Hereupon the ecclesiastic may observe: Your doubt means that you disbelieve

Jesus; therefore you are an "Infidel" instead of an "Agnostic." To which

the agnostic may reply: No; for two reasons: first, because your evidence

that Jesus said what you say he said is worth very little; and secondly,

because a man may be an agnostic, in the sense of admitting he has no

positive knowledge, and yet consider that he has more or less probable

ground for accepting any given hypothesis about the spiritual world. Just

as a man may frankly declare that he has no means of knowing whether the

planets generally are inhabited or not, and yet may think one of the two

possible hypotheses more likely than the other, so he may admit that he has

no means of knowing anything about the spiritual world, and yet may think

one or other of the current views on the subject, to some extent, probable.

The second answer is so obviously valid that it needs no discussion. I draw

attention to it simply in justice to those agnostics who may attach greater

value than I do to any sort of pneumatological speculations, and not

because I wish to escape the responsibility of declaring that, whether

Jesus sanctioned the demonological part of Christianity or not, I

unhesitatingly reject it. The first answer, on the other hand, opens up the

whole question of the claim of the biblical and other sources, from which

hypotheses concerning the spiritual world are derived, to be {467} regarded

as unimpeachable historical evidence as to matters of fact.

Now, in respect of the trustworthiness of the Gospel narratives, I was

anxious to get rid of the common assumption that the determination of the

authorship and of the dates of these works is a matter of fundamental

importance. That assumption is based upon the notion that what contemporary

witnesses say must be true, or, at least, has always a _prima facie_ claim

to be so regarded; so that if the writers of any of the Gospels were

contemporaries of the events (and still more if they were in the position

of eye-witnesses) the miracles they narrate must be historically true, and,

consequently, the demonology which they involve must be accepted. But the

story of the _Translation of the blessed martyrs Marcellinus and Petrus_,

and the other considerations (to which endless additions might have been

made from the Fathers and the mediaeval writers) set forth in a preceding

essay, yield, in my judgment, satisfactory proof that, where the miraculous

is concerned, neither considerable intellectual ability, nor undoubted

honesty, nor knowledge of the world, nor proved faithfulness as civil

historians, nor profound piety, on the part of eye-witnesses and

contemporaries, affords any guarantee of the objective truth of their

statements, when we know that a firm belief in the miraculous was ingrained

in their minds, and was the pre-supposition of their observations and

reasonings.

Therefore, although it be, as I believe, demonstrable that we have no real

knowledge of the {468} authorship, or of the date of composition of the

Gospels, as they have come down to us, and that nothing better than more or

less probable guesses can be arrived at on that subject, I have not cared

to expend any space on the question. It will be admitted, I suppose, that

the authors of the works attributed to Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John,

whoever they may be, are personages whose capacity and judgment in the

narration of ordinary events are not quite so well certified as those of

Eginhard; and we have seen what the value of Eginhard's evidence is when

the miraculous is in question.

I have been careful to explain that the arguments which I have used in the

course of this discussion are not new; that they are historical and have

nothing to do with what is commonly called science; and that they are all,

to the best of my belief, to be found in the works of theologians of

repute.

The position which I have taken up, that the evidence in favour of such

miracles as those recorded by Eginhard, and consequently of mediaeval

demonology, is quite as good as that in favour of such miracles as the

Gadarene, and consequently of Nazarene demonology, is none of my discovery.

Its strength was, wittingly or unwittingly, suggested, a century and a half

ago, by a theological scholar of eminence; and it has been, if not exactly

occupied, yet so fortified with bastions and redoubts by a living

ecclesiastical Vauban, that, in my judgment, it has been rendered

impregnable. In the early part of {469} the last century, the

ecclesiastical mind in this country was much exercised by the question, not

exactly of miracles, the occurrence of which in biblical times was

axiomatic, but by the problem: When did miracles cease? Anglican divines

were quite sure that no miracles had happened in their day, nor for some

time past; they were equally sure that they happened sixteen or seventeen

centuries earlier. And it was a vital question for them to determine at

what point of time, between this _terminus a quo_ and that _terminus ad

quem_, miracles came to an end.

The Anglicans and the Romanists agreed in the assumption that the

possession of the gift of miracle-working was _prima facie_ evidence of the

soundness of the faith of the miracle-workers. The supposition that

miraculous powers might be wielded by heretics (though it might be

supported by high authority) led to consequences too frightful to be

entertained by people who were busied in building their dogmatic house on

the sands of early Church history. If, as the Romanists maintained, an

unbroken series of genuine miracles adorned the records of their Church,

throughout the whole of its existence, no Anglican could lightly venture to

accuse them of doctrinal corruption. Hence, the Anglicans, who indulged in

such accusations, were bound to prove the modern, the mediaeval Roman, and

the later Patristic, miracles false; and to shut off the wonder-working

power from the Church at the exact point of time when Anglican doctrine

ceased and Roman doctrine {470} began. With a little adjustment--a squeeze

here and a pull there--the Christianity of the first three or four

centuries might be made to fit, or seem to fit, pretty well into the

Anglican scheme. So the miracles, from Justin say to Jerome, might be

recognised; while, in later times, the Church having become "corrupt"--that

is to say, having pursued one and the same line of development further than

was pleasing to Anglicans--its alleged miracles must needs be shams and

impostures.

Under these circumstances, it may be imagined that the establishment of a

scientific frontier between the earlier realm of supposed fact and the

later of asserted delusion, had its difficulties; and torrents of

theological special pleading about the subject flowed from clerical pens;

until that learned and acute Anglican divine, Conyers Middleton, in his

_Free Inquiry_, tore the sophistical web they had laboriously woven to

pieces, and demonstrated that the miracles of the patristric age, early and

late, must stand or fall together, inasmuch as the evidence for the later

is just as good as the evidence for the earlier wonders. If the one set are

certified by contemporaneous witnesses of high repute, so are the other;

and, in point of probability, there is not a pin to choose between the two.

That is the solid and irrefragable result of Middleton's contribution to

the subject. But the Free Inquirer's freedom had its limits; and he draws a

sharp line of demarcation between the patristic and the New Testament

miracles--on the professed ground that the accounts of the {471} latter,

being inspired, are out of the reach of criticism.

A century later, the question was taken up by another divine, Middleton's

equal in learning and acuteness, and far his superior in subtlety and

dialectic skill; who, though an Anglican, scorned the name of Protestant;

and, while yet a Churchman, made it his business to parade, with infinite

skill, the utter hollowness of the arguments of those of his brother

Churchmen who dreamed that they could be both Anglicans and Protestants.

The argument of the _Essay on the Miracles recorded in the Ecclesiastical

History of the Early Ages_,[129] by the present Roman Cardinal, but then

Anglican Doctor, John Henry Newman, is compendiously stated by himself in

the following passage:--

If the miracles of Church history cannot be defended by the arguments

of Leslie, Lyttleton, Paley, or Douglas, how many of the Scripture

miracles satisfy their conditions? (p. cvii).

And, although the answer is not given in so many words, little doubt is

left on the mind of the reader, that, in the mind of the writer, it is:

None. In fact, this conclusion is one which cannot be resisted, if the

argument in favour of the Scripture miracles is based upon that which

laymen, whether lawyers, or men of science, or historians, or ordinary men

of affairs, call evidence. But there is something really impressive {472}

in the magnificent contempt with which, at times, Dr. Newman sweeps aside

alike those who offer and those who demand such evidence.

Some infidel authors advise us to accept no miracles which would not

have a verdict in their favour in a court of justice; that is, they

employ against Scripture a weapon which Protestants would confine to

attacks upon the Church; as if moral and religious questions required

legal proof, and evidence were the test of truth[130] (p. cvii).

"As if evidence were the test of truth"!--although the truth in question is

the occurrence, or the non-occurrence of certain phenomena at a certain

time and in a certain place. This sudden revelation of the great gulf fixed

between the ecclesiastical and the scientific mind is enough to take away

the breath of any one unfamiliar with the clerical organon. As if, one may

retort, the assumption that miracles may, or have, served a moral or a

religious end, in any way alters the fact that they profess to be

historical events, things that actually happened; and, as such, must needs

be exactly those subjects about which evidence is appropriate and legal

proofs (which are such merely because they afford adequate evidence) may be

justly demanded. The Gadarene miracle either happened, or it did not.

Whether the Gadarene "question" is moral or religious, or not, has nothing

to do with the fact that it is a purely {473} historical question whether

the demons said what they are declared to have said, and the

devil-possessed pigs did, or did not, rush over the cliffs bounding the

Lake of Gennesaret on a certain day of a certain year, after A.D. 26 and

before A.D. 36: for vague and uncertain as New Testament chronology is, I

suppose it may be assumed that the event in question, if it happened at

all, took place during the procuratorship of Pilate. If that is not a

matter about which evidence ought to be required, and not only legal, but

strict scientific proof demanded by sane men who are asked to believe the

story--what is? Is a reasonable being to be seriously asked to credit

statements, which, to put the case gently, are not exactly probable, and on

the acceptance or rejection of which his whole view of life may depend,

without asking for as much "legal" proof as would send an alleged

pickpocket to gaol, or as would suffice to prove the validity of a disputed

will?

"Infidel authors" (if, as I am assured, I may answer for them) will decline

to waste time on mere darkenings of counsel of this sort; but to those

Anglicans who accept his premises, Dr. Newman is a truly formidable

antagonist. What, indeed, are they to reply when he puts the very pertinent

question:--

whether persons who not merely question, but prejudge the

Ecclesiastical miracles on the ground of their want of resemblance,

whatever that be, to those contained in Scripture--as if the Almighty

could not do in the Christian Church what He had not already done at

the time of its foundation, or under the Mosaic Covenant--whether such

reasoners are not siding with the sceptic,

{474}

and

whether it is not a happy inconsistency by which they continue to

believe the Scriptures while they reject the Church[131] (p. liii).

Again, I invite Anglican orthodoxy to consider this passage:--

the narrative of the combats of St. Antony with evil spirits, is a

development rather than a contradiction of revelation, viz. of such

texts as speak of Satan being cast out by prayer and fasting. To be

shocked, then, at the miracles of Ecclesiastical history, or to

ridicule them for their strangeness, is no part of a scriptural

philosophy (pp. liii-liv).

Further on, Dr. Newman declares that it has been admitted

that a distinct line can be drawn in point of character and

circumstance between the miracles of Scripture and of Church history;

but this is by no means the case (p. lv) ... specimens are not wanting

in the history of the Church, of miracles as awful in their character

and as momentous in their effects as those which are recorded in

Scripture. The fire interrupting the rebuilding of the Jewish temple,

and the death of Arius, are instances, in Ecclesiastical history, of

such solemn events. On the other hand, difficult instances in the

Scripture history are such as these: the serpent in Eden, the Ark,

Jacob's vision for the multiplication of his cattle, the speaking of

Balaam's ass, the axe swimming at Elisha's word, the miracle on the

swine, and various instances of prayers or prophecies, in which, as in

that of Noah's blessing and curse, words which seem the result of

private feeling are expressly or virtually ascribed to a Divine

suggestion (p. lvi).

Who is to gainsay our ecclesiastical authority {475} here? "Infidel

authors" might be accused of a wish to ridicule the Scripture miracles by

putting them on a level with the remarkable story about the fire which

stopped the rebuilding of the Temple, or that about the death of Arius--but

Dr. Newman is above suspicion. The pity is that his list of what he

delicately terms "difficult" instances is so short. Why omit the

manufacture of Eve out of Adam's rib, on the strict historical accuracy of

which the chief argument of the defenders of an iniquitous portion of our

present marriage law depends? Why leave out the account of the "Bene

Elohim" and their gallantries, on which a large part of the worst practices

of the mediaeval inquisitors into witchcraft was based? Why forget the angel

who wrestled with Jacob, and, as the account suggests, somewhat overstepped

the bounds of fair play, at the end of the struggle? Surely, we must agree

with Dr. Newman that, if all these camels have gone down, it savours of

affectation to strain at such gnats as the sudden ailment of Arius in the

midst of his deadly, if, prayerful,[132] enemies; and the fiery explosion

which {476} stopped the Julian building operations. Though the _words_ of

the "Conclusion" of the _Essay on Miracles_ may, perhaps, be quoted against

me, I may express my satisfaction at finding myself in substantial

accordance with a theologian above all suspicion of heterodoxy. With all my

heart, I can declare my belief that there is just as good reason for

believing in the miraculous slaying of the man who fell short of the

Athanasian power of affirming contradictories, with respect to the nature

of the Godhead, as there is for believing in the stories of the serpent and

the ark told in Genesis, the speaking of Balaam's ass in Numbers, or the

floating of the axe, at Elisha's order, in the second book of Kings.

It is one of the peculiarities of a really sound argument that it is

susceptible of the fullest development; and that it sometimes leads to

conclusions unexpected by those who employ it. To my mind, it is impossible

to refuse to follow Dr. Newman when he extends his reasoning from the

miracles of the patristic and mediaeval ages backward in time as far as

miracles are recorded. But, if the rules of logic are valid, I feel

compelled to extend the argument forward to the alleged Roman miracles of

the present day, which Dr. Newman might not have admitted, but which

Cardinal Newman may hardly reject. Beyond question, there is as good, or

perhaps better, evidence for the miracles worked by our Lady of Lourdes, as

there is for the floating of Elisha's axe, {477} or the speaking of

Balaam's ass. But we must go still further; there is a modern system of

thaumaturgy and demonology which is just as well certified as the

ancient.[133] Veracious, excellent, sometimes learned and acute persons,

even philosophers of no mean pretensions, testify to the "levitation" of

bodies much heavier than Elisha's axe; to the existence of "spirits" who,

to the mere tactile sense, have been indistinguishable from flesh and

blood, and, occasionally, have wrestled with all the vigour of Jacob's

opponent; yet, further, to the speech, in the language of raps, of

spiritual beings, whose discourses, in point of coherence and value, are

far inferior to that of Balaam's humble but sagacious steed. I have not the

smallest doubt that, if these were persecuting times, there is many {478} a

worthy "spiritualist" who would cheerfully go to the stake in support of

his pneumatological faith, and furnish evidence, after Paley's own heart,

in proof of the truth of his doctrines. Not a few modern divines, doubtless

struck by the impossibility of refusing the spiritualist evidence, if the

ecclesiastical evidence is accepted, and deprived of any _a priori_

objection by their implicit belief in Christian Demonology, show themselves

ready to take poor Sludge seriously, and to believe that he is possessed by

other devils than those of need, greed, and vainglory.

Under these circumstances, it was to be expected, though it is none the

less interesting to note the fact, that the arguments of the latest school

of "spiritualists" present a wonderful family likeness to those which adorn

the subtle disquisitions of the advocate of ecclesiastical miracles of

forty years ago. It is unfortunate for the "spiritualists" that, over and

over again, celebrated and trusted media, who really, in some respects,

call to mind the Montanist[134] and gnostic seers of the second century,

are either proved in courts of law to be fraudulent impostors; {479} or, in

sheer weariness, as it would seem, of the honest dupes who swear by them,

spontaneously confess their long-continued iniquities, as the Fox women did

the other day in New York.[135] But, whenever a catastrophe of this kind

takes place, the believers are no wise dismayed by it. They freely admit

that not only the media, but the spirits whom they summon, are sadly apt to

lose sight of the elementary principles of right and wrong; and they

triumphantly ask: How does the occurrence of occasional impostures disprove

the genuine manifestations (that is to say, all those which have not yet

been proved to be impostures or delusions)? And, in this, they

unconsciously plagiarise from the churchman, who just as freely admits that

many ecclesiastical miracles may have been forged; and asks, with calm

contempt, not only of legal proofs, but of common-sense probability, Why

does it follow that none are to be supposed genuine? I must say, however,

that the spiritualists, so far as I know, do not venture to outrage right

reason so boldly as the ecclesiastics. They do not sneer at "evidence"; nor

repudiate the requirement of legal proofs. In fact, there can be no doubt

that the spiritualists produce better evidence for their manifestations

than can be shown either for the miraculous death of Arius, or for the

Invention of the Cross.[136]

{480}

From the "levitation" of the axe at one end of a period of near three

thousand years to the "levitation" of Sludge & Co. at the other end, there

is a complete continuity of the miraculous, with every gradation from the

childish to the stupendous, from the gratification of a caprice to the

illustration of sublime truth. There is no drawing a line in the series

that might be set out of plausibly attested cases of spiritual

intervention. If one is true, all may be true; if one is false, all may be

false.

This is, to my mind, the inevitable result of that method of reasoning

which is applied to the confutation of Protestantism, with so much success,

by one of the acutest and subtlest disputants who have ever championed

Ecclesiasticism--and one cannot put his claims to acuteness and subtlety

higher.

... the Christianity of history is not Protestantism. If ever there

were a safe truth it is this.... "To be deep in history is to cease to

be a Protestant."[137]

I have not a shadow of doubt that these anti-Protestant epigrams are

profoundly true. But I have as little that, in the same sense, the

"Christianity of history is not" Romanism; and that to be deeper in history

is to cease to be a Romanist. The reasons which compel my doubts about the

compatibility of the Roman doctrine, or any other form {481} of

Catholicism, with history, arise out of exactly the same line of argument

as that adopted by Dr. Newman in the famous essay which I have just cited.

If, with one hand, Dr. Newman has destroyed Protestantism, he has

annihilated Romanism with the other; and the total result of his

ambidextral efforts is to shake Christianity to its foundations. Nor was

any one better aware that this must be the inevitable result of his

arguments--if the world should refuse to accept Roman doctrines and Roman

miracles--than the writer of Tract 85.

Dr. Newman made his choice and passed over to the Roman Church half a

century ago. Some of those who were essentially in harmony with his views

preceded, and many followed him. But many remained; and, as the quondam

Puseyite and present Ritualistic party, they are continuing that work of

sapping and mining the Protestantism of the Anglican Church which he and

his friends so ably commenced. At the present time, they have no little

claim to be considered victorious all along the line. I am old enough to

recollect the small beginnings of the Tractarian party; and I am amazed

when I consider the present position of their heirs. Their little leaven

has leavened, if not the whole, yet a very large lump of the Anglican

Church; which is now pretty much of a preparatory school for Papistry. So

that it really behoves Englishmen (who, as I have been informed by high

authority, are all, legally, members of the State Church, if they profess

to belong to no other sect) to wake up to what that {482} powerful

organisation is about, and whither it is tending. On this point, the

writings of Dr. Newman, while he still remained within the Anglican fold,

are a vast store of the best and the most authoritative information. His

doctrines on Ecclesiastical miracles and on Development are the

corner-stones of the Tractarian fabric. He believed that his arguments led

either Romeward, or to what ecclesiastics call "Infidelity," and I call

Agnosticism. I believe that he was quite right in this conviction; but

while he chooses the one alternative, I choose the other; as he rejects

Protestantism on the ground of its incompatibility with history, so, _a

fortiori_, I conceive that Romanism ought to be rejected, and that an

impartial consideration of the evidence must refuse the authority of Jesus

to anything more than the Nazarenism of James and Peter and John. And let

it not be supposed that this is a mere "infidel" perversion of the facts.

No one has more openly and clearly admitted the possibility that they may

be fairly interpreted in this way than Dr. Newman. If, he says, there are

texts which seem to show that Jesus contemplated the evangelisation of the

heathen:

... Did not the Apostles hear our Lord? and what was _their_ impression

from what they heard? Is it not certain that the Apostles did not

gather this truth from His teaching? (Tract 85, p. 63).

He said, "Preach the Gospel to every creature." These words _need_ have

only meant "Bring all men to Christianity through Judaism." Make them

Jews, that they may enjoy Christ's privileges, which are lodged in

Judaism; teach them those rites and ceremonies, circumcision and the

like, which {483} hitherto have been dead ordinances, and now are

living: and so the Apostles seem to have understood them (_ibid._ p.

65).

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