But I can venture to say, that even if one thing were older or younger
than another, it could not become older or younger in a greater degree
than it was at first; for equals added to unequals, whether to periods
of time or to anything else, leave the difference between them the same
as at first.
Of course.
Then that which is, cannot become older or younger than that which
is, since the difference of age is always the same; the one is and has
become older and the other younger; but they are no longer becoming so.
True.
And the one which is does not therefore become either older or younger
than the others which are.
No.
But consider whether they may not become older and younger in another
way.
In what way?
Just as the one was proven to be older than the others and the others
than the one.
And what of that?
If the one is older than the others, has come into being a longer time
than the others.
Yes.
But consider again; if we add equal time to a greater and a less time,
will the greater differ from the less time by an equal or by a smaller
portion than before?
By a smaller portion.
Then the difference between the age of the one and the age of the others
will not be afterwards so great as at first, but if an equal time be
added to both of them they will differ less and less in age?
Yes.
And that which differs in age from some other less than formerly, from
being older will become younger in relation to that other than which it
was older?
Yes, younger.
And if the one becomes younger the others aforesaid will become older
than they were before, in relation to the one.
Certainly.
Then that which had become younger becomes older relatively to that
which previously had become and was older; it never really is older, but
is always becoming, for the one is always growing on the side of youth
and the other on the side of age. And in like manner the older is always
in process of becoming younger than the younger; for as they are always
going in opposite directions they become in ways the opposite to one
another, the younger older than the older, and the older younger than
the younger. They cannot, however, have become; for if they had already
become they would be and not merely become. But that is impossible; for
they are always becoming both older and younger than one another: the
one becomes younger than the others because it was seen to be older and
prior, and the others become older than the one because they came into
being later; and in the same way the others are in the same relation to
the one, because they were seen to be older, and prior to the one.
That is clear.
Inasmuch then, one thing does not become older or younger than another,
in that they always differ from each other by an equal number, the one
cannot become older or younger than the others, nor the others than the
one; but inasmuch as that which came into being earlier and that which
came into being later must continually differ from each other by a
different portion--in this point of view the others must become older
and younger than the one, and the one than the others.
Certainly.
For all these reasons, then, the one is and becomes older and younger
than itself and the others, and neither is nor becomes older or younger
than itself or the others.
Certainly.
But since the one partakes of time, and partakes of becoming older and
younger, must it not also partake of the past, the present, and the
future?
Of course it must.
Then the one was and is and will be, and was becoming and is becoming
and will become?
Certainly.
And there is and was and will be something which is in relation to it
and belongs to it?
True.
And since we have at this moment opinion and knowledge and perception of
the one, there is opinion and knowledge and perception of it?
Quite right.
Then there is name and expression for it, and it is named and expressed,
and everything of this kind which appertains to other things appertains
to the one.
Certainly, that is true.
Yet once more and for the third time, let us consider: If the one is
both one and many, as we have described, and is neither one nor many,
and participates in time, must it not, in as far as it is one, at times
partake of being, and in as far as it is not one, at times not partake
of being?
Certainly.
But can it partake of being when not partaking of being, or not partake
of being when partaking of being?
Impossible.
Then the one partakes and does not partake of being at different times,
for that is the only way in which it can partake and not partake of the
same.
True.
And is there not also a time at which it assumes being and relinquishes
being--for how can it have and not have the same thing unless it
receives and also gives it up at some time?
Impossible.
And the assuming of being is what you would call becoming?