THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN
In the spring of 1864, the cavalry of the army of the Potomac was
thoroughly reorganized. Pleasonton, who had been rather a staff officer
of the general commanding the army than a real chief of cavalry, was
retired and Sheridan took his place. Kilpatrick was sent to the west and
James H. Wilson, an engineer officer, succeeded him in command of the
Third division. Buford's old division, the First, was placed under
Torbert, an infantry officer whose qualifications as a commander of
cavalry were not remarkable. There were several of his subordinates who
were both more capable and more deserving, notably Custer, Merritt and
Thomas C. Devin. John Buford, the heroic, one of the ablest of all the
generals of division, had succumbed to the exposures of the previous
campaign. His death befell in December, 1863, on the very day when he
received his commission as major-general, a richly deserved reward for
his splendid and patriotic services in the Gettysburg and other
campaigns. His death created a void which it was hard to fill. Gregg was
the only one of the three old and tried division commanders who remained
with the corps.
Of the generals of brigade, Merritt and Devin remained with their old
division. Davies was transferred from the Third to the Second, and
Custer's Michigan brigade became the First brigade of the First
division, the general going with it.
Pleasonton who was sent to Rosecrans, in Missouri, although perhaps not,
like his illustrious successor, a cavalry chief of the first rank, had a
brilliant record, and in the campaign of 1863 had performed most
meritorious and effective service and certainly deserves a high place in
the list of union leaders of that period. In all the campaigns of the
year 1863, he acquitted himself with the highest credit and in many of
the battles, notably at Chancellorsville, Middleburg and Brandy Station,
he was an equal match for Stuart and his able lieutenants. If, in the
readjustment incident to the assumption by General Grant of the chief
command, Pleasonton could have been permitted to serve loyally under
Sheridan, who was his junior in rank, it would, doubtless, have been
better for both of them. He would have been obliged, to be sure, to
crucify his ambition and waive his rank, but his name might have been
linked with those of Gregg, and Merritt, and Custer in the record of
"Little Phil's" picturesque marches from the Wilderness to the James;
from Harper's Ferry to Cedar Creek; and from Winchester to Appomattox.
He left the army in whose achievements he had borne so honorable a part,
and no opportunities for distinction came to him afterwards. Others
wore the laurels that might have been his.
Soon after his arrival, General Sheridan reviewed the cavalry corps on
the open ground near Culpeper. There were ten thousand mounted men in
line, and when they broke into column to pass in review before the
assembled generals of the army, it was a magnificent spectacle. To this
day the writer's blood quickens in his veins and a flush of pardonable
pride mantles his face whenever he recalls the circumstance of one of
Custer's staff coming to his quarters after the parade, to convey with
the general's compliments the pleasant information that General Sheridan
had personally requested him to compliment the officers and men of the
regiment, on its excellent appearance and soldierly bearing on the
review. Only a short time before, General Kilpatrick had sent a similar
message after seeing the regiment at brigade drill. How cheering these
messages were; and how full of encouragement to the full performance of
duty in the trying times that were close at hand! Life is not too full
of such words of cheer, even when we do our best. It is not so much
admiration as appreciation that one craves from his fellow men,
especially from those who are by circumstance placed over him. But envy,
and malice, and a mean, begrudging spirit often stand at the door to
keep it out, when it would fain enter, bringing the sunshine with it.
There was nothing narrow or mean about Sheridan. Conscious of his own
greatness, he was too broad to begrudge recognition to others. When a
subordinate deserved commendation and Sheridan knew it, he always gave
it.
Although the movement of the army of the Potomac, which initiated in
Virginia the campaign of 1864 and resulted in the battle of the
Wilderness, began on May 3, it was the morning of May 4, when the
Wolverine troopers left their camp near Culpeper. The Second and Third
divisions, as has been shown, had the honor of leading the advance and
preceded the infantry, crossing at Ely's and Germanna fords,
respectively, on the day before. The First division bivouacked on the
north side of the river during the night of May 4. At three o'clock on
the morning of May 5, the march was resumed and, crossing at Ely's ford,
it moved to Chancellorsville, and was encamped that night at the
"Furnaces," south of the Orange plank road, about midway between
Wilderness Church and Todd's Tavern, in the rear of the left of the
union lines.
Early on the morning of May 6, "boots and saddles" and "to horse"
summoned the brigade to arms; and at two o'clock a.m., it was on the
march by the Furnace road toward the intersection of that highway with
the Brock turnpike. Gregg was at Todd's Tavern, at the junction of the
Catharpin and Brock roads. Custer was to be the connecting link between
Gregg's division and Hancock's corps. Devin, with the Second brigade,
was ordered to report to Custer. Wilson had been out the previous day on
the Orange plank road and pike, beyond Parker's Store, where he
encountered Stuart's cavalry and was roughly handled. While moving up
in the darkness, we came upon the scattered troopers of the First
Vermont cavalry, which for some time before the redistribution had been
attached to the Michigan brigade, but was then in Chapman's brigade of
Wilson's division. They were moving to the rear, and seemed much
chagrined over their defeat and declared that they did not belong to the
Third division, but were the "Eighth Michigan."
"Come along with us," said their old Michigan companions-in-arms.
"Wish we could," they replied.
Arriving at his destination before daylight, Custer posted his troops so
as to be ready to meet the expected attack. Two troops, one from the
First Michigan the other from the Sixth, commanded by Captain George R.
Maxwell and Captain Manning D. Birge, respectively, were sent well out
on the Brock road to picket the front. The line of battle was formed in
the woods, facing a cleared space, beyond which dense timber served as a
screen to prevent the enemy's approach from being discovered. The right
was held by the First and Sixth Michigan, formed in two lines,
regimental front, the Sixth in rear, the men standing "in place, rest"
in front of their horses. It was prolonged to the left by the Fifth and
Seventh Michigan and Devin's brigade, composed of the Fourth, Sixth and
Ninth New York and Seventeenth Pennsylvania regiments of cavalry. Devin,
however, did not arrive on the ground until the battle was well under
way. The right of the line was "in the air," so far as was at that time
known, the infantry not being in sight.
The open field directly in front extended some 200 yards beyond our
position, to the right, and it was, perhaps, 500 yards across it to the
woods. The timber in which we formed extended from the rear clear around
the right and across the front. In other words, the patch of open ground
was enclosed on three sides, at least, by dense woods. The alignment
faced in a westerly direction, and was back in the timber far enough to
be hidden from the approaching foe. To the right and as it turned out,
somewhat to the rear, lay the army of the Potomac, which had been
battling with Lee all the previous day; and orders had been issued for
the fighting to be resumed at five o'clock in the morning.
Thus we stood, prepared, in a state of expectancy, awaiting the sounds
that were to summon us to battle.
The brigade band was posted near the left flank of the First Michigan.
General Custer, alert and wary, with a portion of his staff and escort,
was out inspecting the picket line.
The horse artillery had not yet arrived.
Every trooper was alert and ready for whatever might come.
The field, of which mention has been made, was bisected by a ravine,
nearly diagonally from left front to right rear, the ground sloping into
it from front and rear. This ravine was to play a prominent part in the
battle that ensued.
Suddenly, the signal came. A picket shot was heard, then another, and
another. Thicker and faster the spattering tones were borne to our ears
from the woods in front. Then, it was the "rebel yell;" at first faint,
but swelling in volume as it approached. A brigade of cavalry, led by
the intrepid Rosser, was charging full tilt toward our position. He did
not stop to skirmish with the pickets but, charging headlong, drove them
pell-mell into the reserves, closely following, with intent to stampede
the whole command.
It was a bold and brilliant dash, but destined to fall short of complete
success.
Rosser had met his match.
When the confederate charge was sounded, Custer was near his picket line
and, scenting the first note of danger, turned his horse's head toward
the point where he had hidden his Wolverines in ambush and, bursting
into view from the woods beyond the field, we saw him riding furiously
in our direction. When he neared the edge of the woods, circling to the
front and curbing the course of his charger as he rode, he bade the band
to play and, with saber arm extended, shouted to the command, already in
the saddle:
"Forward, by divisions!"
As the band struck up the inspiriting strains of "Yankee Doodle," the
First Michigan broke by subdivisions from the right, the Sixth following
in line, regimental front and the two regiments charged with a yell
through the thick underbrush out into the open ground just as the
confederate troopers emerged from the woods on the opposite side. Both
commands kept on in full career, the First and Sixth inextricably
intermingled, until they reached the edge of the ravine, when they
stopped, the confederates surprised by the sudden appearance and
audacity of the Michigan men and their gallant leader; Custer well
content with checking Rosser's vicious advance. Some of the foremost of
either side kept on and crossed sabers in the middle of the ravine.
Among these was Lieutenant Cortez P. Pendill, of the Sixth Michigan, who
was severely wounded among the very foremost. One squadron of the
confederates, possibly a small regiment, charging in column of fours,
went past our right flank, and then, like the French army that marched
up a hill and then marched down again, turned and charged back, without
attempting to turn their head of column towards the place where Custer
was standing at bay, with his Michiganders clustered thick about him.
Pretty soon the confederates ran a battery into the field and opened on
us with shell. Every attempt to break Custer's line, however, ended in
failure, the Spencer carbines proving too much of an obstacle to be
overcome.
Meanwhile, the Fifth and Seventh had been doing excellent service on the
left, forging to the front and threatening the right of the confederate
position.
But it was evident that our own right was vulnerable, and Custer ordered
Major Kidd to take the Sixth, move it by the rear to the woods on the
right, dismount to fight on foot and, to use his own words: "Flank that
battery."
The regiment had become much scattered in the charge, but the "rally"
was sounded, and as many men as could be quickly assembled on the
colors, were withdrawn from the field and, obeying the order with as
much alacrity as possible, in a few moments they were in position and
moving forward briskly through the thick woods. But, they had not
proceeded far, when a strong line of dismounted confederates was
encountered. Both commanders seem to have ordered a simultaneous
movement with a similar purpose, viz: To flank the other and attack his
rear.
The two forces met very nearly on the prolongation of the line held by
the mounted men of the First, Fifth and Seventh Michigan, east of the
ravine. The confederate line extended beyond the right of the Sixth as
far as we could see, and it was at once evident that we were greatly
outnumbered, and liable to have the right flank turned at any moment.
The little force stood bravely up to their work, using the Spencers with
deadly effect, and checking the advance of the confederates in their
immediate front. Major Charles W. Deane who was helping to direct the
movement, had his horse shot under him. Seeing that the left of the
confederates were trying to pass around our right flank, the captain of
the left troop was directed to hold on to his position and the right was
"refused" to protect the rear. At the same time an officer was
dispatched to General Custer with an appeal for reinforcements.
The entire of the Second brigade was now up and a battery which arrived
on the field after the withdrawal of the Sixth, had been placed in
position and opened upon the enemy. The battle was still raging in the
field, but General Custer sent the Fifth Michigan, Colonel Russell A.
Alger commanding, and the Seventeenth Pennsylvania, Lieutenant Colonel
J.Q. Anderson commanding, to the relief of the Sixth Michigan.
The reinforcements came none too soon. The confederates, confident in
their superior numbers, were pressing hard and threatening to envelop us
completely.
In a solid line of two ranks, with Spencer carbines full shotted, the
two magnificent regiments deployed into line on our right. Then moving
forward, by a left half wheel, turned the tables on the too exultant
foe, and he was forced slowly but surely back. By virtue of his rank
Colonel Alger was in command of the line and, in response to his
clear-voiced order, "Steady men, forward," the three regiments, with a
shout, swept on through the woods, driving everything before them. At
the same time, the mounted men of the First and Seventh charged the
force in their front. The enemy, thereupon, gave way in disorder, was
routed and fled, leaving his dead and wounded in our hands. His repulse
was complete and crushing and we saw no more of him that day. The
Michigan men, with the aid of Devin's New York and Pennsylvania
troopers, had won a signal victory, momentous in its consequences, for
it saved the union left from a disaster much dreaded, the fear of which
neutralized one-half of Hancock's corps during the entire day.
No one who witnessed it, can ever forget the superb conduct of Colonel
Alger and his men when they swung into line on the right of the Sixth
Michigan and turned a threatened reverse into a magnificent victory.
Among the wounded, besides Lieutenant Pendill, already mentioned, were
Captain Benjamin F. Rockafellow, of the Sixth Michigan, and Lieutenant
Alvin N. Sabin, of the Fifth Michigan. All of these officers were
severely wounded and all behaved with the most conspicuous gallantry.
In the meantime, what was the infantry doing? After Rosser was driven
from the field, it was found that there was a line of infantry not far
to the right and rear. Indeed, the left of the infantry line overlapped
the right of the cavalry. Attention was called to the fact when, after
the fight, some of the cavalrymen began to straggle to the rear and
returning, said that the Twenty-sixth Michigan infantry was only a
little way off, and a good many of the men went over for a brief
hand-shake with friends therein.
The Twenty-sixth Michigan was in Barlow's division. They had been
interested listeners to, if not actual witnesses of the cavalry fight.
The contest between the dismounted men of Rosser's and Custer's commands
had been almost, if not quite, in their front and occasional shots had
come their way.
Why did not Barlow, or indeed, Gibbon's entire command, move up at the
time when the Sixth Michigan cavalry was contending alone with a
superior force directly in their front?
The answer to that question is in the sealed book which contains the
reason of Grant's failure in the "Wilderness."
Let us see!
Grant's orders to the corps commanders--Sedgwick, Warren and
Hancock--were to attack Lee's army at five o'clock a.m., May 6.
Longstreet had not arrived but was expected up in the morning, and
prisoners said he would attack the union left. Hancock was directed to
look out for the left. Barlow's division was posted for that purpose.
Hancock's corps was divided into two wings, the right wing under Birney
consisting of the three divisions of Birney, Mott and Getty; the left
wing of Gibbon's and Barlow's divisions under Gibbon. Barlow, as has
been seen, was to look out for the left. "The left" was well looked
after by Sheridan's cavalry for, aside from Custer's two brigades which
were directly in contact with Barlow's left flank, Gregg's division was
posted at Todd's Tavern, still farther to the left.
Sedgwick and Warren attacked Ewell at the hour, but were unsuccessful.
Hancock's assault upon Hill was completely successful, although
Longstreet arrived in the nick of time to save Hill. But Hancock's
attack was with his right wing under Birney, and Longstreet struck the
left of Birney's command. Where were the two divisions of Gibbon, posted
for the very purpose of looking out for Longstreet?
In General A.A. Humphrey's, "Virginia Campaigns," page 40, we read:
"At seven a.m., General Hancock sent a staff officer to General
Gibbon, informing him of the success of his right wing, and directing
him to attack the enemy's right with Barlow's division. This order
was only partially obeyed. Had Barlow's division advanced as
directed, he (General Hancock) felt confident that the enemy's force
would have been defeated. The cause of his failure was probably owing
to the expected approach of Longstreet on his (Barlow's) left."
Again:
"At 8:30 a.m., Hancock began an attack with Birney's wing and
Gibbon's division of the left wing."
General Grant, in his memoirs, (pp. 196-197):
"Hancock was ready to advance, but learning that Longstreet was
threatening his left flank, sent a division of infantry, commanded by
General Barlow, to cover the approaches by which Longstreet was
expected."
General Sheridan, (memoirs, vol. I, pp. 362-363):
"On the sixth, General Meade became alarmed about his left flank and
sent a dispatch, saying: 'Hancock has been heavily pressed and his
left turned. You had better draw in your cavalry to protect the
trains.'"
And again:
"On the morning of the sixth, Custer's and Devin's brigades had been
severely engaged before I received the above note. They had been most
successful in repulsing the enemy's attacks, and I felt that the line
could be held. But the despatch from General Hancock was alarming, so
I drew all the cavalry close in around Chancellorsville."
Grant's memoirs, once more:
"The firing was hardly begun when Hancock was informed that the left
wing was seriously threatened so as to fully occupy Barlow. The
enemy's dismounted cavalry opened on him (sic.) with artillery and
pressed forward his skirmish line. The rapid firing of Sheridan's
attack helped to confirm the impression that this was a serious flank
attack by the enemy. These repeated reports prevented Hancock from
throwing his full strength into the attack along the plank road."
"The rapid firing of Sheridan's attack" is good. Sheridan is entitled to
the credit of placing Custer where he was. But that is all. Sheridan was
not on the ground to direct the attack in any way; nor was the division
commander on the ground. It was Custer's attack and it was Custer's
victory. The only dismounted cavalry that attacked Barlow was Rosser's
cavalry, and Custer's cavalry was between Rosser and Barlow. The only
artillery with which the dismounted cavalry opened on Barlow was
Rosser's battery and Custer and his men were between Barlow and that
battery. Had Barlow taken the trouble to ascertain what was really going
on in his front, an easy matter, he would have found that, so far from
this dismounted cavalry endangering his flank, they had been driven off
the field in headlong flight, leaving their dead and wounded. There was
never a moment during the entire day (May 6, 1864,) when Barlow was in
the slightest danger of being flanked. His failure to advance, enabled
Longstreet to swing across his front and attack Birney's left, thus
neutralizing Hancock's victory over Hill. If Barlow and Gibbon had
advanced as they were ordered to do, they would have struck Longstreet's
flank and, probably, crushed it.
All of which seems to demonstrate that, in battle, as in the ordinary
affairs of life, imaginary dangers often trouble us more than those
which are real.
The fear of being flanked was an ever present terror to the army of the
Potomac, and the apparition which appeared to McDowell at Manassas, to
Pope at the Second Bull Run, to Hooker at Chancellorsville, flitted over
the Wilderness also, and was the principal cause why that campaign was
not successful.
And then again, General Meade placed too low an estimate upon the value
of cavalry as a factor in battle and failed utterly to appreciate the
importance of the presence of Sheridan's troopers upon his left. Had
Meade and Hancock known Sheridan then, as they knew him a year later,
when he intercepted the flight of the army of Northern Virginia at Five
Forks and Sailor's Creek, there would have been in their minds no
nervous apprehension that Longstreet might reenact in the Wilderness the
part played at Chancellorsville by Stonewall Jackson. As it was, Grant's
strategy and Hancock's heroism were paralyzed by these false rumors
about Longstreet's menacing the safety of the Potomac army by moving
against its left and rear. If such a thing was seriously intended, it
was met and thwarted by Custer and Gregg who, alone and unaided as at
Gettysburg, successfully resisted every effort on the part of Stuart's
cavalry to break through the union lines. The noise of the successful
battle which the union cavalry was waging, instead of reassuring the
federal commanders as it should have done, served only to increase the
alarm which extended to General Hancock and to army headquarters, as
well. If a proper rating had been placed upon the services of the
cavalry all apprehension would have been quieted. Barlow and Gibbon
would have moved promptly to the front as directed, and Hill and Ewell
might have been crushed before Longstreet was in position to save them.
General Sheridan's report gives a very meager and inadequate account of
the cavalry fight in the Wilderness. In his book he dismisses it with a
paragraph. Major McClellan, Stuart's adjutant general, in his "Campaigns
of Stuart's Cavalry," makes no mention of it at all, though he devotes
much space to Rosser's victory over Wilson, on the fifth. That is not
strange, perhaps, in the case of the confederate chronicler, who set out
in his book to write eulogiums upon his own hero, and not upon Sheridan
or Custer. He has a keen eye for confederate victories and, if he has
knowledge of any other, does not confess to it. As for Sheridan, his
corps was scattered over a wide area, its duty to guard the left flank
and all the trains, and he was not present in person when Custer put an
abrupt stop to Rosser's impetuous advance. It is now known that he was
so hampered by interference from army headquarters that his plans
miscarried, and the relations between himself and his immediate superior
became so strained that the doughty little warrior declared that he
would never give the cavalry corps another order. By General Grant's
intervention, however, these difficulties were so far reconciled that
Sheridan was soon off on his memorable campaign which resulted in the
bloody battle of Yellow Tavern and the death of the foremost confederate
cavalier, General J.E.B. Stuart.