Part 1.
"He that uttereth slander is a fool."--Prov. x. 18.
General declamations against vice and sin are indeed excellently
useful, as rousing men to consider and look about them: but they do
often want effect, because they only raise confused apprehensions of
things, and indeterminate propensions to action; which usually,
before men thoroughly perceive or resolve what they should practise,
do decay and vanish. As he that cries out "Fire!" doth stir up
people, and inspireth them with a kind of hovering tendency every
way, yet no man thence to purpose moveth until he be distinctly
informed where the mischief is; then do they, who apprehend
themselves concerned, run hastily to oppose it: so, till we
particularly discern where our offences lie (till we distinctly know
the heinous nature and the mischievous consequences of them), we
scarce will effectually apply ourselves to correct them. Whence it
is requisite that men should be particularly acquainted with their
sins, and by proper arguments be dissuaded from them.
In order whereto I have now selected one sin to describe, and
dissuade from, being in nature as vile, and in practice as common,
as any other whatever that hath prevailed among men. It is slander,
a sin which in all times and places hath been epidemical and rife;
but which especially doth seem to reign and rage in our age and
country.
There are principles innate to men, which ever have, and ever will
incline them to this offence. Eager appetites to secular and
sensual goods; violent passions, urging the prosecution of what men
affect; wrath and displeasure against those who stand in the way of
compassing their desires; emulation and envy towards those who
happen to succeed better, or to attain a greater share in such
things; excessive self-love; unaccountable malignity and vanity, are
in some degrees connatural to all men, and ever prompt them to this
dealing, as appearing the most efficacious, compendious, and easy
way of satisfying such appetites, of promoting such designs, of
discharging such passions. Slander thence hath always been a
principal engine whereby covetous, ambitious, envious, ill-natured,
and vain persons have striven to supplant their competitors, and
advance themselves; meaning thereby to procure, what they chiefly
prize and like, wealth, or dignity, or reputation, favour and power
in the court, respect and interest with the people.
But from especial causes our age peculiarly doth abound in this
practice; for, besides the common dispositions inclining thereto,
there are conceits newly coined, and greedily entertained by many,
which seem purposely levelled at the disparagement of piety,
charity, and justice, substituting interest in the room of
conscience, authorising and commending for good and wise, all ways
serving to private advantage. There are implacable dissensions,
fierce animosities, and bitter zeals sprung up; there is an extreme
curiosity, niceness, and delicacy of judgment: there is a mighty
affectation of seeming wise and witty by any means; there is a great
unsettlement of mind, and corruption of manners, generally diffused
over people: from which sources it is no wonder that this flood
hath so overflown, that no banks can restrain it, no fences are able
to resist it; so that ordinary conversation is full of it, and no
demeanour can be secure from it.
If we do mark what is done in many (might I not say, in most?)
companies, what is it but one telling malicious stories of, or
fastening odious characters upon another? What do men commonly
please themselves in so much, as in carping and harshly censuring,
in defaming and abusing their neighbours? Is it not the sport and
divertisement of many, to cast dirt in the faces of all they meet
with; to bespatter any man with foul imputations? Doth not in every
corner a Momus lurk, from the venom of whose spiteful or petulant
tongue no eminency of rank, dignity of place, or sacredness of
office, no innocence or integrity of life, no wisdom or
circumspection in behaviour, no good-nature or benignity in dealing
and carriage, can protect any person? Do not men assume to
themselves a liberty of telling romances, and framing characters
concerning their neighbour, as freely as a poet doth about Hector or
Turnus, Thersites or Draucus? Do they not usurp a power of playing
with, or tossing about, of tearing in pieces their neighbour's good
name, as if it were the veriest toy in the world? Do not many
having a form of godliness (some of them, demurely, others
confidently, both without any sense of, or remorse for what they do)
backbite their brethren? Is it not grown so common a thing to
asperse causelessly that no man wonders at it, that few dislike,
that scarce any detest it? that most notorious calumniators are
heard, not only with patience, but with pleasure; yea, are even held
in vogue and reverence as men of a notable talent, and very
serviceable to their party? so that slander seemeth to have lost its
nature, and not to be now an odious sin, but a fashionable humour, a
way of pleasing entertainment, a fine knack, or curious feat of
policy; so that no man at least taketh himself or others to be
accountable for what is said in this way? Is not, in fine, the case
become such, that whoever hath in him any love of truth, any sense
of justice or honesty, any spark of charity towards his brethren,
shall hardly be able to satisfy himself in the conversations he
meeteth; but will be tempted, with the holy prophet, to wish himself
sequestered from society, and cast into solitude; repeating those
words of his, "Oh, that I had in the wilderness a lodging-place of
wayfaring men, that I might leave my people, and go from them: for
they are . . . . an assembly of treacherous men, and they bend their
tongues like their bow for lies"? This he wished in an age so
resembling ours, that I fear the description with equal patness may
suit both: "Take ye heed" (said he then, and may we not advise the
like now?) "every one of his neighbour, and trust ye not in any
brother: for every brother will utterly supplant, and every
neighbour will walk with slanders. They will deceive every one his
neighbour, and will not speak the truth; they have taught their
tongue to speak lies, and weary themselves to commit iniquity."
Such being the state of things, obvious to experience, no discourse
may seem more needful, or more useful, than that which serveth to
correct or check this practice: which I shall endeavour to do (1)
by describing the nature, (2) by declaring the folly of it: or
showing it to be very true which the wise man here asserteth, "He
that uttereth slander is a fool." Which particulars I hope so to
prosecute, that any man shall be able easily to discern, and ready
heartily to detest this practice.
I. For explication of its nature, we may describe slander to be the
uttering false (or equivalent to false, morally false) speech
against our neighbour, in prejudice to his fame, his safety, his
welfare, or concernment in any kind, out of malignity, vanity,
rashness, ill-nature, or bad design. That which is in Holy
Scripture forbidden and reproved under several names and notions:
of bearing false witness, false accusation, railing censure,
sycophantry, tale-bearing, whispering, backbiting, supplanting,
taking up reproach: which terms some of them do signify the nature,
others denote the special kinds, others imply the manners, others
suggest the ends of this practice. But it seemeth most fully
intelligible by observing the several kinds and degrees thereof; as
also by reflecting on the divers ways and manners of practising it.
The principal kinds thereof I observe to be these:
1. The grossest kind of slander is that which in the Decalogue is
called, bearing false testimony against our neighbour; that is,
flatly charging him with facts which he never committed, and is
nowise guilty of. As in the case of Naboth, when men were suborned
to say, "Naboth did blaspheme God and the king:" and as was David's
case, when he thus complained, "False witnesses did rise up, they
laid to my charge things that I knew not of." This kind in the
highest way (that is, in judicial proceedings) is more rare; and of
all men, they who are detected to practise it, are held most vile
and infamous; as being plainly the most pernicious and perilous
instruments of injustice, the most desperate enemies of all men's
right and safety that can be. But also out of the court there are
many knights-errant of the post, whose business it is to run about
scattering false reports; sometimes loudly proclaiming them in open
companies, sometimes closely whispering them in dark corners; thus
infecting conversation with their poisonous breath: these no less
notoriously are guilty of this kind, as bearing always the same
malice, and sometimes breeding as ill effects.
2. Another kind is, affixing scandalous names, injurious epithets,
and odious characters upon persons, which they deserve not. As when
Corah and his accomplices did accuse Moses of being ambitious,
unjust, and tyrannical: when the Pharisees called our Lord an
impostor, a blasphemer, a sorcerer, a glutton and wine-bibber, an
incendiary and perverter of the people, one that spake against
Caesar, and forbade to give tribute: when the apostles were charged
with being pestilent, turbulent, factious and seditious fellows.
This sort being very common, and thence in ordinary repute not so
bad, yet in just estimation may be judged, even worse than the
former; as doing to our neighbour more heavy and more irreparable
wrong. For it imposeth on him really more blame, and that such
which he can hardly shake off: because the charge signifieth habit
of evil, and includeth many acts; then, being general and
indefinite, can scarce be disproved. He, for instance, that calleth
a sober man drunkard, doth impute to him many acts of such
intemperance (some really past, others probably future), and no
particular time or place being specified, how can a man clear
himself of that imputation, especially with those who are not
thoroughly acquainted with his conversation? So he that calleth a
man unjust, proud, perverse, hypocritical, doth load him with most
grievous faults, which it is not possible that the most innocent
person should discharge himself from.
3. Like to that kind is this: aspersing a man's actions with harsh
censures and foul terms, importing that they proceed from ill
principles, or tend to bad ends; so as it doth not or cannot appear.
Thus when we say of him that is generously hospitable, that he is
profuse; of him that is prudently frugal, that he is niggardly; of
him that is cheerful and free in his conversation, that he is vain
or loose; of him that is serious and resolute in a good way, that he
is sullen or morose; of him that is conspicuous and brisk in
virtuous practice, that it is ambition or ostentation which prompts
him; of him that is close and bashful in the like good way, that it
is sneaking stupidity, or want of spirit; of him that is reserved,
that it is craft; of him that is open, that it is simplicity in him;
when we ascribe a man's liberality and charity to vainglory, or
popularity; his strictness of life, and constancy, in devotion, to
superstition, or hypocrisy. When, I say, we pass such censures, or
impose such characters on the laudable or innocent practice of our
neighbours, we are indeed slanderers, imitating therein the great
calumniator, who thus did slander even God Himself, imputing His
prohibition of the fruit unto envy towards men; "God," said he,
"doth know that in the day ye eat thereof, your eyes shall be
opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil;" who thus
did ascribe the steady piety of Job, not to a conscientious love and
fear of God, but to policy and selfish design: "Doth Job fear God
for nought?"
Whoever, indeed, pronounceth concerning his neighbour's intentions
otherwise than as they are evidently expressed by words, or
signified by overt actions, is a slanderer; because he pretendeth to
know, and dareth to aver, that which he nowise possibly can tell
whether it be true; because the heart is exempt from all
jurisdiction here, is only subject to the government and trial of
another world; because no man can judge concerning the truth of such
accusations, because no man can exempt or defend himself from them:
so that apparently such practice doth thwart all course of justice
and equity.
4. Another kind is, perverting a man's words or actions
disadvantageously by affected misconstruction. All words are
ambiguous, and capable of different senses, some fair, some more
foul; all actions have two handles, one that candour and charity
will, another that disingenuity and spite may lay hold on; and in
such cases to misapprehend is a calumnious procedure, arguing
malignant disposition and mischievous design. Thus when two men did
witness that our Lord affirmed, He "could demolish the temple, and
rear it again in three days"--although He did indeed speak words to
that purpose, meaning them in a figurative sense, discernible enough
to those who would candidly have minded His drift and way of
speaking--yet they who crudely alleged them against Him are called
false witnesses. "At last," saith the Gospel, "came two false
witnesses, and said, This fellow said, I am able to destroy the
temple," etc. Thus also when some certified of St. Stephen, as
having said that "Jesus of Nazareth should destroy that place, and
change the customs that Moses delivered;" although probably he did
speak words near to that purpose, yet are those men called false
witnesses: "And," saith St. Luke, "they set up false witnesses,
which said, This man ceaseth not to speak blasphemous words," etc.
Which instances plainly do show, if we would avoid the guilt of
slander, how careful we should be to interpret fairly and favourably
the words and the actions of our neighbour.
5. Another sort of this practice is, partial and lame
representation of men's discourse, or their practice; suppressing
some part of the truth in them, or concealing some circumstances
about them which might serve to explain, to excuse, or to extenuate
them. In such a manner easily, without uttering any logical
untruth, one may yet grievously calumniate. Thus suppose a man
speaketh a thing upon supposition, or with exception, or in way of
objection, or merely for disputation sake, in order to the
discussion or clearing of truth; he that should report him asserting
it absolutely, unlimitedly, positively and peremptorily, as his own
settled judgment, would notoriously calumniate. If one should be
inveigled by fraud, or driven by violence, or slip by chance into a
bad place or bad company, he that should so represent the gross of
that accident, as to breed an opinion of that person, that out of
pure disposition and design he did put himself there, doth
slanderously abuse that innocent person. The reporter in such cases
must not think to defend himself by pretending that he spake nothing
false; for such propositions, however true in logic, may justly be
deemed lies in morality, being uttered with a malicious and
deceitful (that is, with a calumnious) mind, being apt to impress
false conceits and to produce hurtful effects concerning our
neighbour. There are slanderous truths as well as slanderous
falsehoods: when truth is uttered with a deceitful heart, and to a
base end, it becomes a lie. "He that speaketh truth," saith the
wise man, "showeth forth righteousness: but a false witness
deceit." Deceiving is the proper work of slander: and truth abused
to that end putteth on its nature, and will engage into like guilt.
6. Another kind of calumny is, by instilling sly suggestions; which
although they do not downrightly assert falsehoods, yet they breed
sinister opinions in the hearers; especially in those who, from
weakness or credulity, from jealousy or prejudice, from negligence
or inadvertency, are prone to entertain them. This is done many
ways: by propounding wily suppositions, shrewd insinuations, crafty
questions, and specious comparisons, intimating a possibility, or
inferring some likelihood of, and thence inducing to believe the
fact. "Doth not," saith this kind of slanderer, "his temper incline
him to do thus? may not his interest have swayed him thereto? had he
not fair opportunity and strong temptation to it? hath he not acted
so in like cases? Judge you therefore whether he did it not." Thus
the close slanderer argueth; and a weak or prejudiced person is
thereby so caught, that he presently is ready thence to conclude the
thing done. Again: "He doeth well," saith the sycophant, "it is
true; but why, and to what end? Is it not, as most men do, out of
ill design? may he not dissemble now? may he not recoil hereafter?
have not others made as fair a show? yet we know what came of it."
Thus do calumnious tongues pervert the judgments of men to think ill
of the most innocent, and meanly of the worthiest actions. Even
commendation itself is often used calumniously, with intent to breed
dislike and ill-will towards a person commended in envious or
jealous ears; or so as to give passage to dispraises, and render the
accusations following more credible. 'Tis an artifice commonly
observed to be much in use there, where the finest tricks of
supplanting are practised, with greatest effect; so that pessimum
inimicorum genus, laudantes; there is no more pestilent enemy than a
malevolent praiser. All these kinds of dealing, as they issue from
the principles of slander, and perform its work, so they deservedly
bear the guilt thereof.
7. A like kind is that of oblique and covert reflections; when a
man doth not directly or expressly charge his neighbour with faults,
but yet so speaketh that he is understood, or reasonably presumed to
do it. This is a very cunning and very mischievous way of
slandering; for therein the skulking calumniator keepeth a reserve
for himself, and cutteth off from the person concerned the means of
defence. If he goeth to clear himself from the matter of such
aspersions: "What need," saith this insidious speaker, "of that?
must I needs mean you? did I name you? why do you then assume it to
yourself? do you not prejudge yourself guilty? I did not, but your
own conscience, it seemeth, doth accuse you. You are so jealous and
suspicious, as persons overwise or guilty use to be." So meaneth
this serpent out of the hedge securely and unavoidably to bite his
neighbour, and is in that respect more base and more hurtful than
the most flat and positive slanderer.
8. Another kind is that of magnifying and aggravating the faults of
others; raising any small miscarriage into a heinous crime, any
slender defect into an odious vice, and any common infirmity into a
strange enormity; turning a small "mote in the eye" of our neighbour
into a huge "beam," a little dimple in his face into a monstrous
wen. This is plainly slander, at least in degree, and according to
the surplusage whereby the censure doth exceed the fault. As he
that, upon the score of a small debt, doth extort a great sum, is no
less a thief, in regard to what amounts beyond his due, than if
without any pretence he had violently or fraudulently seized on it:
so he is a slanderer that, by heightening faults or imperfections,
doth charge his neighbour with greater blame, or load him with more
disgrace than he deserves. 'Tis not only slander to pick a hole
where there is none, but to make that wider which is, so that it
appeareth more ugly, and cannot so easily be mended. For charity is
wont to extenuate faults, justice doth never exaggerate them. As no
man is exempt from some defects, or can live free from some
misdemeanours, so by this practice every man may be rendered very
odious and infamous.
9. Another kind of slander is, imputing to our neighbour's
practice, judgment, or profession, evil consequences (apt to render
him odious, or despicable) which have no dependence on them, or
connection with them. There do in every age occur disorders and
mishaps, springing from various complications of causes, working
some of them in a more open and discernible, others in a more secret
and subtle way (especially from Divine judgment and providence
checking or chastising sin): from such occurrences it is common to
snatch occasion and matter of calumny. Those who are disposed this
way, are ready peremptorily to charge them upon whomsoever they
dislike or dissent from, although without any apparent cause, or
upon most frivolous and senseless pretences; yea, often when reason
showeth quite the contrary, and they who are so charged are in just
esteem of all men the least obnoxious to such accusations. So
usually the best friends of mankind, those who most heartily wish
the peace and prosperity of the world and most earnestly to their
power strive to promote them, have all the disturbances and
disasters happening charged on them by those fiery vixens, who (in
pursuance of their base designs, or gratification of their wild
passions) really do themselve embroil things, and raise miserable
combustions in the world. So it is that they who have the
conscience to do mischief, will have the confidence also to disavow
the blame and the iniquity, to lay the burden of it on those who are
most innocent. Thus, whereas nothing more disposeth men to live
orderly and peaceably, nothing more conduceth to the settlement and
safety of the public, nothing so much draweth blessings down from
heaven upon the commonwealth, as true religion; yet nothing hath
been more ordinary than to attribute all the miscarriages and
mischiefs that happened unto it; even those are laid at his door,
which plainly do arise from the contempt or neglect of it; being the
natural fruits or the just punishments of irreligion. King Ahab by
forsaking God's commandments, and following wicked superstitions,
had troubled Israel, drawing sore judgments and calamities thereon;
yet had he the heart and the face to charge those events on the
great assertor of piety, Elias: "Art thou he that troubleth
Israel?" The Jews by provocation of Divine justice had set
themselves in a fair way towards desolation and ruin; this event to
come they had the presumption to lay upon the faith of our Lord's
doctrine: "If," said they, "we let Him alone, all men will believe
on Him, and the Romans shall come, and take away our place and
nation:" whereas, in truth, a compliance with His directions and
admonitions had been the only means to prevent those presaged
mischiefs. And, si Tibris ascenderit in maenia, if any public
calamity did appear, then Christianos ad leones, Christians must be
charged and persecuted as the causes thereof. To them it was that
Julian and other pagans did impute all the concussions, confusions,
and devastations falling upon the Roman Empire. The sacking of Rome
by the Goths they cast upon Christianity; for the vindication of it
from which reproach St. Austin did write those renowned books de
Civitate Dei. So liable are the best and most innocent sort of men
to be calumniously accused in this manner.
Another practice (worthily bearing the guilt of slander) is, aiding
and being accessory thereto, by anywise furthering, cherishing,
abetting it. He that by crafty significations of ill-will doth
prompt the slanderer to vent his poison; he that by a willing
audience and attention doth readily suck it up, or who greedily
swalloweth it down by credulous approbation and assent; he that
pleasingly relisheth and smacketh at it, or expresseth a delightful
complacence therein: as he is a partner in the fact, so he is a
sharer in the guilt. There are not only slanderous throats, but
slanderous ears also; not only wicked inventions, which engender and
brood lies, but wicked assents, which hatch and foster them. Not
only the spiteful mother that conceiveth such spurious brats, but
the midwife that helpeth to bring them forth, the nurse that feedeth
them, the guardian that traineth them up to maturity, and setteth
them forth to live in the world; as they do really contribute to
their subsistence, so deservedly they partake in the blame due to
them, and must be responsible for the mischief they do. For indeed
were it not for such free entertainers, such nourishers, such
encouragers of them, slanderers commonly would die in the womb, or
prove still-born, or presently entering into the cold air, would
expire, or for want of nourishment soon would starve. It is such
friends and patrons of them who are the causes that they are so
rife; they it is who set ill-natured, base, and designing people
upon devising, searching after, and picking up malicious and idle
stories. Were it not for such customers, the trade of calumniating
would fall. Many pursue it merely out of servility and flattery, to
tickle the ears, to soothe the humour, to gratify the malignant
disposition or ill-will of others; who upon the least discouragement
would give over the practice. If therefore we would exempt
ourselves from all guilt of slander, we must not only abstain from
venting it, but forbear to regard or countenance it: for "he is,"
saith the wise man, "a wicked doer who giveth heed to false lips,
and a liar who giveth ear to a naughty tongue." Yea, if we
thoroughly would be clear from it, we must show an aversion from
hearing it, an unwillingness to believe it, an indignation against
it; so either stifling it in the birth, or condemning it to death,
being uttered. This is the sure way to destroy it, and to prevent
its mischief. If we would stop our ears, we should stop the
slanderer's mouth; if we would resist the calumniator, he would fly
from us; if we would reprove him, we should repel him. For, "as the
north wind driveth away rain, so," the wise man telleth us, "doth an
angry countenance a backbiting tongue."
These are the chief and most common kinds of slander; and there are
several ways of practising them worthy our observing, that we may
avoid them, namely these:--
1. The most notoriously heinous way is, forging and immediately
venting ill stories. As it is said of Doeg, "Thy tongue deviseth
mischief;" and of another like companion, "Thou givest thy mouth to
evil, and thy tongue frameth deceit;" and as our Lord saith of the
devil, "When he speaketh a lie, [Greek], he speaketh of his own; for
he is a liar, and the father of it." This palpably is the supreme
pitch of calumny, incapable of any qualifications or excuse: hell
cannot go beyond this; the cursed fiend himself cannot worse employ
his wit than in minting wrongful falsehoods.
2. Another way is, receiving from others, and venting such stories,
which they who do it certainly know or may reasonably presume to be
false; the becoming hucksters of counterfeit wares, or factors in
this vile trade. There is no false coiner who hath not some
accomplices and emissaries ready to take from his hand and put off
his money; and such slanderers at second hand are scarce less guilty
than the first authors. He that breweth lies may have more wit and
skill, but the broacher showeth the like malice and wickedness. In
this there is no great difference between the great devil, that
frameth scandalous reports, and the little imps that run about and
disperse them.
3. Another way is, when one without competent examination, due
weighing, and just reason, doth admit and spread tales prejudicial
to his neighbour's welfare; relying for his warrant, as to the truth
of them, upon any slight or slender authority. This is a very
common and current practice: men presume it lawful enough to say
over whatever they hear; to report anything, if they can quote an
author for it. "It is not," say they, "my invention; I tell it as I
heard it: sit fides penes authorem; let him that informed me
undergo the blame if it prove false." So do they conceive
themselves excusable for being the instruments of injurious disgrace
and damage to their neighbours. But they greatly mistake therein;
for as this practice commonly doth arise from the same wicked
principles, at least in some degree, and produceth altogether the
like mischievous effects, as the wilful devising and conveying
slander: so it no less thwarteth the rules of duty, the laws of
equity; God hath prohibited it, and reason doth condemn it. "Thou
shalt not," saith God in the Law, "go up and down as a tale-bearer
among thy people:" as a talebearer (as Rachil, that is), as a
merchant or trader in ill reports and stories concerning our
neighbour, to his prejudice. Not only the framing of them, but the
dealing in them beyond reason or necessity, is interdicted. And it
is part of a good man's character in Psalm xv., Non accipit
opprobrium, "He taketh not up a reproach against his neighbour;"
that is, he doth not easily entertain it, much less doth he
effectually propagate it: and in our text, "He," it is said, "that
uttereth slander" (not only he that conceiveth it) "is a fool."
And in reason, before exact trial and cognisance, to meddle with the
fame and interest of another, is evidently a practice full of
iniquity, such as no man can allow in his own case, or brook being
used towards himself without judging himself to be extremely abused
by such reporters. In all reason and equity, yea, in all
discretion, before we yield credence to any report concerning our
neighbour, or venture to relate it, many things are carefully to be
weighed and scanned. We should, concerning our author, consider
whether he be not a particular enemy, or disaffected to him:
whether he be not ill-humoured, or a delighter in telling bad
stories; whether he be not dishonest, or unregardful of justice in
his dealings and discourse; whether he be not vain, or careless of
what he saith; whether he be not light or credulous, or apt to be
imposed upon by any small appearance; whether, at least in the
present case, he be not negligent, or too forward and rash in
speaking. We should also, concerning the matter reported, mind
whether it be possible or probable; whether suitable to the
disposition of our neighbour, to his principles, to the constant
tenor of his practice; whether the action imputed to him be not
liable to misapprehension, or his words to misconstruction. All
reason and equity do, I say, exact from us, diligently to consider
such things, before we do either embrace ourselves or transmit unto
others any story concerning our neighbour; lest unadvisedly we do
him irreparable wrong and mischief. Briefly, we should take his
case for our own, and consider whether we ourselves should be
content that upon like grounds or testimonies any man should
believe, or report, disgraceful things concerning us. If we fail to
do thus, we do, vainly, or rashly, or maliciously, conspire with the
slanderer to the wrong of our innocent neighbour; and that in the
psalmist, by a parity of reason, may be transferred to us, "Thou
hast consented unto the liar, and hast partaken with the" author of
calumny.
4. Of kin to this way is the assenting to popular rumours, and
thence affirming matters of obloquy to our neighbour. Every one by
experience knows how easily false news do rise, and how nimbly they
scatter themselves; how often they are raised from nothing, how soon
they from small sparks grow into a great blaze, how easily from one
thing they are transformed into another; especially news of this
kind, which do suit and feed the bad humour of the vulgar. 'Tis
obvious to any man how true that is of Tacitus, how void of
consideration, of judgment, of equity, the busy and talking part of
mankind is. Whoever therefore gives heed to flying tales, and
thrusts himself into the herd of those who spread them, is either
strangely injudicious, or very malignantly disposed. If he want not
judgment, he cannot but know that when he complieth with popular
fame, it is mere chance that he doth not slander, or rather it is
odds that he shall do so; he consequently showeth himself to be
indifferent whether he doeth it or no, or rather that he doth
incline to do it; whence, not caring to be otherwise, or loving to
be a slanderer, he in effect and just esteem is such; having at
least a slanderous heart and inclination. He that puts it to the
venture whether he lieth or no, doth eo ipso lie morally, as
declaring no care or love of truth. "Thou shalt not," saith the
Law, "follow a multitude to do evil;" and with like reason we should
not follow the multitude in speaking evil of our neighbour.
5. Another slanderous course is, to build censures and reproaches
upon slender conjectures, or uncertain suspicions (those [Greek],
evil surmises, which St. Paul condemneth). Of these occasion can
never be wanting to them who seek them, or are ready to embrace
them; no innocence, no wisdom can anywise prevent them; and if they
may be admitted as grounds of defamation, no man's good name can be
secure. But he that upon such accounts dareth to asperse his
neighbour is in moral computation no less a slanderer than if he did
the like out of pure invention, or without any ground at all: for
doubtful and false in this case differ little; to devise, and to
divine, in matters of this nature, do import near the same. He that
will judge or speak ill of others, ought to be well assured of what
he thinks or says; he that asserteth that which he doth not know to
be true, doth as well lie as he that affirmeth that which he knoweth
to be false; for he deceiveth the hearers, begetting in them an
opinion that he is assured of what he affirms; especially in dealing
with the concernments of others, whose right and repute justice doth
oblige us to beware of infringing, charity should dispose us to
regard and tender as our own. It is not every possibility, every
seeming, every faint show or glimmering appearance, which sufficeth
to ground bad opinion or reproachful discourse concerning our
brother: the matter should be clear, notorious and palpable, before
we admit a disadvantageous conceit into our head, a distasteful
resentment into our heart, a harsh word into our mouth about him.
Men may fancy themselves sagacious and shrewd, persons of deep
judgment and fine wit they may be taken for, when they can dive into
others' hearts, and sound their intentions; when through thick mists
or at remote distances they can descry faults in them; when they
collect ill of them by long trains, and subtle fetches of discourse:
but in truth they do thereby rather betray in themselves small love
of truth, care of justice, or sense of charity, together with little
wisdom and discretion: for truth is only seen in a clear light;
justice requireth strict proof. Charity "thinketh no evil," and
"believeth all things" for the best; wisdom is not forward to
pronounce before full evidence. ("He," saith the wise man, "that
answereth a matter before he heareth it, it is folly and shame unto
him.") In fine, they who proceed thus, as it is usual that they
speak falsely, as it is casual that they ever speak truly, as they
affect to speak ill, true or false; so worthily they are to be
reckoned among slanderers.
6. Another like way of slandering is, impetuous or negligent
sputtering out of words, without minding what truth or consequence
there is in them, how they may touch or hurt our neighbour. To
avoid this sin, we must not only be free from intending mischief,
but wary of effecting it; not only careful of not wronging one
distinct person, but of harming any promiscuously; not only
abstinent from aiming directly, but provident not to hit casually
any person with obloquy. For as he that dischargeth shot into a
crowd, or so as not to look about regarding who may stand in the
way, is no less guilty of doing mischief, and bound to make
satisfaction to them he woundeth, than if he had aimed at some one
person: so if we sling our bad words at random, which may light
unluckily, and defame somebody, we become slanderers unawares, and
before we think on it. This practice hath not ever all the malice
of the worst slander, but it worketh often the effects thereof; and
therefore doth incur its guilt, and its punishment; especially it
being commonly derived from ill-temper, or from bad habit, which we
are bound to watch over, to curb, and to correct. The tongue is a
sharp and perilous weapon, which we are bound to keep up in the
sheath, or never to draw forth but advisedly, and upon just
occasion; it must ever be wielded with caution and care: to
brandish it wantonly, to lay about with it blindly and furiously, to
slash and smite therewith any that happeneth to come in our way,
doth argue malice or madness.
7. It is an ordinary way of proceeding to calumniate, for men,
reflecting upon some bad disposition in themselves (although
resulting from their own particular temper, from their bad
principles, or from their ill custom), to charge it presently upon
others; presuming others to be like themselves: like the wicked
person in the psalm, "Thou thoughtest that I was altogether such an
one as thyself." This is to slander mankind first in the gross;
then in retail, as occasion serveth, to asperse any man; this is the
way of half-witted Machiavellians, and of desperate reprobates in
wickedness, who having prostituted their consciences to vice, for
their own defence and solace, would shroud themselves from blame
under the shelter of common pravity and infirmity; accusing all men
of that whereof they know themselves guilty. But surely there can
be no greater iniquity than this, that one man should undergo blame
for the ill conscience of another.
These seem to be the chief kinds of slander, and most common ways of
practising it. In which description, the folly thereof doth, I
suppose, so clearly shine, that no man can look thereon without
loathing and despising it, as not only a very ugly, but a most
foolish practice. No man surely can be wise who will suffer himself
to be defiled therewith. But to render its folly more apparent, we
shall display it; declaring it to be extremely foolish upon several
accounts. But the doing of this, in regard to your patience, we
shall forbear at present.