The one was shown to be in itself which was a whole?
True.
And also in other things?
Yes.
In so far as it is in other things it would touch other things, but in
so far as it is in itself it would be debarred from touching them, and
would touch itself only.
Clearly.
Then the inference is that it would touch both?
It would.
But what do you say to a new point of view? Must not that which is to
touch another be next to that which it is to touch, and occupy the place
nearest to that in which what it touches is situated?
True.
Then the one, if it is to touch itself, ought to be situated next to
itself, and occupy the place next to that in which itself is?
It ought.
And that would require that the one should be two, and be in two places
at once, and this, while it is one, will never happen.
No.
Then the one cannot touch itself any more than it can be two?
It cannot.
Neither can it touch others.
Why not?
The reason is, that whatever is to touch another must be in separation
from, and next to, that which it is to touch, and no third thing can be
between them.
True.
Two things, then, at the least are necessary to make contact possible?
They are.
And if to the two a third be added in due order, the number of terms
will be three, and the contacts two?
Yes.
And every additional term makes one additional contact, whence it
follows that the contacts are one less in number than the terms; the
first two terms exceeded the number of contacts by one, and the whole
number of terms exceeds the whole number of contacts by one in like
manner; and for every one which is afterwards added to the number of
terms, one contact is added to the contacts.
True.
Whatever is the whole number of things, the contacts will be always one
less.
True.
But if there be only one, and not two, there will be no contact?
How can there be?
And do we not say that the others being other than the one are not one
and have no part in the one?
True.
Then they have no number, if they have no one in them?
Of course not.
Then the others are neither one nor two, nor are they called by the name
of any number?
No.
One, then, alone is one, and two do not exist?
Clearly not.
And if there are not two, there is no contact?
There is not.
Then neither does the one touch the others, nor the others the one, if
there is no contact?
Certainly not.
For all which reasons the one touches and does not touch itself and the
others?
True.
Further--is the one equal and unequal to itself and others?
How do you mean?
If the one were greater or less than the others, or the others greater
or less than the one, they would not be greater or less than each other
in virtue of their being the one and the others; but, if in addition to
their being what they are they had equality, they would be equal to one
another, or if the one had smallness and the others greatness, or the
one had greatness and the others smallness--whichever kind had greatness
would be greater, and whichever had smallness would be smaller?
Certainly.
Then there are two such ideas as greatness and smallness; for if they
were not they could not be opposed to each other and be present in that
which is.
How could they?
If, then, smallness is present in the one it will be present either in
the whole or in a part of the whole?
Certainly.
Suppose the first; it will be either co-equal and co-extensive with the
whole one, or will contain the one?
Clearly.
If it be co-extensive with the one it will be co-equal with the one, or
if containing the one it will be greater than the one?
Of course.
But can smallness be equal to anything or greater than anything, and
have the functions of greatness and equality and not its own functions?
Impossible.
Then smallness cannot be in the whole of one, but, if at all, in a part
only?
Yes.
And surely not in all of a part, for then the difficulty of the whole
will recur; it will be equal to or greater than any part in which it is.
Certainly.
Then smallness will not be in anything, whether in a whole or in a part;
nor will there be anything small but actual smallness.
True.
Neither will greatness be in the one, for if greatness be in anything
there will be something greater other and besides greatness itself,
namely, that in which greatness is; and this too when the small itself
is not there, which the one, if it is great, must exceed; this, however,
is impossible, seeing that smallness is wholly absent.
True.
But absolute greatness is only greater than absolute smallness, and
smallness is only smaller than absolute greatness.
Very true.
Then other things not greater or less than the one, if they have neither
greatness nor smallness; nor have greatness or smallness any power of
exceeding or being exceeded in relation to the one, but only in relation
to one another; nor will the one be greater or less than them or others,
if it has neither greatness nor smallness.
Clearly not.
Then if the one is neither greater nor less than the others, it cannot
either exceed or be exceeded by them?
Certainly not.
And that which neither exceeds nor is exceeded, must be on an equality;
and being on an equality, must be equal.
Of course.
And this will be true also of the relation of the one to itself; having
neither greatness nor smallness in itself, it will neither exceed nor be
exceeded by itself, but will be on an equality with and equal to itself.
Certainly.
Then the one will be equal both to itself and the others?
Clearly so.
And yet the one, being itself in itself, will also surround and be
without itself; and, as containing itself, will be greater than itself;
and, as contained in itself, will be less; and will thus be greater and
less than itself.
It will.
Now there cannot possibly be anything which is not included in the one
and the others?
Of course not.
But, surely, that which is must always be somewhere?
Yes.
But that which is in anything will be less, and that in which it is will
be greater; in no other way can one thing be in another.
True.
And since there is nothing other or besides the one and the others, and
they must be in something, must they not be in one another, the one in
the others and the others in the one, if they are to be anywhere?
That is clear.
But inasmuch as the one is in the others, the others will be greater
than the one, because they contain the one, which will be less than the
others, because it is contained in them; and inasmuch as the others
are in the one, the one on the same principle will be greater than the
others, and the others less than the one.
True.
The one, then, will be equal to and greater and less than itself and the
others?
Clearly.
And if it be greater and less and equal, it will be of equal and more
and less measures or divisions than itself and the others, and if of
measures, also of parts?
Of course.
And if of equal and more and less measures or divisions, it will be in
number more or less than itself and the others, and likewise equal in
number to itself and to the others?
How is that?
It will be of more measures than those things which it exceeds, and of
as many parts as measures; and so with that to which it is equal, and
that than which it is less.
True.
And being greater and less than itself, and equal to itself, it will
be of equal measures with itself and of more and fewer measures than
itself; and if of measures then also of parts?
It will.
And being of equal parts with itself, it will be numerically equal to
itself; and being of more parts, more, and being of less, less than
itself?
Certainly.
And the same will hold of its relation to other things; inasmuch as it
is greater than them, it will be more in number than them; and inasmuch
as it is smaller, it will be less in number; and inasmuch as it is equal
in size to other things, it will be equal to them in number.
Certainly.
Once more, then, as would appear, the one will be in number both equal
to and more and less than both itself and all other things.
It will.
Does the one also partake of time? And is it and does it become older
and younger than itself and others, and again, neither younger nor older
than itself and others, by virtue of participation in time?
How do you mean?
If one is, being must be predicated of it?
Yes.
But to be (einai) is only participation of being in present time, and to
have been is the participation of being at a past time, and to be about
to be is the participation of being at a future time?
Very true.
Then the one, since it partakes of being, partakes of time?
Certainly.
And is not time always moving forward?
Yes.
Then the one is always becoming older than itself, since it moves
forward in time?
Certainly.
And do you remember that the older becomes older than that which becomes
younger?