THE FORMATION OF A MINISTRY
I.
By the close of 1879 the Beaconsfield Administration was deeply
discredited. The year had opened with the disaster in the Zulu War at
Isandhlwana; in September came the tragedy at Kabul, when Sir Louis
Cavagnari and his staff were slain by a sudden uprising of the tribesmen;
and though Sir Frederick Roberts fought his way into the Afghan capital on
October 12th, it was only to be beleaguered within the fortifications of
Sherpur.
The European situation Sir Charles described to his constituents before
the Session of 1880 opened:
'What, I asked, were they promised in the Treaty of Berlin? Turkey
restored to strength, reformed, and, if reformed, made secure for a
distant future; Greece contented; Russian influence excluded; and the
Balkans fortified as "an impregnable frontier" for Turkey. Very
different were the realities. Turkey had been partitioned; Greece had
not been satisfied; surrender of Turkish territory to Greece, though
it was the one form of surrender which might really have strengthened
Turkey, had been opposed rather than advocated by the British
delegates. Austria, gorged with Bosnia and Herzegovina, was alone
contented.
'Of the Asia Minor clandestine convention, it was beyond our power to
fulfil the terms. Russian intrigue would sooner or later create
insurrection in Armenia. The insurrection would be put down by the old
Turkish means, by the old savagery, and our guarantee would prove
useless in face of public opinion at home. The Government had allowed
Russia to gain exactly those things which in the excellent circular of
April 1st, 1878, they had declared that it would be fatal to our
country that she should possess. The Government had proclaimed British
interests in language which I had described as the gospel of
selfishness, but there was not a British interest which was not worse
off for their rule. In Egypt, their policy of joint action with France
was certain to lead to future trouble. Greece was dissatisfied, and
leant on France, and the rising nationalities of South-Eastern Europe
were all alienated from us. Russia was in possession, not only of
Bessarabia, not only of a firm hold over Turkey by the stipulations
with regard to the debt due to her, but of that fortress of Kars and
that port of Batoum which our Government had told us she could not
consistently with British interests be permitted to possess. To add
insult to injury, we were thought such silly children as to believe
that what was left of Turkey had been saved by our plenipotentiaries--
saved in Asia by a bit of paper, and in Europe by an "impregnable
frontier" which was situated in the middle of the Bulgarian country,
and which the Sultan's troops would never be allowed to approach.
'This was a strong indictment, and, as is now seen, it was all true.'
Sir Charles's "indictment" was strengthened by information he had received
as to England's treatment of M. Waddington's circular proposing mediation
between Turkey and Greece, and by the knowledge that the championship of
Greek interests was at this moment being left to France.
'On January 26th I reached Paris on my return from Toulon, and
breakfasted with Gambetta, stupid Spuller remaining with us all the
time. Barrère came to see me, and told me that the late ministerial
crisis in France had had for cause Waddington's refusal to accept
Gambetta's orders to turn out all the reactionaries from the Foreign
Office. "That lock has now been forced." [Footnote: The Waddington
Ministry had fallen in the last days of December, and M. de Freycinet
came into power. M. Camille Barrère was at this time Gambetta's chief
private secretary. Sir Charles had first met him in London during the
Commune. He has had a distinguished career, and is, in 1917,
Ambassador at Rome.] Tissot, French Minister at Athens, and known to
me as having been formerly the representative of the Government of
National Defence in London, when he occupied the Embassy and acted as
an unauthorized Minister, is to be Ambassador at Constantinople, and
Waddington will take the Embassy in London. Barrère has been made
French Commissioner on the European Commission of the Danube, which
enables him for nine months in the year to continue his newspaper work
in Paris. It is true, as stated in the French newspapers, that
Waddington's last circular proposing mediation between Turkey and
Greece was accepted by all the Continental Powers, but not answered by
England.
'On the 27th I breakfasted with Gambetta to meet General Billot,
commanding the Marseille _corps d'armée_, who, in the event of war
occurring between 1887 and 1890, would have been second in command of
the French armies.
'"On the 28th Gambetta, at a private interview, confirmed what Barrère
had said about Greece, regretted that Waddington had proposed to leave
the town of Janina to Turkey, and thought that the French Government
ought to go back to the old position of 'Thessaly and Epirus.' He
added (most confidentially) that as soon as the trouble about 'Article
7' was over Léon Say would come as Ambassador to London." [Footnote:
The double quotes here show that Sir Charles transcribed in his Memoir
a note of the conversation taken at the time.] Léon Say did come, but
Waddington came afterwards, though with some between. Article 7 was,
of course, the Ferry proposal with regard to unauthorized
congregations, which I opposed in conversations with Gambetta, who
supported it as strongly in private as in public. [Footnote: The
'Article 7' referred to was in the Education Bill then under
discussion in the French Assembly. By this article it was proposed
that members of religious bodies which were not recognized by the law
should be forbidden to teach in public or in private schools.] Opinion
in France undoubtedly backed him in his opposition to "Clericalism,"
but I myself continue to think that it was unwise to harry the Church,
although the position of the Government was in accordance with the
law.
'On the same morning I received a letter from Chamberlain inviting
himself to dine with me on February 4th "to discuss the situation."
Chamberlain was strongly opposed to taking Lord Derby in the next
Administration, and determined also, if he could, to shut out Goschen.
'On Wednesday, January 28th, I reached London, and on the 29th saw
Harcourt as to a request which had been made to him by A. M. Sullivan
on behalf of Lord Ramsay, who was standing at Liverpool as the Liberal
candidate, but who had pronounced in favour of Home Rule, to the great
scandal of the country. The Irish members were supposed to be doing
more harm than good by helping him, and were most anxious that someone
from the Liberal Front Bench should give them countenance. Hartington
was strongly opposed to Ramsay's action. Harcourt consented to go, and
went, which must have meant, I think, that he had decided to throw
over Hartington, seeing that Mr. G. was the only possible leader, and
that he did not think that Mr. Gladstone would feel strongly about the
Home Rule pledge. Harcourt told me that Lord Granville and Hartington
intended that Lord Derby should be in the next Government, but found
difficulties, inasmuch as they thought that the land question must be
dealt with, and he was too conservative for the party on it. The Duke
of Argyll was to be left out of the next Cabinet; no one would consent
to become Viceroy of Ireland or Irish Secretary; and there was a
difficulty about the Viceroyalty of India. I suggested Lansdowne for
India, if his wife would go, and it is curious that after many years
he was sent, although sent by the other party. Harcourt said that some
of the older men over whose heads I had passed were very jealous of
me. I said, half in jest: "I believe I am the only English politician
who is not jealous," at which Harcourt laughed very much, and replied:
"We all think that of ourselves." I said: "I mean it."'
The sincerity of that assertion was to be proved within three months. But
he notes in his diary a decision in consequence of Harcourt's warning "to
keep in the background this Session."
'On February 4th Harcourt wrote to me to say that, if I would go to
his house that night, someone from Devonshire House should meet me to
show me the Queen's Speech, as he had to go to Liverpool; Hartington,
he said, was full of approval of my speech.'
The dissolution came suddenly, hastened by the result of a by-election,
which encouraged the Government to believe that the country was with them.
On February 10th Sir Charles dined at Lady Ripon's, where were 'the Duke
of Argyll, Lord Granville, the Childers, and the Hayters.'
'The conversation of the evening turned upon the Southwark election,
where we all knew that the Conservative must win, Clarke (later Sir
Edward Clarke) being a popular Queen's Counsel, an excellent election
speaker, while the Liberals were divided between two bad
candidates.... When the numbers became known to me I wrote in my
diary: "Southwark not quite so bad as I expected, but quite bad
enough." Yet it was this election, which, to anyone who knew the
facts, should have meant nothing, which is supposed to have induced
the Tories to dissolve.' [Footnote: The Conservatives won both the
Liverpool and Southwark elections.]
'Cross drowns the Government,' is Sir Charles's comment on the Return on
the Water Question, for which he now moved; 'the notice contained such a
mass of statistics as to make the return of a very searching character in
its bearing on the agreement that the Home Secretary had come to with the
water companies.' It did frighten Cross, as Mr. Trevelyan had prophesied,
'and the trouble between himself and his colleagues over this question was
the immediate cause of the dissolution.' [Footnote: Mr. Cross, Home
Secretary, had introduced a Bill to provide for the purchase of the
undertakings of the London Water Companies, which was supposed to offer
the companies too favourable terms. Sir Charles notes (July, 1879):
"Manning was getting up a meeting on the water question, and got me to
manage it for him." 'I fancy, indeed,' he adds in his Memoir, 'that it was
the Cardinal who was the indirect cause of the dissolution in the spring
of 1880, for he induced Cross to undertake the purchase of the
Metropolitan Water Supply, and so got him into tangled negotiations.']
Just before the electoral campaign began--
'On March 4th I received a note from Lord Fife asking me to dine with
him on Friday, the 12th, to meet the Prince of Wales at the Prince's
wish. The note was of such a character that it left no choice. When
the dinner came off it turned out well. The Prince laid himself out to
be pleasant, and talked to me nearly all the evening--chiefly about
French politics and the Greek question. The other guests were
Lansdowne, Dunraven, Burnand of _Punch_, Bernal Osborne, and Colonel
Carington, brother of Lord Carrington, a very pleasant member of the
House.' [Footnote: Colonel Carington was M.P. for Wycombe, 1868-1883.]
There was still among leading politicians 'much doubt as to the prospects
of the election,' which Sir Charles found expressed when he spent Sunday,
March 7th, 'at Aston Clinton with the Cyril Flowers, Lord Hartington being
there, and Charles Villiers (at eighty), and Wolff walking over from Tring
Park.' However, on March 15th, Sir William Harcourt wrote from Oxford: "I
have never wavered in my opinion that the Government will be beaten,
though I thought a fortnight ago it would only be a shave."
In his own borough Sir Charles found that there were 580 publicans, and
that 500 of them were Conservative.
'My belief in the influence of the publicans made me hesitate with
regard to Chelsea, where I thought myself not unlikely to be beaten,
but I had a full belief in the success of the party generally. I was
triumphantly returned, bringing in Firth with me, by great majorities
over a clever Tory, Lord Inverurie (afterwards Earl of Kintore, and
Governor of South Australia), and a colonial sheep-farmer, who paid
the cost.'
The result was declared on April 2nd, and Sir Charles, having stayed to
vote in two divisions of Surrey where he owned property, left England for
Toulon on the 7th--a proceeding which separated him from those who were
importunate for office. Before his departure he had dined with Sir William
Harcourt:
'I found his ambition to be to ... succeed Lord Selborne as Lord
Chancellor. In order to reach this goal, he would prefer to be
Attorney-General rather than Home Secretary. James, however, cannot
well be anything but Attorney-General. Harcourt would like James to be
Home Secretary, for which James is not fit, but which he would like to
be. If this combination should fail, then Harcourt would like to be
Chancellor of the Exchequer.... He asked me what I should like, and I
told him that I did not expect to be offered a great post, but that if
there were any such chance the Navy was the only one that I should
like.' [Footnote: Sir Charles's view that a Foreign Secretary had
better be in the House of Lords, so long as there is a House of Lords
to put him in, no doubt influenced his preference for the Admiralty.]
In regard to the events which have now to be narrated, it must be
remembered that the Chamberlain of 1880 was not yet the author of any
"unauthorized programme" or any "gospel of ransom." He was admittedly the
controller of the Caucus. It was widely known that he, like Fawcett, had
professed republican principles. But Queen Victoria's objection to Sir
Charles Dilke--and it will be seen how strongly she maintained it--was
based not merely on his avowal of abstract Republican theories, but also
on his very concrete proposal to assert control over the Civil List.
Chamberlain upon this matter was not committed to a personal view, and it
had not yet been demonstrated that whatever position Dilke defended,
Chamberlain would defend also.
A compact laying down the principle of mutual support between the two
Radicals was proposed in a letter written by Chamberlain to Dilke--then at
Toulon--immediately after the General Election had given the Liberals a
sweeping triumph. They came back 349 against 243 Conservatives. Irish
Nationalists were 60, of whom 35 followed Mr. Parnell.
Chamberlain's proposal was in these words:
"The time has come when we must have a full and frank explanation.
"What I should like--what I hope for with you--is a thorough offensive
and defensive alliance, and in this case our position will be
immensely strong.
"I am prepared to refuse all offers until and unless both of us are
satisfied.
"Can you accept this position with perfect satisfaction? If you think
I am asking more than I can give, I rely upon your saying so--and in
this case you may depend on my loyalty and friendship--I shall support
your claim cordially and just as warmly as if I were personally
interested.
"But my own feeling is that if you are stronger than I am in the
House, my influence is greater than yours out of it, and therefore
that, together, we are much more powerful than separated; and that in
a short time, if not now, we may make our own terms.
"To join a Government as subordinate members, to be silenced and to
have no real influence on the policy, would be fatal to both of us. If
we both remain outside, any Government will have to reckon with us,
and, on the whole, this would be the position which on many grounds I
should prefer.
"I am ready to make all allowances for the difficulties in the way of
giving to both of us the only kind of places which it would be worth
our while to accept. If these are insuperable, I will give a hearty
support to any Government which is thoroughly liberal in its measures;
but I am not going to play the part of a Radical Minnow among Whig
Tritons.
"The victory which has just been won is the victory of the Radicals.
Gladstone and the Caucus have triumphed all along the line, and it is
the strong, definite, decided policy which has commended itself, and
not the halting, half-hearted, armchair business.... The country feels
it, and we should be mad to efface ourselves and disappoint the
expectations of all our strongest supporters.
[Illustration: THE RT. HON. JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN, M.P.
From the painting by F. Holl, R.A., in the National Portrait Gallery.]
"You see that my proposed condition is--both of us to be satisfied.
"As to what ought to satisfy us, if you agree to the principle, we
will consult when the time comes, but my present impression is all or
nothing."
'In other words, Chamberlain's view was that we should insist on both
being in the Cabinet. My own view was that we should insist on one
being in the Cabinet, and the other having a place of influence,
giving him the opportunity of frequent speech in the House of Commons,
pleasant to himself; and my view prevailed.
'On April 19th, Chamberlain wrote again that he had heard from Mr.
Bright that "Mr. Gladstone will take the Premiership if pressed."'
'"I am glad to see that all the papers speak of you as a certainty for
the Cabinet. For myself, I am absolutely indifferent to office, and
the only thing on which I am clear is that I will take no
responsibility which does not carry with it some real power. Another
point on which I have made up my mind is that I will not play second
to Fawcett, or to anyone of the same standing, except yourself."'
On April 22nd, Sir Charles received at Toulon a telegram from Sir William
Harcourt insisting on his immediate return, and he started at once for
London, missing a second urgent telegram from Harcourt on his way. From
Mr. Frederic Harrison he received a letter strongly urging him to claim at
once a place in the Cabinet and 'to lead the new men.' He meant 'the
cultured Radicals; Mr. Bryce and the like.' He urged that the new Left
must have a full place in the Ministry, and that any Liberal Minister must
be pledged to deal with redistribution in the House.
'Hill of the _Daily News_ had written to me that with the exception of
Harcourt everybody thought that Gladstone must be Prime Minister.' Sir
Charles goes on to note a breakfast with Lord Houghton, Renan, Professor
Henry Smith of Oxford, Henry Reeve of the _Edinburgh Review,_ Lord Arthur
Russell, and Lord Reay, at which they
'agreed that Gladstone must be Prime Minister, or would upset the
Government within a year. ... Hill advised that I should take the
Cabinet without Chamberlain if Gladstone was Prime Minister, but
refuse the Cabinet without Chamberlain--_i.e.,_ insist on both being
in the Cabinet--if Hartington was Prime Minister.'
By the night of April 23rd, when Sir Charles reached London, the question
of Mr. Gladstone's primacy was settled, and Ministry-making had begun,
with the decision of Lord Granville to return to the Foreign Office, and
Lord Hartington's consent to act as Secretary of State for India. Mr.
Childers went to the War Office, Lord Northbrook to the Admiralty; Lord
Selborne, most conservative of Whigs, became Lord Chancellor; Lord Spencer
was President of the Council, Lord Kimberley took the Colonies, the Duke
of Argyll the Privy Seal. Sir William Harcourt, who had been called "a
Whig who talked Radicalism," was Home Secretary. Mr. Forster at the Irish
Office, with Lord Cowper as Lord-Lieutenant, did not commend himself
greatly to the advanced party, and Mr. Bright, in returning to the
Chancellorship of the Duchy, brought with him only a tradition of
Radicalism. When it is added that Mr. Dodson was President of the Local
Government Board, ground will be seen for a warning which Sir Charles
received that, although the victory had been forced upon them by the
Radicals almost against their will, the "incorrigible old place-hunters
would, if left to have their own way, appropriate the victory and the
prizes calmly enough to themselves."
On Saturday, April 24th, Sir Charles had two interviews with Sir William
Harcourt, and communicated the result to Chamberlain:
'The position is that Gladstone is in the hands of Lord Wolverton,
[Footnote: As Mr. Glyn he had been Chief Whip.] the evil counsellor of
1874, and that, while a Whig Premier must have had a Radical Cabinet,
Gladstone will say, "You have got me; that is what you asked for," and
will give us a Whig Cabinet. Stansfeld is likely to be in the Cabinet
owing to W. E. Forster's influence, of which I personally shall be
glad. Rosebery is likely to be put in, at which I shall not be
sorry.... Gladstone disapproves strongly of people being put straight
into the Cabinet who have not held office before. This is for
Chamberlain and for me. They are likely to offer me the Under-
Secretaryship for Foreign Affairs, which I suppose I shall be unable
to accept. Later in the evening I was informally offered the
Secretaryship of the Treasury, with management of the Government
business in the House. Harcourt at a second interview said that
Gladstone intended pedantically to follow Peel's rule that men should
not be put straight into the Cabinet without going through non-Cabinet
office; and that Chamberlain and I must both take non-Cabinet office;
[Footnote: It is worth noting that Sir Robert Peel himself had
violated this rule if it ever existed.] that he, Harcourt, strongly
advised us to take Under-Secretaryships of which the Secretary was in
the Upper House, or the Secretaryship of the Treasury. He then offered
me the Under-Secretaryship for the Colonies, to which I replied,
"Certainly not." He said, "Remember that with Mr. Gladstone Prime
Minister, the Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs will have no chance
to speak, because Gladstone will do all the talking." [Footnote: Sir
William Harcourt's prophecy received frequent confirmation. See
_infra_, pp. 384, 459, 535, and Vol. II., p. 51.] At the same time,
there was evidently another reason behind--namely, that Lord Granville
had sooner have anybody in his office than me; in other words, he
would like me in anybody's office except his own. Harcourt strongly
urged me to take office on personal grounds--namely, in order to get
over the Queen's prejudice, and so succeed naturally to the first
vacancy in the Cabinet. I replied that I had sooner keep my
independence than take office without power. He then said curtly, "It
will not be a pleasant opposition." I said it would not be an
opposition at all, as far as I could see, as I should support the
Government and lead a very quiet, humdrum Parliamentary existence.
Harcourt replied, "That is what is always said." "But I shall not be
cross," was my last word. I telegraphed at night for Chamberlain, who
replied that he would come up at five on Sunday afternoon and dine and
sleep. But I prepared him, and was prepared by him, for a double
refusal of office. In fact, we were decided on refusal of that which
alone was offered.
'On Sunday afternoon, 25th, before seeing Chamberlain, I saw James,
who went to Lord Granville and fully stated my views, reporting to me
afterwards that Lord Granville seemed inclined to come round a little.
James added of Harcourt: "Confound that Home Secretary! How discreet
he is even before kissing hands! I shall live at the Home Office." I
went to Euston to meet Chamberlain. We were fully agreed in our line,
and he remained at my house the next morning, when I was sent for by
Mr. Gladstone through Lord Granville, the note being simply to ask me
to call at four o'clock at Lord Granville's house, where Mr. Gladstone
was. The questions which I put to Chamberlain were--"Is your former
opinion changed by the fact that Mr. Gladstone can, if he likes, do
without us, whereas Hartington could not? Or is it changed by the fact
that Gladstone's Government will last six years, whereas Hartington's
would soon have been modified by Gladstone?" Chamberlain's view was my
own view, that, although we were much weaker, we could not change our
attitude as regards one of us being in the Cabinet. Before seeing Mr.
Gladstone I had calls from Fawcett and Lefevre. Nothing had been
offered to Fawcett; Lefevre had been sounded as to an Under-
Secretaryship, and would take it. He told me he was sure that
Stansfeld would have the Local Government Board again and be in the
Cabinet. Childers came three times to see me in the course of the day,
and said that he was most anxious that I should be in the Cabinet and
Chamberlain in a good place outside it; but that the Queen had made a
difficulty about my Republicanism, and he asked me to write him a
letter about it. I declined to say anything new, but ultimately we
agreed that I should write him a letter marked "Private," in which I
wrote to the effect that on March 13th I had been asked the question
at a meeting, and that my answer had been in the newspapers on March
15th, that it was the same answer which I had made before the election
in 1874, and that I had nothing to alter in it.' [Footnote: The rest
of the letter gave a full account of the incident of Saturday, March
13th, 1880:
"The Tories sent the 'Reverend' W. Pepperell, an ex-dissenting
minister, to a meeting of mine, who asked me 'whether it was true that
I was a republican?' I replied to the effect that 'while as a matter
of speculative opinion I thought that a country starting afresh--as
France after Sedan--would in these days generally do better to adopt a
republican form of government than a limited monarchy, yet that in a
country possessing a constitutional monarchy it would be mere folly to
attempt to upturn it, and consequently folly even to try to disturb
it.' The answer was a very long one, and was nowhere _fully_ reported,
but everything in it was on these lines."]
A copy of this letter was ultimately brought to the Queen, and on May 5th
returned by Sir Henry Ponsonby with the words, "Her Majesty accepts Sir
Charles Dilke's explanation." But Lord Granville, through whom it had been
sent, and who had by that time become Sir Charles's immediate chief,
softened the austerity of this formula by explaining that the Queen in a
private letter had said she was "quite ready to believe all I had told her
about you, having known you as a child."
These preliminary conversations having occupied the morning, Sir Charles
set out after luncheon for the decisive interview.
'When I got to Lord Granville's I found Lord Granville, Lord
Wolverton, and Mr. Gladstone in the room, and Mr. Gladstone at once
offered me the Under-Secretaryship for Foreign Affairs. I asked who
was to be in the Cabinet. I was told Mr. Gladstone, Lord Granville,
Hartington, Harcourt, and Lord Spencer. Further than this, they said,
nothing was settled. I asked, "What about Chamberlain?" Mr. Gladstone
replied to the effect that Chamberlain was a very young member of the
House who had never held office, and that it was impossible to put him
straight into the Cabinet. I then said that this made it impossible
that I should accept the Under-Secretaryship for Foreign Affairs, or
any place. Mr. Gladstone said he would see whether anything could be
done, but that he feared not. I then asked whether, supposing that
anything could be done in my direction, I should be excluding Grant
Duff [Footnote: Sir M. Grant Duff had been spoken of for this office
in 1868, and had then in that Ministry become Under-Secretary of State
for India. In 1880 he was--much to Sir Charles's joy--made Under-
Secretary for the Colonies, his chief, Lord Kimberley, being in the
Lords.] from the Under-Secretaryship for Foreign Affairs, because I
said that I should be very sorry to do that, for both personal and
public reasons. He replied that if I refused it, it would not be
offered to Grant Duff; and I then left....
'On Tuesday morning Chamberlain was sent for, and accepted a seat in
the Cabinet (with the Presidency of the Board of Trade), and at one
o'clock I accepted the Under-Secretaryship for Foreign Affairs. Just
about this time I received a message from James: "Do, for the sake of
our future comfort, take something. The Bench will be dreadfully dull.
Stansfeld _in_ office must be worse than Stansfeld out." But Stansfeld
was not in office. What had interfered at the last moment to prevent
an appointment which was resolved upon I never knew for certain.
[Footnote: Mr. Stansfeld is generally believed to have refused office
owing to his wish to devote himself entirely to the cause of a special
measure of social reform in which he was interested.] But, as they had
not intended to put Chamberlain in, and I forced him in, I suppose
that Stansfeld was the man who had to make way for Chamberlain.'
II.
So ended the negotiations. The Radical wing had asserted itself, and
asserted itself successfully. It had been enabled to do so by Sir
Charles's action. To him the matter represented the mere carrying out of a
bargain; but friends were, as is natural in such a case, remonstrant, and
he was accused of "needless self-sacrifice," of "Quixotic conduct," of
"self-abnegation," of "your usual disinterestedness in politics," and the
bargain was much criticized. A letter from Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice,
congratulating Sir Charles on the stand he had made, added: "Not that I am
altogether satisfied with the result. I had assumed that as a matter of
course you would be in the Cabinet. I share the universal feeling that of
the two you had the undoubted claim to priority." But this regret was
probably based on more than personal grounds, and may well be read with a
letter written many years afterwards, in July, 1914:
"The real truth is that Dilke was too big a man to be an Under-
Secretary in 1880, and the whole position was a false one. I fancy
Lord Granville felt it to be so. One of his best points was his
readiness to recognize ability. I think he desired Dilke's sphere in
the Office to be as large as possible consistently with the general
arrangements of the Office, but it is always difficult to make special
arrangements work smoothly if they are based on a false principle.
"Dilke ought to have insisted on being in the Cabinet. It was very
much to his honour that he did not do so."
Lord Fitzmaurice goes on to say that in the making of the Cabinet public
opinion would have substituted Sir Charles Dilke for Mr. Dodson, who, in
spite of his work as Chairman of Committees from 1868 to 1873, and
afterwards as Secretary to the Treasury--("he would have made an excellent
Speaker")--had done but little in the House for the party in the long
period of Opposition from 1874 to 1880.
A mistake had, in fact, been made. The strong man should be put where his
services can avowedly be best utilized. This statement is true of
Chamberlain. He was, as the _Times_ put it, "the Carnot of the moment, the
organizer of Liberal victory." [Footnote: Neither Sir Charles Dilke nor
Mr. Chamberlain would, however, have desired to underrate the great share
in organizing the victory of Mr. Adam, the principal Liberal Whip in the
House of Commons, whose services were generally considered to have been
very insufficiently recognized by Mr. Gladstone.] Moreover, the confidence
and friendship which led to constant consultations on every point between
the two men guaranteed an added power to Sir Charles behind the scenes,
and to him power, and not the appearance of power, was the essential
thing. But Dilke's position also as a Parliamentarian, his acknowledged
power and insight on questions both of Home and Foreign Affairs, his
following inside and outside the House of Commons, had created a claim of
long standing to Cabinet rank, and its abandonment made the "false
position" to which Lord Fitzmaurice alludes. Although Mr. Disraeli was
reported to have said, apropos of Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, that an Under-
Secretary for Foreign Affairs with his chief in the House of Lords holds
one of the most important positions in a Ministry, nevertheless the Under-
Secretary is the subordinate of his chief, and Lord Granville's reputation
as Foreign Minister was great.
That personal difficulties at least were overcome is shown by a note of
Lord Granville, written when Sir Charles left the Foreign Office in 1882,
but the note is in itself a commentary on the "false position":
"WALMER CASTLE,
"_December 27th_, '82.
"MY DEAR DILKE,
"As this is the day you expect to go to the Local Government Board, I
cannot help writing you one line. I will not dwell upon the immense
loss you are to me and to the Office. You are aware of it, and I have
no doubt will continue to help us both in the Cabinet and in the
House, and will be ready to advise the Under-Secretary and myself. I
must, however, say how deeply grateful I am for our pleasant
relations, which might easily have been a little strained from the
fact that it was a sort of fluke that you were my Under-Secretary
instead of being my colleague in the Cabinet. As it is, nothing could
be more satisfactory and more pleasant to me, and the knowledge we
have obtained of one another will strengthen and cement our
friendship.
"Yours,
"G."
III.
Sir Charles's acknowledged authority in foreign affairs made his
appointment a matter of congratulation among foreign diplomatists. It was
welcomed on the ground that it would correct Mr. Gladstone's presumed
tenderness towards Russia, and, above all, would make a bond of union with
France through his personal relations with Gambetta, who wrote on April
28th:
"CHER AMI,
"Merci pour votre lettre de ce matin. Je trouve votre détermination
excellente, et si la dépêche de 4 heures qui annonce votre entrée dans
le Cabinet, en qualité de sous secrétaire d'état aux Affaires
Étrangères, est vraie, vous serez universellement approuvé.
"Pour ma part, je vous félicite bien cordialement de la victoire que
vous venez de remporter, car je sais qu'avec des hommes tels que vous
on peut être assuré que c'est une victoire féconde en résultats pour
la civilisation occidentale et le droit européen.
"Votre présence au Foreign Office est bien décisive pour dissiper les
dernières appréhensions et effacer jusqu'aux souvenirs les plus
persistents.
"Mais vous devez avoir autre chose à faire qu'à lire des lettres
inutiles.
"Je vous serre les mains,
"LÉON GAMBETTA."
The letter was 'couched in such terms as to make it desirable to answer
him with some statement of the views of the Government,' and Sir Charles
consulted Lord Granville about his reply, which would 'really be a
despatch,' and must 'say something about 1870' and the period of Lord
Granville's previous tenure of the Foreign Office. With recollections of
that time in their minds, and of England's entry upon the Black Sea
Conference without the presence of a French representative, French
politicians had commented very jealously upon some references to Gambetta
in a speech delivered by Lord Granville at Hanley in March of this year.
Lord Granville accordingly sent Dilke a memorandum in his own hand,
suggesting words for the reply. Gambetta was to be told that a speech
"made before the election" had been interpreted by some of his supporters
in the Press "as of a personal character against him," that Dilke knew
this to have been "the reverse of the speaker's intention," and that he
would be glad to have a talk with Gambetta on the subject of Lord
Granville's policy during the war when he next had the opportunity of
meeting him in Paris.
'But it was indeed difficult for Lord Granville to say anything about his
policy during the war which would please the French.' Gambetta's official
reply was, however, that, having read Lord Granville's speech, he found it
"proper under the circumstances and impartial," and that, although "absurd
ideas with regard to our recent elections had been ascribed to himself,"
he had "desired nothing in those elections" except Sir Charles's personal
triumph. To this Lord Granville rejoined: "Please thank M. Gambetta for
his friendly message. I presume you will not tell him that Lyons says his
assertion about the elections is a tremendous cracker."
Sir Edward Malet, Resident at Cairo, [Footnote: Afterwards Ambassador at
Berlin.] wrote:
"We have had one Under-Secretary after another" (at the Foreign
Office) "who knows nothing about these affairs, and who has therefore
never been able to exert the legitimate influence to which his
position entitled him. It will now be different, and I hope soon to
recognize the thread of your thought in the texture of the Government
policy."
M. Gennadius, the Greek Chargé d'Affaires, while the matter was still
open, implored him not to decline. "All your Greek friends consider our
country's cause as dependent on your acceptance. You have done much for us
already. Make this further sacrifice."
Sir Charles entered upon his functions on Thursday, April 29th, when his
colleague, the Permanent Under-Secretary, Lord Tenterden, took him round
to be introduced to the heads of the various departments. For his private
secretary he chose Mr. George Murray, [Footnote: Now the Right Hon. Sir G.
Murray, G.C.B.] "an extraordinarily able man." But in a few weeks Mr.
Murray was transferred to the Treasury, and afterwards became secretary to
Mr. Gladstone, and, later, to Lord Rosebery when Prime Minister.
'I found' (from Bourke, his predecessor, who had written to him with
great cordiality) 'that as Under-Secretary for the Foreign Office, I
had the Cabinet key--or most secret key that at that time there was:
another still more secret key being introduced after I was in the
Cabinet, and confined to the Cabinet itself. I found in the Foreign
Office that if I liked I might have got back the "Department" which
Lord Derby took away from the Parliamentary Under-Secretary in 1874,
leaving him only the Commercial Department. [Footnote: The
"Department" assigned to the Parliamentary Under-Secretary before 1874
was 'control of' some branch of foreign affairs in its details. See
also below, p. 349.] But I at once decided that I would not have it,
as I wanted to concern myself with the Parliamentary business and with
the important business, instead of doing detailed work at the head of
one section of it.'
On the evening of his first day in office Sir Charles gave a dinner at
Sloane Street to several of his colleagues. There were present
'Fawcett, just appointed Postmaster-General, Lord Northbrook,
Childers, Forster, Hartington, and Goschen.... Chamberlain was at my
dinner, having taken up his quarters with me for a week....
'Hartington after dinner showed me Indian despatches which were very
startling. Mr. Goschen told us that he had refused the Governor-
Generalship of India and the Embassy at Constantinople, but he
afterwards took Constantinople. He appeared at this moment to have
made up his mind to stay in the House of Commons to oppose
equalization of the franchise and redistribution of seats....
'Forster told us that he was starting for Ireland to see whether he
could avoid some renewal of coercion; and Chamberlain and I told him
that he _must_ avoid it. This was the cloud no bigger than a man's
hand.'
Sir Charles goes on to tell how he stayed for a time its development:
'On the night of May 13th, between one and two o'clock in the morning,
I did a thing which many will say I ought not to have done--namely,
went down to a newspaper office to suggest an article against the
policy of another member of the Government. Under the circumstances, I
think that I was justified. I was not a member of the Privy Council or
of the Cabinet, and the interests of the party were at stake, as
subsequent events well showed. There was no shade of private or
personal interest in the matter. The effect of what I did was to stop
the policy of which I disapproved for the year, and might easily have
been to stop it for ever. I had found out in the course of the evening
that Forster was in favour of a Coercion Bill, and that the Cabinet
were likely to adopt it. I went down to the _Daily News_ office, and
told Hill, not even telling Chamberlain until two years afterwards
what I had done. The result of it was that the _Daily News_ had an
article the next morning which smashed Forster's plan.'
IV.
Chamberlain had written on May 4th to Mrs. Pattison: "The charmed circle
has been broken and a new departure made, which is an event in English
political history." But although the circle was broken, only one man had
found his way to the innermost ring; and in the composition of the
Ministry the Radicals were overwhelmingly outnumbered. Such a situation
did not lead to the stability of the Government, and by his reluctance in
the admission of Radicalism to office Mr. Gladstone had created
difficulties for himself. In the House his personal authority was
overridden in a matter which came up at once.
'In the morning of May 3rd I received a note from Lord Frederick
Cavendish, the Secretary of the Treasury, asking me to be at the House
at two, as there would be trouble about Bradlaugh's application to
affirm instead of take the oath. It had been decided by the Cabinet
that "Freddy" Cavendish, [Footnote: Lord F. Cavendish was Financial
Secretary to the Treasury.] who was leader of the House in the absence
of the Ministers who had gone for re-election, should move for a
Committee, and I spoke in support of that view.'
Sir Charles never took part again in any debate upon this once famous
struggle. He supported Mr. Gladstone's view in favour of allowing
affirmation, but he did so without heartiness, disliking 'the trade of
living on blatant atheism,' and finding in himself tendencies which led
him to fear that he was 'clerically minded.' He had always an extreme
dislike of talk or writing that offended legitimate susceptibilities.
The completion of the Ministry inevitably left some personal claims
unsettled.
'On May 1st I had John Morley to dinner to meet Chamberlain, who was
still staying with me. We talked over the men who had been left out.
Edmond Fitzmaurice was one, but Mr. Gladstone did not care about
having brothers. [Footnote: Mr. Gladstone was believed in 1868 to have
declined to have Lord Clarendon and his brother, Mr. Charles Villiers,
both in the Cabinet. See _Life of Granville,_ vol. i., p. 537. In the
new Government Lord Lansdowne was Under-Secretary for India, but
resigned in the course of the year on the Irish Land Question.] At
Chamberlain's wish Courtney had been offered the Secretaryship of the
Board of Trade, which, however, he declined. He would have taken the
place of Judge Advocate General, but it was not offered to him.
Chamberlain told us that the Cabinet were unanimous for getting rid of
Layard, the Ambassador at Constantinople, but that the Queen was
trying hard to keep him. The result of this difference of opinion
ultimately was that Goschen went to Constantinople on a special
embassy, without salary, and keeping his place in the House of
Commons, and that Layard continued to draw the salary without doing
any work.'
A large section of the Liberal Press was at this period very independent,
and helped to frustrate Mr. Gladstone's determination to exclude Radicals
from office.
Sir Charles's relations with Mr. Hill, then editor of the _Daily News,_
were close, as also was the alliance between the two Radical Ministers and
Mr. John Morley, who had just then become editor of the _Pall Mall
Gazette_.
'On May 14th John Morley asked me to see him to give him information
as to the general position of foreign affairs, and I consented to do
so. "It would be worth silver and gold and jewels," he said, "if I
could have ten minutes with you about three times a week."'
Chamberlain gave him the same privilege concerning domestic policy--a
privilege 'which he used so well that no complaint ever arose in regard to
it.' Chamberlain was much in touch with 'Escott of the _Standard_ and the
_World_.'
It was suggested at the dinner of May 1st that Mr. Courtney might succeed
Sir H. Drummond Wolff on the Commission for Reforms, appointed under
Article XXIII. of the Treaty of Berlin, for the European provinces of
Turkey and Crete; but this too Mr. Courtney declined, and the place was
eventually filled by Lord E. Fitzmaurice. Mr. Trevelyan was not included
in the Ministry. [Footnote: See the _Life of Goschen_, by the Hon. Arthur
Elliot, vol. i., pp. 215, 216; T. E. Holland, _The European Concert in the
Eastern Question_, pp. 291, 292; also _Turkey_, No. 15 (1880). Lord E.
Fitzmaurice was subsequently appointed British Plenipotentiary, under
Articles LIV. and LV. of the Treaty of Berlin, to the Conference in regard
to the navigation of the Danube. Both Mr. Courtney and Mr. Trevelyan
joined the Ministry later.]
At the moment Conservative society was inclined to regard the new Ministry
with suspicious wonder, and Sir Charles tells how, on May 5th, a week
after taking office, when he and Chamberlain were dining with the Prince
of Wales--
'most of the Cabinet were present with their wives; also the new
Viceroy of India (Lord Ripon), and Rosebery and his wife. When the
Duke of Cambridge came in, following the Prince and Princess, after
shaking hands with those he knew, he stood staring about, whereupon
Harcourt, nudging Chamberlain and myself, said, "He is looking for
Bradlaugh."'
New men were coming to the front; a new political era had begun, and to
the Radicals the situation was summed up by the House of Commons' jest
which stated that B.C. now meant "Before Chamberlain," and A.D. "Anno
Dilke."
The break with the past was real and important: 1880 is a marking date in
the political history of Great Britain, and the change was due to the
Radical combination.