Judaism, it seems to have tended towards a revival of the ethical and
religious spirit of the prophetic age, accompanied by the belief in Jesus
as the Messiah, and by various accretions which had grown round Judaism
subsequently to the exile. To these belong the doctrines of the
Resurrection, of the Last Judgment, of Heaven and Hell; of the hierarchy of
good angels; of Satan and the hierarchy of evil spirits. And there is very
strong ground for believing that all these doctrines, at least in the
shapes in which they were held by the post-exilic Jews, were derived from
Persian and Babylonian[138] sources, and are essentially of heathen origin.
How far Jesus positively sanctioned all these indrainings of circumjacent
Paganism into Judaism; how far any one has a right to declare, that the
refusal to accept one or other of these doctrines, as ascertained verities,
comes to the same thing as contradicting Jesus, it appears to me not easy
to say. But it is hardly less difficult to conceive that he could have
distinctly negatived any of them; and, more especially, that demonology
which has been accepted by {484} the Christian Churches in every age and
under all their mutual antagonisms. But, I repeat my conviction that,
whether Jesus sanctioned the demonology of his time and nation or not, it
is doomed. The future of Christianity, as a dogmatic system and apart from
the old Israelitish ethics which it has appropriated and developed, lies in
the answer which mankind will eventually give to the question whether they
are prepared to believe such stories as the Gadarene and the
pneumatological hypotheses which go with it, or not. My belief is they will
decline to do anything of the sort, whenever and wherever their minds have
been disciplined by science. And that discipline must, and will, at once
follow and lead the footsteps of advancing civilisation.
The preceding pages were written before I became acquainted with the
contents of the May number of the _Nineteenth Century_, wherein I discover
many things which are decidedly not to my advantage. It would appear that
"evasion" is my chief resource, "incapacity for strict argument" and
"rottenness of ratiocination" my main mental characteristics, and that it
is "barely credible" that a statement which I profess to make of my own
knowledge is true. All which things I notice, merely to illustrate the
great truth, forced on me by long experience, that it is only from those
who enjoy the blessing of a firm hold of the Christian faith that such
manifestations of meekness, patience, and charity are to be expected. {485}
I had imagined that no one who had read my preceding papers, could
entertain a doubt as to my position in respect of the main issue as it has
been stated and restated by my opponent:
an Agnosticism which knows nothing of the relation of man to God must
not only refuse belief to our Lord's most undoubted teaching, but must
deny the reality of the spiritual convictions in which He lived.[139]
That is said to be "the simple question which is at issue between us," and
the three testimonies to that teaching and those convictions selected are
the Sermon on the Mount, the Lord's Prayer, and the Story of the Passion.
My answer, reduced to its briefest form, has been: In the first place, the
evidence is such that the exact nature of the teachings and the convictions
of Jesus is extremely uncertain, so that what ecclesiastics are pleased to
call a denial of them may be nothing of the kind. And, in the second place,
if Jesus taught the demonological system involved in the Gadarene story--if
a belief in that system formed a part of the spiritual convictions in which
he lived and died--then I, for my part, unhesitatingly refuse belief in
that teaching, and deny the reality of those spiritual convictions. And I
go further and add, that, exactly in so far as it can be proved that Jesus
sanctioned the essentially pagan demonological theories current among the
Jews of his age, exactly in so far, for me, will his authority in any
matter touching the spiritual world be weakened.
{486}
With respect to the first half of my answer, I have pointed out that the
Sermon on the Mount, as given in the first Gospel, is, in the opinion of
the best critics, a "mosaic work" of materials derived from different
sources, and I do not understand that this statement is challenged. The
only other Gospel, the third, which contains something like it, makes, not
only the discourse, but the circumstances under which it was delivered,
very different. Now, it is one thing to say that there was something real
at the bottom of the two discourses--which is quite possible; and another
to affirm that we have any right to say what that something was, or to fix
upon any particular phrase and declare it to be a genuine utterance. Those
who pursue theology as a science, and bring to the study an adequate
knowledge of the ways of ancient historians, will find no difficulty in
providing illustrations of my meaning. I may supply one which has come
within range of my own limited vision.
In Josephus's _History of the Wars of the Jews_ (chap, xix.), that writer
reports a speech which he says Herod made at the opening of a war with the
Arabians. It is in the first person, and would naturally be supposed by the
reader to be intended for a true version of what Herod said. In the
_Antiquities_, written some seventeen years later, the same writer gives
another report, also in the first person, of Herod's speech on the same
occasion. This second oration is twice as long as the first, and though the
general tenour of the two speeches is {487} pretty much the same, there is
hardly any verbal identity, and a good deal of matter is introduced into
the one, which is absent from the other. Josephus prides himself on his
accuracy; people whose fathers might have heard Herod's oration were his
contemporaries; and yet his historical sense is so curiously undeveloped
that he can, quite innocently, perpetrate an obvious literary fabrication;
for one of the two accounts must be incorrect. Now, if I am asked whether I
believe that Herod made some particular statement on this occasion;
whether, for example, he uttered the pious aphorism, "Where God is, there
is both multitude and courage," which is given in the _Antiquities_, but
not in the _Wars_, I am compelled to say I do not know. One of the two
reports must be erroneous, possibly both are: at any rate, I cannot tell
how much of either is true. And, if some fervent admirer of the Idumean
should build up a theory of Herod's piety upon Josephus's evidence that he
propounded the aphorism, is it a "mere evasion" to say, in reply, that the
evidence that he did utter it is worthless?
It appears again that, adopting the tactics of Conachar when brought face
to face with Hal o' the Wynd, I have been trying to get my simpleminded
adversary to follow me on a wild-goose chase through the early history of
Christianity, in the hope of escaping impending defeat on the main issue.
But I may be permitted to point out that there is an alternative hypothesis
which equally fits the facts; and that, after all, there {488} may have
been method in the madness of my supposed panic.
For suppose it to be established that Gentile Christianity was a totally
different thing from the Nazarenism of Jesus and his immediate disciples;
suppose it to be demonstrable that, as early as the sixth decade of our era
at least, there were violent divergencies of opinion among the followers of
Jesus; suppose it to be hardly doubtful that the Gospels and the Acts took
their present shapes under the influence of these divergencies; suppose
that their authors, and those through whose hands they passed, had notions
of historical veracity not more eccentric than those which Josephus
occasionally displays: surely the chances that the Gospels are altogether
trustworthy records of the teachings of Jesus become very slender. And
since the whole of the case of the other side is based on the supposition
that they are accurate records (especially of speeches, about which ancient
historians are so curiously loose), I really do venture to submit that this
part of my argument bears very seriously on the main issue; and, as
ratiocination, is sound to the core.
Again, when I passed by the topic of the speeches of Jesus on the Cross, it
appears that I could have had no other motive than the dictates of my
native evasiveness. An ecclesiastical dignitary may have respectable
reasons for declining a fencing match "in sight of Gethsemane and Calvary";
but an ecclesiastical "Infidel"! Never. It is obviously impossible that, in
the belief that "the greater includes the less," {489} I, having declared
the Gospel evidence in general, as to the sayings of Jesus, to be of
questionable value, thought it needless to select for illustration of my
views, those particular instances which were likely to be most offensive to
persons of another way of thinking. But any supposition that may have been
entertained that the old familiar tones of the ecclesiastical war-drum will
tempt me to engage in such needless discussion had better be renounced. I
shall do nothing of the kind. Let it suffice that I ask my readers to turn
to the twenty-third chapter of Luke (revised version), verse thirty-four,
and he will find in the margin
Some ancient authorities omit: And Jesus said "Father forgive them, for
they know not what they do."
So that, even as late as the fourth century, there were ancient
authorities, indeed some of the most ancient and weightiest, who either did
not know of this utterance, so often quoted as characteristic of Jesus, or
did not believe it had been uttered.
Many years ago, I received an anonymous letter, which abused me heartily
for my want of moral courage in not speaking out. I thought that one of the
oddest charges an anonymous letter-writer could bring. But I am not sure
that the plentiful sowing of the pages of the article with which I am
dealing with accusations of evasion, may not seem odder to those who
consider that the main strength of the answers with which I have been
favoured (in this review and elsewhere) is devoted, not to anything in
{490} the text of my first paper, but to a note which occurs at p. 171. In
this I say:
Dr. Wace tells us: "It may be asked how far we can rely on the accounts
we possess of our Lord's teaching on these subjects." And he seems to
think the question appropriately answered by the assertion that it
"ought to be regarded as settled by M. Renan's practical surrender of
the adverse case."
I requested Dr. Wace to point out the passages of M. Renan's works in
which, as he affirms, this "practical surrender" (not merely as to the age
and authorship of the Gospels, be it observed, but as to their historical
value) is made, and he has been so good as to do so. Now let us consider
the parts of Dr. Wace's citation from Renan which are relevant to the
issue:--
The author of this Gospel [Luke] is certainly the same as the author of
the Acts of the Apostles. Now the author of the Acts seems to be a
companion of St. Paul--a character which accords completely with St.
Luke. I know that more than one objection may be opposed to this
reasoning; but one thing, at all events, is beyond doubt, namely, that
the author of the third Gospel and of the Acts is a man who belonged to
the second apostolic generation; and this suffices for our purpose.
This is a curious "practical surrender of the adverse case." M. Renan
thinks that there is no doubt that the author of the third Gospel is the
author of the Acts--a conclusion in which I suppose critics generally
agree. He goes on to remark that this person _seems_ to be a companion of
St. Paul, and adds that Luke was a companion of St. Paul. Then, somewhat
needlessly, M. Renan points out that there is more than one objection to
jumping, from such data as these, to {491} the conclusion that "Luke" is
the writer of the third Gospel. And, finally, M. Renan is content to reduce
that which is "beyond doubt" to the fact that the author of the two books
is a man of the second apostolic generation. Well, it seems to me that I
could agree with all that M. Renan considers "beyond doubt" here, without
surrendering anything, either "practically" or theoretically.
Dr. Wace (_Nineteenth Century_, March, p. 363) states that he derives the
above citation from the preface to the 15th edition of the _Vie de Jesus_.
My copy of _Les Evangiles_, dated 1877, contains a list of Renan's _Oeuvres
Completes_, at the head of which I find _Vie de Jesus_, 15^e edition. It
is, therefore, a later work than the edition of the _Vie de Jesus_ which
Dr. Wace quotes. Now _Les Evangiles_, as its name implies, treats fully of
the questions respecting the date and authorship of the Gospels; and any
one who desired, not merely to use M. Renan's expressions for controversial
purposes, but to give a fair account of his views in their full
significance, would, I think, refer to the later source.
If this course had been taken, Dr. Wace might have found some as decided
expressions of opinion in favour of Luke's authorship of the third Gospel
as he has discovered in _The Apostles_. I mention this circumstance because
I desire to point out that, taking even the strongest of Renan's
statements, I am still at a loss to see how it justifies that
large-sounding phrase, "practical surrender of the adverse case." For, on
p. 438 of _Les Evangiles_, Renan speaks of the way in {492} which Luke's
"excellent intentions" have led him to torture history in the Acts; he
declares Luke to be the founder of that "eternal fiction which is called
ecclesiastical history"; and, on the preceding page, he talks of the "myth"
of the Ascension--with its "_mise en scene voulue_." At p. 435, I find
"Luc, ou l'auteur quel qu'il soit du troisieme Evangile"; at p. 280, the
accounts of the Passion, the death and the resurrection of Jesus, are said
to be "peu historiques"; at p. 283, "La valeur historique du troisieme
Evangile est surement moindre que celles des deux premiers." A Pyrrhic sort
of victory for orthodoxy this "surrender!" And, all the while, the
scientific student of theology knows that the more reason there may be to
believe that Luke was the companion of Paul, the more doubtful becomes his
credibility, if he really wrote the Acts. For, in that case, he could not
fail to have been acquainted with Paul's account of the Jerusalem
conference, and he must have consciously misrepresented it.
We may next turn to the essential part of Dr. Wace's citation (_Nineteenth
Century_, p. 365) touching the first Gospel:--
St. Matthew evidently deserves peculiar confidence for the discourses.
Here are the "oracles"--the very notes taken while the memory of the
instruction of Jesus was living and definite.
M. Renan here expresses the very general opinion as to the existence of a
collection of "logia," having a different origin from the text in which
they are embedded, in Matthew. "Notes" are somewhat suggestive of a
shorthand writer, but the suggestion is {493} unintentional, for M. Renan
assumes that these "notes" were taken, not at the time of the delivery of
the "logia" but subsequently, while (as he assumes) the memory of them was
living and definite; so that, in this very citation, M. Renan leaves open
the question of the general historical value of the first Gospel, while it
is obvious that the accuracy of "notes" taken, not at the time of delivery,
but from memory, is a matter about which more than one opinion may be
fairly held. Moreover, Renan expressly calls attention to the difficulty of
distinguishing the authentic "logia" from later additions of the same kind
(_Les Evangiles_, p. 201). The fact is, there is no contradiction here to
that opinion about the first Gospel which is expressed in _Les Evangiles_
(p. 175).
The text of the so-called Matthew supposes the pre-existence of that of
Mark, and does little more than complete it. He completes it in two
fashions--first, by the insertion of those long discourses which gave
their chief value to the Hebrew Gospels; then by adding traditions of a
more modern formation, results of successive developments of the
legend, and to which the Christian consciousness already attached
infinite value.
M. Renan goes on to suggest that besides "Mark," "pseudo-Matthew" used an
Aramaic version of the Gospel originally set forth in that dialect.
Finally, as to the second Gospel (_Nineteenth Century_, p. 365):--
He [Mark] is full of minute observations, proceeding, beyond doubt,
from an eye-witness. There is nothing to conflict with the supposition
that this eye-witness ... was the Apostle Peter himself, as Papias has
it.
Let us consider this citation by the light of _Les Evangiles_:-- {494}
This work, although composed after the death of Peter, was, in a sense,
the work of Peter; it represents the way in which Peter was accustomed
to relate the life of Jesus (p. 116).
M. Renan goes on to say that, as an historical document, the Gospel of Mark
has a great superiority (p. 116); but Mark has a motive for omitting the
discourses, and he attaches a "puerile importance" to miracles (p. 117).
The Gospel of Mark is less a legend than a biography written with credulity
(p. 118). It would be rash to say that Mark has not been interpolated and
retouched (p. 120).
If any one thinks that I have not been warranted in drawing a sharp
distinction between "scientific theologians" and "counsels for creeds"; or
that my warning against the too ready acceptance of certain declarations as
to the state of biblical criticism was needless; or that my anxiety as to
the sense of the word "practical" was superfluous; let him compare the
statement that M. Renan has made a "practical surrender of the adverse
case" with the facts just set forth. For what is the adverse case? The
question, as Dr. Wace puts it, is, "It may be asked how far can we rely on
the accounts we possess of our Lord's teaching on these subjects." It will
be obvious that M. Renan's statements amount to an adverse answer--to a
"practical" denial that any great reliance can be placed on these accounts.
He does not believe that Matthew, the apostle, wrote the first Gospel; he
does not profess to know who is responsible for the collection of "logia,"
or how many of them are authentic; though he calls the second Gospel the
{495} most historical, he points out that it is written with credulity, and
may have been interpolated and retouched; and, as to the author, "quel
qu'il soit," of the third Gospel, who is to "rely on the accounts" of a
writer who deserves the cavalier treatment which "Luke" meets with at M.
Renan's hands?
I repeat what I have already more than once said, that the question of the
age and the authorship of the Gospels has not, in my judgment, the
importance which is so commonly assigned to it; for the simple reason that
the reports, even of eye-witnesses, would not suffice to justify belief in
a large and essential part of their contents; on the contrary, these
reports would discredit the witnesses. The Gadarene miracle, for example,
is so extremely improbable, that the fact of its being reported by three,
even independent, authorities could not justify belief in it unless we had
the clearest evidence as to their capacity as observers and as interpreters
of their observations. But it is evident that the three authorities are not
independent; that they have simply adopted a legend, of which there were
two versions; and instead of their proving its truth, it suggests their
superstitious credulity: so that if "Matthew," "Mark," and "Luke" are
really responsible for the Gospels, it is not the better for the Gadarene
story, but the worse for them.
A wonderful amount of controversial capital has been made out of my
assertion in the note to which I have referred, as an _obiter dictum_ of no
consequence {496} to my argument, that if Renan's work[140] were
non-extant, the main results of biblical criticism, as set forth in the
works of Strauss, Baur, Reuss, and Volkmar, for example, would not be
sensibly affected. I thought I had explained it satisfactorily already, but
it seems that my explanation has only exhibited still more of my native
perversity, so I ask for one more chance.
In the course of the historical development of any branch of science, what
is universally observed is this: that the men who make epochs, and are the
real architects of the fabric of exact knowledge, are those who introduce
fruitful ideas or methods. As a rule, the man who does this pushes his
idea, or his method, too far; or, if he does not, his school is sure to do
so, and those who follow have to reduce his work to its proper value, and
assign it its place in the whole. Not unfrequently they, in their turn,
overdo the critical process, and, in trying to eliminate error, throw away
truth.
Thus, as I said, Linnaeus, Buffon, Cuvier, Lamarck, really "set forth the
results" of a developing science, although they often heartily contradict
one another. Notwithstanding this circumstance, modern classificatory
method and nomenclature have largely grown out of the work of Linnaeus; the
modern conception of biology, as a science, and of its relation to
climatology, geography, and geology, are as largely rooted in the results
of the labours of Buffon; comparative {497} anatomy and palaeontology owe a
vast debt to Cuvier's results; while invertebrate zoology and the revival
of the idea of evolution are intimately dependent on the results of the
work of Lamarck. In other words, the main results of biology up to the
early years of this century are to be found in, or spring out of, the works
of these men.
So, if I mistake not, Strauss, if he did not originate the idea of taking
the mythopoeic faculty into account in the development of the Gospel
narratives, and though he may have exaggerated the influence of that
faculty, obliged scientific theology hereafter to take that element into
serious consideration; so Baur, in giving prominence to the cardinal fact
of the divergence of the Nazarene and Pauline tendencies in the primitive
Church; so Reuss, in setting a marvellous example of the cool and
dispassionate application of the principles of scientific criticism over
the whole field of Scripture; so Volkmar, in his clear and forcible
statement of the Nazarene limitations of Jesus, contributed results of
permanent value in scientific theology. I took these names as they occurred
to me. Undoubtedly, I might have advantageously added to them; perhaps I
might have made a better selection. But it really is absurd to try to make
out that I did not know that these writers widely disagree; and I believe
that no scientific theologian will deny that, in principle, what I have
said is perfectly correct. Ecclesiastical advocates, of course, cannot be
expected to take this view of the matter. To them, these mere seekers after
truth, in so far as {498} their results are unfavourable to the creed the
clerics have to support, are more or less "infidels," or favourers of
"infidelity"; and the only thing they care to see, or probably can see, is
the fact that, in a great many matters, the truth-seekers differ from one
another, and therefore can easily be exhibited to the public, as if they
did nothing else; as if any one who referred to their having, each and all,
contributed his share to the results of theological science, was merely
showing his ignorance; and as if a charge of inconsistency could be based
on the fact that he himself often disagrees with what they say. I have
never lent a shadow of foundation to the assumption that I am a follower of
either Strauss, or Baur, or Reuss, or Volkmar, or Renan; my debt to these
eminent men--so far my superiors in theological knowledge--is, indeed,
great; yet it is not for their opinions, but for those I have been able to
form for myself, by their help.
In _Agnosticism: a Rejoinder_ (p. 410), I have referred to the difficulties
under which those professors of the science of theology, whose tenure of
their posts depends on the results of their investigations, must labour;
and, in a note, I add--