CHAPTER XL.—_Of the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and what

therein is to be noted. Wherein among other Matters is shown how the

same Causes may lead to the Safety or to the Ruin of a Commonwealth._

It being my desire to treat fully of those disorders which arose in

Rome on the creation of the decemvirate, I think it not amiss first of

all to relate what took place at the time of that creation, and then to

discuss those circumstances attending it which seem most to deserve

notice. These are numerous, and should be well considered, both by

those who would maintain the liberties of a commonwealth and by those

who would subvert them. For in the course of our inquiry it will be

seen that many mistakes prejudicial to freedom were made by the senate

and people, and that many were likewise made by Appius, the chief

decemvir, prejudicial to that tyranny which it was his aim to establish

in Rome.

After much controversy and wrangling between the commons and the nobles

as to the framing of new laws by which the freedom of Rome might be

better secured, Spurius Posthumius and two other citizens were, by

general consent, despatched to Athens to procure copies of the laws

which Solon had drawn up for the Athenians, to the end that these might

serve as a groundwork for the laws of Rome. On their return, the next

step was to depute certain persons to examine these laws and to draft

the new code. For which purpose a commission consisting of ten members,

among whom was Appius Claudius, a crafty and ambitious citizen, was

appointed for a year; and that the commissioners in framing their laws

might act without fear or favour, all the other magistracies, and in

particular the consulate and tribuneship, were suspended, and the

appeal to the people discontinued; so that the decemvirs came to be

absolute in Rome. Very soon the whole authority of the commissioners

came to be centred in Appius, owing to the favour in which he was held

by the commons. For although before he had been regarded as the cruel

persecutor of the people, he now showed himself so conciliatory in his

bearing that men wondered at the sudden change in his character and

disposition.

This set of commissioners, then, behaved discreetly, being attended by

no more than twelve lictors, walking in front of that decemvir whom the

rest put forward as their chief; and though vested with absolute

authority, yet when a Roman citizen had to be tried for murder, they

cited him before the people and caused him to be judged by them. Their

laws they wrote upon ten tables, but before signing them they exposed

them publicly, that every one might read and consider them, and if any

defect were discovered in them, it might be corrected before they were

finally passed. At this juncture Appius caused it to be notified

throughout the city that were two other tables added to these ten, the

laws would be complete; hoping that under this belief the people would

consent to continue the decemvirate for another year. This consent the

people willingly gave, partly to prevent the consuls being reinstated,

and partly because they thought they could hold their ground without

the aid of the tribunes, who, as has already been said, were the judges

in criminal cases.

On it being resolved to reappoint the decemvirate, all the nobles set

to canvass for the office, Appius among the foremost; and such

cordiality did he display towards the commons while seeking their

votes, that the other candidates, “_unable to persuade themselves that

so much affability on the part of so proud a man was wholly

disinterested,_” began to suspect him; but fearing to oppose him

openly, sought to circumvent him, by putting him forward, though the

youngest of them all, to declare to the people the names of the

proposed decemvirs; thinking that he would not venture to name himself,

that being an unusual course in Rome, and held discreditable. “_But

what they meant as a hindrance, he turned to account,_” by proposing,

to the surprise and displeasure of the whole nobility, his own name

first, and then nominating nine others on whose support he thought he

could depend.

The new appointments, which were to last for a year, having been made,

Appius soon let both commons and nobles know the mistake they had

committed, for throwing off the mask, he allowed his innate arrogance

to appear, and speedily infected his colleagues with the same spirit;

who, to overawe the people and the senate, instead of twelve lictors,

appointed one hundred and twenty. For a time their measures were

directed against high and low alike; but presently they began to

intrigue with the senate, and to attack the commons; and if any of the

latter, on being harshly used by one decemvir, ventured to appeal to

another, he was worse handled on the appeal than in the first instance.

The commons, on discovering their error, began in their despair to turn

their eyes towards the nobles, “_and to look for a breeze of freedom

from that very quarter whence fearing slavery they had brought the

republic to its present straits._” To the nobles the sufferings of the

commons were not displeasing, from the hope “_that disgusted with the

existing state of affairs, they too might come to desire the

restoration of the consuls._”

When the year for which the decemvirs were appointed at last came to an

end, the two additional tables of the law were ready, but had not yet

been published. This was made a pretext by them for prolonging their

magistracy, which they took measures to retain by force, gathering

round them for this purpose a retinue of young noblemen, whom they

enriched with the goods of those citizens whom they had condemned.

“_Corrupted by which gifts, these youths came to prefer selfish licence

to public freedom._”

It happened that at this time the Sabines and Volscians began to stir

up a war against Rome, and it was during the alarm thereby occasioned

that the decemvirs were first made aware how weak was their position.

For without the senate they could take no warlike measures, while by

assembling the senate they seemed to put an end to their own authority.

Nevertheless, being driven to it by necessity, they took this latter

course. When the senate met, many of the senators, but particularly

Valerius and Horatius, inveighed against the insolence of the

decemvirs, whose power would forthwith have been cut short, had not the

senate through jealousy of the commons declined to exercise their

authority. For they thought that were the decemvirs to lay down office

of their own free will, tribunes might not be reappointed. Wherefore

they decided for war, and sent forth the armies under command of

certain of the decemvirs. But Appius remaining behind to govern the

city, it so fell out that he became enamoured of Virginia, and that

when he sought to lay violent hands upon her, Virginius, her father, to

save her from dishonour, slew her. Thereupon followed tumults in Rome,

and mutiny among the soldiers, who, making common cause with the rest

of the plebeians, betook themselves to the Sacred Hill, and there

remained until the decemvirs laid down their office; when tribunes and

consuls being once more appointed, Rome was restored to her ancient

freedom.

In these events we note, first of all, that the pernicious step of

creating this tyranny in Rome was due to the same causes which commonly

give rise to tyrannies in cities; namely, the excessive love of the

people for liberty, and the passionate eagerness of the nobles to

govern. For when they cannot agree to pass some measure favourable to

freedom, one faction or the other sets itself to support some one man,

and a tyranny at once springs up. Both parties in Rome consented to the

creation of the decemvirs, and to their exercising unrestricted powers,

from the desire which the one had to put an end to the consular name,

and the other to abolish the authority of the tribunes. When, on the

appointment of the decemvirate, it seemed to the commons that Appius

had become favourable to their cause, and was ready to attack the

nobles, they inclined to support him. But when a people is led to

commit this error of lending its support to some one man, in order that

he may attack those whom it holds in hatred, if he only be prudent he

will inevitably become the tyrant of that city. For he will wait until,

with the support of the people, he can deal a fatal blow to the nobles,

and will never set himself to oppress the people until the nobles have

been rooted out. But when that time comes, the people, although they

recognize their servitude, will have none to whom they can turn for

help.

Had this method, which has been followed by all who have successfully

established tyrannies in republics, been followed by Appius, his power

would have been more stable and lasting; whereas, taking the directly

opposite course, he could not have acted more unwisely than he did. For

in his eagerness to grasp the tyranny, he made himself obnoxious to

those who were in fact conferring it, and who could have maintained him

in it; and he destroyed those who were his friends, while he sought

friendship from those from whom he could not have it. For although it

be the desire of the nobles to tyrannize, that section of them which

finds itself outside the tyranny is always hostile to the tyrant, who

can never succeed in gaining over the entire body of the nobles by

reason of their greed and ambition; for no tyrant can ever have honours

or wealth enough to satisfy them all.

In abandoning the people, therefore, and siding with the nobles, Appius

committed a manifest mistake, as well for the reasons above given, as

because to hold a thing by force, he who uses force must needs be

stronger than he against whom it is used. Whence it happens that those

tyrants who have the mass of the people for their friends and the

nobles for their enemies, are more secure than those who have the

people for their enemies and the nobles for their friends; because in

the former case their authority has the stronger support. For with such

support a ruler can maintain himself by the internal strength of his

State, as did Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, when attacked by the Romans and

by the whole of Greece; for making sure work with the nobles, who were

few in number, and having the people on his side, he was able with

their assistance to defend himself; which he could not have done had

they been against him. But in the case of a city, wherein the tyrant

has few friends, its internal strength will not avail him for its

defence, and he will have to seek aid from without in one of three

shapes. For either he must hire foreign guards to defend his person; or

he must arm the peasantry, so that they may play the part which ought

to be played by the citizens; or he must league with powerful

neighbours for his defence. He who follows these methods and observes

them well, may contrive to save himself, though he has the people for

his enemy. But Appius could not follow the plan of gaining over the

peasantry, since in Rome they and the people were one. And what he

might have done he knew not how to do, and so was ruined at the very

outset.

In creating the decemvirate, therefore, both the senate and the people

made grave mistakes. For although, as already explained, when speaking

of the dictatorship, it is those magistrates who make themselves, and

not those made by the votes of the people, that are hurtful to freedom;

nevertheless the people, in creating magistrates ought to take such

precautions as will make it difficult for these to become bad. But the

Romans when they ought to have set a check on the decemvirs in order to

keep them good, dispensed with it, making them the sole magistrates of

Rome, and setting aside all others; and this from the excessive desire

of the senate to get rid of the tribunes, and of the commons to get rid

of the consuls; by which objects both were so blinded as to fall into

all the disorders which ensued. For, as King Ferrando was wont to say,

men often behave like certain of the smaller birds, which are so intent

on the prey to which nature incites them, that they discern not the

eagle hovering overhead for their destruction.

In this Discourse then the mistakes made by the Roman people in their

efforts to preserve their freedom and the mistakes made by Appius in

his endeavour to obtain the tyranny, have, as I proposed at the outset,

been plainly shown.

Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius · 第 40 / 64 章