"To speak evil of no man."--Titus iii. 2.
These words do imply a double duty; one incumbent on teachers,
another on the people who are to be instructed by them.
The teacher's duty appeareth from reflecting on the words of the
context, which govern these, and make them up an entire sentence:
put them in mind, or, rub up their memory to do thus. It is St.
Paul's injunction to Titus, a bishop and pastor of the Church, that
he should admonish the people committed to his care and instruction,
as of other great duties (of yielding obedience to magistrates, of
behaving themselves peaceably, of practising meekness and equity
towards all men, of being readily disposed to every good work), so
particularly of this, [Greek], to revile or speak evil of no man.
Whence it is apparent that this is one of the principal duties that
preachers are obliged to mind people of, and to press upon them.
And if this were needful then, when charity, kindled by such
instructions and examples, was so lively; when Christians, by their
sufferings, were so inured to meekness and patience; even every one,
for the honour of his religion, and the safety of his person, was
concerned in all respects to demean himself innocently and
inoffensively; then is it now especially requisite, when (such
engagements and restraints being taken off, love being cooled,
persecution being extinct, the tongue being set loose from all
extraordinary curbs) the transgression of this duty is grown so
prevalent and rife, that evil-speaking is almost as common as
speaking, ordinary conversation extremely abounding therewith, that
ministers should discharge their office in dehorting and dissuading
from it.
Well indeed it were, if by their example of using mild and moderate
discourse, of abstaining from virulent invectives, tauntings, and
scoffings, good for little but to inflame anger, and infuse ill-
will, they would lead men to good practice of this sort: for no
examples can be so wholesome, or so mischievous to this purpose, as
those which come down from the pulpit, the place of edification,
backed with special authority and advantage.
However, it is to preachers a ground of assurance and matter of
satisfaction, that in pressing this duty they shall perform their
duty: their text being not so much of their own choosing, as given
them by St. Paul; they can surely scarce find a better to discourse
upon: it cannot be a matter of small moment or use, which this
great master and guide so expressly directeth us to insist upon.
And to the observance of his precept, so far as concerneth me, I
shall immediately apply myself.
It is then the duty of all Christian people (to be taught and
pressed on them) not to reproach, or speak evil of any man. The
which duty, for your instruction, I shall first endeavour somewhat
to explain, declaring its import and extent; then, for your further
edification, I shall inculcate it, proposing several inducements
persuasive to the observance of it.
I. For explication, we may first consider the object of it, no man;
then the act itself, which is prohibited, to blaspheme, that is, to
reproach, to revile, or (as we have it rendered) to speak evil.
No man. St. Paul questionless did especially mean hereby to hinder
the Christians at that time from reproaching the Jews and the pagans
among whom they lived, men in their lives very wicked and corrupt,
men in opinion extremely dissenting from them, men who greatly did
hate, and cruelly did persecute them; of whom therefore they had
mighty provocations and temptations to speak ill; their judgment of
the persons, and their resentment of injuries, making it difficult
to abstain from doing so. Whence by a manifest analogy may be
inferred that the object of duty is very large, indeed universal and
unlimited: that we must forbear reproach not only against pious and
virtuous persons, against persons of our own judgment or party,
against those who never did harm or offend us, against our
relations, our friends, our benefactors, in respect of whom there is
no ground or temptation of evil-speaking; but even against the most
unworthy and wicked persons, against those who most differ in
opinion and practice from us, against those who never did oblige us,
yea, those who have most disobliged us, even against our most bitter
and spiteful enemies. There is no exception or excuse to be
admitted from the quality, state, relation, or demeanour of men; the
duty (according to the proper sense, or due qualifications and
limits of the act) doth extend to all men: for, "Speak evil of no
man."
As for the act, it may be inquired what the word [Greek] (to
blaspheme) doth import. I answer, that it is to vent words
concerning any person which do signify in us ill-opinion, or
contempt, anger, hatred, enmity conceived in our minds towards him;
which are apt in him to kindle wrath, and breed ill-blood towards
us; which tend to beget in others that hear ill-conceit or ill-will
towards him; which are much destructive of his reputation,
prejudicial to his interests, productive of damage or mischief to
him. It is otherwise in Scripture termed [Greek], to rail or
revile, (to use bitter and ignominious language); [Greek], to speak
contumeliously; [Greek], to bring railing accusation (or reproachful
censure); [Greek], to use obloquy, or detraction; [Greek], to curse,
that is, to speak words importing that we do wish ill to a person.
Such is the language we are prohibited to use. To which purpose we
may observe that whereas, in our conversation and commerce with men,
there do frequently often occur occasions to speak of men and to men
words apparently disadvantageous to them, expressing our dissent in
opinion from them, or a dislike in us of their proceedings, we may
do this in different ways and terms; some of them gentle and
moderate, signifying no ill mind or disaffection towards them;
others harsh and sharp, arguing height of disdain, disgust, or
despite, whereby we bid them defiance, and show that we mean to
exasperate them. Thus, telling a man that we differ in judgment
from him, or conceive him not to be in the right, and calling him a
liar, a deceiver, a fool, saying that he doeth amiss, taketh a wrong
course, transgresseth the rule, and calling him dishonest, unjust,
wicked, to omit more odious and provoking names, unbecoming this
place, and not deserving our notice, are several ways of expressing
the same things whereof the latter, in relating passages concerning
our neighbour, or in debating cases with him, is prohibited: for
thus the words reproaching, reviling, railing, cursing, and the like
do signify, and thus our Lord Himself doth explain them in His
divine sermon, wherein he doth enact this law: "Whosoever," saith
He, "shall say to his brother, Raca" (that is, vain man, or liar),
"shall be in danger of the council; but whosoever shall say, Thou
fool, shall be in danger of hell-fire;" that is, he rendereth
himself liable to a strict account, and to severe condemnation
before God, who useth contemptuous and contumelious expressions
towards his neighbour, in proportion to the malignity of such
expressions.
The reason of things also doth help to explain those words, and to
show why they are prohibited because those harsh terms are needless,
mild words serving as well to express the same things: because they
are commonly unjust, loading men with greater defect or blame than
they can be proved to deserve, or their actions do import; for every
man that speaketh falsehood is not therefore a liar, every man that
erreth is not thence a fool, every man that doeth amiss is not
consequently dishonest or wicked; the secret intentions and habitual
dispositions of men not being always to be collected from their
outward actions; because they are uncharitable, signifying that we
entertain the worst opinions of men, and make the worst construction
of their doings, and are disposed to show them no favour or
kindness: because, also, they produce mischievous effects, such as
spring from the worst passions raised by them.
This in gross is the meaning of the precept. But since there are
some other precepts seeming to clash with this; since there are
cases wherein we are allowed to use the harsher sort of terms, there
are great examples in appearance thwarting this rule; therefore it
may be requisite for determining the limits of our duty, and
distinguishing it from transgression, that such exceptions or
restrictions should be somewhat declared.
1. First, then, we may observe that it may be allowable to persons
in anywise concerned in the prosecution or administration of
justice, to speak words which in private intercourse would be
reproachful. A witness may impeach of crimes hurtful to justice, or
public tranquillity; a judge may challenge, may rebuke, may condemn
an offender in proper terms (or forms of speech prescribed by law),
although most disgraceful and distasteful to the guilty: for it
belongeth to the majesty of public justice to be bold, blunt,
severe; little regarding the concerns or passions of particular
persons, in comparison to the public welfare.
A testimony, therefore, or sentence against a criminal, which
materially is a reproach, and morally would be such in a private
mouth, is not yet formally so according to the intent of this rule.
For practices of this kind, which serve the exigencies of justice,
are not to be interpreted as proceeding from anger, hatred, revenge,
any bad passion or humour; but in way of needful discipline for
God's service, and common benefit of men. It is not, indeed, so
much the minister of justice, as God Himself, our absolute Lord; as
the Sovereign, God's representative, acting in the public behalf; as
the commonwealth itself, who by His mouth do rebuke the obnoxious
person.
2. God's ministers in religious affairs, to whom the care of men's
instruction and edification is committed, are enabled to inveigh
against sin and vice, whoever consequentially may be touched
thereby: yea, sometimes it is their duty with severity and
sharpness to reprove particular persons, not only privately, but
publicly, for their correction, and for the edification of others.
Thus St. Paul directeth Timothy: "Them that sin" (notoriously and
scandalously, he meaneth), "rebuke before all, that others may
fear:" that is, in a manner apt to make impression on the minds of
the hearers, so as to scare them from like offences. And to Titus
he writes, "Rebuke them sharply, that they may be found in the
faith." And, "Cry aloud, spare not, lift up thy voice like a
trumpet, and show my people their transgressions, and the house of
Jacob their sins," saith the Lord to the prophet. Such are the
charges and commissions laid on and granted to His messengers.
Thus we may observe that God's prophets of old, St. John the
Baptist, our Lord Himself, the holy apostles did in terms most
vehement and biting reprove the age in which they lived, and some
particular persons in them. The prophets are full of declamations
and invectives against the general corruption of their times, and
against the particular manners of some persons in them. "Ah, sinful
nation; people laden with iniquity, a seed of evil-doers, children
that are corrupters! They are all adulterers, an assembly of
treacherous men; and they bend their tongues like their bow for
lies. Thy princes are rebellious and companions of thieves; every
one loveth gifts, and followeth after rewards: they judge not the
fatherless, neither doth the cause of the widow come before them.
The prophets prophesy falsely, and the priests rule by their means.
As troops of robbers wait for a man, so the company of priests
murder in the way by consent, and commit lewdness." Such is their
style commonly. St. John the Baptist calleth the Scribes and
Pharisees a "generation of vipers." Our Saviour speaketh of them in
the same terms; calleth them an "evil and adulterous generation,
serpents, and children of vipers. Hypocrites, painted sepulchres,
obscure graves ([Greek]), blind guides; fools and blind, children of
the devil." St. Paul likewise calleth the schismatical heretical
teachers "dogs, false apostles, evil and deceitful workers, men of
corrupt minds, reprobates and abominable." With the like colours do
St. Peter, St. Jude, and other apostles paint them. Which sort of
speeches are to be supposed to proceed, not from private passion or
design, but out of holy zeal for God's honour, and from earnest
charity towards men, for to work their amendment and common
edification. They were uttered also by special wisdom and peculiar
order; from God's authority, and in His name; so that, as God by
them is said to preach, to entreat, to warn, and to exhort, so by
them also He may be said to reprehend and reproach.
3. Even private persons in due season, with discretion and temper,
may reprove others, whom they observe to commit sin, or follow bad
courses, out of charitable design, and with hope to reclaim them.
This was an office of charity imposed anciently even upon the Jews;
much more doth it lie upon Christians, who are obliged more
earnestly to tender the spiritual good of those who by the stricter
and more holy bands of brotherhood are allied to them. "Thou shalt
not hate thy brother; thou shalt in any wise rebuke thy neighbour,
and not suffer sin upon him," was a precept of the old law: and,
[Greek], to admonish the disorderly, is an evangelical rule. Such
persons we are enjoined to shun and decline; but first we must
endeavour by sober advice and admonition to reclaim them; we must
not thus reject them till they appear contumacious and incorrigible,
refusing to hear us, or becoming deaf to reproof. This, although it
necessarily doth include setting out their faults, and charging
blame on them (answerable to their offences), is not the culpable
reproach here meant, it being needful towards a wholesome effect,
and proceeding from charitable intention.
4. Some vehemency, some smartness and sharpness of speech may
sometimes be used in defence of truth, and impugning errors of bad
consequence; especially when it concerneth the interest of truth,
that the reputation and authority of its adversaries should somewhat
be abased or abated. If by partial opinion or reverence towards
them, however begotten in the minds of men, they strive to overbear
or discountenance a good cause, their faults (so far as truth
permitteth and need requireth) may be detected and displayed. For
this cause particularly may we presume our Lord (otherwise so meek
in His temper, and mild in His carriage towards all men) did
characterise the Jewish scribes in such terms, that their authority,
being then so prevalent with the people, might not prejudice the
truth, and hinder the efficacy of His doctrine. This is part of
that [Greek], that duty of contending earnestly for the faith, which
is incumbent on us.
5. It may be excusable upon particular emergent occasions, with
some heat of language to express dislike of notorious wickedness.
As our Lord doth against the perverse incredulity and stupidity in
the Pharisees, their profane misconstruction of His words and
actions, their malicious opposing truth, and obstructing His
endeavours in God's service. As St. Peter did to Simon Magus,
telling him that he was in the gall of bitterness, and in the bond
of iniquity. As St. Paul to Elymas the sorcerer, when he withstood
him, and desired to turn away the Deputy Sergius from the faith;
"O," said he, stirred with a holy zeal and indignation, "thou full
of all subtilty and all mischief, thou child of the devil, thou
enemy of all righteousness, wilt thou not cease to pervert the right
ways of the Lord?" The same spirit which enabled him to inflict a
sore punishment on that wicked wretch, did prompt him to use that
sharp language towards him; unquestionably deserved, and seasonably
pronounced. As also when the high priest commanded him illegally
and unjustly to be misused, that speech from a mind justly sensible
of such outrage broke forth, "God shall smite thee, thou whited
wall." So when St. Peter presumptuously would have dissuaded our
Lord from compliance with God's will, in undergoing those crosses
which were appointed to Him by God's decree, our Lord calleth him
Satan; . . . . "[Greek], "Avaunt, Satan, thou art an offence unto
Me; for thou savourest not the things that be of God, but those that
are of men."
These sort of speeches, issuing from just and honest indignation,
are sometimes excusable, oftentimes commendable; especially when
they come from persons eminent in authority, of notable integrity,
endued with special measures of Divine grace, of wisdom, of
goodness; such as cannot be suspected of intemperate anger, of ill-
nature, of ill-will, or of ill-design.
In such cases as are above mentioned, a sort of evil-speaking about
our neighbour may be allowable or excusable. But, for fear of
overdoing, great caution and temper is to be used; and we should
never apply any such limitations as cloaks to palliate unjust or
uncharitable dealing. Generally it is more advisable to suppress
such eruptions of passion than to vent it; for seldom passion hath
not inordinate motions joined with it, or tendeth to good ends.
And, however, it will do well to reflect on those cases, and to
remark some particulars about them.
First, we may observe that in all these cases all possible
moderation, equity, and candour are to be used; so that no ill-
speaking be practised beyond what is needful or convenient. Even in
prosecution of offences, the bounds of truth, of equity, of humanity
and clemency are not to be transgressed. A judge must not lay on
the most criminal person more blame or contumely than the case will
bear, or than serveth the designs of justice. However our neighbour
doth incur the calamities of sin and of punishment, we must not be
insolent or contemptuous towards him. So we may learn by that law
of Moses, backed with a notable reason: "And it shall be, if the
wicked man be worthy to be beaten, that the judge cause him to lie
down, and to be beaten before his face, according to his fault by a
certain number. Forty stripes he may give him, and not exceed; lest
if he should exceed, and beat him above those stripes, then thy
brother should seem vile unto thee." Whence appears that we should
be careful of not vilifying an offender beyond measure. And how
mildly governors should proceed in the administration of justice,
the example of Joshua may teach us, who thus examineth Achan, the
cause of so great mischief to the public: "My son, give, I pray
thee, glory to the Lord God of Israel, and make confession unto Him;
and tell me now what thou hast done, and hide it not from me." "My
son;" what compellation could be more benign and kind? "I pray
thee;" what language could be more courteous and gentle? "give glory
to God, and make confession;" what words could be more inoffensively
pertinent? And when he sentenced that great malefactor, the cause
of so much mischief, this was all he said, "Why hast thou troubled
us? the Lord will trouble thee;" words void of contumely or
insulting, containing only a close intimation of the cause, and a
simple declaration of the event he was to undergo.
Secondly, likewise ministers, in the taxing sin and sinners, are to
proceed with great discretion and caution, with much gentleness and
meekness; signifying a tender pity of their infirmities, charitable
desires for their good, the best opinion of them, and the best hopes
for them, that may consist with any reason; according to those
apostolical rules: "Brethren, if a man be overtaken in a fault, ye
which are spiritual, restore such an one in the spirit of meekness;
considering thyself, lest thou also be tempted;" and, "We that are
strong ought to bear the infirmities of the weak, and not to please
ourselves:" and, more expressly, "A servant of the Lord must not
fight, but be gentle toward all, apt to teach, patient, in meekness
instructing those that oppose themselves." Thus did St. Peter
temper his reproof of Simon Magus with this wholesome and
comfortable advice: "Repent, therefore, from this thy wickedness,
and pray God if perhaps the thought of thine heart may be forgiven
thee."
Thirdly, as for fraternal censure and reproof of faults (when it is
just and expedient to use it), ordinarily the calmest and mildest
way is the most proper, and most likely to obtain good success; it
commonly doth in a more kindly manner convey the sense thereof into
the heart, and therein more powerfully worketh remorse, than the
fierce and harsh way. Clearly to show a man his fault, with the
reason proving it such, so that he becometh thoroughly convinced of
it, is sufficient to breed in him regret, and to shame him before
his own mind: to do more (in way of aggravation, of insulting on
him, of inveighing against him), as it doth often not well consist
with humanity, so it is seldom consonant to discretion, if we do, as
we ought, seek his health and amendment. Humanity requireth that
when we undertake to reform our neighbour, we should take care not
to deform him (not to discourage or displease him more than is
necessary); when we would correct his manners, that we should also
consider his modesty, and consult his reputation; "curam agentes,"
as Seneca speaketh, "non tantum salutis, sed et honestae cicatricis"
(having care not only to heal the wound, but to leave a comely scar
behind). "Be," adviseth St. Austin, "so displeased with iniquity,
as to consider and consult humanity;" for, "Zeal void of humanity is
not," saith St. Chrysostom, "zeal, but rather animosity; and reproof
not mixed with good-will appeareth a kind of malignity." We should
so rebuke those who, by frailty or folly incident to mankind, have
fallen into misdemeanours, that they may perceive we do sincerely
pity their ill case, and tender their good; that we mean not to
upbraid their weakness or insult upon their misfortune; that we
delight not to inflict on them more grief than is plainly needful
and unavoidable; that we are conscious and sensible of our own
obnoxiousness to the like slips or falls, and do consider that we
also may be tempted, and being tempted, may be overborne. This they
cannot perceive or be persuaded of, except we temper our speech with
benignity and mildness. Such speech prudence also dictateth, as
most useful and hopeful for producing the good ends honest
reprehension doth aim at; it mollifieth and it melteth a stubborn
heart, it subdueth and winneth a perverse will, it healeth
distempered affections. Whereas roughly handling is apt to defeat
or obstruct the cure: rubbing the sore doth tend to exasperate and
inflame it. Harsh speech rendereth advice odious and unsavoury;
driveth from it and depriveth it of efficacy; it turneth regret for
a fault into displeasure and disdain against the reprover; it looks
not like the dealing of a kind friend, but like the persecution of a
spiteful enemy; it seemeth rather an ebullition of gall, or a
defluxion from rancour, than an expression of good-will; the
offender will take it for a needless and pitiless tormenting, or for
a proud and tyrannical domineering over him. He that can bear a
friendly touch, will not endure to be lashed with angry and
reproachful words. In fine, all reproof ought to be seasoned with
discretion, with candour, with moderation, and meekness.
Fourthly, likewise in defence of truth, and maintenance of a good
cause, we may observe that commonly the fairest language is most
proper and advantageous, and that reproachful or foul terms are most
improper and prejudicial. A calm and meek way of discoursing doth
much advantage a good cause, as arguing the patron thereof to have
confidence in the cause itself, and to rely upon his strength: that
he is in a temper fit to apprehend it himself, and to maintain it;
that he propoundeth it as a friend, wishing the hearer for his own
good to follow it, leaving him the liberty to judge, and choose for
himself. But rude speech, and contemptuous reflections on persons,
as they do signify nothing to the question, so they commonly bring
much disadvantage and damage to the cause, creating mighty
prejudices against it; they argue much impotency in the advocate,
and consequently little strength in what he maintains; that he is
little able to judge well, and altogether unapt to teach others;
they intimate a diffidence in himself concerning his cause, and
that, despairing to maintain it by reason, he seeks to uphold it by
passion; that not being able to convince by fair means, he would
bear down by noise and clamour: that not skilling to get his suit
quietly, he would extort it by force, obtruding his conceits
violently as an enemy, or imposing them arbitrarily as a tyrant.
Thus doth he really disparage and slur his cause, however good and
defensible in itself.
A modest and friendly style doth suit truth; it, like its author,
doth usually reside (not in the rumbling wind, nor in the shaking
earthquake, nor in the raging fire, but) in the small still voice;
sounding in this, it is most audible, most penetrant, and most
effectual; thus propounded, it is willingly hearkened to: for men
have no aversion from hearing those who seem to love them, and wish
them well. It is easily conceived, no prejudice or passion clouding
the apprehensive faculties; it is readily embraced, no animosity
withstanding or obstructing it. It is the sweetness of the lips,
which, as the wise man telleth us, increaseth learning; disposing a
man to hear lessons of good doctrine, rendering him capable to
understand them, insinuating and impressing them upon the mind; the
affections being thereby unlocked, the passage becomes open to the
reason.
But it is plainly a preposterous method of instructing, of deciding
controversies, of begetting peace, to vex and anger those concerned
by ill language. Nothing surely doth more hinder the efficacy of
discourse, and prevent conviction, than doth this course, upon many
obvious accounts. It doth first put in a strong bar to attention:
for no man willingly doth afford an ear to him whom he conceiveth
disaffected towards him: which opinion harsh words infallibly will
produce; no man can expect to hear truth from him whom he
apprehendeth disordered in his own mind, whom he seeth rude in his
proceedings, whom he taketh to be unjust in his dealing; as men
certainly will take those to be, who presume to revile others for
using their own judgment freely, and dissenting from them in
opinion. Again, this course doth blind the hearer's mind, so that
he cannot discern what he that pretends to instruct him doth mean,
or how he doth assert his doctrine. Truth will not be discerned
through the smoke of wrathful expressions; right being defaced by
foul language will not appear, passion being excited will not suffer
a man to perceive the sense or the force of an argument. The will
also thereby is hardened and hindered from submitting to truth. In
such a case, non persuadebis, etiamsi persuaseris; although you stop
his mouth, you cannot subdue his heart; although he can no longer
fight, yet he never will yield: animosity raised by such usage
rendereth him invincibly obstinate in his conceits and courses.
Briefly, from this proceeding men become unwilling to mark, unfit to
apprehend, indisposed to embrace any good instruction or advice; it
maketh them indocile and intractable, averse from better
instruction, pertinacious in their opinions, and refractory in their
ways.
"Every man," saith the wise man, "shall kiss his lips that giveth a
right answer;" but no man surely will be ready to kiss those lips
which are embittered with reproach, or defiled with dirty language.
It is said of Pericles, that with thundering and lightning he put
Greece into confusion; such discourse may serve to confound things,
it seldom tendeth to compose them. If reason will not pierce, rage
will scarce avail to drive it in. Satirical virulency may vex men
sorely, but it hardly ever soundly converts them. "Few become wiser
or better by ill words." Children may be frightened into compliance
by loud and severe reprimands; but men are to be allured by rational
persuasion backed with courteous usage; they may be sweetly drawn,
they cannot be violently driven to change their judgment and
practice. Whence that advice of the apostle, "With meekness
instruct those that oppose themselves," doth no less savour of
wisdom than of goodness.
Fifthly, as for examples of extraordinary persons, which in some
cases do seem to authorise the practice of evil-speaking, we may
consider that, as they had especial commission enabling them to do
some things beyond ordinary standing rules, wherein they are not to
be imitated: as they had especial illumination and direction, which
preserved them from swerving in particular cases from truth and
equity; so the tenor of their life did evidence that it was the
glory of God, the good of men, the necessity of the case, which
moved them to it. And of them also we may observe, that on divers
occasions (yea, generally, whenever only their private credit or
interest was concerned), although grievously provoked, they did out
of meekness, patience, and charity, wholly forbear reproachful
speech. Our Saviour, who sometimes upon special reason in His
discourses used such harsh words, yet when He was most spitefully
accused, reproached, and persecuted, did not open His mouth, or
return one angry word: "Being reviled, He did not," as St. Peter,
proposing His example to us, telleth us, "revile again; suffering,
He did not threaten." He used the softest language to Judas, to the
soldiers, to Pilate and Herod, to the priests, etc. And the
apostles, who sometimes inveigh so zealously against the opposers
and perverters of truth, did in their private conversation and
demeanour strictly observe their own rules, of abstinence from
reproach: "Being reviled, we bless; being persecuted, we suffer
it;" so doth St. Paul represent their practice. And in reason we
should rather follow them in this their ordinary course, than in
their extraordinary sallies of practice.
In fine, however in some cases and circumstances the matter may
admit such exceptions, so that all language disgraceful to our
neighbour is not ever culpable; yet the cases are so few and rare in
comparison, the practice commonly so dangerous and ticklish, that
worthily forbearing to reproach doth bear the style of a general
rule; and particularly (for clearer direction) we are in the
following cases obliged carefully to shun it; or in speaking about
our neighbour we must observe these cautions.
1. We should never in severe terms inveigh against any man without
reasonable warrant, or presuming upon a good call and commission
thereto. As every man should not assume to himself the power of
administering justice (of trying, sentencing, and punishing
offenders), so must not every man take upon him to speak against
those who seem to do ill; which is a sort of punishment, including
the infliction of smart and damage upon the persons concerned.
Every man hath indeed a commission, in due place and season, with
discretion and moderation to admonish his neighbour offending; but
otherwise to speak ill of him, no private man hath just right or
authority, and therefore, in presuming to do it, he is disorderly
and irregular, trespassing beyond his bounds, usurping an undue
power to himself.
2. We should never speak ill of any man without apparent just
cause. It must be just; we must not reproach men for things
innocent or indifferent; for not concurring in disputable opinions
with us, for not complying with our humour, for not serving our
interest, for not doing anything to which they are not obliged, or
for using their liberty in any case: it must be at least some
considerable fault, which we can so much as tax. It must also be
clear and certain, notorious and palpable; for to speak ill upon
slender conjectures, or doubtful suspicions, is full of iniquity.
"[Greek], "They rail at things which they know not," is part of
those wicked men's character, whom St. Jude doth so severely
reprehend. If, indeed, these conditions being wanting, we presume
to reproach any man, we do therein no less than slander him; which
to do is unlawful in any case, is in truth a most diabolical and
detestable crime. To impose odious names and characters on any
person, which he deserveth not, or without ground of truth, is to
play the devil; and hell itself scarce will own a fouler practice.
3. We should not cast reproach upon any man without some necessary
reason. In charity (that charity which "covereth all sins," which
"covereth a multitude of sins") we are bound to connive at the
defects, and to conceal the faults of our brethren; to extenuate and
excuse them, when apparent, so far as we may in truth and equity.
We must not therefore ever produce them to light, or prosecute them
with severity, except very needful occasion urgeth--such as is the
glory and service of God, the maintenance of truth, the vindication
of innocence, the preservation of public justice and peace; the
amendment of our neighbour himself, or securing others from
contagion. Barring such reasons (really being, not affectedly
pretended), we are bound not so much as to disclose, as to touch our
neighbour's faults; much more, not to blaze them about, not to
exaggerate them by vehement invectives.
4. We should never speak ill of any man beyond measure; be the
cause never so just, the occasion never so necessary, we should yet
nowise be immoderate therein, exceeding the bounds prescribed by
truth, equity, and humanity. We should never speak worse of any man
whatever than he certainly deserveth, according to the most
favourable construction of his doings; never more than the cause
absolutely requireth. We should rather be careful to fall short of
what in rigorous truth might be said against him, than in the least
to pass beyond it. The best cause had better seem to suffer a
little by our reservedness in its defence, than any man be wronged
by our aspersing him; for God, the patron of truth and right, is
ever able to secure them without the succour of our unjust and
uncharitable dealing. The contrary practice hath indeed within it a
spice of slander, that is, of the worst iniquity.
5. We must never speak ill of any man out of bad principles, or for
bad ends.
No sudden or rash anger should instigate us thereto. For, "Let all
bitterness, and wrath, and anger, and clamour, and evil-speaking be
put away from you, with all malice," is the apostolical precept;
they are all associates and kindred, which are to be cast away
together. Such anger itself is culpable, as a work of the flesh,
and therefore to be suppressed; and all its brood therefore is also
to be smothered; the daughter of such a mother cannot be legitimate.
"The wrath of man worketh not the righteousness of God."
We must not speak ill out of inveterate hatred or ill-will. For
this murderous, this viperous disposition should itself be rooted
out of our hearts: whatever issueth from it cannot be otherwise
than very bad; it must be a poisonous breath that exhaleth from that
foul source.
We must not be provoked thereto by any revengeful disposition, or
rancorous spleen, in regard to any injuries or discourtesies
received. For, as we must not revenge ourselves, or render evil in
any other way, so particularly not in this, which is commonly the
special instance expressly prohibited. "Render not evil for evil,"
saith St. Peter, "nor railing for railing; but contrariwise bless,"
or speak well; and "Bless them," saith the Lord, "which curse you;"
"Bless," saith St. Paul, "and curse not."
We must not also do it out of contempt; for we are not to slight our
brethren in our hearts. No man really, considering what he is,
whence he came, how he is related, what he is capable of, can be
despicable. Extreme naughtiness is indeed contemptible; but the
unhappy person that is engaged therein is rather to be pitied than
despised. However, charity bindeth us to stifle contemptuous
motions of heart, and not to vent them in vilifying expression.
Particularly, it is a barbarous practice, out of contempt to
reproach persons for natural imperfections, for meanness of
condition, for unlucky disasters, for any involuntary defects; this
being indeed to reproach mankind, unto which such things are
incident; to reproach Providence, from the disposal whereof they do
proceed. "Whoso mocketh the poor, despiseth his Maker," saith the
wise man; and the same may be said of him that reproachfully mocketh
him that is dull in parts, deformed in body, weak in health or
strength, defective in any such way.
Likewise we must not speak ill out of envy; because others do excel
us in any good quality, or exceed us in fortune. To harbour this
base and ugly disposition in our minds is unworthy of a man (who
should delight in all good springing up anywhere, and befalling any
man, naturally allied unto him); it is most unworthy of a Christian,
who should tender his brother's good as his own, and rejoice with
those that rejoice. From thence to be drawn to cast reproach upon
any man, is horrible and heinous wickedness.
Neither should we ever use reproach as a means of compassing any
design we do affect or aim at; 'tis an unwarrantable engine of
raising us to wealth, dignity, or repute. To grow by the
diminution, to rise by the depression, to shine by the eclipse of
others, to build a fortune upon the ruins of our neighbour's
reputation, is that which no honourable mind can affect, no honest
man will endeavour. Our own wit, courage, and industry, managed
with God's assistance and blessing, are sufficient, and only lawful
instruments of prosecuting honest enterprises; we need not, we must
not instead of them employ our neighbour's disgrace; no worldly good
is worth purchasing at such a rate, no project worth achieving by
such foul ways.
Neither should we out of malignity, to cherish or gratify ill
humour, use this practice. It is observable of some persons, that
not out of any formed displeasure, grudge, or particular
disaffection, nor out of any particular design, but merely out of a
[Greek], an ill disposition, springing up from nature, or contracted
by use, they are apt to carp at any action, and with sharp reproach
to bite any man that comes in their way, thereby feeding and
soothing that evil inclination. But as this inhuman and currish
humour should be corrected, and extirpated from our hearts; so
should the issues thereof at our mouths be stopped; the bespattering
our neighbour's good name should never afford any satisfaction or
delight unto us.
Nor out of wantonness should we speak ill, for our divertisement or
sport. For our neighbour's reputation is too great and precious a
thing to be played with, or offered up to sport; we are very foolish
in so disvaluing it, very naughty in so misusing it. Our wits are
very barren, our brains are ill furnished with store of knowledge,
if we can find no other matter of conversation.
Nor out of negligence and inadvertency should we sputter out
reproachful speech; shooting ill words at rovers, or not regarding
who stands in our way. Among all temerities this is one of the most
noxious, and therefore very culpable.
In fine, we should never speak concerning our neighbour from any
other principle than charity, or to any other intent but what is
charitable; such as tendeth to his good, or at least is consistent
therewith. "Let all your things," saith St. Paul, "be done in
charity;" and words are most of the THINGS we do concerning our
neighbour, wherein we may express charity. In all our speeches,
therefore, touching him, we should plainly show that we have a care
of his reputation, that we tender his interest, that we even desire
his content and repose. Even when reason and need do so require
that we should disclose and reprehend his faults, we may, we should
by the manner and scope of our speech signify thus much. Which
rule, were it observed, if we should never speak ill otherwise than
out of charity, surely most ill-speaking would be cut off; most, I
fear, of our tattling about others, much of our gossiping would be
marred.
Indeed, so far from bitter or sour our language should be, that it
ought to be sweet and pleasant; so far from rough and harsh, that it
should be courteous and obliging; so far from signifying wrath, ill-
will, contempt, or animosity, that it should express tender
affection, good esteem, sincere respect towards our brethren; and be
apt to produce the like in them towards us. The sense of them
should be grateful to the heart; the very sound and accent of them
should be delightful to the ear. Every one should please his
neighbour for his good to edification. Our words should always be
[Greek], with grace, seasoned with salt; they should have the grace
of courtesy, they should be seasoned with the salt of discretion, so
as to be sweet and savoury to the hearers. Commonly ill language is
a certain sign of inward enmity and ill-will. Good-will is wont to
show itself in good terms; it clotheth even its grief handsomely,
and its displeasure carrieth favour in its face; its rigour is civil
and gentle, tempered with pity for the faults and errors which it
disliketh, with the desire of their amendment and recovery whom it
reprehendeth. It would inflict no more evil than is necessary; it
would cure its neighbour's disease without exasperating his
patience, troubling his modesty, or impairing his credit. As it
always judgeth candidly, so it never condemneth extremely.
II. But so much for the explication of this precept, and the
directive part of our discourse. I shall now briefly propound some
inducements to the observance thereof.
1. Let us consider that nothing more than railing and reviling is
opposite to the nature, and inconsistent with the tenor of our
religion; which (as even a heathen did observe of it) nil nisi
justum suadet, et lene, doth recommend nothing but what is very just
and mild; which propoundeth the practices of charity, meekness,
patience, peaceableness, moderation, equity, alacrity, or good
humour, as its principal laws, and declareth them the chief fruits
of the Divine spirit and grace; which chargeth us to curb and
compose all our passions; more particularly to restrain and repress
anger, animosity, envy, malice, and such-like dispositions, as the
fruits of carnality and corrupt lust; which consequently drieth up
all the sources or dammeth up the sluices of bad language. As it
doth above all things oblige us to bear no ill-will in our hearts,
so it chargeth us to vent none with our mouths.
2. It is therefore often expressly condemned and prohibited as
evil. 'Tis the property of the wicked; a character of those who
work iniquity, to "whet their tongues like a sword, and bend their
bows to shoot their arrows, even bitter words."
3. No practice hath more severe punishments denounced to it than
this. The railer (and it is indeed a very proper and fit punishment
for him, he being exceedingly bad company) is to be banished out of
all good society; thereto St. Paul adjudgeth him: "I have," saith
he, "now written unto you, not to keep company, if any man that is
called a brother be a fornicator, or covetous, or an idolater, or a
railer, or a drunkard, or an extortioner, with such an one not to
eat." Ye see what company the railer hath in the text, and with
what a crew of people he is coupled; but no good company he is
allowed elsewhere; every good Christian should avoid him as a blot,
and a pest of conversation; and finally he is sure to be excluded
from the blessed society above in heaven; for "neither thieves, nor
covetous, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor extortioners shall
inherit the kingdom of God;" and "without" (without the heavenly
city) "are dogs," saith St. John in his Revelation; that is, those
chiefly who out of currish spite or malignity do frowardly bark at
their neighbours, or cruelly bite them with reproachful language.
4. If we look upon such language in its own nature, what is it but
a symptom of a foul, a weak, a disordered and a distempered mind?
'Tis the smoke of inward rage and malice: 'tis a stream that cannot
issue from a sweet spring; 'tis a storm that cannot bluster out of a
calm region. "The words of the pure are pleasant words," as the
wise man saith.
5. This practice doth plainly signify low spirit, ill-breeding, and
bad manners; and thence misbecometh any wise, any honest, any
honourable person. It agreeth to children, who are unapt and
unaccustomed to deal in matters considerable, to squabble; to women
of meanest rank (apt, by nature, or custom, to be transported with
passion) to scold. In our modern languages it is termed villainy,
as being proper for rustic boors, or men of coarsest education and
employment; who, having their minds debased by being conversant in
meanest affairs, do vent their sorry passions, and bicker about
their petty concernments, in such strains; who also, being not
capable of a fair reputation, or sensible of disgrace to themselves,
do little value the credit of others, or care for aspersing it. But
such language is unworthy of those persons, and cannot easily be
drawn from them, who are wont to exercise their thoughts about
nobler matters, who are versed in affairs manageable only by calm
deliberation and fair persuasion, not by impetuous and provocative
rudeness; which do never work otherwise upon masculine souls than so
as to procure disdain and resistance. Such persons, knowing the
benefit of a good name, being wont to possess a good repute, prizing
their own credit as a considerable good, will never be prone to
bereave others of the like by opprobrious speech. A noble enemy
will never speak of his enemy in bad terms.
We may further consider that all wise, all honest, all ingenuous
persons have an aversion from ill-speaking, and cannot entertain it
with any acceptance or complacence; that only ill-natured, unworthy,
and naughty people are its willing auditors, or do abet it with
applause. The good man, in Psalm xv., non accipit opprobrium, doth
not take up, or accept, a reproach against his neighbour: "but a
wicked doer," saith the wise man, "giveth heed to false lips, and a
liar giveth ear to a naughty tongue." And what reasonable man will
do that which is disgustful to the wise and good, is grateful only
to the foolish and baser sort of men? I pretermit that using this
sort of language doth incapacitate a man for benefiting his
neighbour, and defeateth his endeavours for his edification,
disparaging a good cause, prejudicing the defence of truth,
obstructing the effects of good instruction and wholesome reproof;
as we did before remark and declare. Further--
6. He that useth this kind of speech doth, as harm and trouble
others, so create many great inconveniences and mischiefs to himself
thereby. Nothing so inflameth the wrath of men, so provoketh their
enmity, so breedeth lasting hatred and spite, as do contumelious
words. They are often called swords and arrows; and as such they
pierce deeply, and cause most grievous smart; which men feeling are
enraged, and accordingly will strive to requite them in the like
manner and in all other obvious ways of revenge. Hence strife,
clamour, and tumult, care, suspicion, and fear, danger and trouble,
sorrow and regret, do seize on the reviler; and he is sufficiently
punished for this dealing. No man can otherwise live than in
perpetual fear of reciprocal like usage from him whom he is
conscious of having so abused. Whence, if not justice, or charity
towards others, yet love and pity of ourselves should persuade us to
forbear it as disquietful, incommodious, and mischievous to us.
We should indeed certainly enjoy much love, much concord, much
quiet, we should live in great safety and security, we should be
exempted from much care and fear, if we would restrain ourselves
from abusing and offending our neighbour in this kind: being
conscious of so just and innocent demeanour towards him, we should
converse with him in a pleasant freedom and confidence, not
suspecting any bad language or ill usage from him.
7. Hence with evidently good reason is he that useth such language
called a fool: and he that abstaineth from it is commended as wise.
"A fool's lips enter into contention, and his mouth calleth for
strokes. A fool's mouth is his destruction, and his lips are the
snare of his soul. He that refraineth his tongue is wise. In the
tongue of the wise is health. He that keepeth his lips, keepeth his
life: but he that openeth wide his mouth" (that is, in evil-
speaking, gaping with clamour and vehemency) "shall have
destruction. The words of a wise man's mouth are gracious: but the
lips of a fool will swallow up himself. Death and life are in the
power of the tongue; and they that love it shall eat the fruit
thereof;" that is, of the one or the other, answerably to the kind
of speech they choose.
In fine, very remarkable is that advice, or resolution of the grand
point concerning the best way of living happily, in the psalmist:
"What man is he that desireth life, and loveth many days, that he
may see good? Keep thy tongue from evil, and thy lips from speaking
guile." Abstinence from ill-speaking he seemeth to propose as the
first step towards the fruition of a durably happy life.
8. Lastly, we may consider that it is a grievous perverting of the
design of speech, that excellent faculty, which so much
distinguisheth us from, so highly advanceth us above other
creatures, to use it to the defaming and disquieting of our
neighbour. It was given us as an instrument of beneficial commerce
and delectable conversation; that with it we might assist and
advise, might cheer and comfort one another: we, therefore, in
employing it to the disgrace, vexation, damage or prejudice in any
kind of our neighbour, do foully abuse it; and so doing, render
ourselves indeed worse than dumb beasts: for better far it were
that we could say nothing, than that we should speak ill.
"Now the God of grace and peace . . . make us perfect in every good
work to do His will, working in us that which is well-pleasing in
His sight, through Jesus Christ; to whom be glory for ever and ever.
Amen."