Transcriber’s Note:-
The original spelling, hyphenation, and punctuation has been retained,
with the exception of apparent typographical errors which have been
corrected.
Underlined text is denoted =thus=.
Italic characters are denoted _thus_.
Footnotes marked thus [12] have been moved to the end of the chapter in
which they occur.
Footnotes marked thus (12) can be seen in Appendix A, as in the
original document.
Footnote markers (44), (45), (136) and (154) were omitted in the
original document. The location of these markers is the transcriber’s
approximation.
[Illustration: THE BATTLE FOR KHE SANH
HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON, D.C.]
[Illustration:
K.W. White
SOUTHEAST ASIA]
THE BATTLE
FOR
KHE SANH
By
Captain Moyers S. Shore II, USMC
[Illustration: U. S. Marine Corps Badge]
HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS, U. S. MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON, D. C.
Printed 1969
Reprinted 1977
[Illustration: Oblique aerial photograph of the Khe Sanh Combat Base
(United Press International Photo by Kyoichi Sawada)]
Library of Congress Card No. 75-603604
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402
Stock No. 008-065-00114-5
PROLOGUE
It is with pleasure that the Marine Corps presents this account of
the Battle for Khe Sanh which stands as one of the most crucial and
bitterly contested struggles in the Vietnam War. Throughout the
existence of our Corps, thousands of men have been called upon to
further the cause of freedom on scores of battlefields around the
globe. At Khe Sanh, a new generation of Marines, aided by their gallant
U. S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and South Vietnamese counterparts,
admirably upheld this tradition and wrote a thrilling new chapter in
the history of armed conflict.
The two senior U. S. commanders in Vietnam who supervised the
defense--General William C. Westmoreland, USA, and Lieutenant General
Robert E. Cushman, Jr., USMC--have contributed immeasurably to the
production of this work and have also provided their astute summaries
of the operation which appear in the following pages. I heartily
endorse their statements as well as the approach and conclusions of
this history.
In addition, I am grateful to the individuals and agencies of all the
Services who have provided valuable assistance through written comments
and personal interviews which are reflected in the text. In particular,
I wish to extend our appreciation to Mr. David D. Duncan, a veteran
combat photographer who has graciously consented to our use of the
brilliant pictures he took during an eight-day visit to the combat
base. These truly professional shots graphically depict the face of the
siege and enhance the narrative.
The sum total of these contributions, I feel, is an objective, readable
account of this important battle which honors the valiant American
and South Vietnamese troops who held Khe Sanh. I can think of no more
fitting tribute to these men--both living and dead--than to simply
relate the events as they happened. This, then, is their story.
[Illustration: Handwritten signature]
L. F. CHAPMAN, JR.
General, U.S. Marine Corps
Commandant of the Marine Corps
REVIEWED AND APPROVED 28 May 1969
FOREWORD
As the commander of the United States Military Assistance Command,
Vietnam, during the battle of Khe Sanh, I welcome publication by the U.
S. Marine Corps of this historical study. The Marines' heroic defense
of the Khe Sanh area against numerically superior North Vietnamese
forces stands out among the many battles fought to defend the Republic
of Vietnam against Communist aggression.
The enemy's primary objective of his 1968 TET Offensive was to seize
power in South Vietnam by creating a general uprising and causing the
defection of major elements of the Armed Forces of the Republic of
Vietnam. In conjunction with this, the enemy apparently expected to
seize by military action large portions of the northern two provinces
lying just south of the Demilitarized Zone and there to set up a
"liberation government." The virtually unpopulated Khe Sanh Plateau,
which lay astride the enemy's principal avenue of approach from his
large base areas in Laos, was obviously an initial objective of the
North Vietnamese Army. Its seizure would have created a serious threat
to our forces defending the northern area and would have cleared the
way for the enemy's advance to Quang Tri City and the heavily populated
coastal region. There is also little doubt that the enemy hoped at Khe
Sanh to attain a climactic victory, such as he had done in 1954 at Dien
Bien Phu, in the expectation that this would produce a psychological
shock and erode American morale.
My subordinate commanders and I were particularly sensitive to heavy
fighting in the populated areas, since this would result in substantial
destruction to the towns and villages and cause unnecessary suffering
by the civilian population. We wanted to avoid this situation to the
greatest extent possible by denying the enemy freedom of movement
through the Khe Sanh area and into the coastal region. At that time
we did not have sufficient troops, helicopters, or logistical support
in the northern provinces to accomplish this entirely through mobile
operations, and competing requirements for troops and resources did not
permit immediate reinforcement from other areas of South Vietnam. The
situation was further complicated by long periods of fog and low cloud
ceilings during January, February, and March, which made helicopter
operations difficult and hazardous.
To maintain our presence on the Khe Sanh Plateau, our only choice at
the time was to secure the airstrip we had built on the plateau since
this facility was essential as the forward terminus of our supply line.
From here we could maintain our military presence in the area and,
through the use of our firepower, make it costly for large enemy forces
to advance while we awaited the end of the bad weather of the northeast
monsoon and constituted the forces and logistics necessary to strike
out on offensive operations.
Another factor favoring the decision to hold Khe Sanh was the enemy's
determination to take it. Our defense of the area would tie down large
numbers of North Vietnamese troops which otherwise could move against
the vulnerable populated areas whose security was the heart of the
Vietnamese pacification program. Our decision to defend also held the
prospect of causing the enemy to concentrate his force and thereby
provide us a singular opportunity to bring our firepower to bear on him
with minimum restrictions. Had we withdrawn to fight the enemy's force
of over two divisions in the heavily populated coastal area, the use
of our firepower would have been severely restricted because of our
precautionary measures to avoid civilian casualties and minimize damage
to civilian property.
Based on my decision to hold the Khe Sanh Plateau, Lieutenant General
Cushman's and Lieutenant General Lam's first task was to reinforce the
area with sufficient strength to prevent the enemy from overrunning it,
but at the same time to commit no more force than could be supplied by
air. While the battle of Khe Sanh was being fought, emphasis was placed
on the buildup in the northern provinces of the necessary troops,
helicopters, and logistic support for mobile offensive operations to
open Highway 9 and move onto the plateau when the weather cleared at
the end of March.
This report provides a detailed and graphic account of events as they
unfolded. It centers about the 26th Marine Regiment, the main defenders
of the Khe Sanh area, who tenaciously and magnificently held off the
enemy during the two-and-one-half-month siege. Yet the battle of Khe
Sanh was an inter-Service and international operation. Consequently,
appropriate coverage is given to the contributions of the U.S. Army,
Navy, and Air Force, and to South Vietnamese regular and irregular
military units, all of whom contributed to the defense of the area
and to the destruction of the enemy. As Marine artillery from within
the fortified positions pounded the enemy, Army artillery located to
the east provided heavy, long-range fire support. Fighter aircraft
from the Marines, Air Force, and Navy provided continuous close air
support, while B-52 bombers of the Strategic Air Command dealt decisive
blows around-the-clock to enemy forces within striking distance of our
positions and against enemy supply areas. Further, Marine and Air Force
airlift together with Army parachute riggers logistically sustained the
defenders during the siege despite heavy enemy antiaircraft fire.
In early April, when the weather cleared and the troop and logistic
buildup was completed, a combined force of U. S. Army, U. S. Marine,
and Republic of Vietnam units, coordinated by the U. S. Army's 1st
Cavalry Division (Airmobile), maneuvered to link up with the 26th
Marines and rout the remaining enemy elements. Meanwhile, U. S. Marine
Corps engineers expeditiously opened Highway 9 to the plateau. The
crushing defeat suffered by the North Vietnamese Army during the siege
cost the Communists untold casualties, shattered two of their best
divisions, and frustrated their dream of a second Dien Bien Phu.
The battle of Khe Sanh is but one facet of the long and complicated war
in South Vietnam. It is one in which the aggressive nature of North
Vietnam, the resolute determination of our fighting forces, and the
local defeat of the armed enemy can all be clearly seen.
[Illustration: Handwritten Signature]
W. C. WESTMORELAND
General, United States Army
PREFACE
In the extreme northwestern corner of South Vietnam there stands
a monument to the free world. Unlike those which commemorate the
victories of past wars, this one was not built on marble or bronze but
the sacrifices of men who fought and died at a remote outpost to halt
the spread of Communism. This is the story of those men--the defenders
of Khe Sanh--and the epic 77-day struggle which not only denied the
North Vietnamese Army a much needed victory but reaffirmed to the world
the intention of the United States to hold the line in Southeast Asia.
In addition to having been a contest of men and machines, this was the
test of a nation's will.
As a history, this work is not intended to prove any point, but rather
to record objectively the series of events which came to be called the
Battle of Khe Sanh. These events spanned a period from April 1967 to
April 1968. The rationale for the buildup along the Demilitarized Zone
and the commitment to hold the small garrison is presented as a logical
extension of the three-pronged strategy then employed throughout I
Corps and the rest of South Vietnam; this balanced campaign included
pacification programs, counterguerrilla activity, and large unit
offensive sweeps. Although isolated, the Khe Sanh Combat Base was
a vital link in the northern defenses which screened the Allied
counterinsurgency efforts in the densely populated coastal plains from
invasion by regular divisions from North Vietnam. By obstructing this
attempted invasion, American and South Vietnamese forces at Khe Sanh
provided a shield for their contemporaries who were waging a war for
the hearts and minds of the people in the cities, villages, and hamlets
farther to the south. In the process, a reinforced regiment--the 26th
Marines--supported by massive firepower provided by the Marine and Navy
air arms, the U. S. Air Force and Marine and Army artillery, defended
this base and mangled two crack North Vietnamese Army divisions,
further illustrating to Hanoi the futility of its war of aggression.
Later, after the encirclement was broken and additional U.S. forces
became available, the Allies were able to shift emphasis from the fixed
defense to fast-moving offensive operations to control this vital area
astride the enemy's invasion route. In these operations, our troops
thrust out to strike the enemy whenever he appeared in this critical
region. This shift in tactics in the spring of 1968 was made possible
by favorable weather, the buildup of troops, helicopters, and logistics
that had taken place during the winter of 1967-68. An additional factor
was the construction of a secure forward base across the mountains to
the east of Khe Sanh, from which these operations could be supported.
The Khe Sanh Combat Base then lost the importance it had earlier and
was dismantled after its supplies were drawn down, since it was no
longer needed. The strategy of containing the North Vietnamese Army
along the border remained the same; but revised tactics were now
possible.
But in 1967 and early 1968, neither troops nor helicopters, logistics
nor the forward base were available to support the more aggressive
tactics. The enemy lunged into the area in force, and he had to be
stopped. The KSCB with its airstrip was the pivotal point in the area
from which Allied firepower could be directed and which the enemy could
not ignore. It was here that the 26th Marines made their stand.
This study also provides insight into the mechanics of the battle from
the highest echelon of command to the smallest unit. In addition,
appropriate coverage is provided to the supporting arms and the mammoth
logistics effort which spelled the difference between victory and
defeat. While this is basically a story about Marines, it notes the
valiant contributions of U. S. Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel, as
well as the South Vietnamese.
The account is based on records of the U. S. Marine Corps, selected
records of other Services, and appropriate published works. The
comments of and interviews with key participants have been incorporated
into the text. Although this monograph has been cleared for publication
by the Department of Defense, most of the documents cited retain a
security classification.
[Illustration: Handwritten signature]
R. E. CUSHMAN, JR.
Lieutenant General, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Prologue v
Foreword vi
Preface ix
Introduction 1
Part I: Background 3
Part II: The Lull Between The Storms 18
Part III: The Buildup and The Opening Round 29
Part IV: The "So-Called" Siege Begins 53
Part V: The Airlift 72
Part VI: Supporting Arms and Intelligence 93
Part VII: The Turning Point 113
Part VIII: The Breakout 132
Part IX: Epilogue 145
Appendices:
A. Bibliographical Notes and Footnotes 152
B. Glossary 169
C. Chronology 180
D. Task Organization 187
E. Command and Staff List, 3d Marines 193
F. Command and Staff List, 26th Marines 196
G. Military Map Symbols 203
=The Battle for Khe Sanh=
by
Captain Moyers S. Shore II, USMC
INTRODUCTION
"Attention to Colors." The order having been given, Captain William
H. Dabney, a product of the Virginia Military Institute, snapped to
attention, faced the jerry-rigged flag-pole, and saluted, as did every
other man in Company I, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines. The ceremony might
well have been at any one of a hundred military installations around
the world except for a few glaring irregularities. The parade ground
was a battle-scarred hilltop to the west of Khe Sanh and the men in
the formation stood half submerged in trenches or foxholes. Instead of
crisply starched utilities, razor sharp creases, and gleaming brass,
these Marines sported scraggly beards, ragged trousers, and rotted
helmet liner straps. The only man in the company who could play a
bugle, Second Lieutenant Owen S. Matthews, lifted the pock-marked
instrument to his lips and spat out a choppy version of "To the Colors"
while two enlisted men raced to the RC-292 radio antenna which served
as the flag-pole and gingerly attached the Stars and Stripes. As the
mast with its shredded banner came upright, the Marines could hear the
ominous "thunk," "thunk," "thunk," to the southwest of their position
which meant that North Vietnamese 120mm mortar rounds had left their
tubes. They also knew that in 21 seconds those "thunks" would be
replaced by much louder, closer sounds but no one budged until Old
Glory waved high over the hill.
When Lieutenant Matthews sharply cut off the last note of his piece,
Company I disappeared; men dropped into trenches, dived headlong into
foxholes, or scrambled into bunkers. The area which moments before had
been bristling with humanity was suddenly a ghost town. Seconds later
explosions walked across the hilltop spewing black smoke, dirt, and
debris into the air. Rocks, splinters, and spent shell fragments rained
on the flattened Marines but, as usual, no one was hurt. As quickly as
the attack came, it was over. While the smoke lazily drifted away, a
much smaller banner rose from the Marines' positions. A pole adorned
with a pair of red, silk panties--Maggie's Drawers--was waved back
and forth above one trenchline to inform the enemy that he had missed
again. A few men stood up and jeered or cursed at the distant gunners;
others simply saluted with an appropriate obscene gesture. The daily
flag-raising ceremony on Hill 881 South was over.
This episode was just one obscure incident which coupled with hundreds
of others made up the battle for Khe Sanh. The ceremony carried with it
no particular political overtones but was intended solely as an open
show of defiance toward the Communists as well as a morale booster for
the troops. The jaunty courage, quiet determination, and macabre humor
of the men on Hill 881S exemplified the spirit of the U. S. and South
Vietnamese defenders who not only defied the enemy but, in a classic
77-day struggle, destroyed him. At the same time, the fighting around
the isolated combat base touched off a passionate controversy in the
United States and the battle, therefore, warrants close scrutiny.
For proper prospective, however, one first needs to have a basic
understanding of the series of events which thrust Khe Sanh into the
limelight. In effect, the destiny of the combatants was unknowingly
determined almost three years earlier at a place called Red Beach near
Da Nang.
PART I
BACKGROUND
When the lead elements of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade,
commanded by Brigadier General Frederick J. Karch, slogged ashore at
Da Nang on 8 March 1965, Communist political and military aspirations
in South Vietnam received a severe jolt. The buildup of organized
American combat units had begun. In May 1965, the 9th MEB was succeeded
by the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) which was comprised of
the 3d Marine Division, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and, within a
year, the 1st Marine Division. The Commanding General, III MAF was
given responsibility for U. S. operations in I Corps Tactical Zone
which incorporated the five northern provinces and, on 5 June 1965,
Major General Lewis W. Walt assumed that role. (See Map 1). Major units
of the U. S. Army moved into other portions of South Vietnam and the
entire American effort came under the control of the Commander, U. S.
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (ComUSMACV), General William C.
Westmoreland.(1)
[Illustration:
MAP 1 K. W. White
I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE]
The Marines, in conjunction with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam
(ARVN), set about to wrest control of the populace in I Corps from the
Viet Cong and help reassert the authority of the central government.
The Allies launched an aggressive campaign designed to root out the
enemy's source of strength--the local guerrilla. Allied battalion- and
regimental-sized units screened this effort by seeking out and engaging
Viet Cong main forces and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) elements. Smaller
Marine and ARVN units went after the isolated guerrilla bands which
preyed on the Vietnamese peasants. Thousands of fire team-, squad-, and
platoon-sized actions took a heavy toll of the enemy and the Viet Cong
were gradually pushed out of the populated areas. Whenever a village
or hamlet was secured, civic action teams moved in to fill the vacuum
and began the long, tedious process of erasing the effects of prolonged
Communist domination. Progress was slow. Within a year, however, the
area under Government security had grown to more than 1,600 square
miles and encompassed nearly half a million people. As government
influence extended deeper into the countryside, the security, health,
economic well-being, and educational prospects of the peasants were
constantly improved. There was an ever increasing number of enemy
defectors and intelligence reports from, heretofore, unsympathetic
villagers. By mid-1966, Allied military operations and pacification
programs were slowly but seriously eroding the enemy's elaborate
infrastructure and his hold over the people.(2)
It soon became apparent to the leaders in the North that, unless they
took some bold action, ten years of preparation and their master
plan for conquest of South Vietnam would go down the drain. From
the Communists' standpoint, the crucial matter was not the volume
of casualties they sustained, but the survival of the guerrilla
infrastructure in South Vietnam. In spite of their disregard for
human life, the North Vietnamese did not wish to counter the American
military steamroller in the populated coastal plain of I Corps. There,
the relatively open terrain favored the overwhelming power of the
Marines' supporting arms. The enemy troops would have extended supply
lines, their movement could be more easily detected, and they would be
further away from sanctuaries in Laos and North Vietnam. In addition,
when the propaganda-conscious NVA suffered a defeat, it would be
witnessed by the local populace and thus shatter the myth of Communist
invincibility.
If the Marines could not be smashed, and the Communists had tried
several times, they had to be diverted or thinned out. The answer to
the enemy's dilemma lay along the 17th Parallel. Gradually, they massed
large troop concentrations within the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), in
Laos, and in the southern pan-handle of North Vietnam; in short, they
were opening a new front. Nguyen Van Mai, a high Communist official in
Phnom Penh, Cambodia, predicted: "We will entice the Americans closer
to the North Vietnamese border and ... bleed them without mercy." That
remained to be seen.(3)
In response to the enemy buildup along the DMZ throughout the summer
and fall of 1966, General Walt shifted Marine units further north.
The 3d Marine Division Headquarters moved from Da Nang to Phu Bai,
and a Division Forward Command Post (CP) continued to Dong Ha so
that it could respond rapidly to developments along the DMZ. In turn
the 1st Marine Division Headquarters moved from Chu Lai to Da Nang
and took control of operations in central and southern I Corps. For
specific, short-term operations, the division commanders frequently
delegated authority to a task force headquarters. The task force was
a semipermanent organization composed of temporarily assigned units
under one commander, usually a general officer. Because of the fluid,
fast-moving type of warfare peculiar to Vietnam, the individual
battalion became a key element and went where it was needed the most.
It might operate under a task force headquarters or a regiment other
than its own parent unit. For example, it would not be uncommon for the
2d Battalion, 9th Marines to be attached to the 3d Marines while the 2d
Battalion, 3d Marines was a part of another command. Commitments were
met with units that were the most readily available at the time.(4)
With the buildup of American troops in Quang Tri province, there
logically followed the buildup of installations. Dong Ha was the
largest since it served as the brain and nervous system of the entire
area. Eight miles to the southwest was Camp J. J. Carroll, a large
artillery base. The Marine units there were reinforced by several
batteries of U. S. Army 175mm guns which had the capability of firing
into North Vietnam. Located at the base of a jagged mountain ten
miles west of Camp Carroll was another artillery base--the Rockpile.
This facility also had 175mm guns and extended the range of American
artillery support almost to the Laotian border. In addition, the
Marines built a series of strongpoints paralleling and just south of
the DMZ. Gio Linh and Con Thien were the two largest sites. (See Map 2).
During the remainder of 1966 and in the first quarter of 1967, the
intensity of fighting in the eastern DMZ area increased. Each time the
enemy troops made a foray across the DMZ, the Marines met and defeated
them. By 31 March 1967, the NVA had lost 3,492 confirmed killed in
action (KIA) in the northern operations while the Marines had suffered
541 killed. For the Communists, it appeared that direct assaults across
the DMZ were proving too costly--even by their standards.(5)
[Illustration:
MAP 2 E.L. WILSON
NORTHERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE]
The Khe Sanh Plateau, in western Quang Tri Province, provided the
NVA with an excellent alternative. The late Doctor Bernard B. Fall
compared the whole of Vietnam to "two rice baskets on opposite ends
of a carrying pole." Such being the case, Khe Sanh is located at the
pole's fulcrum in the heart of the rugged Annamite Range. Studded with
piedmont-type hills, this area provides a natural infiltration route.
Most of the mountain trails are hidden by tree canopies up to 60 feet
in height, dense elephant grass, and bamboo thickets. Concealment from
reconnaissance aircraft is good, and the heavy jungle under-growth
limits ground observation to five meters in most places. Dong Tri
Mountain (1,015 meters high), the highest peak in the region, along
with Hill 861 and Hills 881 North and South dominate the two main
avenues of approach.[1] One of these, the western access, runs along
Route 9 from the Laotian border, through the village of Lang Vei to Khe
Sanh. The other is a small valley to the northwest, formed by the Rao
Quan River, which runs between Dong Tri Mountain and Hill 861. (See Map
3). Another key terrain feature is Hill 558 which is located squarely
in the center of the northwestern approach. The only stumbling block
to the NVA in early 1967 was a handful of Marines, U. S. Army Special
Forces advisors, and South Vietnamese irregulars.(6) (See Map 3).
The "Green Berets" were the first American troops in the area when,
in August 1962, they established a Civilian Irregular Defense Group
(CIDG) at the same site which later became the Khe Sanh Combat Base
(KSCB). The first Marine unit of any size to visit the area was the 1st
Battalion, 1st Marines (1/1) which, in April 1966, was participating
in Operation VIRGINIA. In early October 1966, the 1st Battalion, 3d
Marines, which was taking part in Operation PRAIRIE, moved into the
base and the CIDG camp was relocated near Lang Vei, 9,000 meters to
the southwest where it continued surveillance and counterinfiltration
operations. The battalion remained at Khe Sanh with no significant
contacts until February 1967 when it was replaced by a single company,
E/2/9.[2] In mid-March 1967, Company E became engaged in a heavy
action near Hill 861 and Company B, 1/9 moved in to reinforce. After a
successful conclusion of the operation, E/2/9 returned to Phu Bai, and
B/1/9 remained as the resident defense company.
[Illustration:
MAP 3 K.W. White
KHE SANH VALLEY]
The KSCB sat atop a plateau in the shadow of Dong Tri Mountain
and overlooked a tributary of the Quang Tri River. The base had a
small dirt airstrip, which had been surfaced by a U. S. Navy Mobile
Construction Battalion (Seabees) in the summer of 1966; the field could
accommodate helicopters and fixed-wing transport aircraft. Organic
artillery support was provided by Battery F, 2/12 (105mm), reinforced
by two 155mm howitzers and two 4.2-inch mortars. The Khe Sanh area
of operations was also within range of the 175mm guns of the U. S.
Army's 2d Battalion, 94th Artillery at Camp Carroll and the Rockpile.
In addition to B/1/9 and the CIDG, there was a Marine Combined Action
Company (CAC) and a Regional Forces company located in the village of
Khe Sanh, approximately 3,500 meters south of the base.[3]
All these units sat astride the northwest-southeast axis of Route 9
and had the mission of denying the NVA a year-round route into eastern
Quang Tri Province. The garrison at Khe Sanh and the adjacent outposts
commanded the approaches from the west which led to Dong Ha and Quang
Tri City. Had this strategic plateau not been in the hands of the
Americans, the North Vietnamese would have had an unobstructed invasion
route into the two northern provinces and could have outflanked the
Allied forces holding the line south of the DMZ. At that time, the
Americans did not possess the helicopter resources, troop strength, or
logistical bases in this northern area to adopt a completely mobile
type of defense. Therefore, the troops at the KSCB maintained a
relatively static defense with emphasis on patrolling, artillery and
air interdiction, and occasional reconnaissance in force operations to
stifle infiltration through the Khe Sanh Plateau. In the event a major
enemy threat developed, General Walt could rapidly reinforce the combat
base by air.(7)
On 20 April 1967, the combat assets at KSCB were passed to the
operational control of the 3d Marines which had just commenced
Operation PRAIRIE IV. The Khe Sanh area of operations was not included
as a part of PRAIRIE IV but was the responsibility of the 3d Marines
since that regiment was in the best position to oversee the base and
reinforce if the need arose. The need arose very soon.(8)
On 24 April 1967, a patrol from Company B, 1/9 became heavily engaged
with an enemy force of unknown size north of Hill 861 and in the
process prematurely triggered an elaborate North Vietnamese offensive
designed to overrun Khe Sanh. What later became known as the "Hill
Fights" had begun. In retrospect, it appears that the drive toward
Khe Sanh was but one prong of the enemy's winter-spring offensive,
the ultimate objective of which was the capture of Dong Ha, Quang
Tri City, and eventually, Hue-Phu Bai.[4] That portion of the enemy
plan which pertained to Khe Sanh involved the isolation of the base
by artillery attacks on the Marine fire support bases in the eastern
DMZ area (e.g., Camp Carroll, Con Thien, Gio Linh, etc.). These
were closely coordinated with attacks by fire on the logistical and
helicopter installations at Dong Ha and Phu Bai. Demolition teams cut
Route 9 between Khe Sanh and Cam Lo to prevent overland reinforcement
and, later, a secondary attack was launched against the camp at Lang
Vei, which was manned by Vietnamese CIDG personnel and U. S. Army
Special Forces advisors. Under cover of heavy fog and low overcast
which shrouded Khe Sanh for several weeks, the North Vietnamese moved
a regiment into the Hill 881/861 complex and constructed a maze of
heavily reinforced bunkers and gun positions from which they intended
to provide direct fire against the KSCB in support of their assault
troops. All of these efforts were ancillary to the main thrust--a
regimental-sized ground attack--from the =325C NVA Division= which
would sweep in from the west and seize the airfield.[5](9) (See Map 4).
The job of stopping the NVA was given to Colonel John P. Lanigan and
his 3d Marines. Although he probably did not know it when he arrived
at Khe Sanh, this assignment would not be unlike one which 22 years
before had earned him a Silver Star on Okinawa. Both involved pushing a
fanatical enemy force off a hill.
[Illustration:
MAP 4 K.W. White
THE ENEMY PLAN]
On 25 April, the lead elements of the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines,
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Gary Wilder, arrived at Khe Sanh. The
following day, 2/3, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Earl R. De Long,
which was taking part in Operation BEACON STAR east of Quang Tri City
was airlifted to the combat base. On the 27th, a fresh artillery
battery, B/1/12, arrived and reinforced F/2/12; by the end of the day,
the two units had been reorganized into an artillery group with one
battery in direct support of each battalion.(10)
Late in the afternoon of the 28th, the Marine infantrymen were ready to
drive the enemy from the hill masses. These hills formed a near-perfect
right triangle with Hill 881 North (N) at the apex and the other two
at the base. Hill 861 was the closest to the combat base, some 5,000
meters northwest of the airstrip. Hill 881 South (S) was approximately
3,000 meters west of 861 and 2,000 meters south of 881N.
The concept of operations entailed a two-battalion (2/3 and 3/3)
assault for which Hill 861 was designated Objective 1; Hill 881S was
Objective 2 and Hill 881N was Objective 3. From its position south of
Hill 861, 2/3 would assault and seize Objective 1 on 28 April. The 3d
Battalion would follow in trace of 2/3 and, after the first objective
was taken, 3/3 would wheel to the west, secure the terrain between
Hills 861 and 881S, then assault Objective 2 from a northeasterly
direction. Coordinated with the 3/3 attack, 2/3 would consolidate its
objective then move out toward Hill 881N to screen the right flank of
the 3d Battalion and reinforce if necessary. When Objectives 1 and 2
were secured, 3/3 would move to the northwest and support 2/3 while it
assaulted Objective 3. (See Map 5).
[Illustration:
MAP 5 K.W. White
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS DURING HILL FIGHTS]
[Illustration: Marines of Company G, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines inch
their way toward the summit of Hill 881N during the Hill fights. (USMC
Photo A189161)]
[Illustration: Close air support strikes of the 1st Marine Aircraft
Wing and massive artillery fires paved the way for infantry assaults.
(USMC Photo A421953)]
After extremely heavy preparatory artillery fires and massive air
strikes, the 3d Marines kicked off the attack. On the 28th, 2/3
assaulted and seized Hill 861 in the face of sporadic resistance. Most
of the enemy troops had been literally blown from their positions by
heavy close air support strikes of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. The
operation continued with a thrust against Hill 881S by 3/3. This area
was the scene of extremely bitter fighting for several days, because,
by this time, the NVA regiment which was originally slated for the
attack on the airfield had been thrown into the hill battles in a vain
effort to stop the Marines. After tons of artillery shells and aerial
bombs had been employed against the hill, Lieutenant Colonel Wilder's
battalion bulled its way to the summit and, on 2 May, secured the
objective. In the meantime, Lieutenant Colonel De Long's battalion
pushed along the ridgeline leading from Hill 861 to 881N. After
smashing a determined NVA counterattack on 3 May, the 2d Battalion
battered its way to the crest of Hill 881N and secured the final
objective on the afternoon of the 5th. The three hills belonged to the
Marines.(11)
The supporting arms had done a good job, for the top of each hill
looked like the surface of the moon. The color of the summit had
changed from a vivid green to a dull, ugly brown. All of the lush
vegetation had been blasted away, leaving in its place a mass of
churned-up dirt and splintered trees. Hundreds of craters dotted the
landscape serving as mute witnesses to the terrible pounding that
the enemy had taken. What the NVA learned during the operation was
something the Marine Corps had espoused for years--that bombs and
shells were cheaper than blood.
Thus, the "Hill Fights" ended and the first major attempt by the NVA
to take Khe Sanh was thwarted. All intelligence reports indicated
that the badly mauled =325C NVA Division= had pulled back to lick its
wounds, ending the immediate threat in western Quang Tri Province. With
the pressure relieved for the time being, General Walt began scaling
down his forces at Khe Sanh, because the next phase of the enemy's
winter/spring offensive involved a drive through the coastal plain
toward Dong Ha.
From 11-13 May, 1/26 moved into the combat base and the adjacent hills
to relieve the 3d Marines. By the evening of the 12th, 2/3 had been
airlifted to Dong Ha and one artillery battery, B/1/12, was pulled
out by convoy. The following day, 3/3 also returned to Dong Ha by
truck. In the meantime, Company A, 1/26, was helilifted to Hill 881S
while Company C took up positions on Hill 861. Company B, 1/26, and
a skeleton headquarters of the 26th Marines arrived and remained at
the base, as did a fresh artillery battery, A/1/13. At 1500 on 13
May, Colonel John J. Padley, Commanding Officer of the 26th Marines,
Forward, relieved Colonel Lanigan as the Senior Officer Present at Khe
Sanh.(12)
In his analysis of the operation, Colonel Lanigan reported that his
men had been engaged in a conventional infantry battle against a
well-trained, highly-disciplined, and well-entrenched enemy force.
In the past, the NVA had used phantom tactics when engaging U. S.
forces--not so at Khe Sanh. The maze of bunker complexes served as a
grim reminder of their determination to stay and fight. They openly
challenged the Americans to push them off the hills, and the 3d Marines
rose to the occasion. The fierce resistance was overcome by aggressive
infantry assaults in coordination with artillery and close air
support, which according to Colonel Lanigan was the most accurate and
devastating he had witnessed in three wars.
The Communists had anticipated a blood letting and they received
one. From 24 April through 12 May 1967, the NVA lost 940 confirmed
killed.[6] Even for the North Vietnamese, this was a massive defeat
which could not be easily absorbed. But the leaders in Hanoi were
committed to a course of action which traded human lives for strategic
expediency. Just like the monsoon rains, the enemy would come again.(13)
FOOTNOTES:
[1] The number indicates the height of the hill in meters.
[2] The designation E/2/9 stands for Company E, 2d Battalion, 9th
Marines. This type of designation will be used periodically for other
Marine units throughout the text.
[3] The Combined Action Program was designed to increase the ability
of the local Vietnamese militia units to defend their own villages.
These units, referred to as Popular Forces, were reinforced by groups
of Marines who lived, worked, and conducted operations with their
Vietnamese counterparts. A Combined Action Company was an organization
controlling several Marine squads which served with different Combined
Action Platoons. Combined Action Company Oscar (CACO) was the unit
operating in the Khe Sanh area. A Regional Forces company was comprised
of local South Vietnamese soldiers along with their American and ARVN
advisors who were under the operational control of the Vietnamese
Province Chief.
[4] The III MAF and enemy operations during the period of the NVA/VC
winter-spring offensive (1966-1967) will be the subject of a separate
monograph prepared by the Historical Branch.
[5] The diversionary attacks were all launched apparently on schedule.
On 27 and 28 April, the previously mentioned Marine fire support and
supply bases were hit by some 1,200 rocket, artillery, and mortar
rounds. Route 9 was cut in several places. The Special Forces Camp
at Lang Vei was attacked and severely mauled on 4 May. Only the main
effort was detected and subsequently thwarted.
[6] Marine losses were 155 killed and 425 wounded.