THE WINTER OF OUR DISCONTENT.
The disappointments of 1916 and 1917--The collapse of Russia--The
Cambrai Battle--The German propaganda--Fears of irresolution at
Home--Reassurances from Home--Effects of the Submarine war--An
economical reorganisation at G.H.Q.--A new Quartermaster General--Good
effects of cheerfulness at Home.
The Somme campaign, 1916, had been begun with very high hopes. The main
conception of it was a sound one, to attack the German line at the point
of junction between the French and British forces, the point where,
according to all the accepted principles, the Allied line should have
been weakest but actually was not. That was the only way to bring an
element of the unexpected into a grand attack in those days of long and
laborious artillery preparations. (The Tank did not appear on the scene
until the Battle of the Somme was two months old and did not develop its
usefulness as a substitute for artillery preparation until nearly a year
later).
For the Somme battle an enormous artillery concentration was made, and
a special "Army of Pursuit" was trained in the rear of our lines to
follow through when the German line had been breached. Then there was a
preliminary bombardment of the German positions from the sea to beyond
the Somme, and, amidst many feint attacks, the British and the French
offensive north and south of the Somme was launched.
The First Battle of the Somme made the walls of Jericho quake but just
failed to bring them down. The Army of Pursuit was given no chance of
pushing to the Rhine; its energies had to be diverted towards sustaining
the attack. The fighting season closed in 1916 with the Germans still
holding their main defences but convinced, so far as the reasonable
section of their leaders were concerned, that the game was up and that
the best thing to do was to work for a peace on the best terms possible.
[Illustration: ON THE RAMPARTS]
Thus 1916 was a somewhat disappointing year; 1917 was even more so. The
fighting season, that year, closed with the Allied cause in a worse
position than in 1916 and with Germany correspondingly encouraged. There
would have been some reasonable excuse if in the winter of 1917-18 tails
drooped at G.H.Q. The weather was particularly vile. Every day the winds
that howled over the bleak hill-top seemed to have come straight from
Russia and Germany, bringing with them a moral as well as a physical
cold. The casualty lists of the Autumn were not cheerful to ponder over;
and it was singularly depressing to hear from Home that in some
political circles those casualty lists were being conned over with the
idea of founding on them a case against the Army.
Nobody was inclined to try to represent the late Autumn campaign as
altogether satisfactory. But it was felt by the soldiers that "they had
done their durn'dest, angels can do no more;" and that there was not
sufficient appreciation of the fact at Home that with Russia down and
out, France in a very bad way, Italy tottering, the British Army had had
to step into the breach, had had to take a gruelling without being able
to accomplish much more than defence.
It had seemed in 1916 that the time had arrived for Germany to pay the
penalty. But a triumph not of a military kind came to her rescue. The
German methods of espionage and civil corruption were on the whole as
blundering and as disastrous as her other methods during the Great War.
They helped to alienate practically all the civilised neutral world. But
in Russia--mystic, generous, trusting Russia--they had an unhappy
success. In the Autumn of 1916 this first showed. Roumania at that time
joined in the war against Germany, and this new accession of strength
apparently marked the near end of the war. But Russia mysteriously
collapsed owing to the effects of German corruption. Roumania was left
"in the air," and a large part of her territory was over-run. From this
date, though many of the gallant soldiers of Russia made heroic efforts
to safeguard their country's honour, that great Ally was practically out
of the fight. By the winter of 1917-18 she was quite out. The French had
had grave troubles. The Italians had had to send out an S.O.S. signal.
We should have been more cheerful if the Cambrai attack, 1917, had had
the full success it deserved. That really was in its conception and
execution a very fine affair. At the time Germany was drawing troops and
guns from the Russian Front and pouring them on to our Front in
wholesale fashion. Both France and Great Britain had had to send Armies
to the help of Italy. Our Battle of Passchendaele was not exactly
flourishing. To undertake a new battle was the last development the
enemy expected of us; and to do what is absolutely unexpected is to do
the big thing in war. The British command collected an Army ostensibly
for Italy, made a great secret assemblage of Tanks, and suddenly
attacked the Germans in the strongest part of their Hindenburg line.
Their line was particularly strong at that point. It comprised three
series of defences each one covered by triple barriers of wire from 50
to 60 yards deep. A system of dug-outs (constructed with the labour of
Russian prisoners) at a depth of 50 feet below the surface made an
underground city with water and electric light installations, kitchens,
drying-rooms and the like. Above the surface the houses were closely
packed with the earth removed from the excavations, and thus became
great earthworks indestructible by any shell-fire.
All this the British Third Army, in a surprise attack carried out by the
Tanks and the Infantry, over-ran and captured in a day's attack. So
fierce was the British advance and so feeble the German defence _when
taken by surprise_ that we almost got into Cambrai. If that centre had
been won the German Front in the West would have been deprived of its
central pillar. The German defence, however, rallied in time to avoid
absolute disaster. When the German military mind was given time to think
it could always make a good show, and the _riposte_ to our Cambrai
attack was a good one. We lost most of the fruits of a dramatic _coup_.
It was more than annoying to think that just when we had successfully
solved the problem of a break-through we had not the means, owing to
commitments elsewhere, to push the thrust home.
* * * * *
Cambrai was a good deal "boomed" in the English Press at the time on
"popular" lines. But I do not think that the skill of generalship and
organisation that it showed were quite appreciated. The favourite
British pose of being a complete ass, altogether inferior to the "other
fellow," used to be pushed to the extreme point in regard to military
matters. The British had a quaint humility in respect to their military
skill. In a shame-faced kind of way they admitted that their soldiers
were brave; but for examples of military genius they always referred to
the "other fellow." Yet one may be daring enough, perhaps, to say
something on the other side; and to suggest that in the Great War the
German was really surpassed in most points of military skill by the
British. The difference was not always great, but where the difference
was greatest was just in those points of invention, of new tactics and
new strategy, which show the better brain. Heresy it will seem; but the
truth is that from 1914 to 1918 the British military system showed
itself superior to the German in resource and sagacity. Perhaps it would
be better to say the British-French military system, for it is difficult
to separate the achievement of one from the other.
Consider one by one the main features of the great campaign. The warfare
in the air was its most dramatic feature. Everything of air tactics and
strategy that the German used he copied from the British and French. It
was the British who originated aeroplane attack with incendiary bullets
on captive balloons, aeroplane escort of attacking infantry, aeroplane
sallies at low altitude on enemy trenches, and the various combinations
of observing machines with fighting machines. In the first battle of the
Somme, when the British and French first disclosed their sky tactics,
the German was absolutely driven out of the air. He had then to learn to
copy all our methods; and he originated none of his own.
Another dramatic feature, the complicated and terribly effective
artillery curtain fire, was evolved by the British-French command. It
was copied by the Germans, who themselves contributed nothing new to
artillery science during the war. Yet another leading feature was the
Tank, the Tank which made its real value first felt at Cambrai. This was
a purely British invention, evolved during this war for the needs of
this war.
* * * * *
Our "Winter of discontent" was not made any sweeter by the suspicion
that existed of a possible yielding on the part of the political powers
at Home to German propaganda. This German propaganda took the form of
blazoning the preparations for a sensational Spring offensive in 1918;
it was trumpeted like a Fat Woman at a Fair, and supplemented by an
almost equally strident advertisement of a gigantic defensive. In
addition to preparing a great on-rush in which Calais, Paris, Rome, and
perhaps London were to be captured, the German High Command wished the
world to know that it was also preparing a mighty series of defensive
positions back to the Rhine. Wonderful showmen! They had not only the
most marvellous Fat Woman, but also a miraculous Skeleton Man. And the
prize they wished to win, by bluff if not by fighting, was agreement to
an inconclusive peace.
The soldiers were not affected much by these tactics. They took solid
comfort from two facts. The first fact was expressed in the homely
proverb "Much cry, little wool." Had the Germans been confident that
they could smash through the steel wall which barred them on the West
from the sea, from the capitals of civilisation, and from the supplies
of raw material for which they were starving, there would have been no
preliminary advertisement. The effort would have been made, and
Germany's enemies would have had to abide by the result. There would not
have been any compunction at the consequent cost in blood. The mere
extravagance of the advertisement of the German plans was proof to the
soldiers at G.H.Q. that those plans were recognised not to have a solid
enough military foundation, and had to be reinforced by showy bluff.
The second fact which gave solid comfort was that in any comparison at
all of forces the German group was inferior to the West
European-American group. There was not any doubt at G.H.Q. Indeed the
more the Germans protested of what they were going to do in the Spring
of 1918 the more firm was G.H.Q. in believing that the enemy was at last
coming to the end of his resources and was anxious to "bluff" a peace
rather than "show" a weak hand.
But it was feared that the people at Home might take the other view, and
it had to be admitted that the German put up a very strong bluff.
Perhaps its cleverest form at the time was in the discussion of "peace
terms"--a discussion in which it was presumed that the German would
impose a victorious peace before the summer of 1918. A characteristic
discussion--G.H.Q. kept a close eye on the German press and minutely
examined every German paper published during the war--would begin with
some Prince pointing out the minimum indemnity that Germany should exact
from her foes, and explaining in what form it should be exacted.
Germany's need, it would be pointed out, would be for raw materials,
food, cotton, wool, rubber, tobacco, silk and the like. It was these
that must be supplied to Germany by way of indemnity. They would have to
be supplied not free, but at a price 20 per cent. lower than the current
market price, and the annual value of this discount would only reach
the modest sum of £50,000,000 a year.
To have had to provide yearly a tribute of any kind to Germany would of
course have taken away the independence of the Allies completely. They
would have been put in the position of admitting a German suzerainty,
and would have become as the oppressed Christian provinces of the old
Turkish Empire. But to provide this tribute of raw material, the
discount on which at 20 per cent. would be £50,000,000 a year, would
have been to engage to send to Germany yearly raw materials of her
choice to the value of £250,000,000. This would have been the first call
on the farms, the mines, the shipping of the Allies, and only after that
call was met would the Allies have been able to begin to supply their
own larders and their own factories.
That was one direction the German Peace Propaganda took. The idea of it
was, presumably, to strike terror into our hearts, to make us welcome
with something like relief the actual official terms of a peace
negotiation when they came to be promulgated.
Then someone in Germany would take the other side. Assuming with
absolute cock-sureness that Germany must win the war in the Spring of
1918, this publicist would affect to regret the savage terms of peace
imposed upon Russia. These terms, it was argued, did not represent the
considered wishes of the German people. But in war the wisdom of the
statesmen was pushed aside by the eagerness of the soldiers. The German
politicians were overwhelmed in regard to the Russian peace because the
Russian had allowed things to go too far. But if only the Western Powers
would agree to negotiate for peace _now_, the "reasonable German
politicians" would be able to assert their authority. There would be no
ruthless military conditions such as were imposed upon Russia. Sweetly
and moderately the Germans would frame their terms; but the Powers of
the Entente must "put the war into liquidation at once." Delay would
mean that the "reasonable German politicians" would lose their power to
restrain the military party.
G.H.Q. remembered the old fable about certain trustful animals being
invited to pay friendly visits to the cave of a beast of prey. One wise
animal noticed that whilst there were many tracks of visitors going into
the cave there were no tracks of visitors coming out. We had noticed
that a free Russia went into negotiation with Germany to conclude a
friendly and reasonable peace on terms of "no annexations and no
indemnities." No free Russia came out.
But G.H.Q. was honestly alarmed for a time that resolution would be
shaken at Home, and welcomed with joy (as the Germans did with rage),
the firm declarations of the Versailles Council of the Allies and the
unshaken confidence and resolution shown in the speech from the Throne
at the prorogation of the British Parliament.
As soon as the Home political situation was seen to be clear, G.H.Q. set
about preparing for the "wrath to come" with a good deal of cheerfulness
and with some amusement that the German propaganda should, as a final
kick, make a strong though forlorn effort to revive the old story that
Great Britain contemplated the seizure from France of Calais and the
department of Pas-de-Calais. "Even," said the German Wireless about this
time, "if it is not openly admitted that the English will never
voluntarily evacuate the French port of Calais, which they have
occupied--" etc., etc.
This lie revived in our Mess between British and French _liaison_
officers an old topic of humorous conversation. For when this particular
lie was burdening the German Wireless some time before, a British
General was showing to a French General the arrangements of the British
Base at Etaples. He exhibited with pride the great bath houses for the
men, built of concrete and "good for a hundred years." "Ah yes, very
solid--good for a hundred years," said the French General, laughing.
Then they both laughed.
* * * * *
Christmas, 1917, was celebrated with the usual British merriment at
G.H.Q., and on New Year's Day everybody's cheerful greeting was "That
this year may see the end of the war." But I think there were few
officers of standing who thought that a peace Christmas was possible in
1918. No one would contemplate the possibility of losing the war, of
stopping on any terms short of a German surrender; but few could see any
possibility of victory near ahead. There were thick clouds all round the
horizon. Russia was finished. Italy was not cheerful. France was
recovering but not yet showing sure signs of emergence from that fit of
depression out of which M. Clemenceau was to pull her--the soul of a
Richelieu in his frail body.
The worst symptom of all from the point of view of the British Army was
the threat of a shortness of supplies. Just when the collapse of Russia
had allowed the enemy to concentrate his full strength on the Western
Front, the great reservoir of British wealth, which was the main
financial resource of the Alliance, showed signs of not being
inexhaustible. There was a call at the same time for greater preparation
and greater economy. From the beginning of 1918 there were two great
cross-currents of correspondence between G.H.Q. and the Home Government,
one demanding new weapons, new defences, new equipment, the other
demanding rigid economy in steel, in timber, in shipping space, in
food, in oil, in expenditure generally. This was partly due to actual
lack of money and of credit. But in the main it was the result of the
submarine war.
It was at the end of 1915 that the German Admiralty prepared a
memorandum arguing that if unrestricted submarine war were adopted as a
policy (_i.e._, sinking everything, hostile or neutral, warship or
passenger ship), then Great Britain would be compelled to sue for peace
within six months. The memorandum gave various statistics regarding food
supplies, tonnage, etc., to prove this hypothesis. The memorandum was
forwarded to the Imperial Chancellor, and by him sent to Dr. Helfferich,
Secretary of State for Finance, for a report. Dr. Helfferich reported
adversely. He was not convinced that Great Britain would be brought to
her knees. He feared the effect upon neutral nations of such a policy.
The German Admiralty persisted in its view. Thereupon the matter was
submitted for report to ten experts representing finance, commerce,
mining, and agriculture. These experts were asked to advise (1) as to
the probable effect upon Great Britain (2) as to the probable effect
upon Germany's relations with neutrals and (3) as to how far the
situation in Germany demanded the employment of such a weapon.
All these experts agreed that the effect on Great Britain would be to
force her to sue for peace within six months or less. Indeed, Herr
Müller, President of the Dresden Bank, thought that Great Britain would
collapse within three months. All the experts also agreed as to the
third point of reference, arguing that Germany's position was so
difficult that the most desperate measures were necessary to end the
war. Herr Engelhardt, of Mannheim, Councillor of Commerce, thought the
economic position of Germany so bad that a few weeks' delay might render
even ruthless submarine war useless. On the second point, the effect on
relations with neutrals, the experts were divided. Some thought that the
United States would be driven to war, others thought not. In all cases
they did not see a reason against ruthless submarine war in their
possible relations with any neutral.
But the fateful decision was not taken until February, 1917, when the
destruction of peaceful shipping, whether of enemy or of neutral
countries, was ordered. It did not end the war in six months, nor in
twelve months; but by the beginning of 1918 there were some very serious
difficulties of supply just when the strictly military position demanded
the most generous effort.
I wonder if those experts who bandy to and fro explanations and
accusations in regard to the German break-through in the Spring of 1918
ever have looked at the matter from the point of view of supply, of the
supply, say, of one sternly necessary item of defence, wire? At a
careful computation we wanted 12,000 tons of barbed wire in January,
1918, and 10,000 more tons in February, 1918, to give our men a
reasonable chance of holding the line which we knew to be threatened. Of
that total of 22,000 tons we actually got 7,700 tons, _i.e._, 35 per
cent. of what was needed.
I do not quote this fact to start another quarrel, shuttle-cocking blame
from soldier to politician. I am more than ready to believe that the
people at Home were then doing their best (as, _pace_ all grousers, I
believe they did their best from August, 1914, to November, 1918). But
you cannot spin out wire like you spin out talk, especially barbed wire.
The British soldier can, with his mere flesh and blood, and that gay
courage of his, do wonders in the way of making up for want of material.
But he could not hold up the attacked sector in the Spring of 1918
against overwhelming odds; and one of the reasons was that he had not
enough wire in front of him. He had not the wire in front of him because
it had not been, _could not be_, supplied.
How anxious was the task of G.H.Q. at the dawn of 1918 may be
illustrated with these heads of correspondence, in and out.
To G.H.Q. from Home.
The greatest economy in steel is urged.
The position in regard to shipping is serious; the strictest
economy in everything is necessary.
Lubricants are hard to get. We urge the greatest economy.
From G.H.Q. to Home.
More machine-guns are urgently needed.
There is a shortage of blankets; there is a shortage of 8,000
tons of barbed wire. New searchlights are needed; 300,000 box
respirators are needed for the American Forces.
I could fill many pages with matter of the same sort. The poison of the
submarine war began to have its cumulative effect just when we were
getting the most peremptory reminders that Supply was going to be the
determining factor of the final struggle, that war had become more and
more a matter of striking at the enemy's life by striking at "the means
whereby he lives." Munitions, food, equipment, railways, roads,
ships--these had become the most important factors, and victory would
incline to the Force which could best concentrate the means to maintain
an overwhelming force at some particular point, which could best
develop, conserve, and transport its material. The field for the
strategist had moved more and more from the Front line towards the Base.
Fortunately, the British Army in France had for its Q.M.G. at this
crisis a man with the courage and the knowledge to carry through a
drastic reorganisation of the Supply and Transport services.
Lieutenant-General Sir Travers Clarke, who took over as Q.M.G., France,
at the end of 1917, was a daring experiment on Lord Haig's part; for he
was a comparative youngster to be put into a post which was then the
most anxious and onerous in the Army, and his actual substantive rank
was that of a major; but he was an acting Major-General with a fine
record in a minor theatre of the war. Lord Haig knew his man well,
though, and, what was just as necessary, knew how to back his man. He
put Sir Travers Clarke in the saddle and kept him there in spite, I have
no doubt, of many thunderous protests from influential quarters, for Sir
Travers Clarke was a ruthless reformer and a stubborn upholder of any
course of action he thought necessary. A character sketch of him that
appeared in the _Morning Post_ in 1919 is worth quoting in part:
[Illustration: LIEUT-GENERAL SIR TRAVERS CLARKE]
"'That big young man,' was a leading American officer's term to describe
Sir Travers Clarke after he had met him in France in Conference, and had
not caught his name. British G.H.Q. perhaps only learned to appreciate
the Q.M.G. fully from the comments of foreign officers who came into
touch with him in 1918. The masterful man took his power so quietly,
came to big decisions with such an air of ease, such an absence of
anything dramatic or violent, that it was a little difficult to
understand his full strength.
"'T.C.'--as often before remarked, the British Army must reduce
everything and everyone to initials--as a regimental officer in the
'Nineties never seemed to get an opening. Nor did his early Staff work
bring him much recognition. But an officer of his to-day, who was a
clerk under him when he was first a Staff Captain, insists that he
always gave the impression of great power in reserve. 'He believed in
the British Army, in hard work, and in himself.' That was the foundation
of the career of a man who, once an opening showed, forged ahead with
marvellous speed to his destiny.
"It took 'T.C.' ten years to become a major; within the next ten years
he had become Lieutenant-General and Quartermaster-General to the
British Armies in France. One year in that post, a year in which were
crowded all the experiences that a great Army could have, marked him as
a great leader of men and a superb organiser. How much the Allied
victory owes to him a grateful country will not appreciate fully until
not only the British but also the French and American campaigns are
analysed.
"'T.C.' had the ideal personality for a military leader. You were always
dreadfully afraid of him and sincerely fond of him. No general ever
made sterner demands on his officers and men. If you could not stand up
to a gruelling day's work and come up smiling for the next day's and the
next day's, until the need had passed, you were no use, and you moved on
to some less exacting sphere. But you were working under a worker, and
you found yourself part of a massive machine which was rolling flat all
obstacles. That made it easy. Further, there was the most generous
appreciation of good work and a keen personal sympathy.
"Sir Travers Clarke has one rule to which he never permitted an
exception: that it is the fighting man who has to be considered first
and last. In France he was quite willing that the Staff should labour to
the extreme point of endurance to take any of the load off the man in
the trenches. He did not like about him men, however clever, who had not
seen fighting. It was the first duty of the Staff, he insisted, to enter
with the completest sympathy into the feelings and the difficulties of
the fighting man. 'Bad Staff work mostly arises from not knowing the
differences between an office and a trench,' was one of his aphorisms."
* * * * *
This is not a history of the war; nor a contribution to any of the
numerous war controversies; it is merely a sketch of life at G.H.Q. as
it appeared to a Staff Officer; but I cannot help obtruding a reply to
some current criticisms of Lord Haig: that he was too inclined to stand
by his officers, that he was reluctant to "butcher" a man, and that in
consequence he did not get the highest standard of efficiency.
Faithfulness to his friends and servants was certainly a marked
characteristic of Lord Haig as Commander-in-Chief. He chose his men
cautiously and, I believe, with brilliant insight. Having chosen them he
stood by them faithfully in spite of press or political or service
thunderings, unless he was convinced that they were not equal to their
work.
It is a characteristic which, even allowing that there was an odd case
of over-indulgence, of giving a man a little too much benefit of the
doubt, worked on the whole for the good. Men do not do their best work
with ropes round their necks; and I believe that a great newspaper
magnate whose motto at first was "Sack, Sack, Sack," very soon found out
that it was a mistake.
In this particular instance I suppose the Commander-in-Chief had
powerful urging often enough to "butcher" his Q.M.G., who did things of
so disturbing a character. He did not; and the event proved him right,
as it did in practically every one of his great trusts during the war.
* * * * *
Reorganisation of Supply and Transport filled the attention of G.H.Q.
during the early months of 1918. Over a curiously wide range of subjects
swept a wave of reform and retrenchment. As I have already told, there
was a definite organisation to collect the salvage of the battlefields,
an organisation which saved millions of money in rags, bottles,
waste-paper, swill, bones and grease as well as in the more obvious
matters of shell-cases and derelict arms and ammunition. An Agricultural
Directorate was set to work to grow potatoes and oats and vegetables and
other food stuffs behind the lines. Rations were judiciously reduced, a
substantial difference being left in favour of the man in the actual
fighting line as compared with the man at the Base. The supply of
certain luxuries at the E.F. canteens was stopped or limited, but it was
provided that the man in the fighting line should suffer less from this
than the man at the Base. Weekly conferences were instituted to discuss
the most economical use of labour, of material and of plant. Every
matter great and small had searching attention, and the British Army
began to be run like an up-to-date competitive business. Some of the
injudicious laughed. They christened the General in charge of Salvage
"O.C. Swills" and "Rags and Bones." They could not "see" a Colonel whose
mission in life was to cut down laundry costs and arrange for the
darning of the men's socks when they came out of the wash.
But all these things had to do with the winning of the war. It is a fact
that if the lavishness of 1914-15-16-17 had been carried into 1918 we
could not have won the war, because we should have been bankrupt of
material.
G.H.Q. at the dawn of the Spring of 1918 was very serious in mind, but
not so much so as to fail to get some amusement as well as interest out
of the various new ideas in military administration; and fully confident
now that the people at Home were going to stick it out. In this
connection there was often mentioned with cheerfulness a London
bye-election towards the end of 1917 for an area which had had special
attention from the German air-raids. Some rather expected to see a
candidate come forward from among the little group known as "Pacifists,"
who would seek votes on the plea that the best way to stop air-raids
quickly and to get out of the discomforts of the war would be to meet
half-way the proposals of the Germans who were trying for an
inconclusive peace.
What actually happened was quite different. A candidate came forward
under the banner of the Government, pledged to the Government's
programme of carrying on the war until German militarism was crushed and
Germany made reparation for the ruin she had wrought in Europe. This
candidate had the support of both the old political parties. Against him
there came out another candidate. Did this candidate seek to win votes
by pleading for a friendly consideration of Germany's hypocritical peace
proposals? He did not. From what one could gather of the feeling of the
electorate, if he had done so he would have been ducked in the nearest
pond. No, his appeal was based on the plea that the Government candidate
did not go far enough in hostility to Germany, and that that gentleman
was not fully in favour of carrying to German homes the dastardly
air-war which Germany waged on a civilian population.
Then a third candidate appeared on the scene. He was not for any
half-hearted policy. His cry to the electors was that neither of the
other two candidates was sufficiently earnest in regard to the war
against Germany. His programme was of one clause only, the necessity of
bombing Germany out of her barbarism. He did not believe that any method
of sweet reasonableness was of any use. A thousand tons of bombs daily
on Berlin, and a ration in proportionate scale on other German towns,
was his idea.
Women speakers came to take part in the contest. Did they advocate
making concessions to the German desire to sneak away from the
consequences of the crime of 1914? They did not. They were more vigorous
than any of the men speakers in demanding a full measure of reprisal on
Germany. No one throughout the whole contest whispered "peace."
It was altogether inspiriting. Here was a chance to see what the people
of England, the people who stood behind the Army and the Navy and were
our ultimate supports, felt about the war. We could see that they were
utterly resolute, with not a sign of weariness, nor of fear, nor of
tolerance for a craven peace. Their message was "Fight on, Fight on.
Bring us home a real peace. We will put up with everything the Boche can
do; we will carry on. But no palter, no surrender. Finish the job you
are at."
The English people terrorised? Not a bit of it. They were only getting
their blood up. And G.H.Q. saw that and was comforted.
There was also a good deal of solid comfort in the way that London took
the bitter experience of "rations." We never had any food scarcity in
the Army and, going on leave, officer or soldier had a food card that
guaranteed him a good holiday supply. So we were in the best position to
appreciate the cheerful way in which Great Britain took the very thin
gruel of ration times. Every officer coming back from leave expressed
his glowing admiration of civilian patience.
Those German agents in London who relieved the tedium of the war for the
Allies by reporting to Berlin such "happenings" as the Battle of Oxford
Street and the destruction of whole quarters of London by air attacks,
set out, for the fooling of the German public, some fine accounts of
dismay and discontent caused by food tickets. But as a matter of truth,
London on rations surprised and gratified the most cheerful optimists.
The old city "took her medicine" not only with patience but with an
actual gaiety.
To sum up: between the close of the fighting season of 1917 and the
beginning of that of 1918, G.H.Q. was at first a little depressed at the
thought that political developments would prevent the Army from seeing
the job through in a satisfactory way; was subsequently reassured as to
the feeling of the civilian population; and thereafter faced the future
with complete confidence.