in fighting
at close quarters. On October 18 there was very fierce fighting in the
Caures Woods east of the Meuse and in the Ormont Woods. On the 14th the
First Corps took St. Juvin, and the Fifth Corps, in hand-to-hand
encounters, entered the formidable Kriemhilde Line, where the enemy had
hoped to check us indefinitely. Later the Fifth Corps penetrated further
the Kriemhilde Line, and the First Corps took Champigneulles and the
important town of Grandpre. Our dogged offensive was wearing down the
enemy, who continued desperately to throw his best troops against us,
thus weakening his line in front of our Allies and making their advance
less difficult.
AMERICANS IN BELGIUM.
Meanwhile we were not only able to continue the battle, but our
Thirty-seventh and Ninety-first Divisions were hastily withdrawn from
our front and dispatched to help the French army in Belgium. Detraining
in the neighborhood of Ypres, these divisions advanced by rapid stages
to the fighting line and were assigned to adjacent French corps. On
October 31, in continuation of the Flanders offensive, they attacked and
methodically broke down all enemy resistance. On November 3 the
Thirty-seventh had completed its mission in dividing the enemy across
the Escaut River and firmly established itself along the east bank
included in the division zone of action. By a clever flanking movement,
troops of the Ninety-first Division captured Spitaals Bosschen, a
difficult wood extending across the central part of the division sector,
reached the Escaut, and penetrated into the town of Audenarde. These
divisions received high commendation from their corps commanders for
their dash and energy.
REGROUPING FOR FINAL ASSAULT.
On the 23d the Third and Fifth Corps pushed northward to the level of
Bantheville. While we continued to press forward and throw back the
enemy's violent counter-attacks with great loss to him, a regrouping of
our forces was under way for the final assault. Evidence of loss of
morale by the enemy gave our men more confidence in attack and more
fortitude in enduring the fatigue of incessant effort and the hardships
of very inclement weather.
With comparatively well-rested divisions, the final advance in the
Meuse-Argonne front was begun on November 1. Our increased artillery
force acquitted itself magnificently in support of the advance, and the
enemy broke before the determined infantry, which, by its persistent
fighting of the past weeks and the dash of this attack, had overcome his
will to resist. The Third Corps took Aincreville, Doulcon, and
Andevanne, and the Fifth Corps took Landres et St. Georges and pressed
through successive lines of resistance to Bayonville and Chennery. On
the 2d the First Corps joined in the movement, which now became an
impetuous onslaught that could not be stayed.
SUCCESSFUL ACCOMPLISHMENT.
On the 3d advance troops surged forward in pursuit, some by motor
trucks, while the artillery pressed along the country roads close
behind. The First Corps reached Authe and Chatillon-Sur-Bar, the Fifth
Corps, Fosse and Nouart, and the Third Corps Halles, penetrating the
enemy's line to a depth of twelve miles. Our large caliber guns had
advanced and were skillfully brought into position to fire upon the
important lines at Montmedy, Longuyon, and Conflans. Our Third Corps
crossed the Meuse on the 5th and the other corps, in the full confidence
that the day was theirs, eagerly cleared the way of machine guns as they
swept northward, maintaining complete co-ordination throughout. On the
6th, a division of the First Corps reached a point on the Meuse opposite
Sedan, twenty-five miles from our line of departure. The strategical
goal which was our highest hope was gained. We had cut the enemy's main
line of communications and nothing but surrender or an armistice could
save his army from complete disaster.
TROOPS ENGAGED.
In all forty enemy divisions had been used against us an the
Meuse-Argonne battle. Between September 26 and November 6 we took
26,059 prisoners and 468 guns on this front. Our divisions engaged were
the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Twenty-sixth, Twenty-eighth,
Twenty-ninth, Thirty-second, Thirty-third, Thirty-fifth, Thirty-seventh,
Forty-second, Seventy-seventh, Seventy-eighth, Seventy-ninth, Eightieth,
Eighty-second, Eighty-ninth, Ninetieth, and Ninety-first. Many of our
divisions remained in line for a length of time that required nerves of
steel, while others were sent in again after only a few days of rest.
The First, Fifth, Twenty-sixth, Forty-second, Seventy-seventh,
Eightieth, Eighty-ninth, and Ninetieth were in the line twice. Although
some of the divisions were fighting their first battle, they soon became
equal to the best.
OPERATIONS EAST OF THE MEUSE.
On the three days preceding November 10, the Third, the Second Colonial,
and the Seventeenth French Corps fought a difficult struggle through the
Meuse Hills south of Stenay and forced the enemy into the plain.
Meanwhile, my plans for further use of the American forces contemplated
an advance between the Meuse and the Moselle in the direction of Longwy
by the First Army, while, at the same time, the Second Army should
assure the offensive toward the rich iron fields of Briey. These
operations were to be followed by an offensive toward Chateau-Salins
east of the Moselle, thus isolating Metz. Accordingly, attacks on the
American front had been ordered and that of the Second Army was in
progress on the morning of November 11, when instructions were received
that hostilities should cease at 11 o'clock A.M.
At this moment the line of the American sector, from right to left,
began at Port-Sur-Seille, thence across the Moselle to Vandieres and
through the Woevre to Bezonvaux, in the foothills of the Meuse, thence
along to the foothills and through the northern edge of the Woevre
forests to the Meuse at Mouzay, thence along the Meuse connecting with
the French under Sedan.
RELATIONS WITH THE ALLIES.
Co-operation among the Allies has at all times been most cordial. A far
greater effort has been put forth by the Allied armies and staffs to
assist us than could have been expected. The French Government and army
have always stood ready to furnish us with supplies, equipment, and
transportation, and to aid us in every way. In the towns and hamlets
wherever our troops have been stationed or billeted the French people
have everywhere received them more as relatives and intimate friends
than as soldiers of a foreign army. For these things words are quite
inadequate to express our gratitude. There can be no doubt that the
relations growing out of our associations here assure a permanent
friendship between the two peoples. Although we have not been so
intimately associated with the people of Great Britain, yet their troops
and ours when thrown together have always warmly fraternized. The
reception of those of our forces who have passed through England and of
those who have been stationed there has always been enthusiastic.
Altogether it has been deeply impressed upon us that the ties of
language and blood bring the British and ourselves together completely
and inseparably.
STRENGTH.
There are in Europe altogether, including a regiment and some sanitary
units with the Italian army and the organizations at Murmansk, also
including those en route from the States, approximately 2,053,347 men,
less our losses. Of this total, there are in France 1,338,169 combatant
troops. Forty divisions have arrived, of which the infantry personnel of
ten have been used as replacements, leaving 30 divisions now in France
organized into three armies of three corps each.
The losses of the Americans up to November 18 are: Killed and wounded,
36,145; died of disease, 14,811; deaths unclassified, 2,204; wounded,
179,625; prisoners, 2,163; missing, 1,160. We have captured about 44,000
prisoners and 1,400 guns, howitzers and trench mortars.
WARM APPRECIATION.
The duties of the General Staff, as well as those of the army and corps
staffs, have been very ably performed. Especially is this true when we
consider the new and difficult problems with which they have been
confronted. This body of officers, both as individuals and as an
organization, have, I believe, no superiors in professional ability, in
efficiency, or in loyalty.
Nothing that we have in France better reflects the efficiency and
devotion to duty of Americans in general than the Service of Supply,
whose personnel is thoroughly imbued with a patriotic desire to do its
full duty. They have at all times fully appreciated their responsibility
to the rest of the army and the results produced have been most
gratifying.
SPECIAL WORK OF DEPARTMENTS.
Our Medical Corps is especially entitled to praise for the general
effectiveness of its work both in hospital and at the front. Embracing
men of high professional attainments, and splendid women devoted to
their calling and untiring in their efforts, this department has made a
new record for medical and sanitary proficiency.
The Quartermaster Department has had difficult and various tasks, but
it has more than met all demands that have been made upon it. Its
management and its personnel have been exceptionally efficient and
deserve every possible commendation.
SPLENDID TECHNICAL SERVICE.
As to the more technical services, the able personnel of the Ordnance
Department in France has splendidly fulfilled its functions, both in
procurement and in forwarding the immense quantities of ordnance
required. The officers and men and the young women of the Signal Corps
have performed their duties with a large conception of the problem and
with a devoted and patriotic spirit to which the perfection of our
communications daily testify. While the Engineer Corps has been referred
to in another part of this report, it should be further stated that the
work has required large vision and high professional skill, and great
credit is due their personnel for the high proficiency that they have
constantly maintained.
Our aviators have no equals in daring or in fighting ability and have
left a record of courageous deeds that will ever remain a brilliant page
in the annals of our army. While the Tank Corps has had limited
opportunities its personnel has responded gallantly on every possible
occasion and has shown courage of the highest order.
The Adjutant General's Department has been directed with a systematic
thoroughness and excellence that surpassed any previous work of its
kind. The Inspector General's Department has risen to the highest
standards and throughout has ably assisted commanders in the enforcement
of discipline. The able personnel of the Judge Advocate General's
Department has solved with judgment and wisdom the multitude of
difficult legal problems, many of them involving questions of great
international importance.
TRIBUTE TO THE PERSONNEL OF THE VARIOUS BRANCHES.
It would be impossible in this brief preliminary report to do justice to
the personnel of all the different branches of this organization which I
shall cover in detail in a later report.
The navy in European waters has at all times most cordially aided the
army, and it is most gratifying to report that there has never before
been such perfect co-operation between these two branches of the
service.
As to Americans in Europe not in the military services, it is the
greatest pleasure to say that, both in official and in private life,
they are intensely patriotic and loyal, and have been invariably
sympathetic and helpful to the army.
Finally, I pay the supreme tribute to our officers and soldiers of the
line. When I think of their heroism, their patience under hardships,
their unflinching spirit of offensive action, I am filled with emotion
which I am unable to express. Their deeds are immortal, and they have
earned the eternal gratitude of our country.