ENTER THE AMERICANS.
How the Germans were misled about the Americans--Early American
fighters--The arrivals in May, 1918--American equipment--Our relations
with the Americans and what they thought of us--The Portuguese.
There are many claimants for the honour of being the War Winner. When I
was in Italy in February, 1918, I found a very genuine belief there that
the Italians were the genuine war winners; that they brought the
decisive weight to bear. Without denying the very useful effect that
Italian neutrality had in the first stages of the war, and Italian
participation at a later date, I think it would be hard to convince,
say, the French of the soundness of the Italian claim. The British might
be more inclined to agree; for they still keep up the curious pose of
being a poor feckless people who never do anything or know anything.
Another claimant for the pride of first place in the Grand Alliance is
Greece; and I believe that Portugal has some idea of putting in a claim.
But on the whole, taking all the circumstances into account and
reckoning not war services only but war effect, the actual final blow to
the Germans' hopes was delivered when the United States of America
declared war. It was when Germany made that declaration necessary, in
spite of the sincere wish of the Americans to keep out of the war, that
all hope vanished of Germany securing an arranged peace. From that
moment it was clear that ultimately she would have to take exactly what
was handed out to her at the conclusion of the war.
It is hard to believe that the German leaders ever seriously believed
the stuff and nonsense that they gave out to comfort their people on the
subject of American participation in the war. But having blundered by
bringing the United States in they had to try to cover up their
blunders.
German diplomacy was not without successes of a kind in the preparation
and prosecution of the war. If it is the function of diplomacy to plot
murders and strikes and arsons in neutral countries, to bribe Oriental
despots such as those of Turkey and Bulgaria into betraying their
people, German diplomacy had a proud record. But concerning the
sentiments and opinions of honourable communities German diplomacy
showed always an abysmal ignorance. In no respect was this more clear
than in its dealings with the United States of America.
At first German diplomacy adopted the idea which was embodied in the
German phrase "those idiotic Yankees"--the idea that the United States
was a kind of Wild West Show, whose simpleton rulers could be fooled
without trouble by the intelligent, the super-intelligent, Germans. When
that idea was exploded, the next to take its place was equally
foolish--that anyhow the antagonism of the United States did not matter,
for she would not make war, and if she made war the effort would be so
feeble as not to be worth considering.
Then when the grim shadow of the great American preparation was already
over the German despotism, and the greatest single white nation of the
world was seen preparing its mighty strength to the full, the German
people were asked to take comfort from yet another delusion, that the
American nation would prove to be a "quitter," that it would be
frightened off the field by the German offensive of the Spring of 1918.
The _Hamburger Echo_ voiced that delusion when it announced: "It is
curious that at this critical moment American war experts are reported
to be planning an inspection trip of the Front. It looks as though
American capitalists were growing nervous. The dollar-republic has
stolen ships which ensure her a great Fleet, but American capital is not
unlimited, hence the liquidation of the war may be contemplated."
How different the truth about that "inspection trip" which had the
effect, certainly, of impressing the American Staff with the extreme
seriousness of the campaign, but led to the result not of "quitting" but
of brigading the American troops temporarily with those of the Allies.
It was an instance of a sensible sacrifice of national vanity that has
probably no parallel in history--that decision of the Americans to allow
their soldiers to fight under British and French flags while they
learned their business.
Unhappy German people to have been fed by their leaders with such
delusions! The United States a "quitter"! Had any German read the
history of the 18th and 19th centuries--heard of Washington, of
Hamilton, of Lincoln? If the German had searched back only so far as
1861 he would have found that the nation which he was told might throw
up the sponge at the first hint of hardship and danger, faced a war
which probably, for nerve strain and call for grim resolution, surpassed
even this great war. The United States had then to fight not a foreign
foe but domestic discord. It had to set its teeth through a series of
great military disasters. It had to hold firmly to a forlorn hope,
whilst it was faced by the ever-present prospect of foreign
interference. No nation in modern times has been put to a harsher test
of courage and resolution than the United States in 1861 and the
following year. No nation in history showed a more indomitable courage.
And this was the nation that the German leaders would fain persuade
their people was likely to prove a "quitter!" I ventured to say at the
time that before the German military despotism was through with the war
it would recognise that the reluctance of the United States to enter the
war would be matched by the reluctance of the United States to go out of
the war until its purpose was finally accomplished.
* * * * *
To tell the story of the American participation in the war does not come
within the province of this work, but some of the facts can be told of
that most dramatic feature of the last stages of the Great War.
There was a very elaborate and very successful mystification of the
enemy over the time, the extent, and the equipment of American arrivals
on the Western Front. The American "Intelligence," in co-operation with
our own and the French Intelligence Branches, managed to surround these
matters with so much mystery that some of our own high Staff Officers
never knew the exact position, and strangely over-estimated the strength
of the American Force on the Western Front. There is good reason to
believe that the German High Command was completely deceived and found
its difficulties increased accordingly.
From almost the first day of the war there were a few individual
Americans fighting for the Allies. In September, 1914, I encountered two
personally with the British Army, and I suppose the actual total number
was some hundreds. Later a great many came over with the Canadian
contingents; and there was also a flying unit, which made a fine
reputation for itself. This began with a small group of Americans in the
Foreign Legion of the French Army. In the spring of 1915 the formation
of an American squadrilla was decided upon. At first the French Minister
of War was not inclined to sanction the proposition, but afterwards
decided that no international law prevented Americans from enlisting
voluntarily, in spite of their country's neutrality. The squadrilla was
to be known as the "Escadrille Américaine," and to be commanded by a
French captain. On November 16th, 1916, Colonel Barès, Chief of the
French Aviation at General Headquarters, decided that the name
"Escadrille Américaine" must be dropped and the official military
number, N124, used in future. The reason given was that Bernstorff had
protested to Washington "that Americans were fighting on the French
Front, that the French _communiqués_ contained the name 'Escadrille
Américaine,' and that these volunteer Americans pushed their brazenness
to the point of having a red Sioux Indian in full war-paint depicted on
their machines." Captain Berthaud, at the Ministry of War, suggested the
adoption of the name "Escadrille de Volontaires," but the name finally
adopted was "Lafayette Escadrille." More than 200 American volunteers
entered the Lafayette Escadrille before America joined in the war. Some
remained in the squadrilla, others were transferred to various French
units, where they frequently distinguished themselves by the brilliance
of their exploits.
All these troops, however, were strictly unofficial and of course
discountenanced by the American Government. After the American
declaration of war, American help was confined for a long time to labour
units, forestry and railway workers. It was not until May, 1918, that
there was any really considerable American fighting force in France, and
not until June, 1918, that it began to have any weight in the fighting
line, and then only as units brigaded with British and French troops. It
was the usual plan--a plan made possible by the admirable and
business-like lack of false pride among the Americans--to split up their
troops among other troops, allow them thus to be "blooded," and after
experience as platoons, companies, brigades, to retire to their own
training grounds and form "pukka" Divisions of their own.
By April 25th, 1918, there were 12,700 American troops in our lines in
France, by May 25th 79,000, by June 25th 188,000. Then the Second Army
Corps was formed and absorbed 95,000 men. The May, 1918, programme
provided for the arrival of six American Divisions within the British
zone of operations, and there actually were 108,921 American troops
attached to the British Army at the end of that month. The British Army
took responsibility for the feeding and equipment of these troops. The
system was adopted of assigning to each American Division as it arrived
a British "mother" Division, to see it through its early troubles of
transport, equipment, food and accommodation. The system worked
admirably and there was very little friction in connection with the
settling down of the Americans. Yet the task of adjustment was not easy.
The American troops had to be equipped with almost everything except
uniforms, badges and caps. The things they had were almost as much a
cause of trouble as the things they had not. The American troops had to
be gently separated from huge kits of unnecessary articles at the same
time as they were provided with necessities.
Judging from the mountainous kits of the American soldiers as they
arrived it was thought that each man carried a roll-top desk, a
typewriter, and a dictagraph in his roll. It was found impossible for
the men to march with their kits, though they were splendid physical
types and full of keenness. I saw one Division disentrain at a station
on Lines of Communication and begin a march to its camp, a distance of
about ten miles. Before half the distance had been covered a great
proportion of the men had had to give up their kits to be stored by the
road side.
One American camp was formed at Samer near Montreuil; and the town's
name was pronounced near enough to "Sammie" to make it easy to persuade
some of the soldiers that it had been named in their honour.
The Americans at first had a natural love for their own methods and
their own wonderful kit; but they were very soon convinced of what were
the practical needs of the campaign and came in time to a whole-hearted
admiration of British methods, which was perhaps the finest testimonial
that G.H.Q. could have had. These Americans coming from a great business
country confessed quite frankly that the "effete" Britisher had "got
them all beat" on questions of supply and transport; and they took over
our system in almost every detail.
Perhaps some of the points that arose will be of interest. The great
underclothing controversy was one of the most amusing. The British Army
had evolved a very practical system of keeping the troops in clean
underclothing without adding to the weight of their kits. A soldier
went up to the trenches or to his unit wearing a clean suit of
underclothes. On the first opportunity, usually within a week, the
soldier went back (on relief if he were an infantry man, on roster if he
were a special unit man) to the Baths which were set up in every
Divisional area. Here he stripped for a hot bath, and whilst he was in
the bath his uniform was cleaned, deprived of any insect population, and
pressed, and his underclothing was taken away to the laundry. He never
saw that underclothing again but drew a new suit, or a clean suit, as he
went out of the baths; and so he marched off spruce and smart. The suit
of underclothing he had left behind was thoroughly disinfected, washed,
repaired if necessary, and went then into the general stock to be issued
again.
At first the Americans could not see that such a system would work.
Their idea was for every man to carry three suits of underclothing, one
on his body two in his kit. Presumably he was expected to change in the
midst of the ghastly mud of a Flanders trench. Also presumably he was
expected to carry about his dirty suits with him, which showed a curious
degree of trust in human nature. It was objected to the British system
that "all men were not the same size," and in response it was pointed
out that neither were all the suits of underclothing kept in stock at
Divisional Baths, but that with a fair attention to the law of averages
and a reasonable surplus allowance no thin man had to go away with a fat
man's suit and no tall man with a short man's. The British system was
finally adopted and won full American approval.
Boots caused another difficulty. The British issue was one pair per man;
the American, two, the spare pair being carried in the kit. The
Americans finally agreed that if they could get for their men boots of
British quality (which was conspicuously better than the American
quality) the one pair issue would suffice.
It would be impossible to praise too highly the common-sense and
civility of the American _liaison_ officers who had to argue out these
points with our officers. They were never unreasonable, and were very
prompt in crediting our officers with politeness and good-will. That
Americans and British can get on very well together this campaign has
proved. I think that in every case where an American and a British
Division were thrown together they parted company with a marked increase
of mutual good-will and respect.
Optimism was the prevailing fault in the American organisation. They
thought that the fighting was a much simpler matter than it actually
proved to be. They thought a man could and would carry an unduly heavy
pack. They were very optimistic in the matter of accoutrements and were
anxious to use their own accoutrements when they had a barely sufficient
supply for the strength of a unit, and no reserve. They were ultimately
convinced that accoutrements in warfare have a way of disappearing, and
without a strong reserve no item of accoutrement can be kept up. When
there was no reserve of some item, British accoutrements were
substituted. It is a testimony to the quality of British equipment that
the American troops showed a desire to be provided with British articles
in substitution for their own, even when the change was not necessary.
British puttees and British breeches were cases in point.
The American troops got British rations, except that coffee took the
place of tea. One coffee-grinder per 250 men was provided. Perhaps
civilian England was puzzled over the fact that in 1918 it was
impossible to buy a coffee-grinder in this country. Now they know why.
They had all been bought up for the American troops. In all things
G.H.Q. did its very best for the Americans. They had a fancy for an
increased scale of Machine-Guns; the Machine-Guns were found for them,
though they were a precious and scarce commodity at the time and we
could not give our own Divisions the increased scale. To provide horse
transport for the Americans we stripped our Field Artillery of two
horses out of every ammunition team of six. The general principle was
that if the Americans wanted anything it had to be found somehow and
found in a hurry. Probably we won an undeserved reputation for slickness
in some matters (such as printing Army publications), for it was the
established rule to give American orders priority.
American _liaison_ officers at G.H.Q. "made good" with the British Staff
very quickly. They had a downright earnestness of manner which was very
engaging. The American Staff seemed to have been chosen strictly for
efficiency reasons and, there being no obstacles of established custom
to overcome, the best men got to the top very quickly. The appointment
of Mr. Frederick Palmer, the famous war correspondent, to a high post on
General Pershing's Intelligence Staff was an example of their way of
doing things. Colonel Palmer as war correspondent had seen much of this
and of many other wars. For his particular post he was an ideal man. But
it would be difficult to imagine him stepping at once into so high a
position in a European Army.
American rank marks were puzzling to British officers at first. An
American _liaison_ officer obliged me with a mnemonic aid to their
understanding.
"You just reckon that you are out to rob a hen-roost. Right. You climb
up one bar; that's a lieutenant. You climb up two bars: that's a
captain. When you get up to the chickens, that's the colonel" (the
colonel's badge was an eagle on the shoulder-straps). "Above the chicken
there's the stars" (a star was the badge of a general).
To the same officer I was indebted for a flattering summing up of
British character.
"I don't say you British people are over-polite. But you are reliable.
Go into a pow-wow and a British officer may strike you as a bit surly.
But if he says he'll do a thing you can reckon that thing done and no
need to worry. Some other people are very polite; and they say awfully
nicely that they'll do anything and everything you ask; and six months
after you find nothing has been done."
* * * * *
The Americans, when they got into action, first as auxiliaries of
British and French Divisions, then in their own Army organisation, were
fine fighters. Their splendid physique made them very deadly in a close
tussle, and they had a business-like efficiency in battle that did not
appeal to the Boche. A favourite American weapon at close quarters was a
shot gun sawn off short at the barrel. It was of fearful effect. The
enemy had the sublime impudence to protest against this weapon as
"contrary to the usages of civilised warfare." This was cool indeed from
the folk who made us familiar with the murder of civil hostages, the
use of civilians as fire-screens, and the employment of poison-gas as
methods of warfare. The Americans answered the impudent protest with
peremptory firmness, and kept the shot gun in use.
It was stated, too, and generally credited, though this matter did not
come within my personal observation, that the American Divisions in
their sector set up and maintained a law in regard to Machine-Gun fire.
They did not consider it fair war that a machine-gunner in an entrenched
position should keep on firing to the very last moment and then expect
to be allowed to surrender peaceably.
The Americans played the game, but they did not play it on "soft" lines,
and the enemy soon got a very wholesome respect for them. There was, in
the early stages of the American participation, an evident attempt on
the part of the German Intelligence to encourage an "atrocity" campaign
against the Americans. German atrocities had a way of casting their
shadows before. A usual method was to accuse Germany's foes in advance
of doing what the Germans proposed to undertake themselves. That was the
way in which Germany ushered in her lawless use of prisoners of war in
the firing line, and her enslavement of the civil population of occupied
Belgium and France. When the German Press engaged in "propaganda" work
on the subject of the American forces coming into action, it took the
line of representing the Americans as altogether despicable and
murderous adventurers, who had come into the war to kill Germans without
any reason whatsoever and when taken prisoners wondered "that they were
not shot on the spot, as the French had told them they would be." As one
German paper put it: "To the question why America carries on the war
against Germany they knew no answer. One can feel for our soldiers who
become enraged against this alien hand which fights against us for no
reason. Our men believe the French fight for glory and to wipe out the
stain of 1870, that Britain struggles for mastery on the sea and to
prove which of the two giants is the stronger. But the American! Our
field-greys despise him and do not recognise him as a worthy opponent,
even though he may fight bravely."
But that sort of talk was soon dropped--as was the suggestion that
American prisoners should get "special treatment" when captured. It was
rather amusing to watch from our Intelligence side the manoeuvres of the
well-drilled German Press on the subject of the Americans. Early in 1918
there was a general disposition in the German papers to write of the
Americans as tomahawkers and "scalpers" and so on. Then we learned from
our tapping of German field reports that officers commanding German
units complained that this sort of propaganda was having such a bad
effect on their men, that they "got the wind up" as soon as they knew
that Americans were in front of them. As a result a great silence
suddenly fell upon the German papers on this point.
After the Americans had formed their own Army system we did not hear so
much of them at Montreuil. But they were naturally always in close touch
with G.H.Q., and to the very end the British Administrative services
were able to give a helping hand to the American allies.
* * * * *
The Portuguese contingent remained with the British Army to the end, and
it did very well, as might have been expected; for as a race the
Portuguese have a proud record of heroism and knightly adventure. In the
Indies, the South Pacific, and the Americas, Portuguese valour has left
imperishable monuments. The British Empire in particular owes much to
such great sea captains as the Portuguese Vasco di Gama (who discovered
the sea route to India), Torres (who discovered and named Australia),
Magellan, Quiros, and Menezes.
We heard much amusing gossip at G.H.Q. from the soldiers at the Front,
who, after a critical weighing of the facts, arrived at the conclusion
that the Portuguese were "good sports." That conclusion was not come to
all at once. The British soldier is very conservative, and he was
inclined to be, for some reason or other, critical of his new allies at
first. In time "Tommy" forgave the Portuguese for having names "that
sounded like blooming prayers," which was one of his early reasons for
doubt. Here is one incident that helped to determine a favourable
verdict:
A forward post held by the Portuguese was subjected to a furious
bombardment late one afternoon by the Germans. After a while a polite
note came down from the Portuguese officer in charge of the sector
informing the British Commander that: "The enemy are heavily bombarding
our position. Accordingly we have evacuated it."
There was some inclination to criticise; it was not the withdrawal; the
best soldiers on earth have to withdraw sometimes. But the polite little
note with its "accordingly" suggested what it was not intended to
suggest, and what was not the fact at all. However, plans were at once
put in hand for artillery action, preparatory to restoring the position
next morning. But some time after nightfall those plans were put aside
on receipt of another polite little note:
"The enemy has ceased bombarding our position. Accordingly we have
re-occupied it."
When the full facts of the incident came out there was a cheer for the
Portuguese. It seems that the officer in charge was a bit of a
tactician and knew his men well. The post he had to hold was very
advanced and poorly fortified. When the enemy began to flood it with
shells he withdrew his garrison to a safe spot that he had selected, and
waited until nightfall. Then, without any artillery preparation, he led
his men forward and, with the bayonet and those deadly little daggers
that the Portuguese soldiers carried, restored the position.
An earlier incident of the Portuguese co-operation was humorous in
another way. "Tommy" had, of course, found a name for the new arrivals,
a name which was more humorous than respectful. Like all Tommy's
word-coinages it was a good one and spread into common use. High
Authority, fearful that offence would be given, issued an order, a very
portentous order, which noticed with reprobation "the habit which had
grown up" of referring to "our noble allies" as "the ---- ----." The
Order concluded with the usual warning of disciplinary action. It was to
be circulated secretly by word of mouth from officer to officer, but
some unfortunate adjutant circulated it in battalion orders so that all
could read--including the Portuguese.