We say that we have to work out together all the consequences, whatever
they may be, which follow, if the one is?
Yes.
Then we will begin at the beginning:--If one is, can one be, and not
partake of being?
Impossible.
Then the one will have being, but its being will not be the same with
the one; for if the same, it would not be the being of the one; nor
would the one have participated in being, for the proposition that one
is would have been identical with the proposition that one is one;
but our hypothesis is not if one is one, what will follow, but if one
is:--am I not right?
Quite right.
We mean to say, that being has not the same significance as one?
Of course.
And when we put them together shortly, and say 'One is,' that is
equivalent to saying, 'partakes of being'?
Quite true.
Once more then let us ask, if one is what will follow. Does not this
hypothesis necessarily imply that one is of such a nature as to have
parts?
How so?
In this way:--If being is predicated of the one, if the one is, and one
of being, if being is one; and if being and one are not the same; and
since the one, which we have assumed, is, must not the whole, if it is
one, itself be, and have for its parts, one and being?
Certainly.
And is each of these parts--one and being--to be simply called a part,
or must the word 'part' be relative to the word 'whole'?
The latter.
Then that which is one is both a whole and has a part?
Certainly.
Again, of the parts of the one, if it is--I mean being and one--does
either fail to imply the other? is the one wanting to being, or being to
the one?
Impossible.
Thus, each of the parts also has in turn both one and being, and is at
the least made up of two parts; and the same principle goes on for ever,
and every part whatever has always these two parts; for being always
involves one, and one being; so that one is always disappearing, and
becoming two.
Certainly.
And so the one, if it is, must be infinite in multiplicity?
Clearly.
Let us take another direction.
What direction?
We say that the one partakes of being and therefore it is?
Yes.
And in this way, the one, if it has being, has turned out to be many?
True.
But now, let us abstract the one which, as we say, partakes of
being, and try to imagine it apart from that of which, as we say, it
partakes--will this abstract one be one only or many?
One, I think.
Let us see:--Must not the being of one be other than one? for the one is
not being, but, considered as one, only partook of being?
Certainly.
If being and the one be two different things, it is not because the one
is one that it is other than being; nor because being is being that it
is other than the one; but they differ from one another in virtue of
otherness and difference.
Certainly.
So that the other is not the same--either with the one or with being?
Certainly not.
And therefore whether we take being and the other, or being and the one,
or the one and the other, in every such case we take two things, which
may be rightly called both.
How so.
In this way--you may speak of being?
Yes.
And also of one?
Yes.
Then now we have spoken of either of them?
Yes.
Well, and when I speak of being and one, I speak of them both?
Certainly.
And if I speak of being and the other, or of the one and the other,--in
any such case do I not speak of both?
Yes.
And must not that which is correctly called both, be also two?
Undoubtedly.
And of two things how can either by any possibility not be one?
It cannot.
Then, if the individuals of the pair are together two, they must be
severally one?
Clearly.
And if each of them is one, then by the addition of any one to any pair,
the whole becomes three?
Yes.
And three are odd, and two are even?
Of course.
And if there are two there must also be twice, and if there are three
there must be thrice; that is, if twice one makes two, and thrice one
three?
Certainly.
There are two, and twice, and therefore there must be twice two; and
there are three, and there is thrice, and therefore there must be thrice
three?
Of course.
If there are three and twice, there is twice three; and if there are two
and thrice, there is thrice two?
Undoubtedly.
Here, then, we have even taken even times, and odd taken odd times, and
even taken odd times, and odd taken even times.
True.
And if this is so, does any number remain which has no necessity to be?
None whatever.
Then if one is, number must also be?
It must.
But if there is number, there must also be many, and infinite
multiplicity of being; for number is infinite in multiplicity, and
partakes also of being: am I not right?
Certainly.
And if all number participates in being, every part of number will also
participate?
Yes.
Then being is distributed over the whole multitude of things, and
nothing that is, however small or however great, is devoid of it? And,
indeed, the very supposition of this is absurd, for how can that which
is, be devoid of being?
In no way.
And it is divided into the greatest and into the smallest, and into
being of all sizes, and is broken up more than all things; the divisions
of it have no limit.
True.
Then it has the greatest number of parts?
Yes, the greatest number.
Is there any of these which is a part of being, and yet no part?
Impossible.
But if it is at all and so long as it is, it must be one, and cannot be
none?
Certainly.
Then the one attaches to every single part of being, and does not fail
in any part, whether great or small, or whatever may be the size of it?
True.
But reflect:--Can one, in its entirety, be in many places at the same
time?
No; I see the impossibility of that.
And if not in its entirety, then it is divided; for it cannot be present
with all the parts of being, unless divided.
True.
And that which has parts will be as many as the parts are?
Certainly.
Then we were wrong in saying just now, that being was distributed into
the greatest number of parts. For it is not distributed into parts more
than the one, into parts equal to the one; the one is never wanting
to being, or being to the one, but being two they are co-equal and
co-extensive.
Certainly that is true.
The one itself, then, having been broken up into parts by being, is many
and infinite?
True.
Then not only the one which has being is many, but the one itself
distributed by being, must also be many?
Certainly.
Further, inasmuch as the parts are parts of a whole, the one, as a
whole, will be limited; for are not the parts contained by the whole?
Certainly.
And that which contains, is a limit?
Of course.
Then the one if it has being is one and many, whole and parts, having
limits and yet unlimited in number?
Clearly.
And because having limits, also having extremes?
Certainly.
And if a whole, having beginning and middle and end. For can anything
be a whole without these three? And if any one of them is wanting to
anything, will that any longer be a whole?
No.
Then the one, as appears, will have beginning, middle, and end.
It will.
But, again, the middle will be equidistant from the extremes; or it
would not be in the middle?
Yes.
Then the one will partake of figure, either rectilinear or round, or a
union of the two?
True.
And if this is the case, it will be both in itself and in another too.
How?
Every part is in the whole, and none is outside the whole.
True.
And all the parts are contained by the whole?
Yes.
And the one is all its parts, and neither more nor less than all?
No.
And the one is the whole?
Of course.
But if all the parts are in the whole, and the one is all of them and
the whole, and they are all contained by the whole, the one will be
contained by the one; and thus the one will be in itself.
That is true.
But then, again, the whole is not in the parts--neither in all the
parts, nor in some one of them. For if it is in all, it must be in one;
for if there were any one in which it was not, it could not be in all
the parts; for the part in which it is wanting is one of all, and if the
whole is not in this, how can it be in them all?
It cannot.
Nor can the whole be in some of the parts; for if the whole were in some
of the parts, the greater would be in the less, which is impossible.
Yes, impossible.
But if the whole is neither in one, nor in more than one, nor in all of
the parts, it must be in something else, or cease to be anywhere at all?
Certainly.
If it were nowhere, it would be nothing; but being a whole, and not
being in itself, it must be in another.
Very true.
The one then, regarded as a whole, is in another, but regarded as being
all its parts, is in itself; and therefore the one must be itself in
itself and also in another.
Certainly.
The one then, being of this nature, is of necessity both at rest and in
motion?
How?
The one is at rest since it is in itself, for being in one, and not
passing out of this, it is in the same, which is itself.
True.
And that which is ever in the same, must be ever at rest?
Certainly.
Well, and must not that, on the contrary, which is ever in other, never
be in the same; and if never in the same, never at rest, and if not at
rest, in motion?
True.
Then the one being always itself in itself and other, must always be
both at rest and in motion?
Clearly.
And must be the same with itself, and other than itself; and also the
same with the others, and other than the others; this follows from its
previous affections.
How so?
Everything in relation to every other thing, is either the same or
other; or if neither the same nor other, then in the relation of a part
to a whole, or of a whole to a part.
Clearly.
And is the one a part of itself?
Certainly not.
Since it is not a part in relation to itself it cannot be related to
itself as whole to part?
It cannot.
But is the one other than one?
No.
And therefore not other than itself?
Certainly not.
If then it be neither other, nor a whole, nor a part in relation to
itself, must it not be the same with itself?
Certainly.
But then, again, a thing which is in another place from 'itself,' if
this 'itself' remains in the same place with itself, must be other than
'itself,' for it will be in another place?
True.
Then the one has been shown to be at once in itself and in another?
Yes.
Thus, then, as appears, the one will be other than itself?
True.
Well, then, if anything be other than anything, will it not be other
than that which is other?
Certainly.
And will not all things that are not one, be other than the one, and the
one other than the not-one?
Of course.
Then the one will be other than the others?
True.
But, consider:--Are not the absolute same, and the absolute other,
opposites to one another?
Of course.
Then will the same ever be in the other, or the other in the same?
They will not.
If then the other is never in the same, there is nothing in which
the other is during any space of time; for during that space of time,
however small, the other would be in the same. Is not that true?
Yes.
And since the other is never in the same, it can never be in anything
that is.
True.
Then the other will never be either in the not-one, or in the one?
Certainly not.
Then not by reason of otherness is the one other than the not-one, or
the not-one other than the one.
No.
Nor by reason of themselves will they be other than one another, if not
partaking of the other.
How can they be?
But if they are not other, either by reason of themselves or of the
other, will they not altogether escape being other than one another?
They will.
Again, the not-one cannot partake of the one; otherwise it would not
have been not-one, but would have been in some way one.
True.
Nor can the not-one be number; for having number, it would not have been
not-one at all.
It would not.
Again, is the not-one part of the one; or rather, would it not in that
case partake of the one?
It would.
If then, in every point of view, the one and the not-one are distinct,
then neither is the one part or whole of the not-one, nor is the not-one
part or whole of the one?
No.
But we said that things which are neither parts nor wholes of one
another, nor other than one another, will be the same with one
another:--so we said?
Yes.
Then shall we say that the one, being in this relation to the not-one,
is the same with it?
Let us say so.
Then it is the same with itself and the others, and also other than
itself and the others.
That appears to be the inference.
And it will also be like and unlike itself and the others?
Perhaps.
Since the one was shown to be other than the others, the others will
also be other than the one.
Yes.
And the one is other than the others in the same degree that the others
are other than it, and neither more nor less?
True.
And if neither more nor less, then in a like degree?
Yes.
In virtue of the affection by which the one is other than others and
others in like manner other than it, the one will be affected like the
others and the others like the one.
How do you mean?
I may take as an illustration the case of names: You give a name to a
thing?
Yes.
And you may say the name once or oftener?
Yes.
And when you say it once, you mention that of which it is the name? and
when more than once, is it something else which you mention? or must it
always be the same thing of which you speak, whether you utter the name
once or more than once?
Of course it is the same.
And is not 'other' a name given to a thing?
Certainly.
Whenever, then, you use the word 'other,' whether once or oftener, you
name that of which it is the name, and to no other do you give the name?
True.
Then when we say that the others are other than the one, and the one
other than the others, in repeating the word 'other' we speak of that
nature to which the name is applied, and of no other?
Quite true.
Then the one which is other than others, and the other which is other
than the one, in that the word 'other' is applied to both, will be in
the same condition; and that which is in the same condition is like?
Yes.
Then in virtue of the affection by which the one is other than the
others, every thing will be like every thing, for every thing is other
than every thing.
True.
Again, the like is opposed to the unlike?
Yes.
And the other to the same?
True again.
And the one was also shown to be the same with the others?
Yes.
And to be the same with the others is the opposite of being other than
the others?
Certainly.
And in that it was other it was shown to be like?
Yes.
But in that it was the same it will be unlike by virtue of the opposite
affection to that which made it like; and this was the affection of
otherness.
Yes.
The same then will make it unlike; otherwise it will not be the opposite
of the other.
True.
Then the one will be both like and unlike the others; like in so far as
it is other, and unlike in so far as it is the same.
Yes, that argument may be used.
And there is another argument.
What?
In so far as it is affected in the same way it is not affected
otherwise, and not being affected otherwise is not unlike, and not
being unlike, is like; but in so far as it is affected by other it is
otherwise, and being otherwise affected is unlike.
True.
Then because the one is the same with the others and other than the
others, on either of these two grounds, or on both of them, it will be
both like and unlike the others?
Certainly.
And in the same way as being other than itself and the same with itself,
on either of these two grounds and on both of them, it will be like and
unlike itself?
Of course.
Again, how far can the one touch or not touch itself and
others?--consider.