AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE
I.
In "a memorandum of later years," quoted by his biographer, Mr. Gladstone
defined his own understanding of "the special commission under which the
Government had taken office" in 1880. "It related to the foreign policy of
the country, the whole spirit and effect of which we were to reconstruct."
Sir Charles's views as to the need for this had long been before the
public, and he threw all his energies into the task of helping to achieve
it.
'The Liberals, having come into office after violent denunciation of
the whole foreign and colonial policy of their predecessors, had a
general wish to reverse it in all parts of the world, and to dismiss
the agents by whom it had been carried out. They were especially
violent against Lytton in India, Layard at Constantinople, and Frere
in South Africa.'
Questions of the Indian frontier and Africa lay outside the immediate
sphere of the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, yet he was constantly
consulted upon both of them, and had his full part in defending the
reversal of Lord Lytton's policy by the new Viceroy, Lord Ripon, who
restored, or perhaps established, the unity of Afghanistan.
In the matter of South Africa, the Boer leaders wrote at once to express
their confidence that the new Government would consist of "men who look
out for the honour and glory of England, not by acts of injustice and
crushing force, but by the way of justice and good faith." They were
answered by promises of local self-government, but such promises had been
made to them before, and the retention of Sir Bartle Frere no doubt seemed
a bad omen. So, at all events, it was regarded by the Radical party. On
May 24th--
'I found that Courtney and my brother, with Dr. Cameron and Jesse
Collings, were getting up an attempt to coerce the Colonial Office and
Mr. Gladstone by preparing a list of between one and two hundred
members who would vote with Wilfrid Lawson for a censure on the
Government for not recalling Frere. Childers had found that it would
be easy to recall him, for Frere had said that he would only go out
for two years, and the two years were over. No doubt Frere, while
blameworthy for the Zulu War, was not responsible for the Transvaal
business, which had been done by Shepstone and Lord Carnarvon before
he went out; but with our people he received the whole discredit for
all that went wrong in South Africa, and it was impossible to wonder
at this when one recalled the language that he habitually made use
of....
'Frere was protected by Mr. Gladstone, and allowed to remain, a
mistake for which we very gravely suffered. As this matter became of
great importance in 1899, I ought to add that Lord Granville backed
Mr. Gladstone in abstaining from rescinding the annexation of the
Transvaal, on the ground that as we were retiring from Kandahar we had
better not also retire from Pretoria.'
When, a few months later, the Boer rising followed, Dilke, with three
other Radical Ministers, Bright, Chamberlain, and Courtney, refused to
defend the Government's action even by a silent vote. 'Everything went as
badly as possible in South Africa, and Lord Kimberley' (the Colonial
Secretary) 'must share the blame with Mr. Gladstone.'
The third instance in which the recall of a man was demanded by Liberal
opinion as essential to the reversal of a policy touched matters in whose
development Sir Charles had a considerable part to play:
'_May 20th._--One of our first troubles in debate was with regard to
Layard's position at Constantinople, we being attacked by our own
people on May 20th, who were more Gladstonian than Mr. Gladstone, as
to the public insults which Layard had heaped upon him. Mr. Gladstone
discussed with me what he was to say, and I have his note which, in
addition to the statement about Layard, contains the curiously large
one, "Statements made in Opposition not to be taken too literally when
in office."'
Next day Mr. Gladstone wrote: "Thank you for the wonderful despatch you
kindly made in obtaining for me the particulars about Layard's
appointment."
The new Under-Secretary writes of these early days and first impressions:
'The general opinion of the party was that a Liberal policy was being
pursued in foreign affairs, and that we had in the Foreign Office
carried out that which the country intended us to do. We were able to
bring about joint action on the part of Europe, and by means of it to
settle the Greek and Montenegrin questions; and Goschen's presence at
Constantinople was useful, inasmuch as he fully shared the views of
the Liberal party upon foreign affairs, although he differed from them
in domestic matters. On the other hand, the party were frightened
about India, for, although Lord Lytton had been removed, the
Government refused to make any sign as to the immediate evacuation of
Kandahar, and, as a matter of fact, it was a long time before the
Queen's resistance upon this point could be overcome. She no doubt
felt more able to stand out against Hartington, whom she liked, than
against Lord Granville.' [Footnote: See _Life of Granville_, vol. ii.,
p. 5.]
Lord Lytton's policy is thus described:
'The _Allgemeine Zeitung_ for one of the last days of February
contained a remarkable disclosure of the Government scheme for the
settlement of Afghan affairs, which, so far as I know, did not appear
in the English newspapers. It was quoted from some Indian paper, and
revealed the fact that Persia was to occupy Herat, Kabul and Kandahar
being capitals of two separate States. I did not at the time believe
that it was possible that the Government should have absolutely
reversed the past British policy by proposing the cession of Herat to
Persia, but when I came into office at the end of April I made
immediate inquiry into the subject, and found that it was true, and
that they had done so. It was afterwards admitted.'
This proposal, however, had been declined by Persia. Before the fall of
the Beaconsfield Ministry--
'The Amir of Afghanistan had written to tell us that he must be the
friend of Russia, though he would be our friend too. We had replied
(that is to say, the outgoing Government had replied) that Russia had
sworn to us to have no dealings with Afghanistan, but that we should
in any case evacuate his country in October without conditions,
although he must respect our hold on Kandahar. Persia, it was clear
from Lytton's despatches, had acted under Russian influence when
declining Herat on our conditions.'
Under Lord Ripon, the policy of breaking up Afghanistan disappeared. But
although there was a clear intention to abandon all claim to remain in
Kandahar, yet the difficulty which attends any retrogressive movement in
Central Asia was at this moment intensified, because Russia was
threatening to advance on Merv, only 250 miles from Herat; and it seemed
as if the Tsar's troops might occupy one Afghan stronghold at the moment
when the Queen's forces withdrew from another.
'Lord Granville showed me, 15th May, some notes of language which he
intended to hold to Russia as to Central Asia, very strong indeed upon
the question of Merv; but the Cabinet afterwards took all this out,
not a single man being found in the Cabinet to back up Lord Granville
upon this question.'
In the succeeding months Sir Charles maintained a steady correspondence
with the new Viceroy, Lord Ripon, who described his task as a hard one.
"But I will do my best to perform it faithfully, and trust to you to back
me up." In it appears the reason for Lord Ripon's unwilling acceptance of
Abdurrahman, whom he called "the most Russian of the candidates" for the
Afghan throne, but also the inevitable choice. If Lord Ripon broke with
him, no hope appeared of establishing "even a semblance of order" before
the Indian Government withdrew the troops, "as," said the Viceroy, "we
_must_, because the service in Afghanistan, especially in winter, is so
unpopular with the native troops as to be a serious difficulty if it
should continue long. I hate the idea of leaving the Afghans a prey to
anarchy, created to some extent, at all events, by our policy, and I shall
do all I can to avoid it."
The Eastern Question was still dominant. The Treaty of Berlin had left
three sources of discontent in the region affected by its provisions. In
Bulgaria, Turkey complained that the Bulgarians had not fulfilled their
promise to disarm and to raze fortifications. In Greece, evasive
negotiations concerning the promised 'rectification of the frontier' were
being deliberately spun out. On the Montenegrin border, territory
surrendered and evacuated by the Turks had immediately been occupied by
Mohammedan Albanians before the Montenegrin troops could reach it.
'On my first examination of the papers at the Foreign Office, I found
that the black spot was Montenegro; the Roman Catholic Albanians on
the frontier and the Mahomedan Albanians being equally determined not
to become Montenegrin, and the Montenegrins insisting either on the
line of the Treaty, which would give them some Mahomedan, or on the
lines of the "Corti compromise," which would give them some Roman
Catholic Albanian subjects.' [Footnote: The "Corti compromise" was so
named after the Italian Ambassador at Constantinople, who advocated a
frontier line more favourable to Turkey than those previously proposed
(Sir Edward Hertslet's _Map of Europe by Treaty_, vol. iv.).]
Immediate steps were taken to remove the menace to European tranquillity
which arose from what the Austrian Ambassador called "the Porte's long
delays and tergiversation."
'_May 1st._--Pressure at Constantinople had begun this day, the
Cabinet having on the previous day approved an excellent and firm
despatch from Lord Granville to Layard, really written from the first
word to the last by Tenterden, containing the phrase, "While Her
Majesty's Government wish to abstain from anything like menace, any
intimation they give will be adhered to to the letter." The weak point
about the despatch, however, was that the Russians had written us a
despatch in the same sense, and that it might have been made to appear
that we were only acting under Russian dictation. At the same time the
despatch returned to the position of the circular bearing Lord
Salisbury's name, which I have called the April 1st (1878) Circular,
and set up that Concert of Europe which was destined to be kept
together until the Greek and Montenegrin frontier questions had been
settled....
'On May 3rd the Cabinet again considered our circular despatch
(calling on the Powers to address an identic and simultaneous note to
the Porte to fulfil its Treaty obligations as regards Greece,
Montenegro, and Armenia) in its final form.... On May 4th I lunched
with Lord Granville, and found that it was finally settled that
Goschen would go as Ambassador to Constantinople and Edmond
Fitzmaurice in Wolff's place.'
Meanwhile France was vigorously backing the new policy. Lord Granville was
deeply engaged in trying to unite Germany with the Powers in carrying out
concerted action, which was constantly evaded by Bismarck.
'_May 7th_.--On this day I had an opportunity of reading quietly a
curious despatch of Odo Russell, dated April 29th, recounting the
views of Prince Bismarck, who seemed to me to have been laughing at
him. The Prince "is even more willing to give his support to any
combined policy of England and France, as for instance in Egypt,
because he looks upon an Anglo-French alliance as the basis of peace
and order in Europe." [Footnote: This despatch is to be found in the
_Life of Granville_, vol. ii., p. 211, where the date is given as May
1st.]
'On Sunday, May 9th, I had to dinner Léon Say, the new French
Ambassador; Montebello, his first secretary, afterwards Ambassador at
Constantinople; Lord Lyons and his secretary Sheffield; Lord
Tenterden, my colleague at the Foreign Office; my secretary Murray;
Harcourt, and C. E. D. Black, who the week afterwards became
Harcourt's secretary on my recommendation. Léon Say brought with him
from the French "bag" Gambetta's answer to my letter. Gambetta
informed me that the French Government were unanimous in throwing over
Waddington's compromise and giving Greece all that she had been
intended to have; and Gambetta was in favour, and said that his Prime
Minister' (M. de Freycinet) 'was in favour, of taking active steps to
prevent further delay on the part of Turkey.' [Footnote:
"CHAMBRE DES DÉPUTÉS,
"PARIS,
"_le 7 Mai_, 1880.
"CHER AMI,
"Les dernières Élections Cantonales m'avaient si vivement absorbé que
je n'ai pu trouver la minute de liberté nécessaire pour répondre à vos
deux lettres.
"Permettez-moi d'ailleurs, après m'être excusé du retard, de vous dire
que je ne partageais ni votre émotion ni votre point d'impatience. Je
crois fermement que la solution grecque sera prochainement obtenue, en
dépit des résistances et des tergiversations qui peuvent se produire
chez les Turcs ou ailleurs. L'important est de maintenir le concert de
l'Europe, de le manifester par l'action commune d'une démonstration
navale; et d'après tout ce que je sais, j'ai confiance que le
gouvernement de la République est resté dans la ligne de conduite et
qu'il y persévérera.
"Quant à la Grèce, il convient qu'elle attende aussi, sans faire
mesure, l'effet de cette démonstration. Je suis peut-être optimiste,
mais je crois à une issue favorable.
"En ce qui touche le traité de Commerce votre lettre m'a fort surpris,
et je ne peux m'expliquer une attitude si contraire aux préliminaires
pris par M. L. Say: je vous prie de ne pas trop vous hâter de la
porter à la connaissance du public. Je crois qu'il y a là quelque
malentendu que je serai bien aise de faire disparaître, si vous voulez
m'y donner le temps.
"Je vais demain à Cherbourg, où je verrai vos amis qui sont invités
par la Ville, et au retour je vous manderai ce que j'aurai appris sur
les négociations du traité de Commerce qu'il serait si bon de voir
conclure.
"Bien cordialement,
"L. GAMBETTA."
"CHAMBRE DES DÉPUTÉS,
"PARIS,
"_le 8 Mai_, 1880.
"MON CHER AMI,
"Je profite de l'intermédiaire d'un jeune ami, M. Auguste Gérard, que
vous avez déjà rencontré, pour vous envoyer quelques lignes de réponse
a votre aimable dernière communication.
"J'ai vu le Président de notre cabinet au sujet de la question
Grecque, et comme vous pensez, le gouvernement est unanime pour
reprendre la question de Janina intégralement, en écartant
définitivement la dernière proposition de Waddington; on accepte la
formation de la commission internationale, chargée de reprendre le
tracé au double point de vue diplomatique et technique. On y défendra
le tracé qui englobe Janina. Ce qui importerait aujourd'hui serait
d'agir promptement, et de concert. On commettrait une lourde faute en
laissant la Porte atermoyer plus longtemps et épuiser toutes les
forces des diverses nationalités auxquelles elle refuse de donner les
maigres satisfactions fixées par le traité de Berlin.
"M. Léon Say doit avoir reçu d'ailleurs à ce sujet les instructions
les plus nettes, et vous l'avez probablement déjà vu.
* * * * * * *
"A bientôt, je l'espère,
"Votre dévoué,
"LÉON GAMBETTA."]
Such a step had already been taken by Great Britain on May 8th, when the
Cabinet--
'wrote a despatch to the Courts proposing a Conference at Berlin or
Paris as to the Greek frontier, which led, in fact, to the Conference
summoned at Berlin to consider the fulfilment of the terms of the
Treaty.'
On May 10th this activity was resented by the Sultan, who 'telegraphed his
unwillingness to receive Goschen, and great pressure had to be brought to
bear upon him during the next few days to induce him to consent.'
There was another matter arising out of the Russo-Turkish War which had
occupied Sir Charles much while in Opposition--namely, the government of
Cyprus. He did not think that the Foreign Office was the proper department
to administer dependencies, and accordingly, within a few days of taking
office, he raised the question whether there was any ground for keeping
Cyprus under the Foreign Office, and suggested its transfer to the
Colonial Office. In this Lord Granville concurred. But--
'Philip Currie, who as head of the Turkish department was managing the
affairs of Cyprus, did not want to lose it, and asked to be allowed to
prepare a memorandum in the opposite sense, and Lord Granville wrote,
"I do not expect to be converted by Currie's memorandum. Do you? If
not, the Colonial Office will have to bolt it." The Colonial Office
did have to bolt it, for the island was soon handed over to them!'
By the close of the year, as has been seen, Sir Charles was able to report
to his constituents "that, acting under the instructions of Lord
Granville, he had secured a greatly improved administration for this
island."
On May 21st--
'Egypt began to trouble me, and I was not to be clear of the
embarrassment which it caused for several years. I wrote to Lord
Granville to say that I had been sounded through Rivers Wilson as to
how the Government would take the appointment of a Nubar Ministry with
an English Finance Minister,' and Sir Charles again warned Lord
Granville of dissensions between the English representatives in Egypt.
It became the most serious of all the embarrassments which involved Mr.
Gladstone's Government. On May 8th--
'I had to see Lord Ripon, who had appointed Colonel Gordon to be his
private secretary, and to inform him privately that the Foreign Office
feared that he would find him too excitable to be possible as a
secretary, which, indeed, very speedily proved to be the case.'
Gordon resigned before Lord Ripon reached India, and on June 14th
telegraphed to Sir Charles--
'to know whether we would let him take service again with the Chinese.
I saw a friend of his in London, one of the Chinese Commissioners of
Customs, and asked whether Gordon could be got to telegraph that he
would refuse any military command in the event of war between China
and Russia. He said he thought so, and I told Lord Granville, who
wrote back, "I have told the Duke of Cambridge that on these
conditions he might have leave."'
Lord Ripon wrote on his arrival:
"... So, you see, your warnings about Gordon came true. It is
fortunate that the arrangement came to an end before I got here. As it
is, there is no real harm done; we parted the best of friends, and I
learned to my astonishment, after I left him at Bombay, that he was
off for China."
So passes out of sight for the moment, but only for the moment, this
fateful personality.
An immediate trouble, however, arose out of the Anglo-Turkish Convention
of 1878, by which Great Britain had been pledged to defend Turkey's
possessions in Asia Minor on condition that necessary reforms in
government were introduced. This pledge made England indirectly
responsible for the character of Turkish rule in Armenia; and Sir Charles
had repeatedly expressed the view that England was committed to more than
she could perform, either as against Russia or on behalf of Armenia. On
May 14th the Cabinet left in the draft of instructions to Mr. Goschen 'a
passage of Tenterden's, in which we recognized the Asia Minor Convention
of our predecessors.... But I induced Lord Granville to strike it out
after the Cabinet on his own responsibility.'
On the other hand, since the Convention existed, Sir Charles held that by
abrogating it they 'might appear to invite the Russians to invade Armenia,
which Russia might proceed to do in the name of humanity.' So far as
Turkey was concerned, it was considered likely that the Porte would wish
to see the Convention annulled, because it could then sell Cyprus to Great
Britain for cash instead of leasing it in return for the Asiatic
guarantee; and Turkish Pashas would be free from any interference about
reforms in Asia Minor. Ultimately the fear of letting Russia in outweighed
the other considerations, and the Convention was recognized, leaving
England with a heavy burden of moral responsibility for all that
subsequently occurred in Armenia under the protection of what Mr.
Gladstone himself had not unjustly called this "insane covenant."
Meanwhile, Musurus Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador, was complaining to Lord
Granville that 'the Sultan had assented to the Convention under a false
impression, not knowing that a portion of his dominions would be given
over to Austrian control, an alienation not contemplated by the Treaty of
San Stefano.' He complained, moreover, that the arrangement went, in
reality, beyond temporary occupation of provinces. 'We (Lord Salisbury)
had given Bosnia and Herzegovina secretly to Austria without reserve.'
The whole Eastern situation was ill-defined and full of difficulties. Mr.
Goschen, before he left England on his mission, came to Dilke to 'bewail
the unwillingness of Gladstone and of Lord Granville to make up their
minds how far they were going in the direction of coercion of Turkey.' On
May 26th--
'Looking about to see how Turkey was to be coerced with regard to the
Greek and Montenegrin questions, I discovered that all reinforcements
and officials were sent, and all money received by the Constantinople
Government, by the sea route, so that a blockade of the Dardanelles
would cut their Empire in two until they came to terms.'
Sir Charles's aim throughout all these frontier negotiations was to
support the claims of Greece, left indefinite by the Berlin Treaty. At
Great Britain's instance, the Greeks had refrained from attacking Turkey
when Turkey was engaged with Russia; but the Treaty of Berlin had only
promised to Greece in general terms "a rectification of frontier." On the
other hand, the Treaty had awarded to Montenegro certain districts of
Albania, which, as already stated; showed great repugnance to accept
Montenegrin rule. Sir Charles now conceived a plan--
"for combining Albanian autonomy with personal union with Greece,
finding that the Albanians were willing to accept the King of the
Hellenes, provided they succeeded in obtaining securities or
privileges for the Roman Catholic Church, to which great numbers of
them belonged."
On May 28th he learnt from the Greek Chargé d'Affaires that proposals for
such a personal union had been made to the King of Greece, directly and
very secretly, "on the part of a Turkish statesman." The Southern
Albanians, wrote M. Gennadius, are to all intents and purposes Greeks.
But, the latter added, "the initiative ought to proceed from the
Albanians." A few days later Mr. Goschen wrote from Constantinople that
the proposed union would be a solution "very valuable for Europe," but
that the Turks would struggle hard to outbid the Greeks, and the Albanians
were very strong in the Palace, and were trusted all over the Empire.
Still, autonomy, Mr. Goschen thought, the Albanians "would and must have
in some shape." [Footnote: See also _Life of Goschen_, vol. ii., pp. 215,
216.]
In their attempt to reverse the Beaconsfield policy there was one
influence steadily opposed to the Government.
'On June 11th there went out a despatch, which had been for several
days on the stocks, as to the Anglo-Turkish Convention. It had come
back on the 10th from the Queen, who had written by the side of our
words: "The acquisition of Cyprus is, in their view, of no advantage
to the country either in a military or political sense." "I do not in
the least agree in this.--V.R.I." But we sent it, all the same.'
The King of Greece had come to London, and on June 4th Sir Charles went by
his wish to Marlborough House, and had an hour's conversation, 'chiefly
upon the question of personal union with Albania, but partly with regard
to the past, as to which I received his thanks.' 'I thought him a very
able man, an opinion which I have never changed.' All Europe confirmed
this judgment when the King of the Hellenes was struck down more than
thirty years later in the very achievement of his long-planned schemes. In
1880 the note of disparagement was widespread; but Sir Charles was not
alone in his estimate:
'Dizzy was once, after this date, talking to me and the Duchess of
Manchester about him, and the Duchess said to me: "How you Liberals
have deceived that poor little King!" Whereupon Dizzy replied: "It
would take a very clever Government to deceive that youth."'
Elsewhere Sir Charles wrote that the King was a "good talker, but
academic," and, dining at Marlborough House on June 6th, he heard an
estimate of him as the too industrious apprentice:
'A big aide-de-camp of the King of Greece took more champagne than was
good for him, and was extremely funny. Pointing to his King, he said:
"Now, there is my King. He is a good little King; but he is not what I
call a fashionable King." And then, pointing to the Prince of Wales,
he said: "Now, that is what I call a fashionable Prince--_un Prince
vraiment 'chic.'_ He goes to bed late, it is true, but he gets up--
well, never. That is what I call a really fashionable Prince. My King
gets up at six!"'
Sir Charles met the King repeatedly during the next fortnight, to follow
out, with the maps, the military details of the proposed new frontier. As
soon as the French and Austrian Governments had accepted the British
proposal for a Conference at Berlin to settle the question of the
frontiers, and Bismarck had consented to call it, Lord Odo Russell wrote
that he would have to "act on the Greek Frontier Commission, in which
Dilke was better versed than anyone," and begged Sir Charles to "lend him
his lights," 'which,' says the Memoir, 'I had to proceed to do' by an
exhaustive letter.
A naval demonstration in the Adriatic now followed, generally known as
'the Dulcigno demonstration,' carried out by ships of the concerted
Powers, under command of the senior Admiral present, and acting under a
_protocole de désintéressement_. It was imposing rather than formidable,
since France and Italy both instructed their officers in no case to fire a
shot. But it was powerfully reinforced by the threat of independent
British action, on the lines which Sir Charles Dilke suggested, and, so
helped, it did its work, so far as the Montenegrin question was concerned.
The Greek question still remained for settlement.
Phases in the development of this situation are thus chronicled:
'On June 23rd I went to the State Ball, and had a good deal of talk
with Musurus, to try and find out about a curious business which I
noted in my diary as follows: "The Russians and Turks are working
together. The Russians came yesterday to propose to send 20,000
Russian men in English ships to coerce Turkey, and the Turks tell us
to-day that they will yield to an occupation by a European force, but
not to a mere naval demonstration. Both want to raise the difficulties
which this will cause, and to fish in troubled waters."
'On Wednesday, June 30th, at three o'clock, an interview took place
between Lord Granville, Lord Northbrook' (First Lord of the
Admiralty), 'Childers' (Secretary of State for War), 'Sir John Adye'
(Childers' adviser), 'and myself at the Foreign Office as to the means
of coercing Turkey. The War Office wished to place an army corps in
Greece, which, if they were to send a full complement of guns, would
take a month. I suggested the far cheaper plan of a naval occupation
of the port of Smyrna, and the collection and stoppage of customs and
dues. Mr. Gladstone came in a little late, and took up my idea. But,
preferring his Montenegrins to my Greeks, he insisted that we should
first deal by the fleet with the Montenegrin question at Dulcigno.
Both ideas went forward. The Dulcigno demonstration took place, and
produced the cession of territory to the Montenegrins; and we
afterwards let out to the Turks our intentions with regard to Smyrna,
and produced by this means the cession of territory to Greece.
[Footnote: _Life of Granville_, vol. ii., p. 231.]
'On Thursday, July 1st, we had a further interview with the Admiralty
to arrange our naval demonstrations. On this day there came to see me
Professor Panariétoff, a secret agent of the Prince of Bulgaria. He
informed me that his Government intended to press on a union between
Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia. They did not see any reason why they
should wait. It might suit the English Liberal Cabinet that they
should wait; but from their point of view, why wait? At a party in the
evening I met Borthwick, who playfully assured me that he knew that
our policy was to send one army corps to Greece to support the Greeks
against the Turks, and another to Eastern Roumelia to support the
Turks in maintaining the Treaty of Berlin. The two, after each of them
had accomplished its mission, would probably, he thought, come into
hostilities with one another in Macedonia.'
On July 5th the Austrian Ambassador, Count Karolyi, told Sir Charles that
the Turkish representative at Vienna had been solemnly warned to reckon no
longer upon the possibility of disagreement among the Powers, and to
consider 'the danger which would result if the Powers became convinced
that the Porte had no respect either for their pledges or its own.' This
Dilke hailed as 'a great step in advance on Austria's part,' and on July
7th he called at the Austrian Embassy, at the wish of the Ambassador, who
explained the views of his Government:
'It would send two ships to meet two ships of each Power that chose to
send any, to watch the Montenegro coast with a view to carrying out
the Dulcigno proposal if the Porte would not give effect to the Corti
compromise within three weeks.' Count Karolyi 'then went on to speak
warmly in favour of the future of Greece, and to say that as regarded
the Greek frontier Austria would be willing even to send troops.'
Public feeling in Austria, it appeared, was willing to sanction much
stronger measures in support of Greece than it would tolerate on behalf of
Montenegro. The British Foreign Office now proceeded to utilize the
position of vantage which had been gained.
'On July 16th I noted that, Lord Granville having urged the Queen to
write an autograph letter to the Sultan of a nature to induce him to
give in, the Queen very naturally refused, on the ground that she
dissented from every proposition in the draft sent her. She offered to
write a mild word of advice or recommendation to him to yield without
bloodshed, and this proposal was accepted by the Government. A
telegram based on it was despatched on the 17th, and it asked in the
name of united Europe for a complete fulfilment of the conditions of
the Treaty of Berlin. The Sultan had at this moment despatched a
secret agent, a French advocate at Constantinople, to Gambetta, who
assured him that it was because France was interested in the
maintenance of the Ottoman Empire that it was absolutely necessary to
force Turkey to allow herself to be saved.
'The attitude of the French Government had begun to embarrass us a
good deal. On July 28th I wrote to Gambetta that we could not
understand the hesitations of the French Government, which was
continually putting in reserves. All this was known at Constantinople,
and augmented the resistance of the Porte; the Prime Minister's paper
was attacking us, and Gambetta's paper (the _République Française_)
giving us no support.... In his telegraphic reply Gambetta used words
of encouragement with regard to the attitude of his Government, as to
which, no doubt, he was himself finding a good deal of trouble. A
little later he sent over one of his private secretaries with a fuller
letter.'
A conversation with Gambetta would have been valuable to Sir Charles at
this moment, and he regretted having to forgo an opportunity which
offered. He had procured invitations for--
'the Brasseys and Samuelson to the Cherbourg banquet, [Footnote: This
banquet was the occasion of Gambetta's famous Cherbourg speech, a
passage from which is inscribed on his monument in Paris.] which was
to be given to the President of the Republic and the Presidents of the
two Chambers (that is, Grévy, Gambetta, and Léon Say). Brassey asked
me to go with him in the _Sunbeam_. Although I should like to have
gone, I was under engagements in London; and I spent the Sunday
dismally ... instead of at Cherbourg with Gambetta.'
But he sent him messages by Mr. Bernhard Samuelson [Footnote: M.P. for
Banbury; afterwards Sir Bernhard Samuelson.] which were quickly effective.
Also, although public opinion in Austria favoured Greece, Sir Charles had
ground for believing that Italian Ministers kept the Turks perfectly
informed, and that even while advising concession upon Montenegro, they
did so with the suggestion that the Greek claims might be the more easily
resisted. Austria's concern was, of course, with the northern part of the
Illyrian coast; Italy's with the southern. As he noted later in the year,
'the European Concert was about as easy to manage as six horses to drive
tandem.' Nevertheless, by the first week in August, 1880, he was able to
write:
'A collective note had now been presented by the Powers to the Porte,
so that we had carried the Powers with us as fully in our Montenegrin
policy, represented by the collective note, as in our Greek policy,
represented by the previous Identic note--a most considerable success,
contrasting strongly with the failure which our foreign policy met
with two or three years later.'
These impressions were shared by Lord Ripon, who followed European and
domestic affairs keenly, from India. He wrote on August 17th:
"I rejoice to see that the F.O. seems to be distancing all competitors
in the race of success, ... which" (he added) "in regard to some
parliamentary proceedings is not very high praise, you will be perhaps
inclined to say."
II.
Even after the collective note had been presented, the European situation
remained delicate and difficult through the mutual distrust of the Powers.
On August 9th Lord Granville, who through all these negotiations was
exerting his greatest diplomatic skill in keeping Germany in the Concert,
expressed to Sir Charles his conviction that 'Bismarck had spies in the
Queen's household, and knew everything that went on.' On the side of
France matters improved. [Footnote: See _Life of Granville_, vol. ii.,
chapter vi.]
'On the 8th I received, at last, a reply from Gambetta to my letters--
a reply in which he showed that he fully agreed with me, but that he
was not as a fact all-powerful with the Prime Minister (Freycinet).
The same post, however, brought me a letter from Lord Houghton, who
was at Vichy, and who complained that it was an unhealthy state of
things that Gambetta (who had talked freely to him while in Paris)
"should exercise so much irresponsible power." ... The result of my
attempts to stir up Gambetta upon our side was seen in the report by
Bernhard Samuelson of Gambetta's conversation with him at Cherbourg on
Monday, August 9th, and in an article which appeared on Wednesday,
August 11th, and another on Friday, the 13th, in Gambetta's paper on
the coercion of the Turks. These articles were from the pen of
Barrère, who had been over in the previous week to see me, and were
written at the personal direction of Gambetta; and Adams (Secretary to
the Embassy) wrote from Paris on the 13th that the tone of the French
Government had correspondingly improved.'
But even while France assisted in one direction, she introduced fresh
complications in another by her quickly maturing designs on Tunis--which
had been mentioned to Sir Charles by the French Ambassador, M. Léon Say,
as early as June 8th. French diplomatists claimed an authorization from
Lord Salisbury. [Footnote: See Crispi's _Memoirs_, vol. ii., pp. 98-109
and 121; _Life of Granville_, vol. ii., pp. 215, 270, 436, as to Tunis and
Tripoli.] "How can you," he was reported to have said, during the
conversations which attended the Congress of Berlin, "leave Carthage to
the barbarians?"
'It was on this day (June 8th, 1880) that I became fully aware of the
terms of Lord Salisbury's offer of Tunis to France, as to which he
misled the public, Lord Salisbury having, when reminded of the
statement, said privately that it was "a private conversation," and
publicly that there was "no foundation for the statement."'
Later Sir Charles made inquiries of M. Say, who gave the dates of the two
conversations as July 21st and 26th, 1878.
'Lord Salisbury made a denial which is on record at the Foreign Office
in his own handwriting in red ink, but this denial is dated July 16th
--_i.e._, before the conversations.'
The trouble developed rapidly. By August 14th, 1880, Italy was threatening
to withdraw her Ambassador from Paris, 'on account of the receipt of
information showing that the French intended to occupy Tunis under Lord
Salisbury's permission.'
At this moment Sir Charles's health broke down. Two notes from his chief,
Lord Granville, are preserved, the first evidently sent across in the
office:
"MY DEAR DILKE,
"Please don't be a d--d fool. Go home and do exactly what your doctor
tells you.
"Yrs. G."
And again on August 18th Lord Granville wrote:
"I must formally request you not to leave the house till you send me
the doctor's written statement that he has advised you to do so. I
consider myself an honorary member of the gouty faction, and entitled
to speak with weight on the folly of trying to bully the disorder."
To this friendly dictation the patient submitted till the 23rd, when he
insisted on going to the House to answer questions, but returned to bed,
and next morning underwent an operation. [Footnote: He worked hard during
his enforced confinement to the house, and one of his visitors was M.
Joseph Arnaud, one of Gambetta's secretaries, who was sent by his friend
to reassure him as to the pressure he was using in the Frontier Question.
It is of M. Arnaud that Sir Charles tells a Gambetta story: 'G. was jovial
to-day, November 12th, 1880. Arnaud having said that all the people to
whom tickets were given for the presidential tribune were grateful to
Gambetta, and all who were angry were angry with him--Arnaud--the reply
was: "Tu ne comprends donc pas que tu es institué pour ça?"'] In a few
days he was again in Parliament, where the peace party, headed by Sir
Wilfrid Lawson, had begun to denounce the naval demonstration against
Turkey. In this they were backed by the Fourth Party, who spoke of it as
"the combined filibustering." However, on September 7th, the general
question was raised on the motion for adjournment of the House, and Sir
Charles, 'replying to the peace party on the one hand, and on the other to
Cowen, who attacked them in the name of Albanian nationality,' drew from
Lord Granville this compliment:
"My mother once said that Clarendon--with a slight headache--was the
pleasantest man she knew. I will not say that an operation makes you
speak better, but it certainly does not prevent your speaking as well
as usual."
The Fourth Party [Footnote: Dilke dates the birth of the Fourth Party at
the beginning of the Gladstone Ministry, and says: 'Gorst was its real
brain, the other two members (for Arthur Balfour hardly belonged to it)
contributing "brass."'] were also busy in denunciation of the Government's
policy in Afghanistan, which had been finally determined on August 7th,
when--
'the Cabinet directed Lord Hartington and Lord Ripon to retire from
Kandahar, although we had now heard of the intention of the Russians
to occupy Merv, a step on their part which was certain to make our
retirement from Kandahar unpopular with those who did not know its
necessity.'
Another circumstance even more certain to add to the unpopularity of the
retirement was not then known to the Home Government. On July 26th, Lord
Ripon, writing to Sir Charles, complained of the "embarrassing
engagements" with which "Lytton's reckless proceedings" had hampered him.
One of these engagements bound him to maintain Shere Ali as Wali of
Kandahar; and on July 27th, Ayub Khan, Shere Ali's rival, defeated at
Maiwand the force under General Burrows which was supporting Great
Britains' nominee. The policy of evacuation met with resistance in a
quarter where such policies were always opposed. On September 7th Sir
Charles left London to stay with Lord Granville at Walmer Castle, and Lord
Hartington joined them on the 9th.
'The Queen had written for the second time to Hartington urging with
great warmth that we should retain Kandahar, although, as Hartington
said, this meant, to India, an expenditure of four millions sterling a
year, on local troops, for no military return.... The Queen ... at
this moment was not only protesting strongly with regard to Kandahar,
but also, in cipher telegrams, against the naval demonstration....
'On September 20th Lord Granville, just starting for Balmoral, came to
see me. He told me that he thought of sending Dufferin to
Constantinople at the end of Goschen's special mission, and Paget to
Petersburg, and Layard to Rome if he could not get a pension out of
the Treasury for Layard.'
The Queen conceived the interests of England as Lord Beaconsfield had
presented them. But Mr. Gladstone did not conceive of English interests as
bound up with Turkish success, and wrote on September 21st:
"If Turkey befools Europe at Dulcigno, we may as well shut up shop
altogether."
About the same time Chamberlain expressed his mind on questions of foreign
policy in their bearing on party politics:
"Kandahar will have to be given up.... I only hope Hartington will
have the pluck to do it at once and before we get into some fresh
scrape. I observe the papers generally speak well of the session, the
Government, and especially of the Radicals. So far so good. We have
scored very well up to this time."
'In another letter Chamberlain added:
'"What about the Concert of Europe? Will it last through a bombardment
of Dulcigno? I don't much like concerts. Our party of two, with
Dillwyn as chorus, was about as numerous as is consistent with
harmony, and I fear five great Powers are too many to make a happy
family."'
In France the great ally of the Sultan's Fabian policy had fallen. M. de
Freycinet found himself forced to resign on September 19th:
'On September 9th I recorded that Gambetta means to turn out
Freycinet. He foretold all this when Freycinet took office, and said
to me at that time: "He will do well enough until he tries to fly. But
one of these days he will set off flying." Gambetta turned out
Freycinet on this occasion, but the day was to come when Freycinet
would turn out Gambetta.'
On the 23rd Sir Charles 'heard from Paris that the fallen Minister "had
been discovered to have been negotiating with the Vatican for months,
without the knowledge even of his own colleagues."'
In the new Ministry, with Jules Ferry as Prime Minister, the Foreign
Office fell to Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, [Footnote: M. Barthélemy Saint-
Hilaire, born in 1805, the well-known philosophical writer and translator
of Aristotle, was now seventy-five years of age. He entered the Chamber of
Deputies in 1848 as a member of the Left, and became a member of the
Senate in 1876. He was the first Secrétaire-Général de la Présidence de la
République.] and Lord Houghton said: "Think of the old Aristotelian
Barthélemy having the F.O.! Without pretension, I think at my age I am
just as fit for the English one." This was a view in which Sir Charles
inclined to agree, although M. Barrère wrote: "Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire's
tendencies are excellent. He is in complete accord with _us_, and his
views are wholly ours."
Lord Houghton also spoke of an interview with Moltke, who had told him
that 'Russia was the cause of the necessity for the immense arming of
Europe, not France, which at present might be trusted to keep quiet.'
'On September 28th I noted: "Cabinet suddenly and most unexpectedly
summoned for Thursday to sit on Parnell, the Sultan, and the Queen,
about Ireland, Dulcigno, and Kandahar respectively."... [Footnote: The
decisions as to the Irish difficulties are dealt with in the first
portion of Chapter XXII., pp. 343-348.]
'On September 30th Chamberlain, who was staying at Sloane Street, gave
me a note of what passed at the Cabinet. With regard to Kandahar, the
Generals whose names had been suggested by the Queen had been
consulted, and had, of course, pronounced against giving it up. So the
Queen had got her own way sufficiently for the matter to be left over
till after Christmas. The Cabinet were evidently sorry that they had
not more fully and more early adopted my suggestion of British
coercion of the Turks at Smyrna. And on this occasion they agreed to
try to induce the other Powers to agree upon (1) local action, or (2)
the seizure of a material guarantee: (1) meaning a demonstration at
the Dardanelles, and (2) meaning Crete.'
But the Eastern, unlike the Irish, trouble was now nearing a close,
though--
'On October 1st Lord Granville came to sit with me, and was very
gloomy. He thought that Mr. Gladstone was inclined to give in to the
Turks rather than resort to coercion. Harcourt came in also--at one
moment, "Whatever we do, we must not be snubbed," and the next, "After
all, it will be no worse than Palmerston and Denmark."'
Sir Charles's plan for the seizure of Smyrna was now agreed to in
principle by the Ministers in London, but while it still remained
uncertain whether they could carry other Powers with them in this coup,
Lord Lyons, British Ambassador at Paris, had written expressing a wish to
see, Dilke concerning negotiations for a commercial treaty, 'and the
Foreign Office also desired that I should deal with the Danube question
later.' Sir Charles left London on October 11th.
'Before I left, Lord Granville showed me a letter from Hartington from
Balmoral saying that the Queen had not named Kandahar to him, and had
"agreed to the Smyrna seizure project," but was angry about Ireland.
Hartington added that he had pledged Forster to put down Parnell. As
to her not naming Kandahar, Lord Granville said that she never
attacked the policy of a department to its chief.'
At Paris Sir Charles was warned by Lord Lyons that '"you will find the
French Foreign Office in some confusion, as the new Under-Secretary of
State is vigorously employed in 'purging' it of clericals and
reactionaries."' On October 12th he went with Lord Lyons to see Barthélemy
Saint-Hilaire, and also Jules Ferry, the Prime Minister, and Tirard, the
Minister of Commerce, with whom he would be principally brought into
touch.
Lord Granville was in London with Mr. Gladstone, bewailing the unhappy
fate of those who have to wait for an Eastern Power to make up its mind.
But at last the Porte's decision to surrender Dulcigno was announced, and
Lord Granville wrote:
"MY DEAR DILKE,
"I accept your felicitations _d'avance_--the Turkish Note has got us
out of a great mess. My liver feels better already. I hope you will
improve the occasion by impressing upon all that it only requires firm
language from all, such as was used by them on Saturday, to make the
Turk yield.
"I wonder whether they will be keen about Turkish finance. It is
rather in their line.
"How are we to help our poor friends the Greeks?"
The letter closed by a warning not to write by the post, "unless to say
something which it is desirable the French Government should know."
Caution as to danger of gossip about his frequent meetings with Gambetta
was also urged. [Footnote: Sir Charles notes on 11th November: 'Having had
a telegram from Lord Granville to caution me, I told Gambetta that I did
not want my visits talked about because of the German newspapers. The
result of it was that the _Agence Havas_ stated that I had not seen
Gambetta, and this was copied by Blowitz next day, so that the _Times_
repeated the untrue statement!']
Acting on these suggestions, Sir Charles Dilke during the next four days
discussed with the French Foreign Office and with Gambetta (who had
written on September 28th to say, "Je reviendrai exprès de Suisse pour
vous vous en causer à fond"), not only commercial negotiations, but also
Turkish finance and the affairs of Greece. According to Lord Edmond
Fitzmaurice, the interests of Greece were at this time suffering because
Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire was anxious to reconcile the Porte to those
designs "which France was executing at Tunis and contemplating at
Tripoli"; [Footnote: _Life of Granville_, vol. ii., pp. 215, 436.] and in
Sir Charles's notes of these interviews there is repeated mention of
Gambetta's references to what Lord Salisbury had promised or suggested in
regard to Tunis. Gambetta himself was strongly Philhellene, but said to
his friend on October 17th: "Mr. Gladstone has spoilt our European affairs
by putting Montenegro first." He held, and M. de Courcel agreed with him,
that the Concert was for the moment "used up," and that Greece must wait
until it could be reinvigorated. The conclusion which Sir Charles drew and
conveyed to Lord Granville was that 'France waited on Germany, and Germany
on Austria, in regard to the Eastern Question, and consequently that,
Austria being absolutely mistress of the situation, a confidential
exchange of opinions at Vienna was essential.'
The demonstration at Dulcigno was carried out in December, but no further
progress was made then towards helping their "poor friends the Greeks."
Sir Charles's health was not at this time fully restored, but he was hard
at work. Even when he went for a short rest to his villa near Toulon he
was obliged to take a cipher with him, and, having no secretary at hand,
spent much of his time (most grudgingly) in ciphering and deciphering
telegrams.
'On October 25th Lord Granville wrote to me to Toulon, in cipher, to
the effect that Odo Russell thought that "Bismarck was jealous of the
leading part in Europe which we were now taking."'
Later, in November, the Prince of Wales, just returned from Berlin,
confirmed this. At the German Court Sir Charles was regarded as a "most
dangerous man" and as "a French spy." "But," the Prince added, "they say
the same of me." On November 22nd Lord Odo Russell is quoted as saying
'that at the Court of Berlin I was considered a most dangerous man, but
that the Crown Princess fought my battles like a sound Liberal and a true
Briton as she is.'
At the close of the year, addressing his constituents, Sir Charles
delivered a very effective general reply to Lord Salisbury's attacks on
the Government's European policy. It was a little hard to be blamed for
delay in settling difficulties which all sprang from Lord Salisbury's own
"harum-scarum hurry" when he was Foreign Minister and Second
Plenipotentiary of England. Lord Salisbury might say of the naval
demonstration that the Powers might as well have sent "six washing-tubs
with flags attached to them." The fact was that only to the concerted
action of the whole of the Powers had Turkey yielded.
"The European Concert is the first real attempt in modern times to
arrive at such an understanding between the six Great Powers as might
gradually become a basis for partial disarmament, and for the adoption
of a policy which would cease to ruin nations in time of peace by
perpetual preparations for war. In arriving at the idea that when
territorial changes are to be made it is for Europe to arrange them, a
practical step has been taken in the direction of this policy."
"Quite excellent," wrote Lord Granville. "I am delighted, and so, let us
hope, is Salisbury." [Footnote: The complicated story of the negotiations
relating to the Montenegrin and Greek frontier questions will be found in
detail in the _Life of Granville_, vol. ii., chap, vi., and the _Life of
Lord Goschen_, vol. ii., chap. vii. The principal documents, with
illustrative maps, are given in Sir Edward Hertslet's _Map of Europe by
Treaty_, vol. iv.]