Freedom, have had difficulty in framing such Laws as would preserve
their Freedom, Cities which at the first have been in Subjection will
find this almost impossible._
How hard it is in founding a commonwealth to provide it with all the
laws needed to maintain its freedom, is well seen from the history of
the Roman Republic. For although ordinances were given it first by
Romulus, then by Numa, afterwards by Tullus Hostilius and Servius, and
lastly by the Ten created for the express purpose, nevertheless, in the
actual government of Rome new needs were continually developed, to meet
which, new ordinances had constantly to be devised; as in the creation
of the censors, who were one of the chief means by which Rome was kept
free during the whole period of her constitutional government. For as
the censors became the arbiters of morals in Rome, it was very much
owing to them that the progress of the Romans towards corruption was
retarded. And though, at the first creation of the office, a mistake
was doubtless made in fixing its term at five years, this was corrected
not long after by the wisdom of the dictator Mamercus, who passed a law
reducing it to eighteen months; a change which the censors then in
office took in such ill part, that they deprived Mamercus of his rank
as a senator. This step was much blamed both by the commons and the
Fathers; still, as our History does not record that Mamercus obtained
any redress, we must infer either that the Historian has omitted
something, or that on this head the laws of Rome were defective; since
it is never well that the laws of a commonwealth should suffer a
citizen to incur irremediable wrong because he promotes a measure
favourable to freedom.
But returning to the matter under consideration, we have, in connection
with the creation of this new office, to note, that if those cities
which, as was the case with Rome, have had their beginning in freedom,
and have by themselves maintained that freedom, have experienced great
difficulty in framing good laws for the preservation of their
liberties, it is little to be wondered at that cities which at the
first were dependent, should find it not difficult merely but
impossible so to shape their ordinances as to enable them to live free
and undisturbed. This difficulty we see to have arisen in the case of
Florence, which, being subject at first to the power of Rome and
subsequently to that of other rulers, remained long in servitude,
taking no thought for herself; and even afterwards, when she could
breathe more freely and began to frame her own laws, these, since they
were blended with ancient ordinances which were bad, could not
themselves be good; and thus for the two hundred years of which we have
trustworthy record, our city has gone on patching her institutions,
without ever possessing a government in respect of which she could
truly be termed a commonwealth.
The difficulties which have been felt in Florence are the same as have
been felt in all cities which have had a like origin; and although,
repeatedly, by the free and public votes of her citizens, ample
authority has been given to a few of their number to reform her
constitution, no alteration of general utility has ever been
introduced, but only such as forwarded the interests of the party to
which those commissioned to make changes belonged. This, instead of
order, has occasioned the greatest disorder in our city.
But to come to particulars, I say, that among other matters which have
to be considered by the founder of a commonwealth, is the question into
whose hands should be committed the power of life and death over its
citizens’ This was well seen to in Rome, where, as a rule, there was a
right of appeal to the people, but where, on any urgent case arising in
which it might have been dangerous to delay the execution of a judicial
sentence, recourse could be had to a dictator with powers to execute
justice at once; a remedy, however, never resorted to save in cases of
extremity. But Florence, and other cities having a like origin,
committed this power into the hands of a foreigner, whom they styled
Captain, and as he was open to be corrupted by powerful citizens this
was a pernicious course. Altering this arrangement afterwards in
consequence of changes in their government, they appointed eight
citizens to discharge the office of Captain. But this, for a reason
already mentioned, namely that a few will always be governed by the
will of a few and these the most powerful, was a change from bad to
worse.
The city of Venice has guarded herself against a like danger. For in
Venice ten citizens are appointed with power to punish any man without
appeal; and because, although possessing the requisite authority, this
number might not be sufficient to insure the punishment of the
powerful, in addition to their council of Ten, they have also
constituted a council of Forty, and have further provided that the
council of the “_Pregai_,” which is their supreme council, shall have
authority to chastise powerful offenders. So that, unless an accuser be
wanting, a tribunal is never wanting in Venice to keep powerful
citizens in check.
But when we see how in Rome, with ordinances of her own imposing, and
with so many and so wise legislators, fresh occasion arose from day to
day for framing new laws favourable to freedom, it is not to be
wondered at that, in other cities less happy in their beginnings,
difficulties should have sprung up which no ordinances could remedy.