Hallett's speech on that occasion, allow me now to read you some
extracts from Mr. Curtis's address. The general aim of the speech was
to reconcile the People to kidnapping; the rhetorical means to this
end were an attempt to show that kidnapping was expedient; that it was
indispensable; that it had been long since agreed to; that the Slaves
were foreigners and had no right in _Massachusetts_. He said:--
"We have come here not to consider particular measures of
government but to assert that we have a government, not to
determine whether this or that law be wise or just, but to
declare that there is law, and its duties and power."
"Every sovereign State has and must have the right to judge
_what persons from abroad_ shall be admitted."
"Are not these persons [fugitive slaves] foreigners as to
us--and what right have they to come here at all, _against
the will of the legislative power of the State_.
[Massachusetts had no legislation forbidding them!] And if
their coming here or remaining here, is not consistent with
the safety of the State and the welfare of the citizens _may
we not_ prohibit their coming, or _send them back_ if they
come?" "_To deny this_ is to deny the right of
self-preservation to a State.... It ... _throws us back at
once into a condition below the most degraded savages who
have a semblance of government_." "You know that the great
duty of justice could not otherwise be performed, [that is
without the fugitive-from-labor clause in the Constitution];
that our peace at home and our safety from foreign
aggression could not otherwise be insured; and that only by
this means could we obtain 'the Blessings of Liberty' to the
people of Massachusetts and their posterity." "In no other
way could we become an example of, and security for, the
capacity of man, safely and peacefully and wisely to govern
himself under free and popular institutions."
So the fugitive slave bill is an argument against human depravity,
showing the capacity of man to govern himself "safely and peacefully
and wisely."
He adds, as early as 1643 the New England colonies found it necessary
"to insert an article substantially like this one," for the rendition
of fugitive servants, and in 1789 the Federal government demanded that
the Spaniards should surrender the fugitive slaves of Georgia.
Injustice, Gentlemen, has never lacked a precedent since Cain killed
Abel. Mr. Curtis continues:--
"When I look abroad over 100,000 happy homes in
Massachusetts and see a people, such as the blessed sun has
rarely shone upon, so intelligent and educated, moral,
religious, progressive, and free to do every thing but
wrong--I fear to say that I should not be in the wrong to
put all this at risk, because our _passionate will_ impels
us to break a promise our wise and good fathers made, not to
allow a _class of foreigners_ to come here, or to _send them
back if they came_."
So the refusal to kidnap Ellen and William Craft came of the
"_passionate will_" of the people, and is likely to ruin the happy
homes of a moral and religious people!
"_With the rights of these persons_ I firmly believe
_Massachusetts has nothing to do_. It is enough for us that
they have no right to be _here_. Whatever natural rights
they have--and I admit these natural rights to their fullest
extent--this is not the _soil_ on which to vindicate them.
This is _our_ soil, sacred to _our_ peace, on which we
intend to perform _our_ promises, and work out for the
benefit of ourselves and our posterity and the world, the
destiny which our Creator has assigned to _us_."
Gentlemen of the Jury, it is written of that Creator that He is "no
Respecter of Persons;" and "hath made of one blood all nations of men
for to dwell on all the face of the earth." The "Our Creator" of Mr.
Curtis is also the Father of William and Ellen Craft; and that great
Soul who has ploughed his moral truths deep into the history of
mankind, represents the final Judge of us all as saying to such as
scorned his natural Law of Justice and Humanity, "INASMUCH AS YE DID
IT NOT TO ONE OF THE LEAST OF THESE YE DID IT NOT TO ME."
Massachusetts is "our soil," is it; "sacred to _our_ peace," which is
to be made sure of by stealing our brother men, and giving to
Commissioners George T. Curtis and Edward G. Loring ten dollars for
making a slave, and only five for setting free a man! Peace and the
fugitive slave bill! No, Gentlemen of the Jury, it is vain to cry
Peace, Peace--when there is no peace! Ay, there _is_ no peace to the
wicked; and though the counsel of the ungodly be carried, it is
carried headlong!
In that speech, Gentlemen, Mr. Curtis made a special attack upon me:--
"There has been made within these walls," said he, "the
declaration that an article of the Constitution [the
rendition clause] of the United States 'shall not be
executed, _law or no law_.' A gentleman offered a resolve
... that 'constitution or no constitution, law or no law, we
will not allow a fugitive slave to be taken from
Massachusetts.' The chairman of a public meeting [Hon.
Charles Francis Adams, on October 14th] declared here that
'the law will be resisted, and if the fugitive resists, and
if he slay the slave-hunter, or even the Marshal, and if he
therefor be brought before a Jury of Massachusetts men, that
Jury will not convict him.' And as if there should be
nothing wanting to exhibit the madness which has possessed
men's minds, _murder and perjury_ have been enacted into
virtues, and in this city preached from the sacred desk. I
must not be suspected of exaggerating in the least degree. I
read therefore the following passage from a sermon preached
and published in this city:--
"'Let me suppose a case which may happen here and before
long. A woman flies from South Carolina to Massachusetts to
escape from bondage. Mr. Greatheart aids her in her escape,
harbors and conceals her, and is brought to trial for it.
The punishment is a fine of one thousand dollars and
imprisonment for six months. I am drawn to serve as a juror
and pass upon this offence. I may refuse to serve and be
punished for that, leaving men with no scruples to take my
place, or I may take the juror's oath to give a verdict
according to the law and the testimony. The law is plain,
let us suppose, and the testimony conclusive. Greatheart
himself confesses that he did the deed alleged, saving one
ready to perish. The judge charges that if the jurors are
satisfied of that fact then they must return that he is
guilty. This is a nice matter. Here are two questions. The
one put to me in my official capacity as juror, is this:
"Did Greatheart aid the woman?" The other, put to me in my
natural character as man, is this: "Will you help punish
Greatheart with fine and imprisonment for helping a woman
obtain her unalienable rights?" If I have extinguished my
manhood by my juror's oath, then I shall do my official
business and find Greatheart guilty, and I shall seem to be
a true man; but if I value my manhood I shall answer after
my natural duty to love man and not hate him, to do him
justice, not injustice, to allow him the natural rights he
has not alienated, and shall say, "Not guilty." Then men
will call me forsworn and a liar, but I think human nature
will justify the verdict.'"
"I should like to ask," he continued, "the reverend gentleman in what
capacity he expects to be punished for his _perjury_?" Gentlemen of
the Jury, I rose and said, "Do you want an answer to your question,
sir?" He had charged me with preaching murder and perjury; had asked,
How I expected to be punished for my own "PERJURY?" When I offered to
answer his question he refused me the opportunity to reply! Thus,
Gentlemen, he charged me with recommending men to commit perjury! Did
he think I advised men to take an oath and break it? On the other side
of the page which he read there stood printed:--
"Suppose a man has sworn to keep the Constitution of the
United States, and the Constitution is found to be wrong in
certain particulars; then his oath is not morally binding,
for before his oath, by his very existence, he is morally
bound to keep the law of God as fast as he learns it. No
oath can absolve him from his natural allegiance to God. Yet
I see not how a man can knowingly, and with a good
Conscience, swear to keep what he deems it wrong to keep,
and will not keep, and does not intend to keep."
Gentlemen, when that speech came to be printed--there was no charge of
"perjury" at all, but a quite different sentence![189]
[Footnote 189: See the speech in Boston Courier of November 27th, with
the editorial comment, and in Daily Advertiser of 28th, _Thanksgiving
Day_. See also the Atlas of November 27th. The Sermon is in 2 Parker's
Speeches, 241.]
9. In February, 1851, George T. Curtis issued the warrant for the
seizure of Shadrach, who was "hauled" in to the court house before
that Commissioner; but "the Lord delivered him out of their hands,"
and he also escaped out of the United States of America.
10. After the escape or rescue of Shadrach, George T. Curtis
telegraphed the news to Mr. Webster, at Washington, declaring "it is
levying war;" thus constructing high treason out of the rescue of a
prisoner by unarmed men, from the hands of a sub-deputy officer of the
United States.
11. George T. Curtis also officiated as Commissioner in the kidnapping
of Thomas Sims, in April, 1851; and under the pretence of
"extradition," sent him to be scourged in the jail of Savannah, and
then to suffer eternal bondage. It was rumored at the time that
Charles P. Curtis and Benjamin R. Curtis, his law-partner and
son-in-law, were the secret legal advisers and chamber-counsel of the
Southern slave-hunters in this case. I know not how true the rumor
was, nor whether it was based on new observation of facts, or was
merely an inference from their general conduct and character.
12. When Mr. Sims was brought before Judge Woodbury, on _habeas
corpus_, Benjamin R. Curtis appeared as counsel for the Marshal, and
also assisted Judge Woodbury in strengthening his opinion against
Sims, by a written note transmitted by an officer of the Court to the
Judge, while he was engaged in delivering his opinion.
13. Gentlemen of the Jury, I have shown you how, in Britain, the
Government, seeking to oppress the people and to crush down freedom of
speech, put into judicial offices such men as were ready to go all
lengths in support of profitable wickedness. You do not forget the men
whom the Stuarts made judges: surely you remember Twysden, and Kelyng,
and Finch, and Saunders, and Scroggs. You will not forget Edmund
Thurlow and John Scott. Well, Gentlemen, in 1851, Judge Woodbury died,
and on the recommendation of Mr. Webster, Mr. Benjamin R. Curtis was
raised to the dignity he now holds. Of course, Gentlemen, the country
will judge of the cause and motive of the selection. No lawyer in New
England had laid down such southern "Principles" for foundation of
law; he outwent Mr. Sprague. None had rendered such service to the
Slave Power. In 1836, he had sought to restore slavery to
Massachusetts, and to accomplish that had denied the existence of any
Higher Law,--the written statute was the only standard of judicial
morals. In 1850, he had most zealously defended the fugitive slave
bill,--coming to the rescue of despotism when it seemed doubtful which
way the money of Boston would turn, and showing most exemplary
diligence in his attempts to kidnap William and Ellen Craft.
Gentlemen, if such services were left unpaid, surely "the Union would
be in danger!" But I must go on with my sad chronicle.
14. As Circuit Judge of the United States, Benjamin R. Curtis, as well
in the construction of juries, as in the construction of the law,
exerted all his abilities against the parties indicted for the rescue
of Shadrach, though Mr. Hale says his conduct was far better than
Judge Sprague's. He did this especially in the case of Elizur Wright,
who appeared without counsel, and thus afforded a better opportunity
to procure a conviction. But it was in vain--all escaped out of his
hands.
15. In 1851, George T. Curtis brought an action for libel against
Benjamin B. Mussey, bookseller, who had just published a volume of
speeches by the Hon. Horace Mann, one of which was against the
business of kidnapping in Boston, wherein George T. Curtis found, as
he alleged, matter libellous of himself. That suit remains yet
undisposed of; but in it he will doubtless recover the full value of
his reputation, on which kidnapping has affixed no stain.
16. In May, 1854, Edward G. Loring issued a warrant for the seizure of
Mr. Burns; decided the case before he heard it, having advised the
counsel not to oppose his rendition, for he would probably be sent
back; held him ironed in his "court," and finally delivered him over
to eternal bondage. But in that case, it is said, Mr. Loring, who has
no Curtis blood in his veins, did not wish to steal a man; and
proposed to throw up his commission rather than do such a deed; but he
consulted his step-brother, Charles P. Curtis, who persuaded him it
would be dishonorable to decline the office of kidnapping imposed upon
him as a United States Commissioner by the fugitive slave bill.
Benjamin R. Curtis, it is said, I know not how truly--himself can
answer, aided Mr. Loring in forming the "opinion" by which he
attempted to justify the "extradition" of Mr. Burns; that is to say,
the giving him up as a slave without any trial of his right to
liberty, merely on a presumptive case established by his claimant.
17. After Commissioner Loring had seized Mr. Burns, Mr. George T.
Curtis, by a communication published in the newspapers, informed the
public that he still continued the business of man-hunting at the old
stand, where all orders for kidnapping would be promptly attended to.
For, he says, there was a statement "that I had declined, or was
unwilling or afraid to act. I did not choose that any one whatever
should have an excuse for believing that Judge Loring was willing to
sit in a case that I had declined." "I thought proper to place myself
as it were by his side." "But I never took a fee [for kidnapping], and
I never shall take one."[190] Did he remember the fate of the Hebrew
Judas, who "betrayed the Innocent Blood," and then cast down the
thirty pieces?
[Footnote 190: See Boston Journal of May 29, and Boston Courier of
June 7, 1854.]
Hitherto the kidnapping commissioners, though both members of the same
family, had pursued their game separately, each on his own account.
After this it appears these two are to hunt in couples: Commissioner
Loring and Commissioner Curtis "as it were by his side:"--
"Swift in pursuit, but matched in mouth like bells,
_Each under each_."
Gentlemen of the Jury, it is a very painful thing for me to deliver
this very sad chronicle of such wicked deeds. But do not judge these
men wholly by those acts. I am by no means stingy of commendation, and
would rather praise than blame. The two elder Messrs. Curtis have many
estimable and honorable qualities,--in private relations it is
said--and I believe it--they are uncommonly tender and delicate and
refined in the elegant courtesies of common life. I know that they
have often been open-handed and generous in many a charity. In the
ordinary intercourse of society, where no great moral principle is
concerned, they appear as decorous and worthy men. Hon. Benj. R.
Curtis,--he will allow me to mention his good qualities before his
face,--though apparently destitute of any high moral instincts, is yet
a man of superior powers of understanding, and uncommon industry; as a
lawyer he was above many of the petty tricks so common in his
profession. Strange as it may seem, I have twice seen Mr. George T.
Curtis's name among others who contributed to purchase a slave; Mr.
Loring's good qualities I have often mentioned, and always with
delight.
But this family has had its hand in all the kidnapping which has
recently brought such misery to the colored people and their friends;
such ineffaceable disgrace upon Boston, and such peril to the natural
Rights of man. These men have laid down and advocated the principles
of despotism; they have recommended, enforced, and practised
kidnapping in Boston, and under circumstances most terribly atrocious.
Without their efforts we should have had no man-stealing here. They
cunningly, but perhaps unconsciously, represented the low Selfishness
of the Money Power at the North, and the Slave Power at the South, and
persuaded the controlling men of Boston to steal Mr. Sims and Mr.
Burns. In 1836 they sought to enslave a poor little orphan girl, and
restore bondage to Massachusetts; in 1851 they succeeded in
enthralling a man. Now, Gentlemen, they are seeking to sew up the
mouth of New England; there is a sad consistency in their public
behavior.
Gentlemen, they are not ashamed of this conduct; when "A Citizen of
Boston," last January, related in the New York Tribune some of the
facts I have just set forth, "One of the name" published his card in
that paper and thanked the "Citizen" for collecting abundant evidence
that the "Curtis Family" "have worked hard to keep the _law_ superior
to fanaticism, disloyalty, and the _mob_," and declared that "they
feel encouraged to continue in the same course and _their children
after them_."[191] Mr. Thomas B. Curtis considers some of the acts I
have just mentioned "among the most meritorious acts" of his
life.[192] Mr. Loring, in his "Remonstrance," justifies Kidnapping!
[Footnote 191: New York Tribune, January 15, 1855.]
[Footnote 192: Daily Advertiser, February 7, 1855.]
They may, indeed, speak well of the bridge which carries them safe
over. Three of the family are fugitive slave bill commissioners; one
of them intellectually the ablest, perhaps morally the blindest, who
so charged me with "Perjury," is the Honorable Judge who is to try me
for a "Misdemeanor." Of course he is perfectly impartial, and has no
animosity which seeks revenge,--the history of courts forbids the
supposition!
Such, Gentlemen, are the antecedents of the Hon. Judge Curtis, such
his surroundings. You will presently see what effect they have had in
procuring this indictment. It a sad tale that I have presented. He
told it, not I; he did the deeds, and they have now found words.
* * * * *
Gentlemen of the Jury, I shall next speak of Judge Curtis's charge to
the grand-jury, delivered in Boston, June 7, 1854--only five days
after his kinsman had sent Mr. Burns into Slavery. Here is that part
of the charge which relates to our case.
"There is another criminal law of the United States to which
I must call your attention, and give you in charge. It was
enacted on the 13th of April, 1790, and is in the following
words:--
"'If any person shall knowingly or wilfully obstruct,
resist, or oppose any officer of the United States, in
serving, or attempting to serve, or execute any mesne
process, or warrant, or any rule or order of any of the
courts of the United States, or any other legal writ or
process whatever, or shall assault, beat, or wound any
officer, or other person duly authorized, in serving or
executing any writ, rule, order, process, or warrant,
aforesaid, such person shall, on conviction, be imprisoned
not exceeding twelve months, and fined not exceeding three
hundred dollars.'
"You will observe, Gentlemen, that this law makes no
provision for a case where an officer, or other person duly
authorized, is killed by those unlawfully resisting him.
That is a case of murder, and is left to be tried and
punished under the laws of the State, within whose
jurisdiction the offence is committed. Over that offence
against the laws of the State of Massachusetts we have here
no jurisdiction. It is to be presumed that the duly
constituted authorities of the State will, in any such case,
do their duty; and if the crime of murder has been
committed, will prosecute and punish all who are guilty.
"Our duty is limited to administering the laws of the United
States; and by one of those laws which I have read to you,
to obstruct, resist, or oppose, or beat, or wound any
officer of the United States, or other person duly
authorized, in serving or executing any legal process
whatsoever, is an offence against the laws of the United
States, and is one of the subjects concerning which you are
bound to inquire.
"It is not material that the same act is an offence both
against the laws of the United States and of a particular
State. Under our system of government the United States and
the several States are distinct sovereignties, each having
its own system of criminal law, which it administers in its
own tribunals; and the criminal laws of a State can in no
way affect those of the United States. The offence,
therefore, of obstructing legal process of the United States
is to be inquired of and treated by you as a misdemeanor,
under the Act of Congress which I have quoted, without any
regard to the criminal laws of the State, or the nature of
the crime under these laws.
"This Act of Congress is carefully worded, and its meaning
is plain. Nevertheless, there are some terms in it, and some
rules of law connected with it, which should be explained
for your guidance. And first, as to the process, the
execution of which is not to be obstructed.
"The language of the Act is very broad. It embraces every
legal process whatsoever, whether issued by a court in
session, or by a judge, or magistrate, or commissioner
acting in the due administration of any law of the United
States. You will probably experience no difficulty in
understanding and applying this part of the law.
"As to what constitutes an obstruction--it was many years
ago decided, by Justice Washington, that to support an
indictment under this law, it was not necessary to prove the
accused used or even threatened active violence. Any
obstruction to the free action of the officer, or his lawful
assistants, wilfully placed in his or their way, for the
purpose of thus obstructing him or them, is sufficient. And
it is clear that if a multitude of persons should assemble,
even in a public highway, with the design to stand together,
and thus prevent the officer from passing freely along the
way, in the execution of his precept, and the officer should
thus be hindered or obstructed, this would of itself, and
without any active violence, be such an obstruction as is
contemplated by this law. If to this be added use of any
active violence, then the officer is not only obstructed,
but he is resisted and opposed, and of course the offence is
complete, for either of them is sufficient to constitute it.
"If you should be satisfied that an offence against this law
has been perpetrated, you will then inquire by whom; and
this renders it necessary for me to instruct you concerning
the kind and amount of participation which brings
individuals within the compass of this law.
"And first, all who are present and actually obstruct,
resist, or oppose, are of course guilty. So are all who are
present leagued in the common design, and so situated as to
be able, in case of need, to afford assistance to those
actually engaged, though they do not actually obstruct,
resist, or oppose. If they are present for the purpose of
affording assistance in obstructing, resisting, or opposing
the officers, and are so situated as to be able in any event
which may occur, actually to aid in the common design,
though no overt act is done by them, they are still guilty
under this law. The offence defined by this act is a
misdemeanor; and it is rule of law that whatever
participation, in case of felony, would render a person
guilty, either as a principal in the second degree, or as an
accessory before the fact, does, in a case of misdemeanor,
render him guilty as a principal; in misdemeanors all are
principals. And, therefore, in pursuance of the same rule,
not only those who are present, but those who, though absent
when the offence was committed, did procure, counsel,
command, or abet others to commit the offence, are
indictable as principal.