“In the internal intuition there is nothing permanent, for the
_Ego_ is but the consciousness of my thought.... From all this
it is evident that rational psychology has its origin in a mere
misunderstanding. The unity of consciousness, which lies at
the basis of the categories, is considered to be an intuition
of the subject as an object; and the category of substance is
applied to the intuition. But this unity is nothing more than
the unity in _thought_, by which no object is given; to which
therefore the category of substance cannot be applied.”[91]
Concerning the statement that Kant had believed in the non-evolutionary
origin of living beings, we quote from his essay on _The Different Races
of Men_, Chap. III, where Kant speaks of “the immediate causes of the
origin of these different races.” He says:
“The conditions (_Gründe_) which, inhering in the constitution
of an organic body, determine a certain evolutionary process
(_Auswickelung_[92]) are called, if this process is concerned
with particular parts, _germs_; if, on the other hand, it
touches only the size or the relation of the parts to one
another, I call it _natural capabilities_ (_natürliche
Anlagen_).”[93]
And in a foot-note Kant makes the following remark:
“Ordinarily we accept the terms natural science
(_Naturbeschreibung_) and natural history in one and the
same sense. But it is evident that the knowledge of natural
phenomena, as they _now are_, always leaves to be desired
the knowledge of that which they _have been_ before now and
through what succession of modifications they have passed in
order to have arrived, in every respect, to their present
state. _Natural History_, which at present we almost entirely
lack, would teach us the changes that have affected the form
of the earth, likewise, the changes in the creatures of the
earth (plants and animals), that they have suffered by natural
transformations and, arising therefrom, the departures from the
prototype of the original species, that they have experienced.
It would probably trace a great number of apparently different
varieties back to species of one and the same kind and would
convert the present so intricate school-system of Natural
Science into a natural system in conformity with reason.”[94]
Kant has nowhere, so far as we know, made any objection to the idea of
evolution. But he opposed the theory that all life should have originated
from _one single_ kind. In reviewing and epitomizing Joh. Gottfr.
Herder’s work, “_Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit_,” Kant says:
... “Book II, treats of organized matter on the earth.... The
beginnings of vegetation.... The changes suffered by man and
beast through climatic influences.... In them all we find one
prevailing form and a similar osseous structure.... These
transitional links render it not at all impossible that in
marine animals, in plants, and, indeed, possibly in so-called
inanimate substances, one and the same fundamental principle
of organization may prevail, although infinitely cruder and
more complex in operation. In the sight of eternal being, which
beholds all things in one connection, it is possible that the
structure of the ice-particle, while receiving form, and of
the snowflake, while being crystallized, bears an analogous
relation to the formation of the embryo in a mother’s womb....
The third book compares the structure of animals and plants
with the organization of man.... It was not because man was
ordained to be a rational creature that upright stature was
given him for using his limbs according to reason; on the
contrary he acquired his reason as a consequence of his upright
stature.... From stone to crystals, from crystals to metals,
from metals to plant-creation, from thence to the animal,
and ultimately to man, we have seen the form of organization
advancing, and with it the faculties and instincts of creatures
becoming more diversified, until at last they all became united
in the human form, in so far as the latter could comprise
them.... As the body increases by food, so does the mind by
ideas; indeed, we notice here the same laws of assimilation, of
growth, and of generation. In a word, an inner spiritual man is
being formed within us, which has a nature of its own and which
employs the body as an instrument merely.... Our humanity is
merely a preliminary training, the bud of a blossom to come.
Step by step does nature cast off the ignoble and the base,
while it builds and adds to the spiritual and continues to
fashion the pure and refined with increasing niceness; thus are
we in a position to hope from the artist-hand of nature that in
that other existence our bud of humanity will also appear in
its real and true form of divine manhood.” ...
[Herder’s idea of evolution would stand on the whole if his conception of
“the spiritual” did not imply a preternatural agent.]
“The present state of man is probably the link of junction
between two worlds.... Yet man is not to investigate himself in
this future state; he is to believe himself into it.”
Kant makes no objection whatever to the evolutionary ideas of Herder.
But Herder was not free from supernaturalism and from fantastic ideas
in reference to the future development of man. He had not yet dropped
the dualistic conception of the ‘duplicity’ of man and believed in the
immortality of a distinct spiritual individual within his body. Kant’s
objection, therefore, is two-fold; 1) against Herder’s supernaturalism
which leads him beyond this world; and, 2) against the descent of _all_
species from _one and the same genus_. He says:
“In the gradation between the different species and individuals
of a natural kingdom, nature shows us nothing else than the
fact that it abandons individuals to total destruction and
preserves the species alone.... As concerns that _invisible_
kingdom of active and independent forces, we fail to see why
the author, after having believed he could confidently infer
from organized beings, the existence of the rational principle
in man did not rather attribute this principle directly to
him merely as spiritual nature, instead of lifting it out of
chaos through the structural form of organised matter.... As
to the gradation of organized beings, our author is not to
be too severely reproached, if the scheme has not met the
requirements of his conception, which extends so far beyond
the limits of this world; for its application even to the
natural kingdoms here on earth leads to nothing. The slight
differences exhibited when species are compared with reference
to their common points of resemblance, are, where there is
such great multiplicity, a necessary consequence of just this
multiplicity. The assumption of common kinship between them,
inasmuch as one kind would have to spring from another and all
from one original and primitive species, or from one and the
same creative source (Mutterschoss)—the assumption of such
a common kinship would lead to ideas so strange that reason
shrinks from them, and we cannot attribute this idea to the
author without doing him injustice. Concerning his suggestions
in comparative anatomy through all species down to plants,
the workers in natural science must judge for themselves
whether the hints given for new observations, will be useful
and whether they are justified.... It is desirable that our
ingenious author who in the continuation of his work will find
more _terra firma_, may somewhat restrain his bright genius,
and that philosophy (which consists rather in pruning than in
fostering luxuriant growth) may lead him to the perfection of
his labors not through hints but through definite conceptions,
not by imagination but by observation, not by a metaphysical or
emotional phantasy but by reason, broad in its plan but careful
in its work.”
Kant rejected certain conceptions of evolution, but he did not at all
show himself averse to the idea in general. He touched upon the subject
only incidentally and it is certain that he did not especially favor or
entertain the belief in a non-evolutionary origin of living beings.
Before proceeding to the main points of his criticism, Mr. Spencer calls
attention to what he designates as Kant’s _abnormal_ reasoning. Mr.
Spencer says:
“Something must be said concerning abnormal reasoning as
compared with normal reasoning.” ...
“Instead of setting out with a proposition of which the
negation is inconceivable, it sets out with a proposition of
which the affirmation is inconceivable, and therefrom proceeds
to draw conclusions” ...
“The first sentence in Kant’s first chapter runs thus: ‘Nothing
can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it,
which can be called good without qualification, except a Good
Will.’” ...
“Most fallacies result from the habit of using words without
fully rendering them into thoughts—passing them by with
recognitions of their meanings as ordinarily used, without
stopping to consider whether these meanings admit of being
given to them in the cases named. Let us not rest satisfied
with thinking vaguely of what is understood by ‘a Good Will,’
but let us interpret the words definitely. Will implies the
consciousness of some end to be achieved. Exclude from it every
idea of purpose, and the conception of Will disappears. An
end of some kind being necessarily implied by the conception
of Will, the quality of the Will is determined by the quality
of the end contemplated. Will itself, considered apart from
any distinguishing epithet, is not cognizable by Morality at
all. It becomes cognizable by Morality only when it gains its
character as good or bad by virtue of its contemplated end as
good or bad.” ...
“Kant tells us that a good will is one that is good in and for
itself without reference to ends.”
It is unfortunate that Mr. Spencer misunderstood the first sentence of
Kant’s book (_Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten_). Kant does not
speak of “a good will without qualification,” nor does the expression
“without qualification” refer to “a will without reference to ends.” Kant
speaks of good will in opposition to other good things. Nothing, he
says, can without qualification (_ohne Einschränkung_) be called good,
except a good will.[95] Dr. Porter sums up the first page of Kant’s essay
in the following words:
“The first section of the treatise opens with the memorable
and often-quoted utterance, that ‘nothing can be possibly
conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called
good without qualification, except a good will.’ If character
is compared with gifts of nature, as intelligence, courage,
and gifts of fortune, as riches, health, or contentment, all
these are defective, ‘if there is not a good will to correct
their possible perversion and to rectify the whole principle of
acting, and _adapt it to its end_.’[96] A man who is endowed
with every other good can never give pleasure to an impartial,
rational spectator unless he possesses a good will. ‘Thus a
good will appears to constitute the indispensable condition of
being worthy of happiness.’ ... ‘Moreover, a good will is good
not for what it effects but for what it intends, even when it
fails to accomplish its purposes, ... as when the man wills
the good of another and is impotent to promote it, or actually
effects just the opposite of what he proposes or wills.’”
In the passages quoted by Dr. Porter, Kant speaks of “the _end_ to which
good will adapts other goods”; and in another passage of the same book,
Kant directly declares that “it is the _end_ that serves the will as
the objective ground of its self-determination.” Mr. Spencer must have
overlooked these sentences. Kant says:
“The will is conceived as a power of determining itself to
action in accordance with the conception of certain laws. And
such a power can only be met with in rational beings. _Now it
is the END that serves the will as the objective ground of its
self-determination_, and this end, if fixed by reason alone,
must hold equally good for all rational creatures.”
* * * * *
Mr. Spencer interrupts his essay on the Ethics of Kant by a digression
on Kant’s conception of time and space. It would lead us too far at
present if we would follow Mr. Spencer on this ground also. A comparison
of Spencer’s remarks on the subject with Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason”
will show that Kant’s view of space and time is radically different from
that view which Mr. Spencer represents as the Kantian conception of time
and space.
* * * * *
Kant rejects the idea that happiness is the end and purpose of life
and at the same time he declares that ethics must be based not on the
pursuit of happiness but on the categorical imperative or more popularly
expressed on our sense of duty.
Mr. Spencer argues:
“One of the propositions contained in Kant’s first chapter is
that ‘we find that the more a cultivated reason applies itself
with deliberate purpose to the enjoyment of life and happiness,
so much the more does the man fail of true satisfaction.’” ...
“That which Kant should have said is that the _exclusive_
pursuit of what are distinguished as pleasures and amusements
is disappointing.” ...
“It is not, as Kant says, guidance by ‘a cultivated reason,’
which leads to disappointment, but guidance by an uncultivated
reason.”
The passage quoted by Mr. Spencer from Kant, reads in its context as
follows:
“In the physical constitution of an organized being we take it
for granted[97] that no organ for any purpose will be found
in it but such as is also the fittest and best adapted for
that purpose. If in a being possessing reason and will, the
preservation, the prosperity, in a word, the happiness of that
being, constituted the actual purpose of nature, nature had
certainly adopted an extremely unwise expedient to this end,
had it made the reason of that being the executive agent of its
purposes in this matter. For all actions that it had to perform
with this end in view, and the whole rule of its conduct, would
have been far more exactly prescribed by _instinct_, and this
end would have been far more safely attained by this means than
can ever take place through the instrumentality of _reason_.”
...
“As a matter of fact we find that the more a cultivated
reason occupies itself with the purpose of enjoying life and
happiness, the farther does the person possessing it recede
from the state of true contentment; and hence there arises in
the case of many, and pre-eminently in the case of those most
experienced in the exercise of reason, if they are only frank
enough to confess it, a certain degree of misology or hate of
reason; for after weighing every advantage that they derive,
I will not say from the invention of all arts facilitating
ordinary luxury, but even from the sciences, (which after
all are in their eyes a luxury of the intellect,) they still
discover that virtually they have burdened themselves more with
toil and trouble than they have gained in point of happiness,
and thus, in the end, they are more apt to envy than contemn
the commoner type of men who are more immediately subject to
the guidance of natural instinct alone, and who do not suffer
their reason to influence in any great degree their acts and
omissions.”
Kant uses the expression “cultivated reason” not in opposition to
“uncultivated reason,” but to “instinct” as that inherited faculty
which teaches a being to live in accordance with nature and its natural
conditions, without the interference of thought and reflection.
That uncultivated reason would lead to disappointment, Kant never would
have denied. He would have added: “It does more, it leads to a speedy
ruin.”
But if reason does not produce happiness, what then is the use of reason?
Kant answers, reason produces in man the good will.
It is reason which enables man to form abstractions, to think in
generalizations and to conceive the import of universal laws. When his
will deliberately and consciously conforms to universal laws, it is good.
Kant says:
“Thus will (viz. the good will) can not be the sole and whole
Good, but it must still be the highest Good and the condition
necessary to everything else, even to all desire of happiness.”
...
“To know what I have to do in order that my volition be good,
requires on my part no far-reaching sagacity. Unexperienced
in respect of the course of nature, unable to be prepared for
all the occurrences transpiring therein, I simply ask myself:
Can’st thou so will, that the maxim of thy conduct may become a
universal law? Where it can not become a universal law, there
the maxim of thy conduct is reprehensible, and that, too, not
by reason of any disadvantage consequent thereupon to thee or
even others, but because it is not fit to enter as a principle
into a possible enactment of universal laws.”
If a maxim of conduct is fit to enter as a principle into a possible
enactment of universal laws, it will be found in harmony with the
cosmical laws; if not, it must come in conflict with the order of things
in the universe. It then cannot stand, and will, if persistently adhered
to, lead (perhaps slowly but inevitably) to certain ruin.
Concerning the proposition that happiness may be regarded as the purpose
of life Kant in his review of Herder’s “Ideen zur Philosophie der
Geschichte der Menschheit” (Ed. H. IV, p. 190), speaks of the relativity
of happiness and its insufficiency as a final aim of life:
... “First of all the happiness of an animal, then that of a
child and of a youth, and lastly that of man! In all epochs
of human history, as well as among all classes and conditions
of the same epoch, that happiness has obtained which was in
exact conformity with the individual’s ideas and the degree
of his habituation to the conditions amid which he was
born and raised. Indeed, it is not even possible to form a
comparison of the degree of happiness nor to give precedence
to one class of men or to one generation over another....
If this shadow-picture of happiness ... were the actual aim
of Providence, every man would have the measure of his own
happiness within him.... Does the author (Herder) think perhaps
that, if the happy inhabitants of Otaheite had never been
visited by more civilized peoples and were ordained to live
in peaceful indolence for thousands of years to come—that we
could give a satisfactory answer to the question why they
should exist at all and whether it would not have been just as
well that this island should be occupied by happy sheep and
cattle as that it should be inhabited by men who are happy only
through pure enjoyment?”
Concerning the mission or purpose of humanity and its ultimate
realization, Kant interprets Herder’s views as follows:
“It involves no contradiction to say that no individual
member of all the offspring of the human race, but that
only the species, fully attains its mission (Bestimmung).
The mathematician may explain the matter in his way. The
philosopher would say: the mission of the human race as a whole
is _unceasing progress_, and the perfection (Vollendung) of
this mission is a mere idea (although in every aspect a quite
useful one) of the aim towards which, in conformity with the
design of providence, we are to direct our endeavors.”
We learn from the passages quoted from Kant that his idea of good will is
neither mystical and supernatural, nor is it vague. It is a conception
as logically and definitely defined as any mathematical definition.
Good will in the sense in which Kant defines it, is only possible in
a reasonable being by the power of its reason. The good will is the
intention of conforming to universal principles and thus of being in
harmony with the All. This good will is the corner-stone of Kant’s
ethics; it appears as the categoric imperative of duty, so to act that
the maxim of one’s conduct may be fit to become a universal law. It is
formulated in another passage: “Act so as if the maxim of thy conduct by
thy volition were to become a natural law.”
It is easily seen that, in Kant’s conception, the _ought_ of morals (viz.
of the categoric imperative) does not stand in contradiction to the
_must_ of natural laws. Kant’s conception is monistic, not dualistic.
Kant says:
“The moral _ought_ is man’s _inner_, _necessary_ volition as
being a member of an intelligible world and is _conceived_ by
him as an ought only in so far as he considers himself also as
a member of the sensory world.”[98]
Our way of explaining it would be: Man _feels_ in his activity the
categoric imperative as an ought. So the snow crystal, if it were
possessed of sensation, would _feel_ its formation as an “ought.” But
both are, and to an outside observer will appear, as a “must.”
* * * * *
In the Spencerian system of ethics, which is utilitarianism, the moral
maxim or the idea of duty is not distinguished from the feeling of
pleasure or pain that accompanies ethical thoughts and acts, and their
consequences. This lack of distinction induces Mr. Spencer to consider
man’s pursuit of happiness as the basis of ethics. Accordingly the
aim of ethics, he maintains, is not the performance of duty, not the
realization of the good; to the utilitarian this is only the means. The
end of ethics is the greatest happiness of the greatest number.
It is strange that Mr. Spencer’s essay contains a passage which, although
intended as a point of objection to Kant, is a corroboration of Kant’s
ethics, and a refutation of Mr. Spencer’s own views. While denying the
statement that “a cultivated reason, if applied with deliberate purpose
to the enjoyment of life and happiness, will fail to produce true
satisfaction,” Mr. Spencer says:
“I assert that it is untrue on the strength of personal
experiences. In the course of my life there have occurred
many intervals, averaging a month each, in which the pursuit
of happiness was the sole object, and in which happiness was
successfully pursued. How successfully may be judged from the
fact that I would gladly live over again each of those periods
without change, an assertion which I certainly cannot make of
any portions of my life spent in the daily discharge of duties.”
This statement, if it proves anything, proves that happiness is one thing
and duty is another; it proves that Kant’s theory of ethics, which is
based on the discharge of duty and not on the pursuit of happiness, is
correct, and that Mr. Spencer’s theory which identifies duty with the
pursuit of happiness, is wrong.
However, we must in this place express our opinion that Mr. Spencer’s
statement _cannot_ be quite correct. The discharge of duty, unpleasant
though the drudgery part of it may have been, was undoubtedly accompanied
and followed by a certain satisfaction, which perhaps was less in
quantity, but certainly higher in quality than the pleasure derived from
the mere pursuit of happiness. And in the valuation of the intrinsic
and of the moral worth of pleasures, the quality alone should be taken
into consideration, not the quantity. In this sense only can an ethical
hedonism or utilitarianism be acceptable. The man whose pleasures and
pains are of a higher kind, of a nobler form, and of a better quality, is
morally and generally the more evolved man. And then, the basis of ethics
would be, not so much pleasure or happiness as the quality of pleasure or
happiness; it would be an aspiration to evolve toward a higher plane of
life, to shape our lives in nobler forms, and to enjoy nobler, greater,
and more spiritual pleasures, or, as Kant says, “unceasing progress.”
Mr. Spencer’s assertion, if taken in the sense in which it stands, is a
contradiction of his ethical theory. But even if Mr. Spencer had declared
that the discharge of duty affords a kind of happiness or satisfaction,
as it truly does, there would still remain a deep gap between his and
Kant’s ethics. Mr. Spencer reduces ethics to mere worldly prudence; he
says that we must do the good in order to be happy, and for the sake of
its utility, and Kant says we must act so as to be in agreement with
universal law. Mr. Spencer says:
“But now, supposing we accept Kant’s statement in full, what
is its implication? That happiness is the thing to be desired,
and, in one way or another, the thing to be achieved.” ...
“An illustration will best show how the matter stands. To
a tyro in archery the instructor says: ‘Sir, you must not
point your arrow directly at the target; if you do, you will
inevitably miss it; you must aim high above the target, and you
may then possibly pierce the bull’s-eye.’ What now is implied
by the warning and the advice? Clearly that the purpose is
to hit the target. Otherwise there is no sense in the remark
that it will be missed if directly aimed at; and no sense in
the remark that to be hit, something higher must be aimed at.
Similarly with happiness. There is no sense in the remark that
happiness will not be found if it is directly sought, unless
happiness is a thing to be somehow or other obtained.” ...
“So that in this professed repudiation of happiness as an end,
there lies the inavoidable implication that it _is_ the end.”
The pursuit of happiness is by no means repudiated by Kant as wrong or
immoral; it is only maintained to be insufficient as a foundation of
ethics. Kant’s remark that happiness will not be found if it is directly
sought has no reference to his own ethics. Kant, speaking from the
standpoint of one who takes the view of utilitarianism, says that if a
cultivated reason applies itself to the sole purpose of enjoying life and
happiness, it will meet with a failure.[99]
Any other explanation of the moral _ought_ than that from the Good Will,
Kant declares to be _heteronomy_. Will would no longer be itself, and the
principle of action would lie in something foreign to the will. Kant says:
“Will in such a case would not be a law to itself; but the
object by its relation to the will would impose the law upon
the will.... This would admit of hypothetical imperatives
only: ‘I ought to do a certain thing, because I want something
else.’ The moral and therefore categorical imperative, on the
contrary, says: ‘I ought to act so or so, even if I had nothing
else in view.’ For instance: the hypothetical imperative
of heteronomy says: ‘I ought not to lie, if I ever wish to
preserve my honor.’ The categorical imperative says: ‘I ought
not to lie even if it would not in the least bring me to
shame.’”
Mr. Spencer quotes the following passage from Kant:
“I omit here all actions which are already recognized as
inconsistent with duty, although they may be useful for this
or that purpose, for with these the question whether they are
done _from duty_ can not arise at all, since they even conflict
with it. I also set aside those actions which really conform
to duty, but to which men have _no_ direct _inclination_,
performing them because they are impelled thereto by some
other inclination. For in this case we can readily distinguish
whether the action which agrees with duty is done _from
duty_, or from a selfish view. It is much harder to make this
distinction when the action accords with duty, and the subject
has besides a _direct_ inclination to it. For example, it is
always a matter of duty that a dealer should not overcharge an
inexperienced purchaser, and wherever there is much commerce
the prudent tradesman does not overcharge, but keeps a fixed
price for every one, so that a child buys of him as well as any
other. Men are thus _honestly_ served; but this is not enough
to make us believe that the tradesman has so acted from duty
and from principles of honesty: his own advantage required it;
it is out of the question in this case to suppose that he might
besides have a direct inclination in favor of the buyers, so
that, as it were, from love he should give no advantage to one
over another[!]. Accordingly the action was done neither from
duty nor from direct inclination, but merely with a selfish
view.
“On the other hand, it is a duty to maintain one’s life, and,
in addition, every one has also a direct inclination to do
so. But on this account the often anxious care which most men
take for it has no intrinsic worth, and their maxim has no
moral import. They preserve their life _as duty requires_, no
doubt, but not _because duty requires_. On the other hand,
if adversity and hopeless sorrow have completely taken away
the relish for life; if the unfortunate one, strong in mind,
indignant at his fate rather than desponding or dejected,
wishes for death, and yet preserves his life without loving
it—not from inclination or fear, but from duty—then his maxim
has a moral worth.
“To be beneficent when we can is a duty; and besides this,
there are many minds so sympathetically constituted that
without any other motive of vanity or self-interest, they find
a pleasure in spreading joy around them, and can take delight
in the satisfaction of others so far as it is their own work.
But I maintain that in such a case an action of this kind,
however proper, however amiable it may be, has nevertheless no
true moral worth, but is on a level with other inclinations.”
(pp. 17-19)
Kant’s metaphysics of ethics is to practical ethics what pure mathematics
is to applied mathematics, or what logic is to grammar. Kant’s method of
reasoning _in abstracto_ everywhere shows the mathematical bent of his
mind. In a foot-note (Editio Hartenstein, IV), p. 258, he says:
“As pure mathematics is distinguished from applied mathematics
and pure logic from applied logic, so may the pure philosophy
(the metaphysics) of ethics be distinguished from the applied
philosophy of ethics, that is, as applied to human nature.
By this distinction of terms it at once appears that ethical
principles are not based upon the peculiarities of human
nature but that they must be existent by themselves _a
priori_,—whence, for human nature, just as well as for _any_
rational nature, practical rules can be derived.”
Schleiermacher says:
“A good is any agreement (“unity”) of definite sides [certain
aspects] of reason and nature.... The end of ethical praxis
is the highest good, _i. e._, the sum of all unions of nature
and reason.... The moral law may be compared to the algebraic
formula which (in analytical geometry) determines the course
[path] of a curve; the highest good may be compared to the
curve itself, and virtue, or moral power, to an instrument
arranged for the purpose of constructing the curve according to
the formula.” (Quoted from a translation of Ueberweg.)
Kant declares in other passages that in examples taken from practical
life, it will be difficult to separate clearly and unmistakably the
sense of duty as the real moral motive from other motives, inclinations,
habits, etc. But such a distinction must be made, if the moral value of
motives is to be considered _in abstracto_. This is necessary for a clear
conception of the essential features of morality. Mr. Spencer has on
other occasions highly praised the power of generalization, which indeed
is fundamentally the same faculty, as thinking _in abstracto_; here,
however, he does not follow Kant’s argument, but declares “that the
assumed distinction between sense of duty and inclination is untenable.”
He says:
“The very expression _sense_ of duty implies that the mental
state signified is a feeling; and if a feeling it must,
like other feelings, be gratified by acts of one kind and
offended by acts of an opposite kind. If we take the name
conscience, which is equivalent to sense of duty, we see the
same thing. The common expressions ‘a tender conscience,’ ‘a
seared conscience,’ indicate the perception that conscience
is a feeling—a feeling which has its satisfactions and
dissatisfactions, and which _inclines_ a man to acts which
yield the one and avoid the other—produces an _inclination_,”
(p. 476).
It is quite true that every state of consciousness is a feeling, but
we can and must discriminate between consciousness or feeling and the
idea or thought which becomes conscious, in which the feeling appears,
and which is, so to speak, the special form of a certain feeling. The
consciousness and its special form, the feeling and the mental object
of feeling, are in reality one and the same. Yet they are different and
must _in abstracto_ be well distinguished. Mr. Spencer’s method is that
of generalization, but generalizing can lead to no satisfactory results,
if it is not constantly accompanied by discrimination. We must generalize
and discriminate.
If a certain group of states of consciousness takes the form of a
logical syllogism, it must not be expected that logic will find its
explanation in feeling, although it cannot be denied that all the
states of consciousness are feelings. Not the feeling in this case is
to be explained, but logic. In our generalizations we must discriminate
_in abstracto_ between the feeling and the idea which feels. We must
positively abstract from feeling and cannot consider whether the feeling
of logical arguments is pleasant or unpleasant. Mr. Spencer’s method
of explaining ethics, if applied to logic, would be as follows: “Man’s
logical sense is a very complex feeling and has developed from simple
percepts such as can be observed in the lowest animals; percepts are
a higher evolved form of reactions against irritations such as take
place in protoplasm. The old method of explaining logic is that of
deduction, modern logic will be inductive. Formerly pure logic was
considered as a science _a priori_; but the evolution-philosophy shows
that logic is developed by steps, it appears _a priori_ to the individual
now, but it is in reality a consolidated product of multitudinous
experiences received mainly by ancestors and added to by self. Logical
sense accordingly finds its explanation in most simple feelings. Our
conceptions of logically incorrect feelings will be more and more
avoided because they will ultimately be found to be unpleasant; logical
correctness is striven for because of the feeling of satisfaction that
accompanies the conception of a logically correct conclusion.”
Sense is feeling, there can be no doubt. Logical sense and mathematical
sense are feelings and if a person thinks a mathematical axiom or a
logical syllogism or an ethical maxim, he has a feeling. Logical sense
of reason is the product of evolution, and it cannot be denied either
that one man has a more logical or mathematical or moral sense than
another. But it does not follow that an explanation of mathematics, or
logic, or ethics, must be derived from feeling pleasure and pain, or
happiness. On the contrary we must abstract from feeling altogether and
concern ourselves with the object of feeling only, which is the idea
or the special form in which and as which feeling appears. States of
consciousness (never mind whether they are painful or pleasurable) must
be considered as moral if their mental object, _i. e._, the idea, the
thought, the motive, the form in which feeling becomes manifest, is in
harmony with the universal order of things.
* * * * *
Mr. Spencer declares that the world would be intolerable “if Kant’s
conception of moral worth were displayed universally in men’s acts.”
And it must be acknowledged that Kant’s ethics in their logical and
irrefutable rigidity not only impressed the literary world of his time
with the grandeur and sublimity of ethics; Kant’s ethics also astounded,
and overwhelmed his readers with awe. Virtue no longer appeared to be the
fervid enthusiasm of sentiments; it congealed into the cold idea of duty
which can be fixed in abstract rules and will operate like the correctly
calculated gear of a machine. Objections have been raised by some of
Kant’s own disciples; but it must be known that the Kantian view of
ethics does not suppress feelings, emotions and inclinations, it excludes
them only from an estimation of the moral worth of actions. Kant gave the
_coup de grace_ to all sentimentality which had taken the lead in ethical
questions too long. Mr. Spencer says:
“If those acts only have moral worth which are done from a
sense of duty ... we must say that a man’s moral worth is
greater in proportion as the strength of his sense of duty
is such that he does the right thing not only apart from
inclination but against inclination. According to Kant,
then, the most moral man is the man ... who says of another
that which is true though he would like to injure him by a
falsehood; who lends money to his brother though he would
prefer to see him in distress.”
Schiller, although an admirer of Kant, makes in his Xenions a similar
objection to this corollary of the ethics of pure reason. He says:
“Willingly serve I my friends; but ’tis pity, I do it with pleasure.
And I am really vexed, that there’s no virtue in me!”
And he answers in a second distich:
“There is no other advice than that you try to despise friends,
And, with disgust, you will do what such a duty demands.”
The difficulty is removed under the following consideration: A man with
good inclinations is less exposed to temptation than a man with bad
inclinations. If both act morally under conditions otherwise the same,
the latter has shown greater strength of moral purpose than the former.
The former’s character (viz., his inherited inclinations and habits which
represent the sum total of the moral energies of his ancestors,) is more
moral than that of the latter. But the latter deserves more credit than
the former for overcoming the temptation; he has in this special act
shown more moral strength of will than his more fortunate and morally
higher advanced fellow-man. To those who have accepted the Kantian view,
Mr. Spencer’s and Schiller’s objection can serve as a warning, not to
lose sight of emotions altogether. Man is not only a reasonable being, he
is at the same time a feeling creature. The instinctive faculties of man,
the so-called subconscious states, are the basis of his consciousness.
They form the roots of his soul from which spring the clear conceptions
of his reason. The more man’s habits and inclinations agree with morals,
the more strength of purpose is left for further ethical advancement and
moral progress.
Similar objections have also been made to Kant’s mechanical explanation
of the origin of the planetary systems and milky ways. It seemed as if
the divinity of nature were replaced by the rigid law of gravity. In his
poem “The God’s of Greece,” Schiller complains:
“Fühllos selbst für ihres Künstlers Ehre,
Gleich dem todten Schlag der Pendeluhr,
Dient sie knechtisch dem Gesetz der Schwere,
Die entgötterte Natur.”
“Dead even to her Master’s praise,
Like lifeless pendulum’s vibration,
Lo, godless Nature now obeys,
Slave-like, the law of gravitation.”[100]
Such objections are always raised when a scientific explanation destroys
the mystic view that a spirit or at least something unexplainable is
the supposed cause of certain phenomena. Our sentiments are so closely
connected and intimately interwoven with our errors that truth appears
hostile to sentiment, and it becomes difficult to part with errors
sanctified by emotion. Sentimentality always complains that clear thought
is an enemy of romanticism, and romanticism is the only possible poetry
to the taste of the sentimental.
Now it cannot be denied that a one-sided knowledge not only appears
rigid, it truly _is_ so, and will be destructive of such emotions as
reverence, awe, æsthetic taste, religion and art. Criticism is a most
essential feature of science and philosophy, and how negative, how
desolate and melancholy appear the results of criticism! But the pruning
process of criticism is very wholesome, and true science will only profit
by discarding the vagueness of indistinct conceptions. Alpine lakes that
are really deep can only gain by lucidity. Thus the clearness of genuine
science and broad philosophy will only show the depth of truth into which
by all its lucidity our emotions can plunge without ever finding it
shallow or fathoming it in all its profundity.
Kant’s doctrine of ethics is a truth that can stand the severest test.
Ethics, in the sense of the word as used by Kant, can be found in
man only, in so far as he is a reasonable being. A truly reasonable
being does not allow himself to be guided by impulses but is led by
maxims. Inclinations and habits are remnants of instinct. Not he who
in instinctive good-naturedness acts morally, is the ethical man, but
he who deliberately and consciously considers himself a representative
of the general order of things. The man, who adopts such maxims as can
become universal principles, identifies his will with the laws of the
universe. Man’s moral dignity must not be sought in vague feelings or in
instinctive inspirations; it is based upon his reason and is developed in
so far only as he makes use of his reason.