A state of peace among men who live side by side is not the natural
state (_status naturalis_), which is rather to be described as a
state of war:[116] that is to say, although there is not perhaps
always actual open hostility, yet there is a constant threatening
that an outbreak may occur. Thus the state of peace must be
_established_.[117] For the mere cessation of hostilities is no
guarantee of continued peaceful relations, and unless this guarantee
is given by every individual to his neighbour—which can only be done
in a state of society regulated by law—one man is at liberty to
challenge another and treat him as an enemy.[118]
[116] “From this diffidence of one another, there is no way for
any man to secure himself, so reasonable, as anticipation; that
is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can,
so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him:
and this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is
generally allowed.” (Hobbes: _Lev._ I. Ch. XIII.) [Tr.]
[117] Hobbes thus describes the establishment of the state. “A
_commonwealth_ is said to be _instituted_, when a _multitude_
of men do agree, and _covenant, every one, with every one_,
that to whatsoever _man_, or _assembly of men_, shall be given
by the major part, the _right_ to _present_ the person of them
all, that is to say, to be their _representative_; everyone,
as well he that _voted for it_, as he that _voted against it_,
shall _authorize_ all the actions and judgments, of that man, or
assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own, to
the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected
against other men.” (_Lev._ II. Ch. XVIII.)
There is a covenant between them, “as if every man should say to
every man, _I authorise and give up my right of governing myself,
to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that
thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in
like manner_.” (_Lev._ II. Ch. XVII.) [Tr.]
[118] It is usually accepted that a man may not take hostile
steps against any one, unless the latter has already injured
him by act. This is quite accurate, if both are citizens of a
law-governed state. For, in becoming a member of this community,
each gives the other the security he demands against injury, by
means of the supreme authority exercising control over them both.
The individual, however, (or nation) who remains in a mere state
of nature deprives me of this security and does me injury, by
mere proximity. There is perhaps no active (_facto_) molestation,
but there is a state of lawlessness, (_status injustus_) which,
by its very existence, offers a continual menace to me. I can
therefore compel him, either to enter into relations with me
under which we are both subject to law, or to withdraw from my
neighbourhood. So that the postulate upon which the following
articles are based is:—“All men who have the power to exert
a mutual influence upon one another must be under a civil
government of some kind.”
A legal constitution is, according to the nature of the
individuals who compose the state:—
(1) A constitution formed in accordance with the right of
citizenship of the individuals who constitute a nation (_jus
civitatis_).
(2) A constitution whose principle is international law which
determines the relations of states (_jus gentium_).
(3) A constitution formed in accordance with cosmopolitan law,
in as far as individuals and states, standing in an external
relation of mutual reaction, may be regarded as citizens of one
world-state (_jus cosmopoliticum_).
This classification is not an arbitrary one, but is necessary
with reference to the idea of perpetual peace. For, if even
one of these units of society were in a position physically to
influence another, while yet remaining a member of a primitive
order of society, then a state of war would be joined with these
primitive conditions; and from this it is our present purpose to
free ourselves.