And would you say that the whole sail includes each man, or a part of it
only, and different parts different men?
The latter.
Then, Socrates, the ideas themselves will be divisible, and things which
participate in them will have a part of them only and not the whole idea
existing in each of them?
That seems to follow.
Then would you like to say, Socrates, that the one idea is really
divisible and yet remains one?
Certainly not, he said.
Suppose that you divide absolute greatness, and that of the many great
things, each one is great in virtue of a portion of greatness less than
absolute greatness--is that conceivable?
No.
Or will each equal thing, if possessing some small portion of equality
less than absolute equality, be equal to some other thing by virtue of
that portion only?
Impossible.
Or suppose one of us to have a portion of smallness; this is but a part
of the small, and therefore the absolutely small is greater; if the
absolutely small be greater, that to which the part of the small is
added will be smaller and not greater than before.
How absurd!
Then in what way, Socrates, will all things participate in the ideas, if
they are unable to participate in them either as parts or wholes?
Indeed, he said, you have asked a question which is not easily answered.
Well, said Parmenides, and what do you say of another question?
What question?
I imagine that the way in which you are led to assume one idea of each
kind is as follows:--You see a number of great objects, and when you
look at them there seems to you to be one and the same idea (or nature)
in them all; hence you conceive of greatness as one.
Very true, said Socrates.
And if you go on and allow your mind in like manner to embrace in one
view the idea of greatness and of great things which are not the idea,
and to compare them, will not another greatness arise, which will appear
to be the source of all these?
It would seem so.
Then another idea of greatness now comes into view over and above
absolute greatness, and the individuals which partake of it; and then
another, over and above all these, by virtue of which they will all
be great, and so each idea instead of being one will be infinitely
multiplied.
But may not the ideas, asked Socrates, be thoughts only, and have no
proper existence except in our minds, Parmenides? For in that case each
idea may still be one, and not experience this infinite multiplication.
And can there be individual thoughts which are thoughts of nothing?
Impossible, he said.
The thought must be of something?
Yes.
Of something which is or which is not?
Of something which is.
Must it not be of a single something, which the thought recognizes as
attaching to all, being a single form or nature?
Yes.
And will not the something which is apprehended as one and the same in
all, be an idea?
From that, again, there is no escape.
Then, said Parmenides, if you say that everything else participates
in the ideas, must you not say either that everything is made up of
thoughts, and that all things think; or that they are thoughts but have
no thought?
The latter view, Parmenides, is no more rational than the previous one.
In my opinion, the ideas are, as it were, patterns fixed in nature, and
other things are like them, and resemblances of them--what is meant by
the participation of other things in the ideas, is really assimilation
to them.
But if, said he, the individual is like the idea, must not the idea also
be like the individual, in so far as the individual is a resemblance of
the idea? That which is like, cannot be conceived of as other than the
like of like.
Impossible.
And when two things are alike, must they not partake of the same idea?
They must.
And will not that of which the two partake, and which makes them alike,
be the idea itself?
Certainly.
Then the idea cannot be like the individual, or the individual like the
idea; for if they are alike, some further idea of likeness will always
be coming to light, and if that be like anything else, another; and new
ideas will be always arising, if the idea resembles that which partakes
of it?
Quite true.
The theory, then, that other things participate in the ideas by
resemblance, has to be given up, and some other mode of participation
devised?
It would seem so.
Do you see then, Socrates, how great is the difficulty of affirming the
ideas to be absolute?
Yes, indeed.
And, further, let me say that as yet you only understand a small part
of the difficulty which is involved if you make of each thing a single
idea, parting it off from other things.
What difficulty? he said.
There are many, but the greatest of all is this:--If an opponent argues
that these ideas, being such as we say they ought to be, must remain
unknown, no one can prove to him that he is wrong, unless he who denies
their existence be a man of great ability and knowledge, and is
willing to follow a long and laborious demonstration; he will remain
unconvinced, and still insist that they cannot be known.
What do you mean, Parmenides? said Socrates.
In the first place, I think, Socrates, that you, or any one who
maintains the existence of absolute essences, will admit that they
cannot exist in us.
No, said Socrates; for then they would be no longer absolute.
True, he said; and therefore when ideas are what they are in relation to
one another, their essence is determined by a relation among themselves,
and has nothing to do with the resemblances, or whatever they are to be
termed, which are in our sphere, and from which we receive this or that
name when we partake of them. And the things which are within our sphere
and have the same names with them, are likewise only relative to one
another, and not to the ideas which have the same names with them, but
belong to themselves and not to them.
What do you mean? said Socrates.
I may illustrate my meaning in this way, said Parmenides:--A master has
a slave; now there is nothing absolute in the relation between them,
which is simply a relation of one man to another. But there is also an
idea of mastership in the abstract, which is relative to the idea of
slavery in the abstract. These natures have nothing to do with us,
nor we with them; they are concerned with themselves only, and we with
ourselves. Do you see my meaning?
Yes, said Socrates, I quite see your meaning.
And will not knowledge--I mean absolute knowledge--answer to absolute
truth?
Certainly.
And each kind of absolute knowledge will answer to each kind of absolute
being?
Yes.
But the knowledge which we have, will answer to the truth which we have;
and again, each kind of knowledge which we have, will be a knowledge of
each kind of being which we have?
Certainly.
But the ideas themselves, as you admit, we have not, and cannot have?
No, we cannot.
And the absolute natures or kinds are known severally by the absolute
idea of knowledge?
Yes.
And we have not got the idea of knowledge?
No.
Then none of the ideas are known to us, because we have no share in
absolute knowledge?