the Roman Commonwealth belonged.
I forego all discussion concerning those cities which at the outset
have been dependent upon others, and shall speak only of those which
from their earliest beginnings have stood entirely clear of all foreign
control, being governed from the first as pleased themselves, whether
as republics or as princedoms.
These as they have had different origins, so likewise have had
different laws and institutions. For to some at their very first
commencement, or not long after, laws have been given by a single
legislator, and all at one time; like those given by Lycurgus to the
Spartans; while to others they have been given at different times, as
need rose or accident determined; as in the case of Rome. That
republic, indeed, may be called happy, whose lot has been to have a
founder so prudent as to provide for it laws under which it can
continue to live securely, without need to amend them; as we find
Sparta preserving hers for eight hundred years, without deterioration
and without any dangerous disturbance. On the other hand, some measure
of unhappiness attaches to the State which, not having yielded itself
once for all into the hands of a single wise legislator, is obliged to
recast its institutions for itself; and of such States, by far the most
unhappy is that which is furthest removed from a sound system of
government, by which I mean that its institutions lie wholly outside
the path which might lead it to a true and perfect end. For it is
scarcely possible that a State in this position can ever, by any
chance, set itself to rights, whereas another whose institutions are
imperfect, if it have made a good beginning and such as admits of its
amendment, may in the course of events arrive at perfection. It is
certain, however, that such States can never be reformed without great
risk; for, as a rule, men will accept no new law altering the
institutions of their State, unless the necessity for such a change be
demonstrated; and since this necessity cannot arise without danger, the
State may easily be overthrown before the new order of things is
established. In proof whereof we may instance the republic of Florence,
which was reformed in the year 1502, in consequence of the affair of
Arezzo, but was ruined in 1512, in consequence of the affair of Prato.
Desiring, therefore, to discuss the nature of the government of Rome,
and to ascertain the accidental circumstances which brought it to its
perfection, I say, as has been said before by many who have written of
Governments, that of these there are three forms, known by the names
Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, and that those who give its
institutions to a State have recourse to one or other of these three,
according as it suits their purpose. Other, and, as many have thought,
wiser teachers, will have it, that there are altogether six forms of
government, three of them utterly bad, the other three good in
themselves, but so readily corrupted that they too are apt to become
hurtful. The good are the three above named; the bad, three others
dependent upon these, and each so like that to which it is related,
that it is easy to pass imperceptibly from the one to the other. For a
Monarchy readily becomes a Tyranny, an Aristocracy an Oligarchy, while
a Democracy tends to degenerate into Anarchy. So that if the founder of
a State should establish any one of these three forms of Government, he
establishes it for a short time only, since no precaution he may take
can prevent it from sliding into its contrary, by reason of the close
resemblance which, in this case, the virtue bears to the vice.
These diversities in the form of Government spring up among men by
chance. For in the beginning of the world, its inhabitants, being few
in number, for a time lived scattered after the fashion of beasts; but
afterwards, as they increased and multiplied, gathered themselves into
societies, and, the better to protect themselves, began to seek who
among them was the strongest and of the highest courage, to whom,
making him their head, they tendered obedience. Next arose the
knowledge of such things as are honourable and good, as opposed to
those which are bad and shameful. For observing that when a man wronged
his benefactor, hatred was universally felt for the one and sympathy
for the other, and that the ungrateful were blamed, while those who
showed gratitude were honoured, and reflecting that the wrongs they saw
done to others might be done to themselves, to escape these they
resorted to making laws and fixing punishments against any who should
transgress them; and in this way grew the recognition of Justice.
Whence it came that afterwards, in choosing their rulers, men no longer
looked about for the strongest, but for him who was the most prudent
and the most just.
But, presently, when sovereignty grew to be hereditary and no longer
elective, hereditary sovereigns began to degenerate from their
ancestors, and, quitting worthy courses, took up the notion that
princes had nothing to do but to surpass the rest of the world in
sumptuous display and wantonness, and whatever else ministers to
pleasure so that the prince coming to be hated, and therefore to feel
fear, and passing from fear to infliction of injuries, a tyranny soon
sprang up. Forthwith there began movements to overthrow the prince, and
plots and conspiracies against him undertaken not by those who were
weak, or afraid for themselves, but by such as being conspicuous for
their birth, courage, wealth, and station, could not tolerate the
shameful life of the tyrant. The multitude, following the lead of these
powerful men, took up arms against the prince and, he being got rid of,
obeyed these others as their liberators; who, on their part, holding in
hatred the name of sole ruler, formed themselves into a government and
at first, while the recollection of past tyranny was still fresh,
observed the laws they themselves made, and postponing personal
advantage to the common welfare, administered affairs both publicly and
privately with the utmost diligence and zeal. But this government
passing, afterwards, to their descendants who, never having been taught
in the school of Adversity, knew nothing of the vicissitudes of
Fortune, these not choosing to rest content with mere civil equality,
but abandoning themselves to avarice, ambition, and lust, converted,
without respect to civil rights what had been a government of the best
into a government of the few; and so very soon met with the same fate
as the tyrant.
For the multitude loathing its rulers, lent itself to any who ventured,
in whatever way, to attack them; when some one man speedily arose who
with the aid of the people overthrew them. But the recollection of the
tyrant and of the wrongs suffered at his hands being still fresh in the
minds of the people, who therefore felt no desire to restore the
monarchy, they had recourse to a popular government, which they
established on such a footing that neither king nor nobles had any
place in it. And because all governments inspire respect at the first,
this government also lasted for a while, but not for long, and seldom
after the generation which brought it into existence had died out. For,
suddenly, liberty passed into license, wherein neither private worth
nor public authority was respected, but, every one living as he liked,
a thousand wrongs were done daily. Whereupon, whether driven by
necessity, or on the suggestion of some wiser man among them and to
escape anarchy, the people reverted to a monarchy, from which, step by
step, in the manner and for the causes already assigned, they came
round once more to license. For this is the circle revolving within
which all States are and have been governed; although in the same State
the same forms of Government rarely repeat themselves, because hardly
any State can have such vitality as to pass through such a cycle more
than once, and still together. For it may be expected that in some sea
of disaster, when a State must always be wanting prudent counsels and
in strength, it will become subject to some neighbouring and
better-governed State; though assuming this not to happen, it might
well pass for an indefinite period from one of these forms of
government to another.
I say, then, that all these six forms of government are pernicious—the
three good kinds, from their brief duration the three bad, from their
inherent badness. Wise legislators therefore, knowing these defects,
and avoiding each of these forms in its simplicity, have made choice of
a form which shares in the qualities of all the first three, and which
they judge to be more stable and lasting than any of these separately.
For where we have a monarchy, an aristocracy, and a democracy existing
together in the same city, each of the three serves as a check upon the
other.
Among those who have earned special praise by devising a constitution
of this nature, was Lycurgus, who so framed the laws of Sparta as to
assign their proper functions to kings, nobles, and commons; and in
this way established a government, which, to his great glory and to the
peace and tranquility of his country, lasted for more than eight
hundred years. The contrary, however, happened in the case of Solon;
who by the turn he gave to the institutions of Athens, created there a
purely democratic government, of such brief duration, that he himself
lived to witness the beginning of the despotism of Pisistratus. And
although, forty years later, the heirs of Pisistratus were driven out,
and Athens recovered her freedom, nevertheless because she reverted to
the same form government as had been established by Solon, she could
maintain it for only a hundred years more; for though to preserve it,
many ordinances were passed for repressing the ambition of the great
and the turbulence of the people, against which Solon had not provided,
still, since neither the monarchic nor the aristocratic element was
given a place in her constitution, Athens, as compared with Sparta, had
but a short life.
But let us now turn to Rome, which city, although she had no Lycurgus
to give her from the first such a constitution as would preserve her
long in freedom, through a series of accidents, caused by the contests
between the commons and the senate, obtained by chance what the
foresight of her founders failed to provide. So that Fortune, if she
bestowed not her first favours on Rome, bestowed her second; because,
although the original institutions of this city were defective, still
they lay not outside the true path which could bring them to
perfection. For Romulus and the other kings made many and good laws,
and such as were not incompatible with freedom; but because they sought
to found a kingdom and not a commonwealth, when the city became free
many things were found wanting which in the interest of liberty it was
necessary to supply, since these kings had not supplied them. And
although the kings of Rome lost their sovereignty, in the manner and
for the causes mentioned above, nevertheless those who drove them out,
by at once creating two consuls to take their place, preserved in Rome
the regal authority while banishing from it the regal throne, so that
as both senate and consuls were included in that republic, it in fact
possessed two of the elements above enumerated, to wit, the monarchic
and the aristocratic.
It then only remained to assign its place to the popular element, and
the Roman nobles growing insolent from causes which shall be noticed
hereafter, the commons against them, when, not to lose the whole of
their power, they were forced to concede a share to the people; while
with the share which remained, the senate and consuls retained so much
authority that they still held their own place in the republic. In this
way the tribunes of the people came to be created, after whose creation
the stability of the State was much augmented, since each the three
forms of government had now its due influence allowed it. And such was
the good fortune of Rome that although her government passed from the
kings to the nobles, and from these to the people, by the steps and for
the reasons noticed above, still the entire authority of the kingly
element was not sacrificed to strengthen the authority of the nobles,
nor were the nobles divested of their authority to bestow it on the
commons; but three, blending together, made up a perfect State; which
perfection, as shall be fully shown in the next two Chapters, was
reached through the dissensions of the commons and the senate.