I cannot tell you.

You can at least tell me that others than the one are more than the

one--other would have been one, but the others have multitude, and are

more than one?

They will have multitude.

And a multitude implies a number larger than one?

Of course.

And shall we say that the lesser or the greater is the first to come or

to have come into existence?

The lesser.

Then the least is the first? And that is the one?

Yes.

Then the one of all things that have number is the first to come into

being; but all other things have also number, being plural and not

singular.

They have.

And since it came into being first it must be supposed to have come into

being prior to the others, and the others later; and the things which

came into being later, are younger than that which preceded them? And

so the other things will be younger than the one, and the one older than

other things?

True.

What would you say of another question? Can the one have come into being

contrary to its own nature, or is that impossible?

Impossible.

And yet, surely, the one was shown to have parts; and if parts, then a

beginning, middle and end?

Yes.

And a beginning, both of the one itself and of all other things, comes

into being first of all; and after the beginning, the others follow,

until you reach the end?

Certainly.

And all these others we shall affirm to be parts of the whole and of the

one, which, as soon as the end is reached, has become whole and one?

Yes; that is what we shall say.

But the end comes last, and the one is of such a nature as to come into

being with the last; and, since the one cannot come into being except in

accordance with its own nature, its nature will require that it should

come into being after the others, simultaneously with the end.

Clearly.

Then the one is younger than the others and the others older than the

one.

That also is clear in my judgment.

Well, and must not a beginning or any other part of the one or of

anything, if it be a part and not parts, being a part, be also of

necessity one?

Certainly.

And will not the one come into being together with each part--together

with the first part when that comes into being, and together with the

second part and with all the rest, and will not be wanting to any part,

which is added to any other part until it has reached the last and

become one whole; it will be wanting neither to the middle, nor to

the first, nor to the last, nor to any of them, while the process of

becoming is going on?

True.

Then the one is of the same age with all the others, so that if the one

itself does not contradict its own nature, it will be neither prior

nor posterior to the others, but simultaneous; and according to this

argument the one will be neither older nor younger than the others, nor

the others than the one, but according to the previous argument the one

will be older and younger than the others and the others than the one.

Certainly.

After this manner then the one is and has become. But as to its becoming

older and younger than the others, and the others than the one, and

neither older nor younger, what shall we say? Shall we say as of being

so also of becoming, or otherwise?

Parmenides · 第 18 / 21 题