THE TREVILIAN RAID
The contents of this chapter constitute the latest contribution of the
author to the literature of the events recorded in this book. Much of
that which has gone before and all of what follows was written many
years ago. But in this final draft, every line has been revised. Time
and the ripeness of years have tempered and mellowed prejudice; the
hasty and sometimes intemperate generalizations of comparative youth
have been corrected by maturer judgment; something of ill-advised
comment and crudity has been eliminated. Many of his conclusions and
even the accuracy of some of his statements of fact, he realizes fully,
may not remain unchallenged; yet it has been his honest endeavor and
purpose to give, so far as in him lies, a truthful and impartial recital
of those salient memories that remain to him of the stirring experiences
of the youthful days when, as a boy he "followed the fortunes of the boy
general" in the campaigns of 1863-64, in the great civil war.
The outlines of the sketches herein made have been drawn from the
official "records of the rebellion" which have been carefully consulted;
the details for the most part have been taken from the storehouse of a
somewhat retentive memory; something of color and atmosphere necessarily
has been left to the imagination. It is a picture that he would present,
rather than a dry recital of dates and places, or a mere table of
statistics. The importance of these things need not be lessened by
seeking to give them an attractive form.
The writer must confess, also to an ambition to contribute something,
albeit but a little, toward giving to the Michigan cavalry brigade the
place in history which it richly earned; so that it may receive in its
due proportions the credit which it deserves for the patriotic and
valiant services rendered on so many battle fields. And especially does
it seem to be to him a duty to do this for the regiment in which it was
his privilege and good luck to serve.
This ambition, however, was nearly stifled, soon after its birth, by an
experience very galling to the pride of a well meaning, if sensitive and
fallible historian.
It was something like twenty years ago that a paper on the battle of
Cedar Creek, prepared with conscientious care and scrupulous fidelity to
the facts as the writer understood them, was mailed to General Wesley
Merritt, with the request, couched in modest and courteous phrase, that
he point out after having read it any inaccuracies of statement that he
might make a note of, as the article was intended for publication.
The distinguished cavalry officer replied, in a style that was bland,
that he had "long since ceased to read fiction;" that he no longer read
"even the Century war articles;" that an officer one month would give
his version of things which another officer in a subsequent number of
the same magazine would stoutly contradict; and that he was heartily
tired of the whole business.
General Merritt was, however, good enough to give in detail his reasons
for dissenting from the writer's account of a certain episode of the
battle, and his letter lent emphasis to the discussion in one of the
early chapters of this volume concerning men occupying different points
of view in a battle. This particular matter will be more fully treated
in its proper place. One must not be too sure of what he sees with his
own eyes and hears with his own ears, unless he is backed by a cloud of
witnesses.
Moreover this was notice plain as holy writ, that no mere amateur in the
art of war may presume, without the fear of being discredited, to have
known and observed that which did not at the time come within the scope
of those who had a recognized status as professional soldiers and find
its way into their official reports. Indeed, a very high authority as
good as told the writer in the war records office in Washington that no
man's memory is as good as the published record, or entitled to any
weight at all when not in entire harmony therewith.
It is evident that this rule, though perhaps a proper and necessary
one, to protect the literature of the war against imposition and fraud,
may very easily bar out much that is valuable and well worth writing, if
not indispensable to a fair and complete record, provided it can in some
way be accredited and invested with the stamp of truth.
It was quite possible for brigade and even regimental commanders, not to
draw the line finer still, to have experiences on the battle field of
which their immediate superiors were not cognizant; nor is it necessary
to beg the question by arguing that all commanding officers were allowed
to exercise a discretion of their own within certain limits.
Official reports were oftentimes but hastily and imperfectly sketched
amidst the hurry and bustle of breaking camp; or on the eve of battle,
when the mind might be occupied with other things of immediate and
pressing importance. Sometimes they were prepared long afterwards, when
it was as difficult to recall the exact sequence and order of events as
it would be after the lapse of years. Some of the "youngsters" of those
days failed to realize the value their reports would have in after years
as the basis for making history. Others were so unfortunate as to have
them "lost in transit" so that, although they were duly and truly
prepared and forwarded through the official channels, they never found
their way into the printed record.
Attention already has been called to the absence of reports of the
commanders of the Michigan cavalry brigade regiments for the Gettysburg
campaign. General George B. Davis, U.S. army, when in charge of the war
records office in Washington, told the writer that he had noticed this
want and wondered at it. He could not account for it. A like misfortune
befell the same regiments when they participated in the Kilpatrick raid.
Only a part of their reports covering the campaign of 1864, including
the Trevilian raid, were published. In this respect the Sixth Michigan
suffered more than either of the others. Not a single report of the
operations of that regiment for that period, appears in the record,
though they were certainly made as required. General Custer's reports
cover that regiment, of course, as they do the others in the brigade,
but it is unfortunate that these are not supplemented by those of the
regimental commander. Until the volumes successively appeared, he was
not aware of this defect; nor did he ever receive from any source an
intimation of it, or have opportunity to supply the deficiency. Hence,
it appeals to him as a duty to remedy, so far as it can be done at this
late day, the omissions in the record as published of this gallant
regiment.
From the beginning to the end of the campaign of 1864, in Virginia--from
the Wilderness, May 4, to Cedar Creek, October 19--except for a single
month when he was in command of the brigade, the writer was present with
and commanded the Sixth Michigan cavalry. Not a single day was he
absent from duty, nor did he miss a battle or skirmish in which the
regiment was engaged. Reports were made, but as we have shown they did
not find their way into the war department. No copies were retained, so
there is a hiatus in the record. There are numerous cases of a similar
kind. Some officers, there is reason to believe, were smart enough to
seek and were given the opportunity to restore the missing links.
The Trevilian raid resulted from the seeming necessity of drawing the
confederate cavalry away from the front of the army of the Potomac while
the movement of the latter from the Chickahominy to the James was in
progress. Sheridan was ordered to take two divisions and proceed to
Charlottesville, on the Virginia Central railroad. Incidentally he was
to unite there with the force operating under General Hunter in the
direction of Lynchburg. He decided to take the First and Second
divisions (Gregg and Torbert). Wilson with the Third division was to
remain with the army, taking his orders directly from General Meade.
As we have seen, the expeditionary force, before making the start, was
at Newcastle Ferry, on the south bank of the Pamunkey river. Three days'
rations to last five days were ordered to be taken in haversacks; also
two days' forage strapped to the pommels of the saddles; one hundred
rounds of ammunition--forty on the person, sixty in wagons; one medical
wagon and eight ambulances; Heaton's and Pennington's batteries; and a
pontoon train of eight boats. The brigade commanders were: Custer,
Merritt, Devin, Davies and Irvin Gregg. In the Michigan brigade there
had been some changes since Cold Harbor. Colonel Alger had returned and
resumed command of his regiment. Major Melvin Brewer, of the First
Michigan, had been promoted to lieutenant colonel and assigned to
command of the Seventh Michigan, his appointment dating June 6.
There is a certain something about the events of that war that makes
them stand out in bold relief, like architectural images on the facade
of an edifice. They throw all other recollections of a lifetime into the
shade. As I sit at my desk writing, with memory at elbow as a prompter,
it is difficult to believe that today (May 7, 1908) it lacks but one
short month of being forty-four years since those preparations were
making on the banks of the Pamunkey river for a cavalry expedition in
some respects more strenuous, more difficult than any which had preceded
it. Yet those incidents are burned into the memory, and it seems that,
after all, it may have been but yesterday, so deep and lasting were the
impressions then produced. As the well focused optical image is
transferred to a sensitized surface, reproducing the picture, so were
those scenes fixed in the mind with photographic certainty, to be
retained as long as memory lasts, somewhat faded by time, it may be, but
complete in outline if not in details.
The campaign of the previous month had been a hard one for the cavalry.
Aside from the fact that he was leaving one third of his force behind,
Sheridan's corps had been decimated. A large number of his troopers had
been killed and wounded, or rendered hors de combat in other ways. The
horses had suffered terribly and many of them had been shot. So only
about half the number of mounted men fit for duty that followed the
colors of the cavalry corps out of the Wilderness, May 8, marched across
the Pamunkey on the pontoon bridge, June 6. Readers who have followed
this narrative through the preceding chapters will readily understand
this.
Sheridan's plan[27] was to move along the north bank of the North Anna
to a point opposite Trevilian Station, on the Virginia Central railroad;
then cross the North Anna by one of the bridges or fords, and by a rapid
movement capture the station, destroy the railroad from Louisa
Courthouse to Gordonsville, and proceed thence to Charlottesville, where
the expected junction with Hunter was to be made. If this plan should
succeed, the two forces thus united were to advance on Lynchburg and do
what, as a matter of fact, Sheridan did not accomplish until the spring
of 1865. Instead of marching to Charlottesville, Hunter went the other
way, and that feature of the expedition was a failure. Breckinridge's
corps of infantry was sent to Gordonsville, the confederate cavalry
succeeded in interposing between that place and Trevilian Station and
Sheridan advanced no farther than the latter point.
[Illustration: WADE HAMPTON]
Sheridan's march began on the morning of June 7. Passing between the
Pamunkey and the Mattapony rivers, he reached Polecat station on the
Richmond and Potomac (Fredericksburg) railroad the evening of June 8,
and encamped there for the night. The next day the march was resumed,
passing through Chilesburg to the North Anna, and along the bank of that
river to Young's Mills, where the entire command bivouacked. June 10, he
journeyed to Twyman's store and crossed the North Anna at Carpenter's
Ford, near Miner's bridge, between Brock's bridge and New bridge,
encamping for the night on the road leading past Clayton's store to
Trevilian Station.
In the meantime, as soon as Sheridan's movement was discovered two
divisions of confederate cavalry (Hampton's and Fitzhugh Lee's) under
Hampton--the latter's division commanded by Butler--started by the
direct road between the Annas for Gordonsville, for the purpose of
intercepting Sheridan. Breckinridge timed his movements to make his line
of march parallel with that of Sheridan. Hampton, having the shorter
distance to cover, although he started two days later than his
adversary, was able to anticipate the latter in arriving, and was
between Gordonsville and Trevilian Station the night that Sheridan
crossed the North Anna. Fitzhugh Lee at the same time was near Louisa
Courthouse, the two confederate commanders thus being separated by a
distance of some six or seven miles on the evening of June 10. The
federal cavalry was all together and in position favorable for
preventing a union of the confederate forces by a sudden movement in the
morning. Both commanders were looking for a battle on the following day
and had made their plans accordingly.
Hampton had with him the three brigades of Rosser, Butler and Young;
while the other division consisted of the brigades of Lomax and Wickham.
It will thus be seen that, while the federal commander had a much
smaller force than that which followed him on the raid of the previous
month, his opponent was able to meet him with nearly twice the relative
strength with which Stuart confronted him at Yellow Tavern. In other
words, while Stuart fought him with the three brigades of Lomax, Wickham
and Gordon (Hampton not being present) the latter at Trevilian Station
had five brigades, including the big South Carolina brigade which fought
so gallantly at Haw's Shop. More than that, Breckinridge's infantry was
behind the cavalry, ready to reinforce it, if needed.
Sheridan's camp was in the woods north of Clayton's store, and extending
eastward as far as Buck Chiles's farm, Gregg on his left, Torbert on the
right. His plan was to advance on Trevilian Station, at an early hour on
the morning of June 11, by the direct road from Clayton's store. It was
given to Gregg to look out for Fitzhugh Lee, who was expected to come
into the action from the direction of Louisa Courthouse.
Hampton planned to advance from Trevilian Station with his own division
and attack Sheridan at Clayton's store. Lee was to take the road from
Louisa Courthouse to the same point and form on Hampton's right. A
glance at the map will show that the two roads intersect. Still another
country road runs from Louisa Courthouse to Trevilian Station.
Sheridan formed his line of battle with Merritt on the right, Devin to
Merritt's left, Custer and Gregg, en echelon, still farther to the left.
Custer covered the road toward Louisa Courthouse. The Seventh Michigan
picketed that road during the night. At a very early hour the pickets of
that regiment were attacked by Lee's advance. The First Michigan was
sent to reinforce the Seventh. One brigade of Gregg's division was also
sent out to meet Lee. The other one was formed on Devin's left. Sheridan
then advanced and attacked Hampton instead of awaiting his attack.
Hampton moved from Trevilian Station with the two brigades of Butler and
Young, Butler on the left. Rosser was sent to guard a road farther to
the left, protecting that flank. Thus Rosser was isolated when the
battle began and Hampton came into action with but two brigades on the
line. Fitzhugh Lee was headed off by the First and Seventh Michigan and
Gregg's brigade, so that, instead of coming to Hampton's assistance as
intended, he was finally compelled to take the road leading directly to
Trevilian Station instead of the one to Clayton's store. It will be seen
later that he arrived there at an opportune moment to prevent the
complete destruction of Hampton's division.
The entire country between the North Anna river and the railroad was
covered with timber and a dense undergrowth, except where there were
occasional patches of cleared farm lands. When Torbert with his two
brigades came into contact with Hampton, his line was found strongly
posted in woods so dense that it was difficult to make headway against
the defense. From the start, however, Sheridan was the aggressor and
Hampton was forced to fight a defensive battle.
In view of the rule laid down by General Sheridan himself (quoted in a
footnote on page 241) a criticism might be made on the tactics of the
battle. But whether the error, if it was an error, should be laid at the
door of the chief of cavalry or of General Torbert there is no way of
finding out, though there is reason to believe that the former left the
tactics on the field to be worked out by the division commanders. Custer
was ordered to take a country road and pass around the flank to the rear
of the enemy confronting Torbert. The exact location of this road was
unknown and Torbert states in his report that he was under a
misapprehension about it; that it did not come out where he supposed it
did; and that Custer by taking it lost touch with the other brigades
which he was not able to regain until it was too late to accomplish the
best results.
Such "combinations rarely work out as expected" and Custer should have
been put into action on the left of the line of battle; should have
advanced with the division, keeping touch to the right, all the brigades
in position to support each other. Then, by directing the entire
movement in person, it is probable that Sheridan might have thrown his
left forward, completely enveloping Hampton's right and crushing it
before there was any possibility of receiving reinforcements. In that
event, this turning movement would have been Custer's part of the
battle, his regiments would have been kept together, under his eye, and
well in hand for a combined movement at the right moment. Complete
success must have followed.
The road which Custer took leaves the North Anna river at New bridge,
and runs to Trevilian Station. It crosses the Louisa Courthouse and
Clayton store road east of Buck Chiles's farm. It intersects the direct
road from Louisa Courthouse to Trevilian Station at a place designated
on the map as "Netherland."
When Custer started out in the morning the chances were that he would
have a hard fight with Fitzhugh Lee at the outset. But it has been shown
how, by the interposition of the First and Seventh Michigan and one of
Gregg's brigades, that officer was obliged to abandon the plan of
reaching Clayton's store and take the other road. So Custer, being
relieved from pressure in that direction, started with the Fifth
Michigan in advance, followed by Pennington's battery, to carry out his
orders to get in Hampton's rear, at or near Trevilian Station. The
advance guard was led by Major S.H. Hastings, one of the most daring
officers in the brigade. At some point beyond the crossroads, east of
Buck Chiles's farm, the exact location being a matter of great
uncertainty, upon which the official reports shed no light whatever,
Hastings discovered a train of wagons, caissons, led horses and other
impedimenta, which he reported to the brigade commander and received
orders to charge upon it, the charge to be supported by the entire
regiment under Colonel Alger. This charge resulted in the capture of the
outfit, but was continued for a long distance beyond the station, this
being necessary in order to head off the train, which made a desperate
effort to escape in the direction of Gordonsville. Custer's order to the
Fifth did not contemplate continuing the pursuit beyond the station,
since he was supposed to make a junction there with the other brigades
of the First division. But those two brigades were still fighting with
Hampton, and the Fifth Michigan was directly in the latter's rear.
When this tumult arose in his rear, Hampton immediately recalled
Rosser's brigade posted to protect his left flank, thereby leaving the
way open for this foray around his right. Rosser, coming quickly upon
the scene, not only intercepted Alger's retreat, but proceeded to
contest with the Fifth Michigan the possession of the captures which
that regiment had made.
But, I am outrunning my story:
The charge of the Fifth Michigan left Custer's front uncovered, and a
force of confederates which belonged to Young's brigade and had probably
been looking out for Hampton's right flank and rear, threw itself across
his path and boldly challenged his right to advance. This was not a
large body of troops, probably the Seventh Georgia cavalry, but it made
up in audacity what it lacked in numbers. At that time--immediately
after the charge of the Fifth Michigan--and before Rosser had begun his
interference, Custer had with him only his staff and escort, and behind
them was Pennington's battery which had no opportunity to come into
action. The situation was apparently critical in the extreme.
The only available regiment at the time to throw into the breach was the
Sixth Michigan and that was just starting to move out of the woods where
it had been encamped during the night. It was not supposed then that the
battle was joined and, indeed, the expectation was that the march was to
be a continuation of that of the previous day, although the picket
firing in the early morning indicated the close proximity of the enemy.
But that had been the case for a morning or two before. Before mounting,
the officer in command had thoughtlessly acceded to the request of a
brother officer to ride a spirited and nervous black horse belonging to
the latter, as he expressed it, "To take the ginger out of him." In
place of the regulation McClellan saddle the horse was equipped with one
of those small affairs used by jockeys in riding race horses. This had
been picked up en route. Horse and saddle certainly made an attractive
looking mount, but not such an one as a cavalry officer with a sound
mind would select for close work on the battle line. The narration of
these circumstances will enable the reader to judge of how little the
subordinate officers knew of the real impending situation. It can be
stated with absolute certainty that the officers of the Sixth were
innocent of any knowledge of the fact that Custer had started out for a
fight, up to the moment when they were ordered to mount and move out of
the woods into a road running along the east side.
The commander of the regiment, mounted as described, and leading the
column of files, not having yet formed fours, on account of the woods
and brush, had barely reached the edge of the woods by the road, when a
member of the brigade staff brought the order to, "Take the gallop and
pass the battery." It is probable that this order was sent at the same
time that the Fifth was sent forward to capture the train. Custer of
course supposed that the Sixth was in column of fours in the road behind
the battery. The commanding officer of the Sixth had moved out in
compliance with orders and knew nothing about the conditions in front.
The command, "Form fours, gallop, march" was given and a touch of the
spur sent the black steed flying toward the front, followed as quickly
as possible by the leading squadron of the regiment. A regimental staff
officer remained to repeat the order to the other squadrons as they came
into the road, successively.
Approaching the crossroads, the conditions were revealed as described in
a previous paragraph. Custer and his escort were exchanging shots with
their revolvers, at short range, with the confederates in their front.
The most remarkable coolness and courage were being displayed on both
sides. The enemy certainly was commanded by an officer of resources who
realized to the fullest extent the responsibility resting upon him to
delay our further advance as long as possible. Custer never lost his
nerve under any circumstances. He was, however, unmistakably excited.
"Charge them" was his laconic command; and it was repeated with
emphasis.
Looking back to see that the leading squadron was pretty well closed up
I gave the command, "Draw sabers" and, without waiting to form front
into line, or for the remainder of the regiment, the column of fours
charged straight at the line of confederates, the black horse leading.
In a moment we were through the line. Just how it was done is to this
day more or less of a mystery. The enemy gave way--scattered to the
right and left--and did not await the contact. On down the road, one
hundred, two hundred--it may have been five hundred--yards, but not more
than that, at breakneck speed, the charge continued. Then it was seen
that there was no enemy in front of us. Where was the enemy?
Custer says in his report that Alger's orders were to stop at the
station. The single word "charge" comprehended his order to me. Nothing
was said about stopping. No warning was given that the Fifth had already
charged and was ahead of us. Nor did I know it. The order had been
obeyed to the letter. The enemy had apparently been dispersed. At all
events he had disappeared from our front. At such times the mind acts
quickly. The obvious course was to halt, rally, reform, see what was
going on in rear, rejoin the brigade commander, get the regiment all
together, for work where we were most needed. Finding that both hands
were required to curb the excited steed which, up to that moment had not
allowed another horse to come up with him, I returned my revolver to the
holster and, when his speed began to slacken, and Captain Vinton,
commander of the charging squadron, came alongside, gave the command,
"Halt" which was twice repeated. My horse swerved to the right and, when
brought to a standstill, was a little way in the woods. The clatter of
hoofs behind had told me that I was followed, and I supposed it was by
my own troopers. Not so, however. Vinton either did not hear, or was too
much "under the influence of a pardonable excitement and zeal" to heed
the order to halt, and continued on down the road to and beyond the
station, where he overtook the rear of the Fifth and proceeded to assist
in the endeavor to bring away the captured property. He was attacked by
Rosser who made a lot of his men prisoners. The detachment that went
with him did not rejoin the regiment until late in the afternoon and
then less the men who had been captured.
The word, "Surrender" uttered in imperious tones saluted my ear and,
glancing over my left shoulder to find whence it came, I found that a
well mounted and sturdy confederate officer had come up from my left
rear and, addressing me in language both profane and apparently designed
to cast reflections on my ancestry, declared that if I did not comply
instantly with his polite request he would complete the front cut on my
head. His men circling around in front with their carbines in the
position of "ready" seemed to hint that they considered his demand a
reasonable one and expressed a purpose to assist in enforcing it. Now,
it is a maxim that no cavalry officer may surrender so long as he is not
unhorsed. But in the situation in which I found myself there did not
seem to be an available alternative. I surrendered, gave up the black
horse and the jockey saddle, and never saw either of them afterwards.
After the experience described I was glad to be rid of them on most any
terms. Several others were captured at the same time and in the same
way. One of them after being dismounted tried to run away but was
quickly brought to a halt by a shot from a confederate's gun which
wounded him.
It appears that when we went through their line the rascally
confederates rallied and, leaving Custer's front charged our rear.
Custer says in his report that after "the Sixth Michigan charged the
rebels charged that regiment in rear." When he wrote that report he had
forgotten that it was only a portion--less than a third of the Sixth
which charged. Two-thirds of the regiment was still back where he was
and not yet in the action. There were two squadrons, one commanded by
Captain Manning D. Birge, the other by Captain Don G. Lovell in reserve.
In using the term squadron here I mean what in the civil war was known
as a battalion (four troops). Vinton's squadron did not all take part in
the charge.
Four confederate cavalrymen undertook the duty of escorting myself and a
young Sixth cavalryman who had been trapped in the same way to the rear
through the woods. Anticipating that our attack would be followed up, we
managed to delay our guards as much as possible, and had gone not more
than a hundred yards when a yelling in the road proclaimed that the
curtain had risen on the second scene of our little drama. Custer had
ordered Birge to charge. Birge's advance put the confederates to flight,
what there were left of them. The noise of the pursuit disconcerted our
captors so that we took the chances and made our escape under cover
of the thick undergrowth. They fired at us as we ran but did not succeed
in making a hit. Fortunately Birge directed his course through the woods
out of which the enemy had come and into which they had gone in their
flight. In a minute we met him coming with a squad of men. He was
greatly rejoiced to find that he had rescued me from my disagreeable
predicament and, looking back across the years, I can see and freely
acknowledge that to no man on this earth am I under greater obligations
than to Manning D. Birge. But for his approach it might not have been
possible for us to successfully make our break for freedom. That was the
only time I ever was a prisoner of war and then only for about ten
minutes. Custer, referring to my capture, says that I was rescued by a
charge of my own regiment led by Captain Birge.
[Illustration: MANNING D. BIRGE]
Bidding Birge to follow my late captors I hurried out to the road and
thence to the crossroads from which we had started so short a time
before. Custer was still there. His battery was there. Most of the Sixth
was halted there. My recollection is that the First and Seventh about
that time joined Custer, after finding that Fitzhugh Lee had withdrawn
from their front looking toward Louisa Courthouse. Birge's charge had
cleared the road of the enemy, for the time being. Custer ordered that a
rail barricade be thrown up across the road leading to the right, from
which direction the attacks had been made on him. Putting the men of
Vinton's and Birge's squadrons who were available at work, Lovell's
squadron of four troops which was intact and well in hand under as good
an officer as there was in the brigade, was posted in line mounted,
parallel with the road, and behind a screen of timber, in readiness to
repel any further attack.
In a few minutes Sergeant Avery, one of the men who had gone with Birge
in pursuit of the enemy from whom I had escaped, came in with a
confederate prisoner splendidly mounted. Avery with cocked revolver was
making his prisoner ride ahead of him and thus brought him in. Receiving
orders to dismount, the man gave the horse a caress and with something
very like a tear in his eye said:
"That is the best horse in the Seventh Georgia cavalry."
The horse, with Avery's consent was turned over to me to take the place
of the captured black. He proved to be a prize. Handsome as a picture,
kind and well broken, sound, spirited but tractable, with a glossy coat
of silky luster, he was a mount that a real cavalryman would become
attached to and be proud of. I rode him and he had the best of care
until he succumbed to the cold weather and exposure near Winchester in
the winter following. He was a finely bred southern horse and could not
endure the climate.
Birge was not so fortunate. When he went after his prisoners he caught a
Tartar, or came very near it. The barricade was only partially
completed, when yelling in front,--that is in the road leading to the
right,--caused every one to look in that direction. Birge and a few of
his men were seen coming at full speed with what looked like a good big
squadron of the enemy at their heels. Mounting the Seventh Georgia
horse, I rode around the barricade and into the field where Lovell was
with his battalion. He had been placed there for just such an emergency.
Birge did not stop until he had leaped his mare over the barricade. When
the confederate column came up, Lovell surprised them with a volley
right in their teeth, which sent them "whirling" back into the woods out
of which they had come.
This was the end of the fighting at that point. Taking with him the
Seventh, under Lieutenant Colonel Brewer, and the battery Custer then
moved on toward Trevilian Station, leaving the First under Lieutenant
Colonel Stagg and the Sixth to bring up and look out for the rear. The
affray at the crossroads had occupied less time than it takes to tell
it. In giving the story it has been difficult to steer into the middle
course between a seeming desire to give undue prominence to one's own
part in the action, on one hand, and affectation of undue modesty, on
the other. The only course appeared to be to narrate the incidents as
they befell and leave it to the kind reader to judge the matter on its
apparent merits.
When Custer approached the station he found Rosser in his way on his
front and right flank. Fitzhugh Lee, coming from Louisa Courthouse, also
attacked his left flank. For a time there was a melee which had no
parallel in the annals of cavalry fighting in the civil war, unless it
may have been at Brandy Station or Buckland Mills. Custer's line was in
the form of a circle and he was fighting an enterprising foe on either
flank and both front and rear. Fitzhugh Lee charged and captured a
section of Pennington's battery. The Seventh Michigan led by Brewer
recaptured it. Fragments of all the regiments in the brigade rallied
around Custer for the mounted fighting, of which there was plenty, while
the First and Sixth dismounted took care of the rear. Custer was
everywhere present giving directions to his subordinate commanders, and
more than one mounted charge was participated in by him in person.
Torbert's attack with Merritt's and Devin's brigades was at length
successful in routing Hampton, whose men were driven into and through
Custer's lines. Many of them were made prisoners. An officer and twelve
men belonging to the Seventh Georgia cavalry, making for the rear as
they supposed, came into the arms of the Sixth Michigan skirmishers at
one time. The officer gave up his revolver to me and it proved to be a
very fine five shooting arm of English make.
In the final stages of the battle, Gregg concentrated against Fitzhugh
Lee, Torbert effected his junction with Custer, and the latter was
extricated from his difficult and dangerous predicament, after
performing prodigies of valor. The lines changed front and the
confederates were driven across the railroad, Hampton towards
Gordonsville, Lee to the eastward. The two did not succeed in coming
together that night, and Lee was obliged to make a wide detour in order
to reunite with his chief on the afternoon of the next day, Sunday, June
12.
The entire command encamped on the battle field in the neighborhood of
Trevilian Station for the night. The next morning Gregg was set at work
tearing up the railroad toward Louisa Courthouse. The First division was
given a rest until the afternoon when, at about three o'clock, although
it was Sunday, the order came for the First division to proceed in the
direction of Gordonsville. In the meantime, the forces of Hampton and
Lee had united and, as will be seen, had planned to stop Sheridan's
further progress at all hazards. There is some reason to believe that a
part of Breckinridge's infantry had come out from Gordonsville to
reinforce Hampton. Such was the impression at the time, and one at
least, of Sheridan's commanders, states in his report that he was
confronted by infantry. The writer is of the opinion that the "infantry"
was Butler's dismounted cavalry which, when in a good position as they
were that day, could do as good fighting as any infantry in the
confederate service.
The Michigan brigade moved out first and the Sixth had the advance. The
order was to proceed to a certain point named and then halt until the
division closed up. Memory does not recall what the place was, but is
quite clear as to that being the specific direction given by General
Custer to the officer in command of the advance regiment. We had gone
but a short distance, not more than a mile or two at most, when the
advance guard reported the enemy entrenched across the way. Skirmishing
began at once between our mounted men in front and dismounted
confederates behind breastworks of considerable strength. A squadron was
deployed and Sergeant Avery was directed to make his way far enough into
the woods to find, if possible, what we had in our front. He came back
in about ten minutes and reported that the breastworks in our immediate
front were thoroughly manned, and that he had seen a column of at least
a thousand men moving into the entrenchments on the enemy's right, in
front of our left flank. He was sent back to give Custer this
information, and the general came up and ordered the entire regiment to
be dismounted to fight on foot. The Sixth was put in on the right of the
road and directly thereafter the Seventh was sent in on the left. It did
not take long to demonstrate that two regiments were not enough and the
First and Fifth went into the action on the right of the Sixth. Then
Torbert reinforced the line with the Reserve brigade and a portion of
the Second, all under Merritt. The entire division became engaged.
Several assaults were made upon the confederate line but without
success. They were in each instance repulsed. Fitzhugh Lee got in on the
right flank of the division and inflicted severe damage upon the Reserve
brigade. We have never been able to understand why, if it was intended
to break the enemy's line, Gregg's division was not brought into the
engagement to protect that flank. General Merritt in his report
intimates that he had to do more than his share of fighting; that when
the Reserve brigade advanced to the assault on the right it was supposed
that the attack would be pressed on the left; that it was not so pressed
and that his brigade suffered unduly on that account. This is another
case of a man being unable to see all that is going on in a battle. The
Michigan brigade was on the left of the line. It was the first brigade
engaged. It began the fight and stayed in it till the end. Harder
fighting has rarely been done than that which fell to the Michigan men
in that battle. Several attempts were made to drive the enemy from their
front. The First Michigan especially made a charge across an open field
in the face of a terrible fire from behind breastworks, going half way
across before they were repulsed. When the First Michigan could not
stand before a storm of bullets, no other regiment in the cavalry corps
need try. That is a certainty. The losses in killed and wounded were
very severe, as will be shown in a table printed at the end of this
chapter.
[Illustration: SERGEANT AVERY]
The fighting continued till ten o'clock that night, when Sheridan
decided to withdraw and abandon the expedition. It is worthy of remark
that the entire division was unable to advance one inch beyond the place
where the advance guard first encountered the enemy and where Sergeant
Avery made the reconnoissance which revealed to General Custer the true
situation. Poor Avery was killed while doing his duty as he always did
in the very front of the battle in the place of greatest danger. Captain
Lovell and Lieutenant Luther Canouse of the Sixth were wounded; Captain
Carr, and Lieutenants Pulver and Warren of the First Michigan were
killed, and Captain Duggan and Lieutenant Bullock of the same regiment
wounded. Captains Hastings and Dodge of the Fifth were wounded; also
Lieutenant Colonel Brewer of the Seventh was wounded on the eleventh.
The casualties in the two days' fighting at Trevilian Station were very
severe. The losses in killed and died from wounds received in the action
aggregated in the brigade forty one, as follows:[28]
First Michigan 13
Fifth Michigan 8
Sixth Michigan 17
Seventh Michigan 3
---
Total 41
Of prisoners lost there were in all two hundred and forty-two,
distributed as follows:
First Michigan 39
Fifth Michigan 102
Sixth Michigan 58
Seventh Michigan 43
---
Total 242
Of those who were captured and held as prisoners of war, eighty-eight
died in southern prisons--most of them in Andersonville--as follows:[29]
First Michigan 12
Fifth Michigan 35
Sixth Michigan 26
Seventh Michigan 15
---
Total 88
The battle of Trevilian Station practically ended the fighting which was
done by the Michigan brigade in the campaign from the Rapidan to the
James. Sheridan's retreat was skilfully conducted but was not especially
eventful. A tabulated statement of the losses in the command, beginning
in the Wilderness, May 6, and ending at Trevilian Station June 12, is
appended hereto. By losses I mean killed in action or died of wounds
received in action. It is not possible to give a reliable statement of
the wounded, reports of regimental commanders being very deficient in
that particular. The table is compiled from the official records in the
office of the adjutant general of Michigan and is believed to be
approximately correct:
First Fifth Sixth Seventh
Michigan Michigan Michigan Michigan Total
Wilderness 2 3 4 -- 9
Todd's Tavern 3 -- -- 1 4
Beaver Dam Station 1 -- -- -- 1
Yellow Tavern 14 7 3 9 33
Meadow Bridge -- -- 2 -- 2
Hanovertown -- -- 3 -- 3
Haw's Shop 5 13 18 6 42
Old Church 2 -- -- 1 3
Cold Harbor 5 1 1 3 10
Trevilian Station 13 8 17 3 41
---- ---- ---- ---- ----
Total 45 32 48 23 148
Recapitulation--Killed and died of wounds, the Rapidan to the James:
First Michigan 45
Fifth Michigan 32
Sixth Michigan 48
Seventh Michigan 23
---
Total 148
In General Merritt's official report[30] for the period May 26 to June
26, he makes the following statement:
"The losses in killed and wounded, (in the Reserve brigade,) are
annexed in tabular statement. As they number more than the loss of
the entire rest of the command they sufficiently attest the severe
services of the brigade."
When General Merritt says "the entire rest of the command" we shall
assume that he means "the entire rest" of the First division. We have no
desire to make invidious comparisons, and have avoided doing so
throughout these recollections. The Reserve brigade was a fine brigade
and always fought well, and never better than at Trevilian Station and
in the battles immediately preceding that engagement. To prove that his
comparison was not warranted it is necessary only to refer to the
official records. On page 810 of the same volume,[31] appended to the
report of General Torbert, for the same period covered by General
Merritt's report, we find:
Reserve Brigade--
Officers killed 6
Officers wounded 17
----
Officers killed and wounded 23
Reserve Brigade--
Men killed 57
Men wounded 275
---- 332
----
Total officers and men killed and wounded 355
Second Brigade--
Officers killed 2
Officers wounded 15
----
Officers killed and wounded 17
Second Brigade--
Men killed 42
Men wounded 163
----
Men killed and wounded 205
----
Total officers and men killed and wounded 222
First Brigade--
Officers killed 3
Officers wounded 12
----
Officers killed and wounded 15
First Brigade--
Men killed 62
Men wounded 192
----
Men killed and wounded 254
----
Total officers and men killed and wounded 269
Total killed and wounded First and Second Brigades 491
Total killed and wounded Reserve Brigade 355
The Reserve brigade comprised five regiments, two of volunteers and
three of regulars. The Michigan brigade consisted of four regiments, of
course, all volunteers. One third of the losses in killed and wounded at
Trevilian Station in the Reserve brigade were in the single regiment,
the First New York dragoons. My authority for this is still the official
records. See page 186 of the volume already quoted and referred to in
the footnote. Close analysis, therefore, shows that there are
inconsistencies in the official records, and unguarded statements in the
official reports.
The rest of the month of June was consumed in the return march to the
army. Owing to the necessity of caring for a large number of wounded and
of guarding several hundred prisoners, to say nothing of an army of
colored people of all ages and of both sexes who joined the procession,
it was necessary to take a tortuous course which traversed the
Spottsylvania battle ground, touched at Bowling Green, followed the
north bank of the Mattapony river, reaching King and Queen Courthouse
June 18. From this place the sick, wounded and prisoners were sent to
West Point. On the 19th we marched to Dunkirk, on the Mattapony river,
which was crossed on a pontoon bridge and thence to the Pamunkey,
opposite White House. June 21, the entire command crossed the Pamunkey
at White House and marched the next day (June 22) to Jones's bridge on
the Chickahoming. June 25 reached the James river and on the 28th
crossed that river to Windmill Point. From here the First and Second
divisions were sent to Reams's Station to the relief of the Third
division under Wilson which had run into a situation similar to, if not
more serious than that which Custer faced on the 11th at Trevilian.
Finding that officer safe, we returned to Lighthouse Point and settled
down--after having fought and marched for fifty-six consecutive
days--for a period of rest and recuperation. During the entire march
from Trevilian to the James, Hampton hovered on the flank of Sheridan's
column, watching for a favorable opportunity to inflict a blow, but
avoiding a general engagement. In crossing from the Pamunkey to the
James, Sheridan was charged with the duty of escorting a train of 900
wagons from the White House to Douthat's Landing on the James. General
Gregg was entrusted with the responsibility of protecting the right
flank, which placed him in the post of danger, and the brunt of the
fighting as well as the greater part of the honors of the movement fell
to his share. Indeed, General Sheridan in his official report, written
in New Orleans a year after the war closed, gave Gregg credit for saving
the train.
The time from July 2, when we returned to Lighthouse Point on the James
river, to July 26 was quiet and uneventful. Many hundred convalescent
wounded and sick men returned from hospital to duty; many also who had
been dismounted by the exigencies of the campaign returned from
dismounted camps. A fine lot of new horses were received. During the
month the condition of the animals was very much improved, good care and
a plentiful supply of forage contributing to the result. The duty
performed was to picket the left flank of the army, the Michigan
regiments connecting with Crawford's division of the Fifth corps.
The story of the participation of the cavalry with the Second corps in
the movement to the north side of the James, which began on the forenoon
of July 26, has been so fully and so well told by General Sheridan in
his reports and in his memoirs that nothing is left to be added. In fact
there is little, if anything, in the part taken by any portion of the
force taken across by Sheridan and Hancock to differentiate it from that
played by the whole. The object of the movement was to draw the enemy's
attention away from the lines around Petersburg preparatory for the
explosion of the mine which was to take place on the 30th. In this it
was successful. General Lee mistook the attack on his left for real
instead of a feint, and detached enough troops to meet it to not only
assure the success of the attack on Petersburg, if it had been made with
determination, but to seriously menace the safety of the two corps
engaged in the movement. General Sheridan truthfully says that, "The
movement to the north side of the James for the accomplishment of our
part of the plan connected with the mine explosion, was well executed,
and every point made; but it was attended with such anxiety and
sleeplessness as to prostrate almost every officer and man in the
command."
This was the last incident of importance connected with the services of
the First cavalry division with the army of the Potomac in the year
1864. August 1, Sheridan was ordered to the Shenandoah Valley and
selected the First and Third cavalry divisions to go with him.
Since this is in some sort a personal narrative it may be of interest to
mention that while at Lighthouse Point I received my commission as
colonel and, July 9, was mustered out of the United States service as
major--with which rank I had been commanding the regiment--and was
mustered in in the new grade. The promotion, which was unsought, was due
to a request made to the governor, signed by all the officers of the
regiment serving in the field, and recommended by General Custer. On the
original petition, on file in the adjutant general's office in Lansing,
is an endorsement in the general's own handwriting.[32]