Parmenides proceeded: And would you also make absolute ideas of the just
and the beautiful and the good, and of all that class?
Yes, he said, I should.
And would you make an idea of man apart from us and from all other human
creatures, or of fire and water?
I am often undecided, Parmenides, as to whether I ought to include them
or not.
And would you feel equally undecided, Socrates, about things of which
the mention may provoke a smile?--I mean such things as hair, mud, dirt,
or anything else which is vile and paltry; would you suppose that each
of these has an idea distinct from the actual objects with which we come
into contact, or not?
Certainly not, said Socrates; visible things like these are such as
they appear to us, and I am afraid that there would be an absurdity in
assuming any idea of them, although I sometimes get disturbed, and begin
to think that there is nothing without an idea; but then again, when I
have taken up this position, I run away, because I am afraid that I may
fall into a bottomless pit of nonsense, and perish; and so I return to
the ideas of which I was just now speaking, and occupy myself with them.
Yes, Socrates, said Parmenides; that is because you are still young; the
time will come, if I am not mistaken, when philosophy will have a firmer
grasp of you, and then you will not despise even the meanest things; at
your age, you are too much disposed to regard the opinions of men. But
I should like to know whether you mean that there are certain ideas of
which all other things partake, and from which they derive their names;
that similars, for example, become similar, because they partake of
similarity; and great things become great, because they partake of
greatness; and that just and beautiful things become just and beautiful,
because they partake of justice and beauty?
Yes, certainly, said Socrates that is my meaning.
Then each individual partakes either of the whole of the idea or else of
a part of the idea? Can there be any other mode of participation?
There cannot be, he said.
Then do you think that the whole idea is one, and yet, being one, is in
each one of the many?
Why not, Parmenides? said Socrates.
Because one and the same thing will exist as a whole at the same time
in many separate individuals, and will therefore be in a state of
separation from itself.
Nay, but the idea may be like the day which is one and the same in many
places at once, and yet continuous with itself; in this way each idea
may be one and the same in all at the same time.
I like your way, Socrates, of making one in many places at once. You
mean to say, that if I were to spread out a sail and cover a number of
men, there would be one whole including many--is not that your meaning?