THE YELLOW TAVERN CAMPAIGN
The sequel to the false alarm about Hancock's left flank being turned
was that all the cavalry was drawn in to guard the trains and protect
the rear of the army. Custer's brigade moved back to the furnaces where
it remained during the night. The morning of the seventh he was ordered
to resume his position of the day before. Gregg's division was returned
to Todd's Tavern. Before the arrival of Gregg's command the First
Michigan cavalry had a spirited encounter with Fitzhugh Lee, in which
Captain Brevoort, in command of the mounted men, particularly
distinguished himself. There was pretty sharp fighting during the entire
day, mostly on foot, the nature of the ground practically precluding
movements on horseback.
The engagement of the cavalry on the seventh of May is known in history
as the battle of Todd's Tavern. It was made necessary in order to retake
the position surrendered by Meade's order of the sixth. Much blood was
shed and many valuable lives were lost in retrieving the error. In the
events of the two days may be found a good illustration of the rule that
an officer (even a great soldier like Sheridan) must obey orders, right
or wrong. Sheridan must have known that there was no need to withdraw
his cavalry from the left of the army. On the contrary he knew that by
all means it ought to remain where it was. Yet he obeyed and had to
fight an offensive battle to regain what he was thus forced to give
away. The conditions of the two days were reversed. On the morning of
the sixth Sheridan was in possession and Stuart was trying to drive him
out. On the morning of the seventh Stuart was in possession and Sheridan
had to drive him out. The material difference was that Stuart failed,
Sheridan succeeded. Sheridan outgeneraled Stuart in both offensive and
defensive tactics. The names of the respective chiefs are given here
but, on the sixth the actual fighting of the union forces was directed
by Custer and Gregg, of the confederates by Rosser and Fitzhugh Lee; on
the seventh, by Gregg, Merritt and Custer for the federal side, by
Fitzhugh Lee on the part of the confederates. Gregg and Custer stood
together in the Wilderness as they had done at Gettysburg. At Todd's
Tavern Merritt, Davies and Devin were added to the combination. And it
was one that neither Stuart, Fitzhugh Lee nor Hampton was ever able to
match.
At night the First and Second divisions were encamped in the open fields
east of Todd's Tavern, and in front of the positions held by them during
the previous two days. Mounted pickets and patrols guarded the front and
it soon became apparent that a movement of both armies was in progress.
From front and rear came significant sounds which the practiced ear had
no difficulty in interpreting. Grant, breaking off successively from his
right, was passing by the rear to the left, concentrating around Todd's
Tavern for a forward movement in the morning towards Spottsylvania
Courthouse. The principle involved was to maneuver Lee out of the
Wilderness into more open country by threatening his communications.
Once again his strategic plans were thwarted by the faulty manner in
which the tactics of the movement were executed. Sheridan had planned to
seize Spottsylvania with his cavalry and his orders were for all three
divisions to move at daylight with that end in view. Wilson was to lead
and be followed up and supported by Merritt and Gregg with the First and
Second divisions. We shall see how Wilson was successful in carrying out
his part of the plan, but how the others were stopped by orders from
Meade, thus preventing the accomplishment of a well conceived enterprise
and neutralizing two-thirds of the cavalry corps just when it was about
to open the way to victory.
By his peculiar tactical night movement Grant held his line of battle
intact except as the various corps broke successively from right to rear
to march to the left. Thus Hancock's corps, though on the extreme left,
was the last corps to move.
Lee, quick to divine the purpose of his adversary, moved his army by the
right flank on a parallel line. All night long the ears of the alert
cavalrymen could catch the indistinct murmur of troops moving with
their impediments which, coming from both front and rear, bespoke the
grand tactics of both commanders and presaged a great battle on the
morrow. The "pop," "pop," "pop," of the carbines along the line of
videttes was well nigh continuous, showing the proximity of the enemy's
prowling patrols and scouts, and the necessity of constant vigilance. So
closely did the confederates approach the outposts that there was
unceasing fear of an attack and neither officers nor men were able to
obtain much rest. To sleep was out of the question. The First Michigan
was held in readiness to make a mounted charge, while the other
regiments were under orders to deploy dismounted, in case the attack
which was looked for should be made. The officers of the First could be
heard encouraging and instructing their men, keeping them alert and
prepared for battle.
From the time of the organization of the Michigan brigade, the First
regiment had been designated as distinctively a saber regiment, the
Fifth and Sixth for fighting on foot, as they were armed with Spencer
rifles, and the result was that with them, dismounting to fight when in
contact with the enemy in the early part of their terms of service
became a sort of second nature. The First had a year's experience with
the cavalry before the others went out, and it was in a saber charge at
the Second Bull Run battle that Brodhead its first colonel was killed.
The First Vermont, like the First Michigan, was a saber regiment and
went out in 1861. When this regiment was attached to the brigade, Custer
had three saber regiments, and it fell to the lot of the Fifth and Sixth
Michigan to be selected more often than the others, perhaps, for
dismounted duty. It often happened, however, that the entire brigade
fought dismounted at the same time; and sometimes, though not often, all
would charge together mounted. Owing to the nature of the country, most
of the fighting in Grant's campaign from the Wilderness to the James was
done on foot. In the Shenandoah valley campaign in the latter part of
the year 1864, the reverse was the case and at the battles of Tom's
Brook, Winchester and Cedar Creek the troopers in the command for the
most part kept to the saddle throughout the engagements.
When Custer wanted to put a single regiment into a mounted charge he
generally selected the First Michigan, because it was not only older and
more experienced but had many officers who possessed both great personal
daring and the rare ability to handle men in action, keeping them well
together so as to support each other and accomplish results. This
regiment was not excelled by any other in the army for that purpose. The
Seventh was an under study for the First. The Fifth and Sixth worked
well together on the skirmish line or dismounted line of battle and had
no superiors in this kind of work. That they were pretty reliable when
called upon mounted also, is shown by the conduct of the Sixth in the
Wilderness and of the Fifth at Trevillian Station. It is only necessary
to mention the gallantry of the Seventh at Hanovertown and at Yellow
Tavern to demonstrate that it was an apt pupil of the First. All the
officers and all the men of the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh took off their
hats and gracefully yielded the palm to the First. It is doubtful if
there was another regiment in the federal cavalry service which
contained so many officers highly marked for their fearless intrepidity
in action. The circumstance of their talking to their men before an
expected engagement was characteristic. They were always ready to face
the peril and lead their men.
Later in the evening, away to the left where the infantry was going into
bivouac a union band began to play a patriotic air. This was the signal
for loud and prolonged cheering. Then a confederate band opposite
responded with one of their southern tunes and the soldiers on that side
cheered. Successively, from left to right and from right to left this
was taken up, music and cheering alternating between federals and
confederates, the sounds receding and growing fainter and fainter as the
distance increased until they died away entirely. It was a most
remarkable and impressive demonstration under the circumstances and
lingered long in the memory of those who heard it.
Though the fighting on the 5th, 6th and 7th had been for the most part
favorable to the union troopers, it was disjointed and, therefore,
neither decisive nor as effective as it might have been. Sheridan
believed that the cavalry corps should operate as a compact
organization, a distinct entity, an integral constituent of the army,
the same as the other corps. He looked upon his relation to the general
in command as being precisely the same as that of Hancock, Sedgwick or
Warren, and insisted that orders to the cavalry should be given through
the cavalry corps commander just as orders to the Second corps were
given through General Hancock. He could not bring himself to consent to
be a mere staff officer dangling at the heels of General Meade, but
conceived himself to be an actual commander, not in name only but in
fact.
Proceeding on this theory he issued orders to the various division
commanders to move at daylight on the morning of May 8, and cooperate
with each other under his personal direction in a plan which he had
devised to seize Spottsylvania Courthouse in advance of Lee's infantry.
They were to advance on converging roads in such a manner as to arrive
successively but to support each other and open a way for the infantry
columns. Wilson crossed Corbin's bridge, charged through the town
driving out some of Fitzhugh Lee's cavalrymen and pursuing them several
miles beyond. Merritt and Gregg made a good start and if they had been
allowed to proceed would have had no difficulty in accomplishing what
Sheridan desired to have them do. But without notice to Sheridan, Meade
countermanded the orders to those two officers directing them to halt
at the bridges and not cross. The result was that Wilson was isolated,
Merritt's cavalry became inextricably entangled with Warren's infantry,
so that neither one of them reached Spottsylvania, as they were both
expected to do, Gregg was neutralized, Wilson's safety jeoparded,
Sheridan's combinations broken up without his knowledge, and the way was
left open for Lee's infantry, so that Anderson with Longstreet's corps
took advantage of the situation and drove Wilson out and took
possession--thus paving the way for Lee to form a defensive line there
instead of farther south, probably inside the defenses of Richmond. Then
it befell that a series of bloody battles had to be fought to regain
what was thus foolishly surrendered; to regain what indeed might have
been held with slight loss, if Sheridan had been let alone, and
permitted to have his way. If he had been given a free hand, and
assuming that Warren, Burnside, Sedgwick and Hancock would have carried
out their part of the program with the same zeal and skill displayed by
Sheridan, it is certain that the battle of Spottsylvania with its
"bloody angle" would never have taken place.
The affair was a fiasco, but for that no blame can be attached to either
Sheridan or Grant, unless the latter be considered blameworthy for not
directing the movements in person instead of leaving the tactics of the
battle to be worked out by Meade.
Once more, as in the Wilderness, the cavalry was drawn in. The entire
corps was massed in rear of the infantry and rendered inert. Sheridan
with his ten thousand troopers was held idle and inactive while Warren,
Sedgwick and Burnside were given the task of defeating Lee's veteran
army without Sheridan's help. All his plans were rendered nugatory. He
became satisfied that his efforts were useless. About noon he went to
Meade's headquarters and they had an interview which is one of the
famous historical episodes of the civil war. He told Meade that,
inasmuch as his plans were to be interfered with, his orders
countermanded, thus destroying the efficiency and usefulness of the
cavalry corps, he must decline to give it further orders and General
Meade could take it and run it himself, as he evidently desired to do.
He kept his poise, however, sufficiently to intimate that he would like
an opportunity to take his corps and go out after Stuart, since he
believed he could whip Stuart in a fair fight if he could have a chance.
Meade reported this conversation to Grant who told Meade to let him go
and try. Grant had confidence enough in Sheridan to believe that he
would make his word good.
The outcome of this was that the entire corps was ordered that very
afternoon to concentrate at Alrich's, on the plank road leading to
Fredericksburg, and be prepared to start at daylight on an expedition
around Lee's right flank, into the enemy's country. It was to be a
second edition, only on a much larger scale, and under a very different
commander, of the Kilpatrick raid, an account of which was given in a
previous chapter. The route selected was very much the same. But,
unlike Kilpatrick and others who had led cavalry expeditions up to that
time, and whose idea was to ride rapidly through the country and avoid
the enemy as much as possible, never fighting unless forced into it
unwillingly, Sheridan went out with the utmost deliberation, looking for
trouble--seeking it--and desiring before every other thing to find
Stuart and fight him on his native heath. The confidence which he
manifested in himself and in the prowess of his command was of its own
kind, and a distinct revelation to the army of the Potomac, in which it
had long been a settled article of belief that Stuart was invincible
and, indeed, up to that time he had been well nigh so, as Sheridan
points out in his memoirs.
In the meantime, the battle was raging around Spottsylvania. Lee's army
was getting into position, his various corps concentrating and
intrenching, and making every preparation for a new base and a stout
resistance. Grant's plans had all miscarried, thus far. Still, he had
taken up his bridges and resolved to fight it out on that line. It was
already evident that there was to be no more retreating. The officers
and men of the army of the Potomac made up their minds that they had
crossed the Rapidan and the Rappahannock for the last time and that Lee
would never be permitted to make a permanent halt outside the
intrenchments of Richmond.
When the long column was marching along the rear of the army, the
sounds of the battle going on could be distinctly heard. Hundreds of
wounded men were coming from the front, mostly so slightly injured that
they were helping themselves off the field to a place of safety where
they could receive needed treatment. It filled us with astonishment to
see the number of them. The official records show that Grant lost more
than ten thousand men in the series of battles around Spottsylvania. It
seemed wicked to take ten thousand men well mounted and equipped away
from the army at such a time as that. Queer ideas Meade had. And queerer
still that Grant should have yielded to him in a matter of such vital
importance. And the men that Sheridan was taking away, were the very
same troops with whom he broke Early's flank at Winchester; and who
stood like a stone wall in the way of Early's advance at Cedar Creek
after two corps of infantry had been routed, only a few months later.
Just imagine for a moment what might have been the result if Sheridan
had been permitted to make the same use of his cavalry in the Wilderness
or at Spottsylvania which he made of it at Winchester and Cedar Creek.
We camped at Alrich's for the night. And it was Sunday night. It will be
remembered that the Kilpatrick expedition left Stevensburg on Sunday
night. Three days' rations were drawn and issued to the men. There was
but one-half of one day's ration of grain for the horses. So it was
settled that our animals would have to depend on the country for their
forage. The force thus assembled consisted of three divisions--about
ten thousand troopers--under Merritt, Gregg and Wilson--seven brigades
commanded by Custer, Devin, Gibbs, Davies, Irvin Gregg, McIntosh and
Chapman. These were all veteran officers, often tried and never found
wanting. Of these brigade commanders, two, Custer and Davies, held the
rank of brigadier general; Devin was colonel of the Sixth New York;
Gibbs of the First New York dragoons; Gregg of the Sixteenth
Pennsylvania; McIntosh of the Third Pennsylvania; Chapman of the Third
Indiana.
There were six batteries of artillery, all regulars but one--the Sixth
New York independent--Captain J.W. Martin. Pennington was still with the
Third division, as was the First Vermont cavalry also. The four Michigan
regiments were commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Peter Stagg, Colonel
Russell A. Alger, Major James H. Kidd and Major Henry W. Granger,
respectively.
The movement began at an early hour. The start was made long before
daylight. General Custer, who was to lead, ordered that the Sixth
Michigan move out first and thus it fell to my lot to be in the van at
the outset of that historic expedition. A guide was furnished, with
directions that the route taken be by the plank road to Tabernacle
church, thence to the Telegraph road running from Fredericksburg to
Richmond, then due south toward Thornburg. The long column wound its way
slowly out of the wilderness on a single road, marching by fours,
Merritt in front, Gregg in rear, Wilson in the centre--seven brigades
and six batteries--beyond doubt the most superb force of mounted men
that ever had been assembled under one leader on this continent, and a
more formidable body of horse than had been seen in that war on either
side, up to that time, or was ever seen afterwards. The column when
stretched out like a huge snake was thirteen miles in length, so that
when the last of Gregg's regiments turned south on the Telegraph road,
the head of Custer's brigade must have been nearing Chilesburg.
The night was clear and quiet; the air was soft and refreshing. To the
right the two great armies were sleeping. There was no note of bugle, no
boom of cannon, no crack of rifle to disturb the tranquility of the
night. As the dawn approached the baying of dogs in the distance gave
notice that the echoes of the march would soon reach the ears of the
enemy's outposts.
But the morning was far advanced, the head of column well on its way
past the right flank of Lee's army, when the first hostile patrols were
encountered. At a crossroad leading to the right a small force of
cavalry made its appearance. It was put to flight by Captain Birge with
troop A. At this point troop E, Captain A.E. Tower, was sent to the
front as advance guard, Sergeant M.E. Avery with eight men going ahead
with orders to charge any enemy that appeared on the road, the troop to
follow him closely and the regiment to support the troop. General Custer
with his staff and escort rode close up to the rear of the regiment.
Behind him came the other Michigan regiments, Devin's and Gibbs's
brigades, then Chapman, McIntosh, Irvin Gregg, and Davies in succession.
Davies was to look out for the rear. Thus the latter, who led the
Kilpatrick expedition, found his position reversed on this. The
responsibility was great and he met it with his accustomed courage and
ability. Davies was one of the few men who early in the war found his
niche and stuck to it. He was an ideal general of brigade; and he kept
his place as such without a check until the war closed.
[Illustration: ANGELO E. TOWER]
To those of us who had been with Kilpatrick but a short two months
before the contrast presented by a mental comparison of Sheridan's
manner of conducting a march with that of his predecessor was most
marked and suggestive. This movement was at a slow walk, deliberate and
by easy stages. So leisurely was it that it did not tax the endurance of
men or horses. There was a steadiness about it that calmed the nerves,
strengthened self-reliance, and inspired confidence. It was a bold
challenge for the confederates to come out and fight a duel to the
finish. That they would be compelled to take up the gage thus thrown
down there was no shadow of doubt.
The advance guard was kept active in the pursuit of confederate scouts
and pickets, small bodies of whom were constantly appearing in front or
hovering on the flanks. Before reaching the point where the road
leading to Beaver Dam was to be taken, the guide, either by ignorance
or design, misled Avery and his men and took them to the eastward. Avery
suspecting something wrong put a halter around the guide's neck and
started to swing him up to the limb of a tree. He immediately discovered
his mistake and a trooper was sent with word to take the other road, who
reached the intersection just as the head of column did, so there was
not a moment's delay. Avery soon came in with a squad of prisoners who
with the guide were turned over to the provost guard. After reaching
Chilesburg we were on the same road over which we marched with
Kilpatrick and needed no guide. The confederate prisoners looked with
astonishment upon this big body of cavalry which had stolen into their
territory like a thief in the night, unexpected and unannounced.
During the day, as long as I had the advance, Captain Craig Wadsworth of
Sheridan's staff rode by my side to represent and report to his chief.
No very important incident happened, but the weather was pleasant, the
air was exhilarating, the companionship was congenial, and there was
sufficient of excitement to make it interesting. Things were kept
moving, and it was very enjoyable, as service with the advance of a
marching column always is.
Late in the afternoon we passed Chilesburg and the country began to have
a familiar look. It was not yet dark when we crossed the North Anna
river at Anderson's bridge and the First division prepared to bivouac
on the south side. Gregg and Wilson went into camp for the night north
of the river.
After crossing the river, Custer was ordered to proceed with his brigade
to Beaver Dam station. Here the First Michigan was given the advance,
Major Melvin Brewer with one battalion as advance guard. The Sixth
followed the First. Otherwise the order of march was the same as during
the day. A mile or so before reaching Beaver Dam, Brewer came upon
several hundred union prisoners who were being hurried under the escort
of confederate infantry to the station, where trains were waiting to
convey them to Richmond. His appearance, of course, resulted in the
release of the prisoners, those of their guards who did not succeed in
escaping by running away in the woods being captured. The engineers
began to sound their locomotive whistles, as a signal for the
confederate escort to hurry up with their prisoners, and Brewer followed
by the First and Sixth dashed into the station before the presence of
the Michiganders was suspected, taking them by surprise and capturing
the two locomotives with their trains. In a few minutes Custer with the
entire brigade was on the ground and it was found that, besides the
trains, he had captured an immense quantity of commissary, medical, and
other stores belonging to Lee's supply departments and which included
nearly all his medical supplies. Everything that could not be carried
away was destroyed. While this destruction was going on some
confederates made their appearance in the adjacent woods and opened
fire but they were driven away without much trouble. This must have been
a very severe loss to the confederates.
The brigade then marched away and rejoined the division, every trooper
having his horse loaded to the limit with such supplies as he thought he
could use. General Merritt in his official report refers to this
destruction of property as a mistake and characterizes the action as
"gaucherie." It is, however, quite certain that the only way to have
saved the supplies for issue to the corps would have been to move the
division to Beaver Dam that night, for Stuart was concentrating his
force at that point and might have been able to reclaim a portion of
them if they had not been destroyed. At all events, Custer was on the
ground and Merritt was not. Custer's action must have been approved by
his judgment.
Early on the morning of May 10 the march was resumed by the Negrofoot
road toward Groundsquirrel bridge across the South Anna river. It was
even more leisurely than on the day before. Flankers were thrown out in
both directions. The long column of fours thus proceeded slowly by the
road while to the right and to the left, about 500 yards out, were
parallel columns of flankers, marching by file, thus assuring that
should the enemy attack either flank, it was only necessary to wheel by
fours in that direction to be in line of battle with a very strong line
of skirmishers well out in front.
But Stuart did not attack. He seems on that morning to have begun to
comprehend Sheridan's plan which was no doubt then sufficiently puzzling
but, as we can see now, very simple. In a word, a slow and steady march,
straight toward the confederate capital, all the time in position to
accept battle should Stuart offer it. If he should not, to hold to the
unyielding tenor of his purpose, and with exasperating persistence
continue to invite it. Stuart had turned off toward the east and was
making a forced march with Fitzhugh Lee's division, consisting of the
brigades of Lomax and Wickham, Gordan's brigade still hanging on to the
rear of Sheridan's column. Our column made the march of eighteen miles
to Groundsquirrel bridge without molestation and camped there that night
on the south side of the river. Stuart after a much longer march went
into camp at Hanover Junction. At one o'clock in the morning May 11 he
moved out toward Yellow Tavern, arriving there at about ten o'clock in
the forenoon, before Sheridan's advance, which was headed in the same
direction, made its appearance. Stuart had thus by a long and hard march
brought his command where it could interpose between the Union cavalry
and Richmond. He seems, however, to have been halting between two
opinions--whether to form squarely across Sheridan's front or to hold
his position on the flank until near enough to Richmond to be within
reach of reinforcements from the troops that were being hurried into the
city from the south to aid in the defense. He appears to have chosen
the latter alternative, for he formed his command in a line running
north and south, facing west, Wickham on the right, Lomax on the left
with batteries near both his right and left flanks. The left of his line
crossed the Telegraph road in front of Yellow Tavern where was quite an
elevated piece of ground on which across the road was a battery well
stationed and well manned. His men, however, must have been pretty well
exhausted by the long march.
Yellow Tavern, which gave its name to the battle that ensued, is a
hamlet at the junction of the Telegraph and Old Mountain roads, about
six miles north of Richmond, where the first named road coalesces and
becomes the Brook Turnpike, as I understand it. The Old Mountain road
comes down from the northwest, the Telegraph road from the east of
north. Sheridan struck the former at Allen's Station on the
Fredericksburg railroad and followed it to Yellow Tavern. The Reserve
brigade reached that place a little before noon and finding Stuart in
possession immediately began skirmishing. Devin came up next and was put
on the line to reinforce Gibbs. When Custer's brigade came up pretty
sharp skirmish firing could be heard in front. Merritt was in charge and
the battle was on. Stuart had dismounted his entire force and formed
them in a very strong defensive position on a commanding ridge beyond
the tavern. Merritt had dismounted a portion of Gibbs's and Devin's
commands and was feeling of Stuart's position. Custer's regiments as
they successively arrived were massed mounted in column of battalions
on the right of the road, in a field, thus clearing the road. The march
that day had been an easy one, the rest the night before had been
complete, and never were men and horses in better condition or spirits
for battle than were Sheridan's troopers.
[Illustration: PHILIP H. SHERIDAN]
Then there was an anxious pause. Glancing back I saw that we were at the
rear of the division. Down the road about 100 yards a column of cavalry
was approaching very slowly. Something at the head of the column
attracted my particular attention and in a moment I made out that it was
a general's battle flag. But I did not recognize it as one that I had
seen before. There were a good many staff officers and a pretty large
escort. As they came opposite the regiment, the officer at the head
looked back and saw that the flag was hanging limp around the staff,
there not being air enough stirring to make it float out. He noted this
and said to the color bearer, "Shake out those colors so they can be
seen." The voice was mild and agreeable. The color-bearer did as
directed and the general looked our way with a keen glance that was
characteristic and took in every detail. Then instantly I knew who he
was. I saluted and said, "Men, General Sheridan," and they gave him a
cheer.
That was the first time I had seen Sheridan except as I "looked toward"
him when passing in review. One may do a good deal of service, even be
in many skirmishes and battles without getting a good look at the corps
commander, much less the commander of the army. There was nothing about
Sheridan's appearance at first glance to mark him as the principal
figure in the scene. Except for the fact that he rode in front one might
have mistaken one of the other officers for chief. But close inspection
easily singled him out. He was well mounted and sat his horse like a
real cavalryman. Though short in stature he did not appear so on
horseback. His stirrups were high up, the shortness being of leg and not
of trunk. He wore a peculiar style of hat not like that of any other
officer. He was square of shoulder and there was plenty of room for the
display of a major general's buttons on his broad chest. His face was
strong, with a firm jaw, a keen eye, and extraordinary firmness in every
lineament. In his manner there was an alertness, evinced rather in look
than in movement. Nothing escaped his eye, which was brilliant and
searching and at the same time emitted flashes of kindly good nature.
When riding among or past his troopers, he had a way of casting quick,
comprehensive glances to the right and left and in all directions. He
overlooked nothing. One had a feeling that he was under close and
critical observation, that Sheridan had his eye on him, was mentally
taking his measure and would remember and recognize him the next time.
No introduction was needed.
It would be as difficult to describe the exact physical traits that
marked Sheridan's personality as to make a list of the characteristic
mental attributes that distinguished him from others. There were
perhaps no special, single, salient points. At least none were
abnormally developed. In making an estimate of the man it was the
ensemble of his qualities that had to be considered. He had to be taken
"all in all." So taken, he was Sheridan. He was not another, or like
another. There was no soldier of the civil war with whom he fairly can
be compared with justice to either. As a tactician on the field of
battle he had no equal, with the possible exception of "Stonewall"
Jackson. In this respect he to my mind more nearly resembled John
Churchill, the great duke of Marlborough, than any other historical
character of modern times of whom I have any knowledge. If he had not
the spark of genius, he came very near to having it. This is a personal
judgment put down here, the writer trusts, with becoming modesty and
with no desire to put himself forward as a military critic.
Sheridan was modest as he was brave, reticent of his plans, not inclined
to exploit his own merits, and he did not wear his heart or his mind
upon his sleeve. His inmost thoughts were his own. What impressed us at
this first sight of him was his calm, unruffled demeanor, his freedom
from excitement, his poise, his apparently absolute confidence in
himself and his troops, his masterful command of the situation. He rode
away toward the front as quietly as he had come from the rear, with no
blare of bugles, no brandishing of swords, no shouting of orders, no
galloping of horses. In his bearing was the assurance that he was going
to accomplish what he had pledged himself to do. He had found Stuart and
was leisurely going forward to see for himself, to make an analysis of
his adversary's position, and, so far as necessary, to give personal
direction to the coming conflict. But he was in no hurry about it and
there was in his face and manner no hint of doubt or inquietude. The
outcome was to him a foregone conclusion.
Such was our chief and such was the beginning of the battle from which
dates his fame as a cavalry leader and independent commander of the
first rank.
Merritt and Custer were already at the front. Experience taught us that
sharp work was at hand. It was not long delayed. The order came from
General Custer for the Fifth and Sixth to dismount to fight on foot. The
First and Seventh were held in reserve mounted. Not having visited this
battle field since that day I am unable to give a very accurate
description of its topographical features and shall not attempt to do
so. The published maps do not throw a very clear light upon the matter,
neither do the official reports. I am in doubt as to whether the
Telegraph road and Brook turnpike are synonymous terms after passing
Yellow Tavern or whether the former lies east of the latter. As I have
shown, Stuart's line ran along the Telegraph road, the right north of
Half Sink, the left on a hill near Yellow Tavern. My authority for this
is McClellan. Lomax held the left and had two pieces of artillery
posted "immediately in the road;" one piece behind them "on a hill on
the left." This would make his line extend due north and south and our
approach to attack it must have been from the west. Devin in his report
says Stuart was driven off the Brook pike to a position 500 yards east
of it. Whether that was at the beginning or near the close of the
engagement is not quite clear. If the former, then the line referred to
by Major McClellan could not have been on the Brook turnpike. I shall
have to deal in general terms, therefore, and not be as specific and
lucid as I would like to be in describing Custer's part in the battle.
Just where the Michigan regiments were posted at the time they were
ordered into the fight I cannot say. They came down toward Yellow Tavern
on the Old Mountain road and I have no recollection of crossing the
pike. It seems to me that they must have been west of it. We were moved
across the road, from where stationed when Sheridan came up, and
deployed in the woods, the Sixth on the right of the Fifth. The line
advanced and presently reached a fence in front of which was a field.
Beyond the field, and to the left of it were woods. In the woods beyond
the field were the dismounted confederate cavalry. Skirmishing began
immediately across the field, each line behind a fence. After a little,
Captain Bayles of Custer's staff came from the right with an order to
move the Sixth by the left flank and take position on the left of the
Fifth. Just as he was giving this order a great shout arose to the left
and, looking in that direction, we saw that the entire of the Fifth
cavalry was climbing the fence and starting for a charge across the
field. The Sixth instantly caught the infection and, before I could say
"aye, yes or no," both regiments were yelling and firing and advancing
on the enemy in the opposite woods. "You can't stop them," said Bayles.
I agreed and in a moment had joined my brave men who were leading me
instead of my leading them.
The wisdom and necessity of Custer's order was, however, immediately
apparent. Some confederates lurking in the woods to the left, opened
fire into the flank of the Fifth Michigan, which for the moment
threatened serious consequences. The line halted and there was temporary
confusion. Quicker than it takes to tell it, Custer had appeared in the
field mounted. One of Alger's battalions changed front and charged into
the woods on the left and the two regiments advanced and drove the enemy
clear through and out of the woods in front. Barring the temporary
check, it was a most gallant and successful affair, for which Custer
gave the two regiments full credit in his official report.
The line was then reformed with the Sixth on the left of the Fifth. At
that time this was the extreme left of the First division and of the
line of battle as well, the Third division not yet having become
engaged.
It was then found that the force with which we had been fighting had
retreated to their main line of battle, along a high ridge or bluff. In
front of this bluff was a thin skirt of timber and a fence. Here
Fitzhugh Lee's sharpshooters were posted in a very strong position
indeed. Between the ridge and the edge of the woods where our line was
halted was a big field not less than four hundred yards across, sloping
down from their position to ours. To attack the confederate line in
front it would be necessary to advance across that field and up that
slope. It looked difficult. The confederate artillery was stationed to
the right front on the extreme left of their line. We were confronted by
Lomax's brigade. Beyond the right of the Fifth Michigan, Custer had the
First Michigan, Colonel Stagg; the Seventh, Major Granger; and First
Vermont, Lieutenant Colonel Preston; all mounted. They were across a
road which ran at right angles with the line of battle, and in the
direction of Lomax's battery.
As soon as our line appeared in the open--indeed, before it left the
woods the confederate artillery opened with shell and shrapnel; the
carbineers and sharpshooters joined with zest in the fray and the man
who thinks they did not succeed in making that part of the neighborhood
around Yellow Tavern an uncomfortably hot place, was not there at the
time. It was necessary to take advantage of every chance for shelter.
Every Wolverine who exposed himself was made a target of. Many men were
hit by bullets. The artillerists did not time their fuses right and most
of the damage was done to the trees behind us, or they were on too high
ground to get the range. The line gradually advanced, creeping forward
little by little until it reached a partial shelter afforded by the
contour of the ground where it sloped sharply into a sort of ditch that
was cut through the field parallel with the line of battle. Here it
halted and the battle went on in this manner for a long time, possibly
for hours. In the meantime, Chapman's brigade, of Wilson's division, had
come into position on the left of the Sixth Michigan, thus prolonging
the line and protecting our flank which till then had been in the air
and much exposed. Off to the left, in front of Chapman, the lay of the
land was more favorable. There were woods, the ground was more nearly
level. The confederate position was not so difficult of approach and
gradually his left began to swing forward and threaten the right flank
of Lomax's position or, more accurately, the confederate center.
Thus for several hours the lines faced each other without decisive
results. At length Sheridan determined upon an assault by mounted troops
supported by those on foot. To Custer was assigned the important duty of
leading this assault. It was toward four o'clock when Sergeant Avery who
had as quick an intuitive perception in battle as any man I ever knew,
and whose judgment was always excellent and his suggestions of great
value, called my attention to what appeared to be preparations for a
mounted charge over to the right where General Custer was with his
colors. "They are going to charge, major," said Avery, "and the instant
they start will be the time for us to advance." That is what was done.
The regiment forming for the charge was the First Michigan. Two
squadrons under Major Howrigan led the vanguard. The bugles sounded,
"forward," "trot," "charge." Heaton's battery farther over was served
with splendid effect. Custer's staff passed the word along for the
entire line to advance. There was no hesitation. The Fifth and Sixth and
Chapman's regiments sprang forward with a shout. There was a gallant
advance up the slope. Fitzhugh Lee's men held on grimly as long as they
could, but there was no check to the charge. Howrigan kept on till he
was among the guns sabering the cannoneers, capturing the two pieces in
the road with their limbers and ammunition. In a few minutes Custer and
Chapman were in possession of the ridge and the entire line of the enemy
was in full retreat. Back about 500 yards the enemy attempted to make a
stand and the Seventh Michigan was ordered to charge. This charge led by
Major Granger resulted in his death. He was killed just before he
reached the enemy's position, causing a temporary repulse of the
regiment, but the entire line came on and the enemy was put to flight in
all directions.
Stuart was mortally wounded while trying in person with a few mounted
men of the First Virginia cavalry to stem the tide of defeat which set
in when the First Michigan captured the battery. There is a controversy
as to how he met his death. Colonel Alger claimed that Stuart was
killed by a shot from one of the men on his dismounted line. Captain
Dorsey, of the First Virginia, who was riding with Stuart at the time,
quoted by Major McClellan, says that he was killed by a pistol shot
fired by one of the men who had been unhorsed in the charge on the
battery and who was running out on foot. In that case it must have been
a First Michigan[25] man who, very likely, paid the penalty of his life
for his temerity. It does not matter. One thing is certain. Stuart's
death befell in front of Custer's Michigan brigade and it was a Michigan
man who fired the fatal shot.
Stuart was taken to Richmond, where he died, leaving behind him a record
in which those who wore the blue and those who wore the gray take equal
pride. He was a typical American cavalryman--one of the very foremost of
American cavaliers and it is a privilege for one of those who stood in
the line in front of which he fell in his last fight to pay a sincere
tribute to his memory as a soldier and a man.
It fell to that other illustrious Virginian--Fitzhugh Lee--to gather up
the fragments and make such resistance as he could to the further march
of the union cavalry.